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LOGIC LECTURES iii
Abstract. An edited version is given of the text of Go¨del’s unpublished manuscript
of the notes for a course in basic logic he delivered at the University of Notre Dame
in 1939. Go¨del’s notes deal with what is today considered as important logical
problems par excellence, completeness, decidability, independence of axioms, and
with natural deduction too, which was all still a novelty at the time the course
was delivered. Full of regards towards beginners, the notes are not excessively
formalistic. Go¨del presumably intended them just for himself, and they are full
of abbreviations. This together with some other matters (like two versions of the
same topic, and guessing the right order of the pages) required additional effort to
obtain a readable edited version. Because of the quality of the material provided
by Go¨del, including also important philosophical points, this effort should however
be worthwhile. The edited version of the text is accompanied by another version,
called the source version, which is quite close to Go¨del’s manuscript. It is meant to
be a record of the editorial interventions involved in producing the edited version
(in particular, how the abbreviations were disabridged), and a justification of that
later version.
Keywords: propositional logic, predicate logic
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010): 01A60 (History of mathematics and
mathematicians, 20th century), 03-01 (Mathematical logic and foundations, in-
structional exposition), 03-03 (Mathematical logic and foundations, historical)
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EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION v
Abbrev.⌊iated⌋ editorial introduction
Go¨del taught a one-semester course in basic logic at the University of Notre
Dame in the spring of 1939, when he turned 33. Among his unpublished
writings in the Princeton University Library one can find notebooks with the
manuscript of his notes for that course. The title Logic Lectures, which we
gave to these notes, is suggested by the German “Log.⌊ik⌋ Vorl.⌊esungen⌋”,
or a variant of that, written on the front covers of the notebooks.
Besides the Notre Dame course Go¨del taught a basic logic course in Vi-
enna in the summer of 1935, notes for which, on 43 notebook pages (27 of
which are numbered), made mainly of formulae and very little accompanying
text in ordinary language, have been preserved in a manuscript at the same
place. The notes for the Notre Dame course, which with their 427 notebook
pages are ten times bigger, are more detailed and we think more important.
Propositional logic is not much present in the Vienna notes.
We have published recently in [A.&D. 2016] a brief, and hence not com-
plete, summary with comments of the Notre Dame notes, and an assessment
of their importance. This preceding short paper is a natural introduction to
this introduction, which is more oriented towards details concerning Go¨del’s
text. We deal however here occasionally, in the paragraph on definite de-
scriptions below and in the last few pages of this introduction, with some
matters of logic and philosophy, partly in the sphere of the preceding paper,
but not to be found there. Anyway, that paper enables us to abbreviate this
introduction (which explains up to a point its title; the rest will be explained
in a moment).
We will not repeat ourselves, and we will not give again all the references
we gave in the preceding paper, but we want to mention however John Daw-
son, who in [Dawson] supplies biographical data on Go¨del’s stay at Notre
Dame, John and Cheryl Dawson who in [Dawson 2005] set what we did with
the Notre Dame notes as a task for Go¨del scholars,1 and Pierre Cassou-
Nogue`s, who has published in [Cassou-Nogue`s 2009] a dozen printed pages
extracted and edited from Go¨del’s manuscript of the Notre Dame course (this
concerns pp. 1.-26. of Notebook I, including small bits of Notebook 0, pp.
73.1-73.7 of Notebook V, pp. 122.-125., 134.-136. of Notebook VI and pp.
137.-157. of Notebook VII; altogether 60 notebook pages).2
1We are grateful to John Dawson for encouraging us to get into this publishing project.
2We have found sometimes useful Cassou-Nogue`s’ reading of Go¨del’s manuscript, and
we wish to acknowledge our debt. Our decipherment of the manuscript does not however
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Besides the edited version of Go¨del’s text we have prepared another ver-
sion of it, which we call the source version, and the present introduction
should serve for both of them. This other, source, version is quite close to
the original manuscript, and is meant to be a record of the additions and
other interventions made in the manuscript to arrive at the edited version,
and a justification of that later version.
Go¨del used abbreviations in the manuscript of the notes quite a lot. For
example, the second sentence and the beginning of the third of Notebook 0
of the manuscript are: “Accord. to this def the centr. part of log. must be
the theory of inf and the theory of logically true prop. By a log true prop. I
mean a prop. which is true for merely log reasons. . . ” In the source version
this is rendered as: “Accord.⌊ing⌋ to this def⌊inition⌋ the centr⌊al⌋ part of
log.⌊ic⌋ must be the theory of inf⌊erence⌋ and the theory of logically true
prop⌊ositions⌋. By a log⌊ically⌋ true prop.⌊osition⌋ I mean a prop.⌊osition⌋
which is true for merely log⌊ical⌋ reasons. . . ” All the abbreviated words
are typed in the source version as they occur in the manuscript, with a
full stop after the abbreviation or without, together with their prolongation
or decipherment within the parenthetical signs ⌊ and ⌋ to obtain the non-
abbreviated, disabridged, word they are supposed to stand for, which one
finds in the edited version. Sometimes whole words are omitted and they are
restored in the source version within ⌊ and ⌋.
Using abbreviations may produce problems, which are however surmount-
able. For example, log., with or without full stop, stands for “logic”, “logi-
cally” and “logical”. Singular or plural has to be inferred from the context;
“form.”, with or without full stop, stands for “formula” or “formulas” (Go¨del
has the plural “formulas” while we here and in our comments use “formu-
lae”; he says often “expression” for “formula”). Sometimes, but not very
often, it is not obvious, and even not certain, what is the abbreviated word;
for example, both “proposition” and “property” are abbreviated by “prop.”.
This involvement with abbreviations in the manuscript goes so far that one
finds even “probl.” for “problem” and “symb.” for “symbol”. Because of
their number, and some particular problems they produced occasionally, tak-
ing care of the abbreviations made our editing task considerably harder, but
this number tells that they cannot be neglected if one wants to leave a more
precise record of Go¨del’s style (see the end of this introduction).
In the source version one may also find all the parts of the text crossed
accords always with his, and we have not followed his editorial interventions.
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out in the manuscript, with the indication that they were found crossed out,
either by being really crossed out in the source version, or if they are too long,
the crossing out is mentioned as an editorial comment within ⌊ and ⌋. We
use ⌊ and ⌋ in the source version in connection with the abbreviations as we
said above, and in general for other editorial comments too. (For example,
we will have ⌊unreadable text⌋.)
In a few cases we have estimated that a crossed out part of the text
is worth reproducing even in the edited version. (Go¨del’s crossing out a
text need not mean dissatisfaction with it, but it may mean perhaps lack
of time to use it in the lectures.) In one place it may compensate a little
bit for a lost part of the text (see the footnote on p. 7. of Notebook IV),
in another (see the footnote on pp. 114.-115. of Notebook VI), it completes
what is needed for establishing that binary relations with composition and
the identity relation make a monoid. (Composition of relations is called by
Go¨del “relative product”, and his examples for it are with relations between
relatives, nephew, son, brother, sister, uncle, father, grandfather, grandchild,
child,. . . , which is etymologically inspirative.) A third such place, which is
tied to Russell’s understanding of definite descriptions (see pp. 123.-125. of
Notebook VI), is philosophically important.
Let us dwell for a moment at this third place, to justify our choice of
reproducing the crossed out text. Go¨del’s says there that taking “The present
king of France is bald” as meaningless is undesirable because whether the
present king of France exists is an empirical question. He then continues:
“Therefore it would depend on an empirical fact whether or not this sequence
of words is a meaningful statement or nonsense, whereas one should expect
that it can depend only on the grammar of the language concerned whether
something makes sense.” So Go¨del asserts the primacy and independence of
the understanding of language over empirical, i.e. epistemological, matters.
The primacy of the linguistic over the epistemological (and presumably other
philosophical concerns, like the ontological, or axiological) should be one of
the main, if not the main, mark of the linguistic turn in twentieth century
philosophy. Go¨del’s single sentence quoted above is more significant and
more explanatory than thousands and thousands of others in the sea of ink
spilled over the king’s baldness.
The notes are written by hand in English in eight notebooks bound by
a spiral, with however some loose leafs (four leaves on a different paper,
not torn out from the notebook, without holes for the spiral, at the end of
Notebook III with pp. new page x-xiii, nine torn out leafs towards the
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end of Notebook V including pp. 73.1-73.7, and nine torn out leafs at the
end of Notebook VII with pp. new page iii-iv and 1.-7.). Go¨del writes
usually on the left pages, the back sides of the leafs, and he uses the right
pages, the front side of the leafs, most often for inserted additions, or simply
continuations of the text from the left pages. As insertion signs, one finds
most often ∀ (which is not used in the manuscript for the universal quantifier),
but also ×, and a few others. Insertions tied to these signs, as well as other
insertions, often tied to ︸︷︷︸, but not continuations on the right pages, are
marked in the source version with \ at the beginning of the insertion and / at
its end. Sometimes one finds remarks and examples not possible to insert
simply in the main text, and they are not to be found in the edited version.
Since usually only the left pages are numbered, and the right page is usually
associated with the left, we do not speak of left and right pages, but say, for
example, that something occurs on the right of a certain page, or use similar
forms of speaking.
There are no footnotes in the source version, because Go¨del does not have
them. (We do not interpret his insertions as footnotes.) All the editorial
comments there are within ⌊ and ⌋. All the footnotes in the edited text are
ours, and they are made of editorial comments.
In general we have strived to stay as close to Go¨del’s text as possible,
at the cost of failing to follow standard usage. Go¨del’s manners in writing
are sometimes strange, according to the contemporary standards, but they
always make sense. (On pp. 47.-49. of Notebook II he says, for example,
“then and only then” for “if and only if”, which one finds later. Instead of
three dots as a punctuation mark he uses two—perhaps because he wants
to abbreviate—but we have rendered that both in the source and the edited
version in the usual triple way.)
We have corrected Go¨del’s not very numerous spelling mistakes, and did
not keep in the edited text peculiar or foreign spelling (like “tautologie” and
“geometrie”). If however an unusual spelling (like, for example, caracter
instead of character) is permitted by the Oxford English Dictionary, then
we kept it. We have not corrected Go¨del’s style in the notes, and we are
aware that it is often on the edge of the grammatically correct, and perhaps
even sometimes on the other side of the edge. In cases of doubt we opted for
keeping his words. We made this choice because thereby the reader should
be able to hear better Go¨del lecturing, to hear his voice and not the voice
of somebody else. Go¨del had at that time no doubt his own foreign accent,
which, since we ourselves are not native speakers of English, we did not want
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to replace with ours.
Go¨del omitted in the notes many punctuation marks, in particular com-
mas and quotation marks, but also full stops, presumably for the sake of
abbreviating. We have added them, in the source version with ⌊ and ⌋ and
in the edited text, together with some colons, only when we considered they
are absolutely indispensable, but we did not want to add all of them that
would usually be written. For example, Go¨del practically never wrote com-
mas before “then”, and we did not add those.
Go¨del was very sparing in using quotation marks. (Initial quotation marks
he wrote in the German way ,, and not “.) He did not use them systematically
for naming words and sentences. We did put them at many places where we
were afraid understanding would be endangered, but at the cost of looking
unsystematic, as Go¨del, we did not restore them everywhere. We felt that
in doing that, analogously to what we said in the preceding paragraph, we
would be too intrusive, and get too estranged from Go¨del’s customs and
intentions. Perhaps he did not omit quotation marks just for the sake of
abbreviating, but wanted to use words autonymously, which might be related
to his involvement with self-reference (see the end of this introduction). Once
one becomes accustomed to this autonymous use, it hardly leads to confusion.
To make easier comparison with the scanned manuscript (which is the
only one we have seen), we have standardized only slightly the numbers of
the pages Go¨del assigned to them there. These numbers are rendered in
both the source and edited version with boldface Arabic figures, followed by
a full stop, which is to be found in the manuscript, but not always, and also
further figures, Arabic, Roman, or letters found in the manuscript; exam-
ples will come in a moment. We found five successive, not very systematic,
numberings of pages in the manuscript starting from pages numbered 1. in
various notebooks. Some pages were left unnumbered by the numberings,
and we introduced our own way of naming them, usually with the label new
page.
We believe the first numbering is made of pp. 1.-26. I of Notebook I
(where a break occurs in that notebook). We will explain below why we
think these pages of Notebook I should precede Notebook 0.
The second numbering starts with pp. 1-38. of Notebook 0 (i.e. the whole
of that notebook), followed by pp. 38.1 II-44. II of Notebook I, followed by
pp. 33.-55.2 of Notebook II, followed by pp. 56.-60. of Notebook I, followed
finally by pp. 61.-76. of Notebook II. Our reasons for this complicated ar-
rangement are in the sense of the text. For example, the involvement of
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Notebook II in this numbering has to do with the presentation of the axiom
system for propositional logic (see Section 1.1.9 in the edited text below). We
must warn however that though in this numbering the page numbers from
different notebooks sometimes fit perfectly, and follow the sense, sometimes
the fitting is somewhat less than perfect.
We have rearranged the page order in our edited version as the first and
second numberings require. In the source version the original order from
the scanned manuscript is kept in general, and also for the pages involved
in these numberings. The order of pages required by the remaining three
numberings are the same in the edited and source version and in the scanned
manuscript, with a small exception which we will mention in a moment.
The third numbering is from the initial, first, p. 1. of Notebook III up to
p. 53. of that notebook.
The fourth, longest, numbering is from the second p. 1. of Notebook III,
which is close to the end of the notebook, up to p. 157. of Notebook VII,
following more or less regularly the order of the notebooks and the numbering
in them.
A small rearrangement guided by subject matter is made in the edited
version in the last part of Section 1.1.10, where guided by subject matter
four pages from Notebook IV not numbered in the manuscript have been
inserted, which has made possible a perfect fitting in Section 1.1.14 Sequents
and natural deduction system.
The fifth, last and shortest, numbering is made of pp. 1.-7. of Notebook
VII, at the very end.
Zero precedes one, and presumably because of that, in the scanned manu-
script Notebook 0 precedes Notebook I, while in §1.II of [Dawson 2005] one
finds that Notebook I “appears to be a rewritten, somewhat condensed ver-
sion” of Notebook 0. It is however not clear in relevant cases that conden-
sation from 0 to I is made, and sometimes the opposite, addition, from I to
0 seems to be at work. Sometimes even the text in Notebook 0 is shorter
than the corresponding text in Notebook I, from which it seems to have
been obtained by tidying up (cf. in the source version the text pp. 20.-21.
of Notebook 0 with the approximately twice longer corresponding text on
pp. 15.-16. of Notebook I). We want to present now additional reasons for
believing that Notebook I precedes Notebook 0, and that Notebook 0 to-
gether with the parts mentioned in the second numbering above is written
later and may be considered to supersede the pages of Notebook I in the first
numbering.
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From p. 4. until the end of p. 21. of Notebook I propositional variables
are written first mostly as capital P , Q and R, which are later on alternated
with the lower-case p, q and r. In the edited version they are all written
uniformly as lower-case, because when they alternate they might be confus-
ing, while in the source version they are as in the manuscript. After p. 21.
of Notebook I and in Notebook 0 the lower-case letters only are used for
propositional variables. This usage is kept in Notebook II and later, and
the capital letters starting from p. 58. of Notebook I, which belongs to our
second numbering, and later, are used as schematic letters for formulae. The
notation in Notebook 0 seems to be a correction of that in Notebook I.
Before p. 42. II of Notebook I the signs + and −, which were used in the
notes for the 1935 Vienna course, are used instead of T and F for naming
truth values. The letters T and F are to be found in Notebook 0, on pages of
Notebook I that belong to our second numbering, and they are used regularly
in Notebook II and later. In the edited text we did not try to replace + and
− by T and F, because no confusion is likely.
The pages numbered in the manuscript with the suffix I in Notebook I,
which belong to our first numbering, could be superseded by pages after p.
23. of Notebook 0, which leave a better impression and belong to our second
numbering. The suffix II added in the manuscript to some later pages in
Notebook I would indicate that these pages belong to the second numbering.
In Notebook I decidability is considered with tautologies on pages that
make Section 1.1.7 Decidability for propositional logic of the edited text. In
Notebook 0 decidability is not considered, but it is considered more thor-
oughly on pp. 41. II-44. II of Notebook I, which belong to our second num-
bering.
The axioms of the system for propositional logic would appear for the first
time on p. 53. of Notebook II, which until the end Notebook II is followed
by a preliminary discussion of the role of primitive rules of inference in logic
(we consider this matter below in a more philosophical spirit), but no such
rule is given. The primitive inference rules are to be found on pp. 56.-59.
of Notebook I, and after them the four axioms are given again on p. 60. of
Notebook I. This induced part of the order in our second numbering.
On pp. 11.-12. of Notebook I Go¨del writes something like handwritten o,
which we put (or perhaps σ), for exclusive disjunction, while on pp. 16. and
18. of Notebook 0 he has for it ◦, which is then again to be found on p. 44.
of Notebook II.
On the same pages pp. 11.-12. of Notebook I, and also on p. 7. of the
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same notebook, one finds a number of times a crossed out word “wrong”
replaced by “false”. In Notebook 0 “wrong” is not to be found and “false”
is used regularly, while later “wrong” occurs here and there, but “false”
predominates.
At the very beginning of the notes, the programme of the course is stated
together with a reprobation of traditional logic (which we will consider below
in this introduction). Citing the source version, a sentence in that part starts
with: “What the textbooks give and also what Arist.⌊otle⌋ gives is a more
or less arbitrary selection of the \ infinity of / ⌊the⌋ laws of logic” on p. 1.
of Notebook I, and with: “What the trad⌊itional⌋ logic gives is a more or
less arbitrary selection from the infinity of the laws of logic” on pp. 1-2. of
Notebook 0. We have not gone over the matter systematically, but it seems
to us that this is an indicative sample of what happens when one passes from
Notebook I to Notebook 0. In Notebook I we have “selection of the infinity of
laws of logic”, where “infinity of” has been inserted (“⌊the⌋” means that the
article has been added by us in the edited version), while in Notebook 0 we
have “selection from the infinity of the laws of logic”, which is less ambiguous
and better English. Note, by the way, that Aristotle and textbooks are not
mentioned here in Notebook 0 (on p. 1. of Notebook 0 a mention of textbooks
a little bit earlier has been crossed out, as marked by a footnote in the edited
version).
We conclude our discussion about Notebook I preceding Notebook 0 with
a detail that sets Notebook 0 apart, and that together with the number of
that notebook may point in the other direction. On the front cover of Note-
book 0 one finds “Vorl. Log.”, while on the front covers of all the remaining
notebooks one finds “Log. Vorl.”, except for Notebook VII, where “Logik
Vorl.” is written (see the source version).
Go¨del’s text has neither chapters nor sections, nor an explicit division
into lectures. The edited version and the source version make two chapters
in this book. We have divided the edited version into two parts, the first
about propositional and the second about predicate logic, and we have fur-
ther divided these parts into sections which, as the parts, we have named
with our own words. Our titles of the parts and sections are not mentioned
in the source version. For them we use standard modern terminology and
not Go¨del’s. We put “connectives” instead of “connections”. Go¨del did not
use the expressions “functional completeness”, “disjunctive normal form”,
“conjunctive normal form”, “sequents”, “natural deduction”, “first-order lan-
guages”, “valid formulas” (he uses “tautology” also for these formulae, or he
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says that they are universally true). He uses the term “class” rather than
“set”, and we have kept it for naming Sections 1.2.7 and 1.2.8 in the edited
text. Our table of contents below is not exactly the same as that given in
[A.&D. 2016]. The present one is more detailed and follows more closely
the manuscript, including repetitions in it. We have added moreover to the
edited text an index for it.
Go¨del did not pay very much attention in the notes to the division of
the text into paragraphs, and where we found it very desirable, following
either the sense of the text or rather the excessive length of the paragraphs
in the manuscript, we introduced new paragraphs, with due notice, using
⌊new paragraph⌋, in the source version. We did not introduce them however
at all places where this might have been done, following a policy similar to
the one we had with punctuation marks.
Some, but not much, of Go¨del’s text is unreadable and a very small
part of it is in shorthand. Sometimes it is not clear whether one has to
do with shorthand or unreadable text. We have not tried to decipher the
shorthand in the source version, because practically everywhere it occurs in
parts omitted in the edited version, which do not belong at all to the main
text, and sometimes are not directly about logic (as, for example, in the
theological remarks at the beginning of Notebook VII). We did not find we
need this decipherment. The unreadable portions of the text are marked with
the words “unreadable text”, “unreadable symbol”, or something related.
Pages written not very systematically, not numbered, with lists of for-
mulae, jottings, and some unreadable text, crossed out to a great extent,
have been rendered as far as possible in the source version but not in the
edited one. We did not want to be too intrusive by making a selection in this
text, which we estimate should not all belong to the edited version. There
are thirteen such pages at the end of Notebook III. Notebook VII starts
with nine, not numbered, pages of remarks and questions mostly theological,
partly unreadable, partly in shorthand, and all seemingly not closely related
to the remaining notes for the course. They are rendered as far as possible
in the source version but not in the edited one. The text crossed out in the
manuscript is not in the edited version.
The underlined parts of the manuscript have in principle been rendered
in the edited version by italics. The underlining has however been kept in
derivations where it can play a special role.
As we said in [A.&D. 2016] (see the section Major problems and branches
of logic), [Hilbert&Ackermann 1928] influenced Go¨del in general, and that
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influence is to be found in the Notre Dame course too. (This influence might
be seen in details like the remarks on the Latin aut and vel on p. 9. of Note-
book 0, which follow [Hilbert&Ackermann 1928], Section I.§1, but Go¨del
also mentions sive. . . sive on p. 7. of Notebook I.) In the notes Go¨del does
not use the expressions “formal language” and “inductive definition”, and
does not have a proper inductive definition of the formal language, i.e. of the
formulae, of propositional logic (he comes nearest to that on pp. 11. and 15.
of Notebook 0 and p. 8. of Notebook I). The formal language of propositional
logic is not defined more precisely in [Hilbert&Ackermann 1928], though a
formal language of first-order predicate logic is defined by a regular inductive
definition in Section III.§4. In the Notre Dame notes however, the formulae
of predicate logic are not defined more precisely than those of propositional
logic (see pp. 32.ff of Notebook IV). It seems that in many textbooks of logic,
at that time and later, and even today, clear inductive definitions of formal
languages might be lacking, the matter being taken for granted.
In the precise inductive definition of formulae in [Go¨del 1931] (Section 2,
pp. 52-53 in the Collected Works), his most famous paper, Go¨del has the
clauses that if a is a formula, then ∼ (a) is a formula, and that if a and b
are formulae, then (a) ∨ (b) is a formula. This definition excludes outermost
parentheses, but in complex formulae it puts parentheses around proposi-
tional letters and negations, where they might be deemed unnecessary. This
way of dealing with parentheses should explain why on pp. 14.-15. of Note-
book 0 (and occasionally also elsewhere, as on pp. 23.ff of Notebook III) it
is taken that there are parentheses around negations, as in (∼ p), which are
not customary, and that there should be a convention that permits to omit
them.
To prefix the universal and existential quantifiers (x) and (∃x) square
brackets are put in the notes around formulae before which they are pre-
fixed, which is also neither customary nor necessary, as noted on p. 41. of
Notebook IV, where in some cases it is permitted, but not required, to omit
these brackets. As in some other matters of logical notation, neither the con-
vention to write the brackets nor the permission to omit them are followed
systematically (see pp. 32.aff of Notebook IV). We have not tried to mend
always this and similar matters in the edited text. Besides corrections of
slips of the pen, found in formulae as well as in English, but not very numer-
ous, we have made changes of what is in the manuscript in cases where we
estimated that understanding would be hampered.
Go¨del’s usage in the notes is not very systematic and consistent, neither
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concerning formalities of logical notation, nor concerning matters of ordinary
English, including punctuation marks (which he does not use as much as it
is usual). One should however always bear in mind that the notes were
presumably meant only for himself, and he could correct in the lectures
whatever irregularity they contain. This matter concerns also sometimes
the meaning of his text, which taken literally is not correct. He speaks, for
instance, nearly always of substitution of objects and not of their names for
individual variables (on p. 42. of Notebook IV one finds, for example, “the
free variables are replaced by individual objects”). On p. 138. of Notebook
VI he says “for any arbitrary object which you substitute for x”, but three
lines below he says “if you substitute for x the name of an arbitrary object”.
On p. 139. of Notebook VII he has “if you substitute for x the name of an
arbitrary object”, with “the name of” inserted later (which in our source
version is rendered with \ and / ). So one may take that Go¨del had always
in mind the correct statements mentioning names, which at most places he
omitted for the sake of abbreviating, which he relied on very much. (It is also
possible that sometimes, except where names are mentioned, by substituting
an object for a variable Go¨del meant interpreting the variable by the object.)
Go¨del’s definition of tautology for propositional logic (see pp. 33. of Note-
book 0 and 25. I. of Notebook I) and valid formula, i.e. tautology or uni-
versally true formula in his terminology, for predicate logic (see p. 45. of
Notebook IV) are not very formal. His definitions could be taken as defining
syntactical notions based on substitution, if this substitution is not under-
stood as model-theoretical interpretation (cf. the parenthetical remark at
the end of the paragraph before the preceding one). The word “model” does
not however occur in the notes, and the notion, which is somehow taken for
granted, is not introduced with much detail.
Concerning tautologies of predicate logic, one finds on p. 54. of Notebook
IV and p. 55. of Notebook V: “An expression is a tautology if it is true in a
world with infinitely many individuals, i.e. one can prove that whenever an
expression is universally true in a world with infinitely many objects it is true
in any world no matter how many individuals there may be and of course
also vice versa.” Go¨del says that he cannot enter into the proof of that. (For
this matter one may consult Section III.§12 of [Hilbert&Ackermann 1928].)
Go¨del seems parsimonious by relying a lot on abbreviations, but he does
not spare his energy and time in explaining quite simple matters in great
detail, and in repeating himself. He addresses beginners, and does not forget
that they are that. This might be a reason to add to those mentioned in the
xvi LOGIC LECTURES
following concluding remark in §1.II of [Dawson 2005] concerning the Notre
Dame notes: “Although the material is standard, the choice and ordering
of topics, as well as some of the examples that are discussed, may well be
of pedagogical interest.” In the remainder of this introduction, we will give
reasons that should be added to those given in [A.&D. 2016], [D.&A. 2016]
and [D.&A. 2016a] to justify our belief that the interest of these notes is not
just pedagogical.
Our involvement with Go¨del’s notes from Notre Dame started with an
interest in Go¨del’s views concerning deduction, about which we wrote in
[D.&A. 2016] and [D.&A. 2016a]. This was the main reason for our getting
into the project, which, as can be gathered from [A.&D. 2016], led to other
matters concerning the course that we found interesting. (Also, one of us
taught a logic course as a visiting professor at Notre Dame when he turned
33.) Concerning deduction, we would like to add here that on pp. 69.-70.
of Notebook II Go¨del commends derived rules and says “in our system we
cannot only derive formulas but also new rules of inference”. We believe
this short remark is in accordance with our discussion in [D.&A. 2016a] and
[D.&A. 2016] of Go¨del’s natural deduction system of Notebook IV and his
recommendation of it in Notebook III. Go¨del’s remarks about rules of in-
ference on pp. 52.-55.2 at the end of Notebook II, which in the edited text
are at the beginning of Section 1.1.9 Axiom system for propositional logic,
are relevant too for Go¨del’s opinions about deduction. Go¨del says there that
if rules are not formulated explicitly and derivability is understood as, for
example, in geometry, where it means “follows by logical inference”, then
“every logical law would be derivable from any other” (p. 55.1 of Notebook
II; cf. the second p. 4. towards the end of Notebook III).
In the edited text we entitled Section 1.1.4 of Notebook 0 and the cor-
responding Section 1.1.1 of Notebook I Failure of traditional logic—the two
gaps. Before dealing with the two gaps, let us survey other aspects of this
failure in connection with matters in the notes. There is first the arbitrariness
and narrowness of the selection of the type of logical form to be investigated.
The logical words selected are not completely pure (quantifiers are meshed
with the connectives in the Aristotelian a, e, i, o forms), and they do not
cover completely the propositional connectives, as Go¨del points out towards
the end of Section 1.2.8 of the edited text (this is a matter in the sphere
of functional completeness, treated by Go¨del in Section 1.1.8 of the edited
text).
These words are also incomplete because they do not cover the quantifiers,
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as it is clearly shown by the envisaged axiomatization of Aristotelian syllo-
gistic as a formal theory of propositional logic in Section 1.2.8 Classes and
Aristotelian moods of the edited text. (We have said in § 16 of [A.&D. 2016]
that  Lukasiewicz was working on such a presentation of Aristotelian syllo-
gistic not much later than Go¨del in the Notre Dame course, if not at the
same time, and they approached the subject in very much the same manner.
This was a short while before the invasion of Poland and the outbreak of the
Second World War, when Go¨del was back in Vienna.)
Relations of arity greater than the arity one, which properties have, are
also left out in the Aristotelian approach, and this is another crucial incom-
pleteness, as Go¨del says in the third paragraph of Section 1.2.1 First-order
languages and valid formulas of the edited text, because these relations are
more important than properties “for the applications of logic in mathemat-
ics and other sciences”. He also notes in the following paragraph of that
section: “Most of the predicates of everyday language are relations and not
properties.”
Traditional logic deals exclusively with unary predicates, tied to proper-
ties, but it is incomplete also because it does not take all of them into account.
Those which have an empty extension are left out, and this is detrimental
for the use of logic, as Go¨del says in Section 1.2.6 Existential presuppositions
of the edited text. First, logic becomes dependent on empirical matters,
and it also becomes impossible to use logic for answering in mathematics or
elsewhere the question whether there is something that satisfies a property.
Like leaving out zero in mathematics, it makes also the theory unnecessarily
more complicated and uglier, if it does not end up in confusion and outright
mistakes with the four wrong moods among the 19 moods, or with the con-
viction that no conclusion can be drawn where this is not the case (see the
end of Section 1.2.8).
In Sections 1.1.4 and 1.1.1 Go¨del speaks about traditional logic failing to
present logical laws as theorems of a deductive system. Occasionally in the
past one heard boasts concerning this matter, which were based neither on
a proof nor even a clear conception of the completeness in question. With
a slight knowledge concerning classes and a few operations on them, which
is based on a small, simple and intuitive fragment of propositional logic, of
which Aristotelian logic is not aware, all the correct 15 Aristotelian moods are
contained in a single formula (see Section 1.2.8). Decidability, which Go¨del
calls completeness (see the remarks about the first gap below), is beyond the
narrow horizon of traditional logic.
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So taking into account several kinds of completeness, traditional logic
failed to reach any of them. It is a complete failure. Traditional logic seems
at first glance to be much present in Go¨del’s course, but only in the Stoic’s
anticipatory discovery of connectives and propositional logical form there is
something mentioned with approval—in the Aristotelian heritage nothing.
This complete failure of traditional logic in matters of completeness should
certainly be taken into account in the explanation of the waste of the realm
of traditional logic, which Greek mathematicians and most of the later ones
ignored in their work, while some, like Descartes, condemned severely, cen-
turies ago. Go¨del’s measured but thorough condemnation is made in the
light of various aspects of completeness, a modern theme developed by him
with success in logic and mathematics.
Go¨del says that his chief aim in the propositional part of the course is to
fill two gaps, solve two problems, which traditional logic failed to deal with,
let alone solve (see the bottom of p. 3. of Notebook 0 and the bottom of
p. 2. and the top of p. 3. of Notebook I). The first is he says the problem
of completeness of logical inference and logically true propositions, which
he explicates as decidability, and the second is the problem of showing how
all of them can be deduced from a small—he says “minimum”—number of
primitive laws. He considers the first problem solved by showing that the
notion of tautology is decidable (see the bottom of p. 43. II of Notebook I),
and the second is solved by proving a deductive system for propositional
logic complete (i.e. the sets of provable formulae and tautologies coincide;
see the second p. 2. towards the end of Notebook III). The two analogous
problems for predicate logic are considered on p. 47. of Notebook IV. Go¨del
mentions that the second completeness problem was solved positively, and he
gives indications concerning the negative solution of the first completeness
problem, i.e. decidability, without entering into the proofs. He mentions the
decidability of the monadic fragment.
For propositional logic Go¨del considers (at the end of p. 43. II of Note-
book I) that providing a decision procedure is even more than what is required
for solving the first problem, as if he thought that providing concretely such
a procedure (which is moreover easy to understand) is more than showing
decidability nonconstructively. Usually today, completeness is understood
in such a way that showing just the recursive enumerability of the set of
tautologies is enough for it, and showing the recursiveness of that set is
not compulsory. Decidability, i.e. the recursiveness of the set of tautologies,
amounts to showing that both this set and its complement with respect to
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the set of formulae, are recursively enumerable, and so it makes sense to call
decidability too completeness ; it is completeness in a stronger sense. Go¨del
in any case distinguished the first problem, and the completeness involved in
this problem, from the second problem of showing completeness with respect
to a deductive system. From a positive solution of the first problem one
can deduce the recursive enuberability of the set of logical laws, but that is
not enough for the second problem, which awaits to be solved. By not re-
ducing proof theory to recursion theory, Go¨del took deduction as a separate
important matter.
In that context, speaking of rules of inference Go¨del says: “And of course
we shall try to work with as few as possible.” (p. 54. of Notebook II) The
“of course” in this sentence reflects something still in the air at the time
the course was given, about which we spoke in Section 5 of [D.&A. 2016a].
Go¨del’s advocacy of minimality is also related to the problem of indepen-
dence of the axioms, with which he dealt in Section 1.1.12 of the edited text
concerning his axiom system for propositional logic. This is besides com-
pleteness and decidability one of the main problems of logic, to which many
investigations in set theory, in which Go¨del was involved too, were devoted.
We believe that his advocacy of minimality has however also to do with the
following.
We said above several times that Go¨del used abbreviations very much.
The economy brought by them is not only, so to speak, physical—with them
less paper is needed, less ink, the reading is quicker. This economy is also of
a conceptual kind. The Chinese way of writing need not have evolved from
abbreviations, but it is as if it did. By moving away from the phonetic way
of writing we do not represent concepts indirectly through the mediation of
spoken words, which are represented in our writing. We represent the con-
cepts directly. The written word “two” represents the number two indirectly
through the mediation of the spoken word, while the figure 2 represents it
directly. The written word “prop.” moves away from the representation of
the spoken word “proposition” (and the context is practically always suffi-
cient not to confuse it with the “prop.” of “property”). The abbreviation
“log.” in our example above stands for different words of different grammati-
cal categories, as a Chinese character does. The Chinese way and the similar
mathematical one are eminently reasonable, and bring advantages once one
becomes accustomed to them.
Mathematical notation is far from phonetic. If something phonetic is
still present in it, it is through abbreviations, or traces of abbreviations,
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often initial letters, as with functions being usually called f . There might be
something mathematical in Go¨del’s inclination towards abbreviations.
Go¨del’s lectures end in the notes with Section 1.2.10 Type theory and
paradoxes of the edited text (pp. 127.-140. of Notebook VI and 137.-157.
of Notebook VII, which precedes Section 1.2.11 Examples and samples of
previous subjects, which does not seem to be a lecture), where he presents
Russell’s paradox not explicitly as a set-theoretical matter, but through the
predicate Φ, read “impredicable”, such that Φ(x) is equivalent with ∼ x(x)
(see p. 142. of Notebook VII; he follows there [Hilbert&Ackermann 1928],
Section IV.§4). Then on pp. 149.-156. of Notebook VII he argues forcibly
that self-reference (his term is “self-reflexivity”) should not be blamed for the
contradiction. He says that rejecting self-reference, which inspired Russell’s
theory of types, both in its ramified and in its simplified form, excludes
many legitimate arguments based on self-reference, which do not lead to
contradiction and are necessary for building set theory (pp. 155.-156. of
Notebook VII). The contradiction in the paradoxes is due to the illegitimacy
of taking that there is a complete, achieved, totality of all objects—or to put
it in other words, the impossibility to achieve completeness in the extensional
realm.
It would be in Go¨del’s style to write: “Abbr. is an abbr”. The turn
towards the conceptual here need not however be simply mathematical, be-
cause the self-reference involved could be akin not only to that made famous
by [Go¨del 1931] but also to the intensional logic of the future (about which
we said something in Section 5 of [D.&A. 2016]), where with legitimate self-
reference the achievement of completeness is expected.
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Chapter 1
EDITED TEXT
1.1 Propositional logic
1.1.1 Failure of traditional logic—the two gaps
JNotebook IK J1.K Logic is usually defined as the science whose object are
the laws of correct thinking. According to this definition the central part of
logic must be the theory of inference and the theory of logically true proposi-
tions [as e.g. the law of excluded middle] and in order to get acquainted with
mathematical logic it is perhaps best to go in medias res and begin with this
central part.
Professor Menger has pointed out in his introductory lecture that the
treatment of these things in traditional logic and in the current textbooks
is unsatisfactory. Unsatisfactory from several standpoints. First from the
standpoint of completeness. What the textbooks and also what Aristotle
gives is a more or less arbitrary selection of the infinity of the laws of logic,
whereas in a systematic treatment as is given in mathematical logic we shall
have to develop methods which allow J2.K us to obtain all possible logically
true propositions and to decide of any given proposition whether or not it is
logically true or of an inference whether it is correct or not. But secondly
the classical treatment is also unsatisfactory as to the question of reducing
the1 laws of logic to a certain number of primitive laws from which they
1If the crossed out “inf.”, which appears at this place in the manuscript, is interpreted
instead as underlined, which is possible, this might be taken as an abbreviation for “infin-
ity”. Above in this paragraph and at the beginning of p. 2. of Notebook 0 one finds the
phrase “the infinity of the laws of logic”.
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can be deduced. Although it is sometimes claimed that everything can be
deduced from the three fundamental laws of contradiction, excluded middle
and identity or from the modus Barbara this claim has never been proved or
even clearly formulated in traditional logic.
The chief aim in the first part of these lectures will be to fill those two
gaps [solve those two problems in a satisfactory way], i.e. to give as far as
possible a complete theory of logical inference and logically true propositions,
J3.K complete at least for a certain very wide domain of propositions, and to
show how they can be reduced to a certain number of primitive laws.
The theory of syllogisms2 as presented in the current textbooks is usually
divided into two parts:
1. The Aristotelian figures and moods of inference including the inferences
with one premise (e.g. contradiction),
2. inferences of an entirely different kind which are treated under the
heading of hypothetical disjunctive conjunctive inferences and which
seem to be a Stoic addition to the Aristotelian figures.
Let us begin with the syllogisms of the second kind which turn out to be
much more fundamental. We have for instance the modus ponendo ponens.
J4.K From the two premises
1. If Leibnitz has invented the infinitesimal calculus he was a great
mathematician,
2. Leibnitz has invented the infinitesimal calculus,
we conclude
Leibnitz was a great mathematician.
Generally, if p and q are arbitrary propositions and if we have the two
premises
1. If p so q,
2. p,
we can conclude
q.
Or take a disjunctive inference tollendo ponens. If we have the two premises
2or syllogistic
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1. Either p or q,
2. Not p,
we can conclude
q.
It is possible to express this is syllogism by one logically true proposition
as follows:
If either p or q and if not-p then q.
This whole statement will be true whatever p, q may be.
Now what is the most striking caracter of these inferences which distin-
guishes them from the Aristotelian syllogistic figures? It is this: J5.K that in
order to make those inferences it is not necessary to know anything about
the structure of p and q. p or q (may themselves be disjunctive or hypo-
thetical propositions), they may be affirmative or negative propositions, or
they may be simple or as complicated as you want; all this is indifferent for
this syllogism, i.e. only propositions as a whole occur in it and it is this fact
that makes this kind of syllogism simpler and more fundamental than the
Aristotelian. The law of contradiction and excluded middle would be other
examples of logical laws of this kind. Because e.g. the law of excluded middle
say for any proposition p either p or ∼ p is true and this quite independently
of the structure of p. With the Aristotelian logical syllogism it is of course
quite different; they depend on the structure of the propositions involved,
e.g. in order to apply the mood Barbara you must know e.g. that the two
premises are general affirmative propositions.
1.1.2 Connectives
Now the theory J6.K of logically true propositions and logical inferences in
which only propositions as a whole occur is called calculus of propositions. In
order to subject it to a systematic treatment we have first to examine more
in detail the connections3 between propositions which can occur in there
inferences, i.e. the or, and, if. . . so, and the not. One has introduced special
symbols to denote them, in fact there are two different symbolisms for them,
3“connective” would be more suitable than “connection”, but Go¨del does not seem
to have used that word at that time (see the last footnote on p. 10. of Notebook 0);
“connection” is put at analogous places below.
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the Russell and the Hilbert symbolism. I shall use in these lectures Russell’s
symbolism. In this not is denoted by ∼, and by a dot . , or by ∨ and the
if. . . so by ⊃, J7.K i.e. if p, q are arbitrary propositions then ∼ p means p
is false, p . q means both p and q are true, p ∨ q means at least one of the
propositions p, q is true, either both are true or one is true and the other one
false. This is different from the meaning that is given to the or in traditional
logic. There we have to do with the exclusive or, in Latin aut . . . aut , which
means that exactly one of the two propositions p, q is true and the other
one is false, whereas this logical symbol for or has the meaning of the Latin
sive. . . sive, i.e. one of the two propositions is true where it is not excluded
that both are true. The exclusive or as we shall see later can be expressed
by a combination of the other logistic symbols, but one has not introduced a
proper symbol for it because it turns out not to be as fundamental as the or
in the sense of sive. . . sive; J8.K it is not very often used. The next symbol
is the ⊃. If p, q are two propositions p ⊃ q means if p so q, i.e. p implies
q. Finally we introduce a fifth connection p ≡ q (p equivalent to q) which
means both p ⊃ q and q ⊃ p.
The five connections introduced so far are called respectively negation,
conjunction, disjunction, implication, equivalence, and all of them are called
connections or operations of the calculus of propositions. Conjunction and
disjunction are also called logical product and logical sum respectively. All
of the mentioned logical operations excluding negation are operations with
two arguments, i.e. they form a new proposition out of two given ones, for
example, p∨q. Only the negation is an operation with one argument forming
a new proposition ∼ p out of any single given proposition.
Not only the operations ⊃, ∨ and . are called implication, disjunction
and conjunction, but also an expression of the form p ⊃ q, p ∨ q is called an
implication etc., where p, q may again be expressions involving again⊃, ∨ etc.
and p, q are called respectively first and second member. Of course if p and
q are propositions then ∼ p, ∼ q, p ∨ q, p . q and p ⊃ q are also propositions
and hence to them the operations of the calculus of propositions can again
be applied, so as to get more complex expressions, e.g. p ∨ (q . r), either p is
true or q and r are both true.
The disjunctive inference I mentioned before would read in this symbolism
as follows: [(p ∨ q) . ∼ p] ⊃ q. You see in more complex expressions as this
one brackets have to be used exactly as in algebra in order to indicate the
order in which the operations have to be applied. E.g. if I put the round
brackets in this expression like this p ∨ (q . ∼ p), it would have a different
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meaning, namely either p is true or q and ∼ p are both true.
There is an interesting J9.K remark due to  Lukasiewicz that one can dis-
pense with the brackets if one writes the operational symbols ∨, ⊃ etc. always
in front of the propositions to which they are applied, e.g. ⊃ p q instead of
p ⊃ q. Then e.g. the two different possibilities for the expression in square
brackets would be distinguished automatically because the first would be
written as follows . ∨ p q ∼ p; the second would read ∨p . q ∼ p, so that they
differ from each other without the use of brackets as you see and it can be
proved that it is quite generally so. But since the formulas in the bracket
notation are more easily readable I shall stick to this notation and put the
operational symbols in between the propositions.
You know in algebra one can spare many brackets by the convention that
the J10.K multiplication connects stronger than addition; e.g. a · b+ c means
(a · b)+ c and not a · (b+ c). We can do something similar here by stipulating
an order of the strength in which the logical symbols bind, so that:
1. the ∼ (and similarly any operation with just one proposition as argu-
ment) connects stronger than any operation with two arguments, as ∨,
⊃ and ., so that ∼ p ∨ q means (∼ p) ∨ q and not ∼ (p ∨ q);
2. the disjunction and conjunction bind stronger than implication and
equivalence, so that e.g. p ∨ q ⊃ r . s means (p ∨ q) ⊃ (r . s) and not
perhaps p ∨ [(q ⊃ r) . s].
A third convention consists in leaving out brackets in such expressions as
(p ∨ q) ∨ r exactly as in (a+ b) + c. A similar convention is made for . .
After those merely symbolic conventions the next thing we have to do
is to examine in more detail the meaning of the operations of the calculus
of propositions. J11.K Take e.g. disjunction ∨. If any two propositions p, q
are given p ∨ q will again be a proposition. Hence the disjunction is an
operation which applied to any two propositions gives again a proposition.
But now (and this is the decisive point) this operation is such that the truth
or falsehood of the composite proposition p ∨ q depends in a definite way
on the truth or falsehood of the constituents p, q. This dependence can be
expressed most clearly in the form of a table as follows: let us form three
columns, one headed by p, one by q, one by p∨ q, and let us write + for true
and − for false. Then for the proposition p ∨ q we have the following four
possibilities:
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p q p ∨ q p o q
+ + + −
+ − + +
− + + +
− − − −
Now J12.K for each of these four cases we can determine whether p ∨ q will be
true or false, namely since p ∨ q means that one or both of the propositions
p, q are true it will be true in the first, second and third case, and false in
the last case. And we can consider this table as the most precise definition
of what ∨ means.
It is usual to call truth and falsehood the truth values, so there are exactly
two truth values, and say that a true proposition has the truth value “truth”
(denoted by +) and a false proposition has the truth value “false” (denoted
by −), so that any proposition has a uniquely determined truth value. The
truth table then shows how the truth value of the composite expressions
depends on the truth value of the constituents. The exclusive or would have
another truth table; namely if we denote it by o for the moment we have that
p o q is false if both p and q are true, and it is false if both are false but true
in the two other cases. The operation ∼ J13.K has of course the following
truth table:
p ∼ p
+ −
− +
Here we have only two possibilities: p true or p wrong, and in the first case
we have that not-p is wrong while in the second it is true. Also the truth
table for . can easily be determined:
p q p . q
+ + +
+ − −
− + −
− − −
(I think I will leave that to you.)
A little more difficult is the question of the truth table for ⊃. J14.K p ⊃ q
was defined to mean “If p is true q is also true”. So let us assume that for
two given propositions p, q we know that p ⊃ q is true, i.e. assume that we
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know “If p then q” but nothing else. What can we conclude then about the
possible truth values of p and q?
Assumption p ⊃ q
p q
− +
− −
+ +
 possible truth values for p, q
+ − } impossible
First it may certainly happen that p is false because the assumption state-
ment “If p then q” says nothing about the truth or falsehood of p. And in
this case where p is false q may be true as well as false because the assump-
tion “If p then q” says nothing about what happens to q if p is false but
only if p is true. So we have both possibilities: p false q true, p false q false.
Next we have the possibility that p is true. J15.K But in this case owing to
the assumption q must also be true. So that the possibility p true q false
is excluded and we have only this third possibility p true q true, and this
possibility may of course really happen. So from the assumption p ⊃ q it
follows that either one of the first three cases happens. But we have also vice
versa: If one of the first three possibilities of the truth values is realized then
(p ⊃ q) is true. Because let us assume we know that one of the three cases
written down is realized. I claim then we know also: “If p is true then q is
true”. If p is true only the third of the three possibilities can be realized (in
all the others p is false), but in this third possibility q is true. J16.K So we
see that the statement p ⊃ q is exactly equivalent with the statement that
one of the three marked cases for the distribution of truth values is realized,
i.e. p ⊃ q is true in each of the three marked cases and false in the last case.
So we have obtained a truth table for implication. However there are two
important remarks about it namely:
1. Exactly the same truth table can also be obtained by a combination
of operations introduced previously, namely ∼ p∨ q has the same truth table
p q ∼ p ∼ p ∨ q
− − + +
− + + +
+ − − −
+ + − +
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J17.K Since p ⊃ q and ∼ p ∨ q have the same truth table they will be
equivalent, i.e. whenever the one expression is true the other one will also be
true and vice versa. This makes it possible to define p ⊃ q by ∼ p ∨ q and
this is the standard way of introducing implication in mathematical logic.
2. The second remark about implication is this. We must be careful not
to forget that p ⊃ q was understood to mean simply “If p then q” and only
this made the construction of the truth table possible. We have deduced
the truth table for implication from the assumption that p ⊃ q means “If
p then q” and nothing else. There are other meanings J18.K perhaps even
more suggested by the term implication for which our truth table would
be completely inadequate. E.g. p ⊃ q could be given the meaning: q is a
logical consequence of p, i.e. q can be derived from p by means of a chain of
syllogisms.
This kind of implication is usually called strict implication and denoted
in this way ≺ and the implication p ⊃ q defined before is called material
implication if it is to be distinguished. Now it is easy to see that our truth
table is false for strict implication. In order to prove that consider the first
line of a supposed such table
p q p ≺ q
+ +
where p and J19.K q are both true and ask what will be the truth value of p ≺
strictly q. It is clear that this truth value will not be uniquely determined.
For take e.g. for p the proposition “The earth is a sphere” and for q “The
earth is not a disk”. Then p and q are both true and p ≺ q is also true
because from the proposition that the earth is a sphere it follows by logical
inference that it is not a disk; on the other hand if you take for p again the
same proposition and for q “France is a republic” then again both p and
q are true but p ≺ q is wrong. J20.K So we see the truth value of p ≺ q
is not uniquely determined by the truth values of p and q, and therefore
no truth table exists. Such connections4 for which no truth table exists are
called intensional as opposed to extensional ones for which they do exist.
The extensional connections are called also truth functions.
4The plural of “connective” would be more suitable (see the footnote on p. 6. of the
present Notebook I).
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So we see the implication which we introduced does not mean logical
consequence. Its meaning is best given by the simple “if then” which has
much wider significance than just logical consequence. E.g. if I say “If he
cannot come he will telephone to you”, that has nothing to do with logical
relations between J21.K his coming and his telephoning, but it simply means
he will either come or telephone which is exactly the meaning expressed by
the truth table. Now the decisive point is that we don’t need any other kind
of implication besides material in order to develop the theory of inference
because in order to make the conclusion from a proposition p to a proposition
q it is not necessary to know that q is a logical consequence of p. It is
quite sufficient to know “If p is true q is true”. Therefore I shall use only
material implication, at least in the first half of my lectures, and use the
terms “implies” and “it follows” only in this sense.
J22.K This simplifies very much the whole theory of inference because
material implication defined by the truth table is a much simpler notion. I
do not want to say by this that a theory of strict implication may not be
interesting and important for certain purposes; in fact I hope to speak about
it later on in my lectures. But its theory belongs to an entirely different part
of logic than that with which we are dealing at present, namely it belongs to
the logic of modalities.
Now I come to some apparently paradoxical consequences of our definition
of implication whose paradoxicality however disappears if we remember that
implication does not mean logical consequence. Namely if we look at the
truth table for p ⊃ q we see at once that p ⊃ q is always true if q is true
whatever p may be. So that means a true proposition is implied by any
proposition. Secondly we see that p ⊃ q is always true if p is false whatever
q J23. IK may be; i.e. a false proposition implies any proposition whatsoever.
In other words: “An implication with true second member is true (whatever
the first member may be) and an implication with a false first member is
always true (whatever the second member may be).” Or written in formulas
this means q ⊃ (p ⊃ q), ∼ p ⊃ (p ⊃ q). Both of these formulas are also
immediate consequences of the fact that p ⊃ q is equivalent with ∼ p ∨ q
because ∼ p ∨ q says exactly either p is false or q is true, so it will always
be true if p is false and if q is true whatever the other proposition may be.
These formulas are rather unexpected and if we apply them to special cases
we get strange consequences. E.g. J24.K “The earth is not a sphere” implies
that France is a republic, but it also implies that France is not a republic
because a false proposition implies any proposition whatsoever. Similarly
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the proposition “France is a republic” is implied by any other proposition
whatsoever, true or false. But these consequences are only paradoxical if
we understand implication to mean logical consequence. For the “if. . . so”
meaning they are quite natural, e.g. q ⊃ (p ⊃ q) means: If q is true then q is
true also if p is true, and ∼ p ⊃ (p ⊃ q) If we have a false proposition p then
if p is true anything is true. J25. IK Another of these so called paradoxical
consequences is this (p ⊃ q) ∨ (q ⊃ p), i.e. of any two arbitrary propositions
one must imply the other one. That it must be so is proved as follows: q
must be either true or false; if q is true the first member of the disjunction is
true and if q is false the second member is true because a false proposition
implies any other. So (one of the two members of the implication is true)
either p ⊃ q or q ⊃ p in any case.
1.1.3 Tautologies
We have here three examples of logically true formulas,5 i.e. formulas which
are true whatever the propositions p, q may be. Such formulas are called
tautological and it is exactly the chief aim of the calculus of propositions to
investigate those tautological formulas.
I shall begin with discussing a few more examples of such logically true
propositions before going over to general considerations. J26. IK We have
at first the traditional hypothetical and disjunctive inferences which in our
notation read as follows:
1. p . (p ⊃ q) ⊃ q ponendo ponens
[2. ∼ q . (p ⊃ q) ⊃ ∼ p tollendo tollens]
3. (p ∨ q) . ∼ q ⊃ p tollendo ponens
disjunctive ponendo tollens does not hold for the not exclusive ∨ which
we have
4. The inference which is called dilemma
(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q)
1.1.4 Failure of traditional logic—the two gaps
JNotebook 0K J1.K Logic is usually defined as the science of the laws of
correct thinking. According to this definition the central part of logic must
5see pp. 23. I-25. I of the present Notebook I
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be the theory of inference and the theory of logically true propositions. By
a logically true proposition I mean a proposition which is true for merely
logical reasons as e.g. the law of excluded middle, which says that for any
proposition p either p or ∼ p is true. I intend to go in medias res right away
and to begin with this central part.
As Professor Menger has pointed out in his introductory lecture the treat-
ment of these things, inferences and logically true propositions, in traditional
logic6 is unsatisfactory in some respect. First with respect to completeness.
What the J2.K traditional logic gives is a more or less arbitrary selection
from the infinity of the laws of logic, whereas in a systematic treatment we
shall have to develop methods which allow us to obtain as far as possible all
logically true propositions and methods which allow to decide of arbitrary
given propositions whether or not they are logically true. But the classical
treatment is unsatisfactory also in another respect; namely as to the ques-
tion of reducing the laws of logic to a certain number of primitive laws from
which J3.K all the others can be deduced. Although it is sometimes claimed
that everything can be deduced from the law of contradiction or from the
first Aristotelian figure, this claim has never been proved or even clearly
formulated in traditional logic.
The chief aim in the first part of this seminary will be to fill these two
gaps of traditional logic, i.e. 1. to give as far as possible a complete theory
of logical inference and of logically true propositions and 2. to show how all
of them can be deduced from a minimum number of primitive laws.
J4.K The theory of inference as presented in the current textbooks is
usually divided into two parts:
1. The Aristotelian figures and moods including the inferences with one
premise, i.e. conversion, contraposition etc.
2. Inferences of an entirely different kind, which are treated under the
heading of hypothetical disjunctive conjunctive inference, and which
are a Stoic addition to the Aristotelian figures.
Let us begin with these inferences of the second kind, which turn out to
be more fundamental than the Aristotelian figures.
Take the following examples of the disjunctive inference tollendo ponens:
J5.K From the two premises
6The following text is here crossed out in the manuscript: “and in most of the current
textbooks”.
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1. Nero was either insane or a criminal,
2. Nero was not insane,
we can conclude
Nero was a criminal.
1. Today is either Sunday or a holiday,
2. Today is not Sunday,
Today is a holiday.
Generally, if p, q are two arbitrary propositions and we have the two
premises
1. Either p or q,
2. not-p,
we can conclude
q.
It is possible to express this syllogism by one logically true proposition as
follows:
“(If either p or q and not-p) then q”
This whole proposition under quotation marks will be true whatever the
propositions p and q may be.
J6.K Now what is the caracter of this inference which distinguishes it from
the Aristotelian figures? It is this that in order to make this inference it is
not necessary to know anything about the structure of the propositions p
and q. p and q may be affirmative or negative propositions, they may be
simple or complicated, they may themselves be disjunctive or hypothetical
propositions; all this is indifferent for this syllogism, i.e. only propositions
as a whole occur in it, and it is this caracter that makes this kind of syllo-
gism simpler and more fundamental than e.g. the Aristotelian J7.K figures,
which depend on the structure of the propositions involved. E.g. in order to
make an inference by mood Barbara you must know that the two premises
are universal affirmative. Another example of a logical law in which only
propositions as a whole occur would be the law of excluded middle, which
says: For any proposition p either p or not-p is true.
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1.1.5 Connectives
Now the theory of those laws of logic in which only propositions as a whole
occur is called calculus of propositions, and it is exclusively with this part
of mathematical logic that we shall have J8.K to do in the next few lectures.
We have to begin with examining in more detail the connections between
propositions which occur in the inferences concerned, i.e. the or, and, if, not.
One has introduced special symbols to denote them. “Not” is denoted by
a circumflex,“and” by a dot, “or” by a kind of abbreviated v (derived from
vel), “if then” is denoted by this symbol similar to a horseshoe:
not ∼ which is an abbreviated N ∼ p
and . p . q
or ∨ p ∨ q
if. . . then ⊃ p ⊃ q
equivalent ≡ p ≡ q
i.e. if p and q are arbitrary propositions ∼ p means p is false, p . q means
both p and q is true, p ∨ q means either p or q, p ⊃ q means if p then q, or
in other words p implies q.7
J9.K About the “or” namely, this logical symbol means that at least one
of the two propositions p, q is true but does not exclude the case where both
are true, i.e. it means one or both of them are true, whereas the “or” in
traditional logic is the exclusive “or” which means that exactly one of the
two propositions p, q is true and the other one false. Take e.g. the sentence
“Anybody who has a salary or interests from capital is liable to income tax”.
Here the “or” is meant in the sense of the logical “or”, because someone who
has both is also liable to income tax. On the other hand, in the proposition
“Any number except 1 is either greater or smaller than 1” we mean the
exclusive “or”. This exclusive “or” corresponds to the Latin aut, the logical
“or” to the Latin vel .8
The exclusive “or” can be expressed by a combination J10.K of the other
logical symbols, but no special symbol has been introduced for it, because it
7Here one finds in the manuscript a broken sentence beginning with: “So if e.g. p is
the proposition today it will rain and q is the proposition tomorrow it will snow then”, of
which the words after q are on p. 9. of the present Notebook 0.
8Here one finds in the manuscript an apparently broken sentence beginning with: “As
we shall see later”.
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is not very often used. Finally, I introduce a fifth connection, the so called
“equivalence” denoted by three horizontal lines. p ≡ q means that both
p implies q and q implies p. This relation of equivalence would hold e.g.
between the two propositions: “Tomorrow is a weekday” and “Tomorrow is
not a holiday”.9
The five notions which we have introduced so far are called respectively
operation of negation, conjunction, disjunction, implication, equivalence. By
a common name they are called functions of the calculus of propositions or10
Disjunction is also called J11.K logical sum and conjunction logical product
because of certain analogies with the arithmetic sum and the arithmetic
product. A proposition of the form p ∨ q is called a disjunction and p, q its
first and second member; similarly a proposition of the form p ⊃ q is called
an implication and p, q its first and second member, and similarly for the
other operations. Of course, if p, q are propositions, then ∼ p, ∼ q, p ∨ q,
p . q, p ⊃ q are also propositions and therefore to them the functions of the
calculus of propositions can again be applied so as to get more complicated
expressions; e.g. p ∨ (q . r), which would mean: Either p is true or q and r
are both true.
The disjunctive syllogism J12.K I mentioned before can be expressed in
our symbolism as follows: [(p ∨ q) . ∼ q] ⊃ p. You see in more complicated
expressions as e.g. this one brackets have to be used exactly as in algebra to
indicate in what order the operations have to be carried out. If e.g. I put the
brackets in a different way in this expression, namely like this (p ∨ q) . r, it
would mean something entirely different, namely it would mean either p or
q is true and in addition r is true.
There is an interesting remark due to the Polish logician  Lukasiewicz,
namely that one can dispense entirely with brackets if one writes the J13.K
operational symbols ∨, ⊃ etc. always in front of the proposition to which they
are applied, e.g. ⊃ p q instead of p ⊃ q. Incidentally, the word “if” of ordinary
language is used in exactly this way. We say e.g. “If it is possible I shall do
it” putting the “if” in front of the two propositions to which we apply it.
Now in this notation where the operations are put in front the two different
possibilities of this expression p ∨ q . r would be distinguished automatically
9Here one finds in the manuscript an incomplete sentence: “because we have If. . . but
also vice versa”.
10text missing in the manuscript; “connective” would be suitable, but Go¨del does not
seem to have used that word at that time. In the preceding paragraph and at the beginning
of the present Section 1.1.5 he has “connection” instead.
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without the use of brackets because the second would read .∨p q r, with “or”
applied to p, q and the “and” applied to this formula and r, whereas the first
would read “and” applied to q, r and the ∨ applied to p and this formula
∨p . qr. As you see, these two formulas differ from each other without the
use of brackets and it can be shown that J14.K it is quite generally so. Since
however the formulas in the bracket notation are more easily readable I shall
keep the brackets and put the operation symbol between the propositions to
which they are applied.
You know in algebra one can save many brackets by the convention that
multiplication is of greater force than addition, and one can do something
similar here by stipulating an order of force between the operations of the
calculus of propositions, and this order is to be exactly the same in which I
introduced them, namely
∼ . ∨ ⊃≡
No order of force is defined for ⊃≡, they are to have equal force. Hence
J15.K
∼ p ∨ q means (∼ p) ∨ q not ∼ (p ∨ q)
p . q ∨ r ′′ (p . q) ∨ r ′′ p . (q ∨ r)
exactly as for arithmetical sum and product
p ∨ q ⊃ r ′′ (p ∨ q) ⊃ r ′′ p ∨ (q ⊃ r)
∼ p ⊃ q ′′ (∼ p) ⊃ q ′′ ∼ (p ⊃ q)
∼ p . q ′′ (∼ p) . q ′′ ∼ (p . q)
∼ p ≡ q ′′ (∼ p) ≡ q ′′ ∼ (p ≡ q)
In all these cases the expression written without brackets has the meaning
of the proposition in the second column. If we have the formula of the third
column in mind we have to write the brackets. Another convention used
in arithmetic for saving brackets is this that instead of (a + b) + c we can
write a + b + c. We make the same conventions for logical addition and
multiplication, i.e. p ∨ q ∨ r means (p ∨ q) ∨ r, p . q . r means (p . q) . r.
The letters p, q, r which denote arbitrary propositions are called proposi-
tional variables, and any expression composed of propositional variables and
the operations ∼, ∨, ., ⊃, ≡ is called meaningful expression or formula of the
calculus of propositions, where also the letters p, q themselves are considered
as the simplest kind of expressions.
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After those merely symbolic conventions the next thing we have to do
is to examine in more detail the meaning of the operations of the calculus
of propositions. Take e.g. the disjunction ∨. If J16.K any two propositions
p, q are given p ∨ q will again be a proposition. But now (and this is the
decisive point) this operation of “or” is such that the truth or falsehood of
the composite proposition p ∨ q depends in a definite way on the truth or
falsehood of the constituents p, q. This dependence can be expressed most
clearly in the form of a table as follows: Let us form three columns, one
headed by p, one by by q, one by p∨ q, and let us write T for true and F for
false. Then for the propositions p, q we have the following four possibilities
p q p ∨ q p ◦ q p . q
T T T F T
T F T T F
F T T T F
F F F F F
Now for each of these four cases we can easily determine J17.K whether p∨ q
will be true or false; namely, since p ∨ q means that one or both of the
propositions p, q are true it will be true in the first, second and third case,
and false only in the fourth case. We can consider this table (called the truth
table for ∨) as the most precise definition of what ∨ means.
It is usual to call truth and falsehood the truth values and to say of a true
proposition that it has the truth value “Truth”, and of a false proposition that
it has the truth value “Falsehood”. T and F then denote the truth values and
the truth table for ∨ shows how the truth value of the composite expression
p ∨ q depends on the truth values of the constituents. The exclusive “or”
would have another truth J18.K table; namely if I denote it by ◦ for the
moment, we have p ◦ q is false in the case when both p and q are true and
in the case when both p and q are false, and it is true in the other cases,
where one of the two propositions p, q is true and the other one is false. The
operation ∼ has the following truth table
p ∼ p
T F
F T
Here we have only two possibilities: p is true and p is false, and if p is true
not-p is false and if p is false not-p is true. The truth table for “and” can
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also easily be be determined: p . q is true only in the case where both p and
q are true and false in all the other three cases.
A little more J19.K difficult is the question of the truth table for ⊃. p ⊃ q
was defined to mean: If p is true then q is also true. So in order to determine
the truth table let us assume that for two given propositions p, q p ⊃ q holds,
i.e. let us assume we know “If p then q” but nothing else, and let us ask what
can we conclude about the truth values of p and q from this assumption.
Assumption p ⊃ q p q ∼ p ∼ p ∨ q
T F T T T
T F F T T
T T T F T
F T F F F
First it may certainly happen that p is false, because the assumption “If p
then q” says nothing about the truth or falsehood of p, and in this case when
p is false q may be true as well as false, because the assumption says nothing
about what happens to q if p is false, but only if p is true. J20.K So we have
both these possibilities: p F q T, p F q F. Next we have the possibility that
p is true, but in this case q must also be true owing to the assumption so
that the possibility p true q false is excluded and it is the only of the four
possibilities that is excluded by the assumption p ⊃ q. It follows that either
one of those three possibilities, which I frame in
p q
F T
F F
T T
occurs. But we have also vice versa: If one of these three possibilities for the
truth value of p and q is realized then p ⊃ q holds. For let us assume we
know that one of the three marked J21.K cases occurs; then we know also “If
p is true q is true”, because if p is true only the third of the three marked
cases can be realized and in this case q is true. So we see that the statement
“If p then q” is exactly equivalent with the statement that one of the three
marked cases for the truth values of p and q is realized, i.e. p ⊃ q will be true
in each of the three marked cases and false in the last case. And this gives
the desired truth table for implication. However there are two important
remarks about it, namely:
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1. Exactly the same truth table can also be J22.K obtained by a combina-
tion of operations introduced previously, namely ∼ p∨ q, i.e. either p is false
or q is true has the same truth table. For ∼ p is true whenever p is false, i.e.
in the first two cases and ∼ p ∨ q is then true if either ∼ p or q is true, and
as you see that happens in exactly the cases where p ⊃ q is true. So we see
p ⊃ q and ∼ p∨ q are equivalent, i.e. whenever p ⊃ q holds then also ∼ p∨ q
holds and vice versa. This makes possible to define p ⊃ q by ∼ p∨ q and this
is the usual way of introducing the implication in mathematical logic.
2. The second remark about the truth table for implication is this. We
must J23.K not forget that p ⊃ q was understood to mean simply “If p then
q” and nothing else, and only this made the construction of the truth table
possible. There are other interpretations of the term “implication” for which
our truth table would be completely inadequate. E.g. p ⊃ q could be given
the meaning: q is a logical consequence of p, i.e. q can be derived from p by
means of a chain of syllogisms. In this sense e.g. the proposition “Jupiter is a
planet” would imply the proposition “Jupiter is not a fixed star” because no
planet can be a fixed star by definition, i.e. J24.K by merely logical reasons.
This kind and also some other similar kinds of implication are called
strict implication and denoted by this symbol ≺ and the implication defined
by the truth table is called material implication if it is to be distinguished
from ≺. Now it is easy to see that our truth table would be false for strict
implication and even more, namely that there exists no truth table at all
for strict implication. In order to prove this consider the first line of our
truth table, where p and q are both true and let us ask what will the truth
value of p ≺ q be in this case. J25.K It turns out that this truth value is
not uniquely determined. For take e.g. for p the proposition “Jupiter is a
planet” and for q “Jupiter is not a fixed star”, then p, q are both true and
p ≺ q is also true. On the other hand if you take for p again “Jupiter is a
planet” and for q “France is a republic” then again both p and q are true,
but p ≺ q is false because “France is a republic” is not a logical consequence
of “Jupiter is a planet”. So we see the truth value of p ≺ q is not uniquely
determined by the truth values of p and q and therefore no truth table
exists. J26.K Such functions of propositions for which no truth table exists
are called intensional as opposed to extensional ones for which a truth table
does exist. The extensional functions are also called truth functions, because
they depend only on the truth or falsehood of the propositions involved.
So we see logical consequence is an intensional relation between proposi-
tions and the material implication introduced by our truth table cannot mean
NOTEBOOK 0 — 1.1.5 Connectives 19
logical consequence. Its meaning is best given by the word “if” of ordinary
language which has a much wider signification than just logical consequence;
e.g. if someone says: “If I don’t come I J27.K shall call you” that does not
indicate that this telephoning is a logical consequence of his not coming, but
it means simply he will either come or telephone, which is exactly the mean-
ing expressed by the truth table. Hence material implication introduced by
the truth tables corresponds as closely to “if then” as a precise notion can
correspond to a not precise notion of ordinary language.
If we are now confronted with the question which one of the two kinds
of implication we shall use in developing the theory of inference we have to
consider two things: 1. material implication is the much simpler and clearer
notion and 2. it is quite sufficient for developing the theory of inference
because in order to conclude q from p it is quite sufficient J28.K to know p
implies materially q and not necessary to know that p implies strictly q. For
if we know p ⊃ q we know that either p is false or q is true. Hence if we
know in addition that p is true the first of the two possibilities that p is false
is not realized. Hence the second must be realized, namely q is true. For
these two reasons that material implication is simpler and sufficient I shall
use only material implication at least in the first introductory part of my
lectures, and shall use the terms “implies” and “follows” only in the sense
of material implication. I do not want to say by this that a theory of strict
implication may not be interesting and important for certain purposes. In
fact I hope it will be discussed in the second half of this seminary. But this
theory belongs to an entirely different part of logic than the one I am dealing
with now, J29.K namely to the logic of modalities.
I come now to some apparently paradoxical consequences of our defini-
tion of material implication whose paradoxicality however disappears if we
remember that it does not mean logical consequence. The first of these conse-
quences is that a true proposition is implied by any proposition whatsoever.
We see this at once from the truth table which shows that p ⊃ q is always
true if q is true whatever p may be. You see there are only two cases where
q is true and in both of them p ⊃ q is true. But secondly we see also that
p ⊃ q is always true if p is false whatever q may be. So that means a false
proposition implies any proposition whatsoever, which is the second of the
paradoxical consequences. These properties of implication J30.K can also be
expressed by saying: “An implication with true second member is always true
whatever the first member may be and an implication with false first member
is always true whatever the second member may be”; we can express that
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also by formulas like this q ⊃ (p ⊃ q), ∼ p ⊃ (p ⊃ q). Both of these formulas
are also immediate consequences of the fact that p ⊃ q is equivalent with
∼ p ∨ q because what ∼ p ∨ q says is exactly that either p is false or q is true;
so ∼ p ∨ q will always be true if p is false and will be also true if q is true
whatever the other proposition may be. If we apply J31.K these formulas to
special cases we get strange consequences; e.g. “Jupiter is a fixed star” implies
“France is a republic”, but it also implies “France is not a republic” because
a false proposition implies any proposition whatsoever. Similarly “France is
a republic” is implied by “Jupiter is a planet” but also by “Jupiter is a fixed
star”. But as I mentioned before these consequences are paradoxical only
for strict implication. They are in pretty good agreement with the meaning
which the word “if” has in ordinary language. Because the first formula then
says if q is true q is also true if p is true which is not paradoxical but trivial
and the second says if p is false then if p is true anything J32.K is true. That
this is in good agreement with the meaning which the word “if” has can be
seen from many colloquialisms; e.g. if something is obviously false one says
sometimes “If this is true I am a Chinaman”, which is another way of say-
ing “If this is true anything is true”. Another of these so called paradoxical
consequences is e.g. that for any two arbitrary propositions one must imply
the other, i.e. for any p, q (p ⊃ q) ∨ (q ⊃ p); in fact q must be either true or
false—if it is true the first member of the disjunction is true because it is an
implication with true second member, if it is false the second member of the
disjunction is J33.K true. So this disjunction is always true.
1.1.6 Tautologies
Those three formulas, as well as the formula of disjunctive inference we had
before,11 are examples of so called universally true formulas, i.e. formulas
which are true whatever the propositions p, q, r occurring in them may be.
Such formulas are also called logically true or tautological, and it is exactly
the chief aim of the calculus of propositions to investigate these tautological
formulas.
I shall begin with discussing a few more examples before going over to
more general considerations. I mention at first some of the traditional hy-
pothetical and J34.K disjunctive inferences which in our notation read as
follows:
11see pp. 30., 32. and 5. of the present Notebook 0
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1. (p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q ponendo ponens (Assertion)
2. (p ⊃ q) . ∼ q ⊃ ∼ p tollendo tollens
3. (p ∨ q) . ∼ q ⊃ p tollendo ponens as we had before
(the modus ponendo tollens holds only for the exclusive ∨)
4. An inference which is also treated in many of the textbooks under the
heading of “dilemma” is this
(p ⊃ r) . (q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p ∨ q ⊃ r)
If both p ⊃ r and q ⊃ r then from p∨q follows r. It is usually written as
an inference with three premises, J35.K namely from the three premises
(p ⊃ r) . (q ⊃ r) . (p ∨ q) one can conclude r.
This is nothing else but the principle of proof by cases, namely the premises
say: one of the two cases p, q must occur and from both of them follows r.
That this formula with three premises means the same thing as the formula
under consideration is clear because this earlier formula says: “If the first
two premises are true then if the third is true r is true”, which means exactly
the same thing as “If all the three premises are true r is true. The possibility
of going over from one of these two formulas to the other is due to another
important logical principle which is called importation and reads like this
[p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] ⊃ (p . q ⊃ r) importation
and its inverse which is called exportation and reads like this
(p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] exportation.
So owing to these two implications we have also an equivalence between the
left and right-hand side. Next we have the three laws of identity, excluded
middle and contradiction which read as follows in our notation
1. p ⊃ p 2. p ∨ ∼ p 3. ∼(p . ∼ p)
We can add another similar law, the law of double negation which says
∼(∼ p) ≡ p. Next we have the very important formulas of transposition:
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃∼ p)
Other forms of this formula of transposition would be
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(p ⊃∼ q) ⊃ (q ⊃∼ p)
(∼ p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ p) proved in the same way.
In all those formulas of transposition we can write equivalence instead of
the main implication,12 i.e. J36.K we have also (p ⊃ q) ≡ (∼ q ⊃ ∼ p).
Another form of transposition, namely with two premises is this (p . q ⊃ r) ⊃
(p . ∼ r ⊃ ∼ q) because under the assumption p . q ⊃ r if we know p . ∼ r,
then q cannot be true because r would be true in this case.
Next we have different so called reductio ad absurdum, e.g.
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃∼ q) ⊃∼ p
A particularly interesting form of reductio ad absurdum is the one which
Professor Menger mentioned in his introductory talk and which reads as
follows
(∼ p ⊃ p) ⊃ p
Other examples of logically true formulas are the commutative and asso-
ciative law for disjunction and conjunction
1. p ∨ q ≡ q ∨ p
2. (p ∨ q) ∨ r ≡ p ∨ (q ∨ r)
3. similar formulas hold for addition
p . q ≡ q . p, (p . q) . r ≡ p . (q . r)
J37.K Next we have some formulas connecting ∨ and . namely at first the
famous so called De Morgan formulas:
∼ (p . q) ≡ ∼ p ∨ ∼ q
∼ (p ∨ q) ≡ ∼ p . ∼ q
The left-hand side of the first means not both p, q are true, the right-hand
side at least one is false. The left-hand side of the second means not at least
one is true, the right-hand side both are false.
These formulas give a means to distribute so to speak the negation of a
product on the two factors and also the negation of a sum on the two terms,
where however sum has to be changed into product and product into sum in
this distribution process. Another tautology connecting sum and product is
J38.K the distributive law which reads exactly analogously as in arithmetic
12Instead of “the main implication” in the manuscript one finds “identity”.
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1. p . (q ∨ r) ≡ p . q ∨ p . r
because let us assume left is true then we have p and two cases q, r; in the
first case p . q, in the second p . r is true, hence in any case right is true
and 2. p ∨ q . r ≡ (p ∨ q) . (p ∨ r)
3. (p ⊃ q) . (q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p ⊃ r) Syllogism, Transitivity of ⊃
4. (p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p ⊃ r)]
(p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] Export
inverse Import13
5. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p . r ⊃ q . s) Leibnitz theorema praeclarum
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p . r ⊃ q . r) factor
6. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ s)
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ r) Sum
7. p ⊃ p ∨ q 7′. p . q ⊃ p
8. p ∨ p ⊃ p 8′. p ⊃ p . p
≡ ≡
9. p ⊃ (q ⊃ p . q)
1.1.7 Decidability for propositional logic
JNotebook IK J38.1 IIK14 Last time and also today in the classes we set
up the truth tables for some of the functions which occur in the calculus
of propositions. Their purpose is to give a precise definition of the func-
tions concerned because they state exactly the conditions under which the
proposition to be defined, e.g. p ∨ q, is true and under which conditions it is
not true. In ordinary language we have also the notions and, or, if etc. which
have very approximately the same meaning, but for setting up a mathemat-
ical theory it is necessary that the notions involved have a higher degree of
preciseness than the notions of ordinary language. It is exactly this what is
accomplished by the truth tables.
13This line and the preceding one are crossed out in the manuscript.
14Notebook 0 ends with p. 38., and hence, judging by how it is numbered, the present
page should be a continuation of Notebook 0. The content of this page does not make
obvious this supposition, but does not exclude it.
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J40. IIK15 Take e.g. the formula p . (p ⊃ q) ⊃ q, the modus ponendo
ponens. Here we have two propositional variables p, q and therefore four
possibilities for these truth values, namely
p q p ⊃ q p . (p ⊃ q) p . (p ⊃ q) ⊃ q
T T T T T
T F F F T
F T T F T
F F T F T
J41. IIK and what we have to do is simply to check that the truth value of the
whole expression is true in each of these four cases, i.e. we have to ascertain
that the truth table of the whole expression consists of T’s only. That’s very
simple. let us write down all the parts of which this expression is built up.
We have first p ⊃ q is a part, then p .(p ⊃ q) and finally the whole expression.
So we see actually in all four cases the whole formula is true. Hence it is
universally true. It is clear that this purely mechanical method of checking
all possibilities will always give a decision whether a given formula is or is
not a J42. IIK tautology. Only if the number of variables p, q occurring in
the expression is large this method is very cumbersome, because the number
of cases which we have to deal with is 2n if the number of variables is n and
the number of cases is the same as the number of lines in the truth table.
Here we had 2 variables p, q and therefore 22 = 4 cases. With 3 variables we
would have 23 = 8 cases and in general if the number of variables is increased
by one the number of cases to be considered is doubled, because each of the
previous cases is split into two new cases according as the truth value of the
new variable is truth or falsehood. Therefore we have J43. IIK 2n cases for n
variables. In the applications however usually the number of cases actually to
be considered is much smaller because mostly several cases can be combined
into one, e.g. in our example case 1 and 2 can be treated together because if
q is true the whole expression is certainly true whatever p may be because it
is then an implication with true second member.
So we see that for the calculus of propositions we have a very simple pro-
cedure to decide for any given formula whether or not it is logically true. This
solves the first of the two general problems which I mentioned in the begin-
ning for the calculus of propositions, namely the problem to give a complete
15In the scanned manuscript there is no page numbered with 39. in the present Note-
book I.
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theory of logically true formulas. We have even more, namely a procedure to
decide of any formula whether or not it is logically true. That this problem
J44. IIK could be solved in such a simple way is chiefly due to the fact that
we introduced only extensional operations (only truth functions of proposi-
tions). If we had introduced strict implication the question would have been
much more complicated. It is only very recently that one has discovered gen-
eral procedures for deciding whether a formula involving strict implication is
logically true under certain assumptions about strict implication.
Now after having solved this so called decision problem for the calculus
of propositions I can go over to the second problem I have announced in the
beginning.
1.1.8 Functional completeness
JNotebook IIK J33.K16 After having solved last time the first of the two
problems I announced in the beginning, namely the problem of deciding of a
given expression whether or not it is a tautology, I come now to the second,
namely to reduce the infinite number of tautologies to a finite number of
axioms from which they can be derived. So this problem consists in setting
up what is called a deductive system for the calculus of propositions. Now
if you think of other examples of deductive systems as e.g. geometry you
will see that their aim is not truly to derive the theorems of the science
concerned from a minimal number of axioms, but also to define the notions
of the discipline concerned in terms of a minimal number of undefined or
J34.K primitive notions. So we shall do the same thing for the calculus of
propositions.
We know already that some of the notions introduced ∼, ∨, . , ⊃, ≡, |
can be defined in terms of others, namely e.g. p ⊃ q ≡ ∼ p ∨ q, p ≡ q ≡
p ⊃ q . q ⊃ p, but now we want to choose some of them in terms of which all
others can be defined. And I claim that e.g. ∼ and ∨ are sufficient for this
purpose because
1. p . q ≡ ∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q)
2. p ⊃ q ≡ ∼ p ∨ q
16In the source version, as in the manuscript, one finds in the present Notebook II first
pages numbered 61.-76., which is followed by pages numbered 33.-55.2. In this edited
version, the order of these two blocks of pages is permuted, which puts them in the right
arithmetical order, and in between pp. 56.-60. of Notebook I fit well.
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3. p ≡ q ≡ (p ⊃ q) . (q ⊃ p)
4. p | q ≡ ∼ p ∨ ∼ q
So it is possible to take ∼ and ∨ as J35.K primitive terms for our deductive
system and we shall actually make this choice. But it is important to remark
that this choice is fairly arbitrary. There would be other possibilities, e.g.
to take ∼, . because ∨ can be expressed in terms of ∼ and . by p ∨ q ≡
∼ (∼ p . ∼ q) and by ∨ and ∼ the others can be expressed as we have just
seen. This fact that the choice of primitive terms is arbitrary to a certain
extent is not surprising. The same situation prevails in any theory, e.g. in
geometry we can take either the notion of movement of the space or the
notion of congruence between figures as primitive because it is possible J36.K
to define congruence of figures in terms of movement of space and vice versa.
The same situation we have here. We can define ∨ in terms of “and” and
“not” but also vice versa “and” in terms of “or” and “not”. And there are
still further possibilities for the primitive terms, e.g. it would be possible to
take ∼ and ⊃ as the only primitive terms because ∨ can be defined by
p ∨ q ≡ ∼ p ⊃ q since
∼ p ⊃ q ≡ ∼∼ p ∨ q ≡ p ∨ q by the law of double negation
In the three cases discussed so far we had always two primitive notions in
terms of J37.K which the others could be defined. It is an interesting question
whether there might not be a single operation in terms of which all the
others can be defined. This is actually the case as was first discovered by
the logician Sheffer. Namely the | function suffices to define all the others
because ∼ p ≡ p | p means at least one of the propositions p, p is false, but
since they are both p that means p is false, i.e. ∼ p, so ∼ can be defined
in terms of | and now the “and” can be defined in terms of ∼ and | since
p . q ≡ ∼ (p | q) for p | q means at least J38.K one of the two propositions
is false; hence the negation means both are true. But in terms of ∼ and
the . others can be defined as we saw before. It is easy to see that we have
now exhausted all possibilities of choosing the primitive terms from the six
operations written down here. In particular we can prove e.g.: ∼,≡ are not
sufficient to define the others in terms of them. We can e.g. show that p ∨ q
cannot be defined in terms of them.
Now what could it mean that p . q or p ∨ q can be defined in terms of
∼,≡? It would mean that we can find an expression f(p, q) in two variables
containing only the symbols ∼,≡ besides p, q and such that p∨
.
q ≡ f(p, q),
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i.e. such that this expression would have the same truth table as p∨
.
q. But
we shall prove now that such an expression does not exist.⌈
Let’s write down the truth functions in two variables p, q which we cer-
tainly can define in terms of ∼,≡; we get the following eight: 1. p ≡ p, 2.
∼ (p ≡ p), 3. p, 4. q, 5. ∼ p, 6. ∼ q, JnewpageK 7. p ≡ q, 8. ∼ (p ≡ q),
and now it can be shown that no others can be defined except those eight
because we can show the following two things: 1. If we take one of those eight
functions and negate it we get again one of those eight functions, 2. If we
take any two of those eight functions and form a new one by connecting them
by an equivalence symbol we get again one of the eight. I.e. by application
of the operation of negation and of the operation of equivalence we never get
outside of the set of eight functions written down. So let’s see at first that
by negating them JnewpageK we don’t get anything new. Now if we negate
the first. . . Now let’s connect any two of them by ≡. If we connect the first
with any formula P we get P again, i.e. (⊤ ≡ P ) ≡ P because. . . and if
connect a contradiction C with any formula P by ≡ we get the negation of
P , i.e. (C ≡ P ) ≡ ∼ P because. . . So by combining the first two formulas
with any other we get certainly nothing new. For the other cases it is very
helpful that (p ≡ ∼ q) ≡ ∼ (p ≡ q); this makes possible to factor out the
negation so to speak. Now in order to apply that to the other formulas we
divide them in two groups. . .
⌋
J39.K For this purpose we divide the 16 truth functions of two variables
which we wrote down last time into two classes according as the number of
letters T occurring in their truth table is even or odd, or to be more exact
according as the number of T’s occurring in the last column. So e.g. p . q is
odd, p ≡ q is even and an arbitrary expression in two variables will be called
even if its truth function is even. And now what we can show is this: Any
expression in two variables containing only ∼ and ≡ is even (i.e. its truth
table contains an even number of T’s, i.e. either 0 or 2 or 4 T’s). In order to
show that we prove the following three lemmas.
1. The letter expressions, namely the letters p, q are even.
2. If an expression f(p, q) is even then also the expression ∼ f(p, q) is
even.
3. If two expressions f(p, q), g(p, q) are even then also the expression
f(p, q) ≡ g(p, q) obtained by connecting them with an equivalence sign
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is even.
J40.K So propositions 2, 3 have the consequence:
By applying the operations ∼ and ≡ to even expressions as many times
as we wish we always get again an even expression.
But any expression containing only ∼ and ≡ is obtained from the single
letters p, q by an iterated application of the operations ∼ and ≡; hence since
p, q are even the expression thus obtained will also be even. So our theorem
that every expression containing only ∼ and ≡ is even will be proved when
we shall have proved the three lemmas.
1. is clear because of the truth table for p (and for q the same thing). 2.
also is clear because ∼ f(p, q) has T’s when f(p, q) had F’s, i.e. the number
of T’s in the new expression is the same as the number of F’s in the J41.K
old one. But the number of F’s in the old one is even because the number of
T’s is even and the number of F’s is equal to the number of T’s.
Now to the third. Call the number of T’s of the first t1, the number of T’s
of the second t2 and call the number of cases in the truth table where both f
and g have the truth value T r. We have that t1 is even and t2 is even, but we
do not know anything about r; it may be odd or even. We shall try to find
out in how many cases f(p, q) ≡ g(p, q), i.e. f ≡ g, will be true and to show
that this number of cases will be even. I prefer to find out in how many cases
it will be false. If we know that this number is even we know also that the
number of cases in which it is true will be even. Now this whole expression
is false if g and f have different truth values, i.e. if J42.K either we have g
false and f true or we have g true and f false. The cases where f is true
and g false make t1− r cases because from t1 cases where f is true we should
subtract cases when g is also true, and because r was the number of cases in
which both are true. Hence in t1− r cases f is T and g is F, and similarly in
t2− r cases g is T and f is F; hence altogether in t1− r+ t2− r cases f and g
have different truth values, i.e. in t1 + t2 − 2r cases f(p, q) ≡ g(p, q) is false,
and this is an even number because t1, t2 and 2r are even, and if you add an
even number to an even number, after subtracting an even number from the
sum you get again an even number. Hence the number of cases in which the
whole expression is false is an even number and such is also the number of
cases in which it is true, i.e. f(p, q) ≡ g(p, q) is an even expression. q.e.d.
So this shows that only even truth functions J43.K can be expressed in
terms of ∼ and ≡. Hence e.g. ∨ and . cannot be expressed because three T’s
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occur in their truth tables. It is easy to see that of the 16 truth functions
exactly half the number is even and also that all even truth functions really
can be expressed in terms of ∼ and ≡ alone. Expressions for these eight truth
functions in terms of ∼ and ≡ are given in the notes that were distributed.17
The general theorem on even functions I proved then has the consequence
that these eight truth functions must reproduce themselves by negating them
or by connecting any two of them by ∼; i.e. if you negate one of those
expressions the resulting expression will be equivalent to one of the eight and
if you form a new expression by connecting any two of them the resulting
expression will again be equivalent to one of the eight. I recommend J44.K
as an exercise to show that in detail.
It is an easy corollary of this result about the undefinability of . and ∨
in terms of ≡ that also ∼ and the exclusive or are not sufficient as primitive
terms because as we saw last time the exclusive or can be expressed in terms
of ∼ and ≡, namely by ∼ (p ≡ q); hence if e.g. ∨ could be defined in terms of
∼ and ◦ (exclusive or) it could also be defined in terms of ∼ and ≡ because
the ◦ can be expressed in terms of ∼ and ≡. The reason for that is of course
that ◦ is also an even function and therefor only even functions can be defined
in terms of it. So we see that whereas ∼ and ∨ are sufficient as J45.K primitive
terms ∼ and exclusive or are not, which is one of the reasons why the not
exclusive or is used in logic. Another of those negative results about the
possibility of expressing some of the truth functions by others would be that
∼ cannot be defined in terms of . ,∨,⊃; even in terms of all three of them it
is impossible to express ∼. I will give that as a problem to prove.
As I announced before we shall choose from the different possibilities of
primitive terms for our deductive system the one in which ∼ and ∨ are taken
as primitive and therefore it is of importance to make sure that not only
the particular functions ≡, . , ⊃, | for which J46.K we introduced special
symbols but that any truth function whatsoever in any number of variables
can be expressed by ∼ and ∨. For truth functions with two variables that
follows from the considerations of last time since we have expressed all 16
truth functions by our logistic symbols and today we have seen that all of
them can be expressed by ∼ and ∨. Now I shall prove the same thing also
for truth functions with three variables and you will see that the method of
proof can be applied to functions of any number of variables. For the three
variables p.q, r we have eight J47.K possibilities for the distribution of truth
17see p. 38. in the present Notebook II above
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values over them, namely
p q r f(p, q, r)
1. T T T p . q . r P1
2. T T F p . q . ∼ r P2
3. T F T p . ∼ q . r
4. T F F
5. F T T
6. F T F
7. F F T
8. F F F P8
Now to define a truth function in three variables means to stipulate a
truth value T or F for f(p, q, r) for each of these eight cases. Now to each
of these eight cases we can associate a certain expression in the following
way: to 1. we associate p . q . r, to 2. we associate p . q . ∼ r, to 3. we
associate p. ∼ q .r,. . . So each of these expressions will have a ∼ before those
letters which have an F in the corresponding case. Denote the expressions
associated with these eight lines by P1,. . . ,P8. Then the expression P2 e.g.
will be true then and only J48.K then if the second case is realized for the
truth values of p, q, r (p . q . ∼ r will be true then and only then if p is T,
q is T and r is false, which is exactly the case for the truth values p, q, r
represented in the second line. And generally Pi will be true if the i
th case
for the truth values of p, q, r is realized. Now the truth function which we
want to express by ∼ and ∨ will be true for certain of those eight cases and
false for the others. Assume it is true for case number i1,i2,. . . ,in and false for
the others. Then form the disjunction Pi1 ∨ Pi2 . . . ∨ Pin , i.e. the disjunction
of those Pi which correspond to the cases in which the given function is true.
This disjunction is an expression in the variables p, q, r containing only the
operations ., ∼ and ∨, and I claim its truth table J49.K will coincide with the
truth table of the given expression f(p, q, r). For f(p, q, r) had the symbol
T in the i1,i2,. . . ,i
th
n line but in no others and I claim the same thing is true
for the expression Pi1 ∨ . . . ∨ Pin .
You see at last a disjunction of an arbitrary number of members will be
true then and only then if at least one of its members is true and it will be
false only if all of its members are false (I proved that in my last lecture
for the case of three members and the same proof holds generally). Hence
this disjunction will certainly be true in the i1,. . . , i
th
n case because Pi1 e.g.
is true in the i th1 case as we saw before. Therefore the J50.K disjunction is
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also true for the i th1 case because then one of its members is true. The same
holds for i2. . . etc. So the truth table for the disjunction will certainly have
the letter T in the i1,. . . ,in line. But it will have F’s in all the other lines.
Because Pi1 was true only in the i
th
1 case and false in all the others. Hence
in a case different from the i1,. . . ,i
th
n Pi1 ,. . . ,Pin will all be false and hence
the disjunction will be false, i.e. Pi1 ∨ . . . ∨ Pin will have the letter F in all
lines other than the i1,. . . ,i
th
n , i,e. it has T in the i1,. . . ,in line and only in
those. But the same thing was true for the truth table of the given f(p, q, r)
by assumption. So they coincide, i.e. f(p, q, r) ≡ Pi1 ∨ . . . ∨ Pin .
J51.K So we have proved that an arbitrary truth function of three variables
can be expressed by ∼, ∨ and ., but . can be expressed by ∼ and ∨, hence
every truth function of three variables can be expressed by ∼ and ∨, and
I think it is perfectly clear that exactly the same proof applies to truth
functions of any number of variables.
Now after having seen that two primitive notions ∼,∨ really suffice to
define any truth function we can begin to set up the deductive system.
I begin with writing three definitions in terms of our primitive notions :
P ⊃ Q =Df ∼ P ∨Q
P . Q =Df ∼ (∼ P ∨ ∼ Q)
P ≡ Q =Df P ⊃ Q . Q ⊃ P
J52.K I am writing capital letters because these definitions are to apply also
if P and Q are formulas, not only if they are single letters, i.e. e.g. p ⊃ p∨ q
means ∼ p ∨ (p ∨ q) and so on.
1.1.9 Axiom system for propositional logic
The18 next thing to do in order to have a deductive system is to set up
the axioms. Again in the axioms one has a freedom of choice as in the
primitive terms, exactly as also in other deductive theories, e.g. in geometry,
many different systems of axioms have been set up each of which is sufficient
to derive the whole geometry. The system of axioms for the calculus of
propositions which I use is essentially the one set up by first by Russell and
then also adopted by Hilbert. It has the following four axioms:
18This section is made of the following blocks of pages in the following order: pp. 52.-
55.2 of Notebook II, pp. 56.-60. of Notebook I and pp. 61.-64. of Notebook II
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J53.K
(1) p ⊃ p ∨ q
(2) p ∨ p ⊃ p
(3) p ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ p
(4) (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)
I shall discuss the meaning of these axioms later. At present I want only
to say that an expression written down in our theory as an axiom or as a
theorem always means that it is true for any propositions p, q, r etc., e.g.
p ⊃ p ∨ q.
Now in geometry and any other theory except logic the deductive system
is completely given by stating what the primitive terms and what the axioms
are. It is important to remark that it is different here for the following
reason: in geometry and other theories it is clear how the theorems are to be
derived from the axioms; they are to be derived by the rules of logic which
are assumed to be known. In our case however we cannot assume the rules
of logic to be known J54.K because we are just about to formulate the rules
of logic and to reduce them to a minimum. So this will naturally have to
apply to the rules of inference as well as to the axioms with which we start.
We shall have to formulate the rules of inference explicitly and with greatest
possible precision, that is in such a way there can never be a doubt whether
a certain rule can be applied for any formula or not. And of course we shall
try to work with as few as possible. I have to warn here against an error.
One might think that an explicit formulation of the rules of inference
besides the axioms is superfluous because the axioms themselves seem to
express rules of inference, e.g. p ⊃ p ∨ q the rule that from a proposition
p one can conclude p ∨ q, and one might think that the axioms themselves
contain at the same time the rules by which the theorems are to be derived.
But this way out of the difficulty would be entirely wrong J55.K because e.g.
p ⊃ p ∨ q does not say that it is permitted to conclude p ∨ q from p because
those terms “allowable to conclude” do not occur in it. The notions in it
are only p, ⊃, ∨ and q. According to our definition of ⊃ it does not mean
that, but it simply says p is false or p ∨ q is true. It is true that the axioms
suggest or make possible certain rules of inference, e.g. the just stated one,
but it is not even uniquely determined what rules of inference it suggests;
e.g. ∼ p ∨ (p ∨ q) says either p is false or p ∨ q is true, which suggests the
rule of inference p : p ∨ q, but it also suggests ∼ (p ∨ q) : ∼ p. So we need
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written specifications, i.e. we have to formulate rules of inference in addition
to formulas.19
It is only because the “if then” in ordinary language is ambivalent and has
besides the meaning given by the truth table also the meaning “the second
member can be inferred from the first” that the axioms seem to express
uniquely rules of inference.
J55.1K This remark applies generally to any question whether or not
certain laws of logic can be derived from others (e.g. whether the law of
excluded middle is sufficient). Such questions have only a precise meaning if
you state the rules of inference which are to be accepted in the derivation. It
is different e.g. in geometry; there it has a precise meaning whether it follows,
namely it means whether it follows by logical inference, but it cannot have
this meaning in logic because then every logical law would be derivable from
any other. So it could J55.2K only mean derivable by the inferences made
possible by the axioms. But as we have seen that has no precise meaning
because an axiom may make possible or suggest many inferences.
JNotebook IK J56.K20 Now it has turned out that three rules of inference
are sufficient for our purposes, namely for deriving all tautologies from these
formulas. Namely first the so called rule of substitution which says:
If we have a formula F (of the calculus of propositions) which involves
the propositional variables say p1, . . . , pn then it is permissible to con-
clude from it any formula obtained by substituting in F for all or some
of the propositional variables p1, . . . , pn any arbitrary expressions, but
in such a way that if a letter pi occurs in several places in F we have
to substitute the same formula in all places where it occurs.
E.g. take the formula (p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] which is called exportation.
According to the rule of substitution we can conclude from it the formula
obtained by substituting p . q for r, i.e. (p . q ⊃ p . q) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ p . q)].
The expression which we substitute, in our case p . q, is quite arbitrary J57.K
and it need not be a tautology or a proved formula. The only requirement
is that if the same letter occurs on several places in the formula in which
we substitute (as in out case the r) then we have to substitute the same
expression in all the places where r occurs as we did here. But it is perfectly
19Here a note in a box in the manuscript mentions pp. 56-60 of Notebook I.
20In the scanned manuscript, pages numbered from 45., with or without II, up to 55.
are missing in the present Notebook I.
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allowable to substitute for different letters the same formula, e.g. for q and r
and it is also allowable to substitute expressions containing variables which
occur on some other places in the formula, as e.g. here p . q. It is clear that
by such a substitution we get always a tautology if the expression in which
we substitute is a tautology, because e.g. that this formula of exportation is
a tautology says exactly that it is true whatever p, q, r may be. So it will in
particular be true if we take for r the proposition p . q, whatever p and q may
be J58.K and that means that the formula obtained by the substitution is a
tautology.
The second rule of inference we need is the so called rule of implication
which reads as follows:
If P and Q are arbitrary expressions then from the two premises P, P ⊃
Q it is allowable to conclude Q.
An example: take for P the formula p . q ⊃ p . q and for Q the formula p ⊃
(q ⊃ p . q)) so that P ⊃ Q will be the formula (p . q ⊃ p . q) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ p . q)].
Then from those two premises we can conclude p ⊃ (q ⊃ p . q). Again we
can prove that this rule of inference is correct, i.e. if the two premises are
tautologies then the conclusion is. Because if we assign any particular truth
values to the propositional variables occurring in P and Q, P and P ⊃ Q will
both get the truth value truth because they are tautologies. Hence Q will
also get the truth value true if any particular truth values are assigned to its
variables. Because if P and P ⊃ Q both have the truth value truth, Q has
also the truth. So Q will have the truth value T whatever truth values are
assigned to the variables occurring in it which means that it is a tautology.
Finally as the third rule of inference we have the rule of defined symbol
which says (roughly speaking) that within any formula the definiens can
be replaced by the definiendum and vice versa, or formulated J59.K more
precisely for a particular definiens say p ⊃ q it says:
From a formula F we can conclude any formula G obtained from F
by replacing a part of F which has the form P ⊃ Q by the expression
∼ P ∨Q and vice versa. (Similarly for the other definitions we had.)
As an example:
1. ∼ p ∨ (p ∨ q) from the first axiom by replacing p ⊃ Q by ∼ p ∨Q
2. ∼ p ⊃ (∼ p ∨ q) (Again clear that tautology of tautology.)
∼ p ⊃ (p ⊃ q)
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This last rule is sometimes not explicitly formulated because it is only nec-
essary if one introduces definitions and it is superfluous in principle to in-
troduce them because whatever can be expressed by a defined symbol can
be done without (only it would sometimes be very long and cumbersome).
If however one introduces definitions as we did this third rule of inference is
indispensable.
Now what we shall prove is that any tautology can be derived from these
four axioms by means of the mentioned three rules of inference:
J60.K
(1) p ⊃ p ∨ q
(2) p ∨ p ⊃ p
(3) p ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ p
(4) (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)
Let us first ascertain that all of these formulas are tautologies and let us
ascertain that fact first by their meaning and then by their truth table.
The first means: If p is true p ∨ q is true. That is clear because p ∨ q
means at least one of the propositions p, q is true, but if p is true then the
expression p ∨ q is true. The second means: If the disjunction p ∨ p is true
p is true, i.e. we know that the disjunction p ∨ p is true means that one of
the two members is true, but since both members are p that means that p is
true. The third says if p ∨ q is true q ∨ p is also true.
JNotebook IIK J61.K This does not need further explanation because the
“or” is evidently symmetric in the two members. Finally the fourth means
this: “If p ⊃ q then if r ∨ p is true then r ∨ q is also true”, i.e. “If you have
a correct implication p ⊃ q then you can get again a correct implication by
adding a third proposition r to both sides of it getting r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q”.
That this is so can be seen like this: it means “If p ⊃ q then if one of the
propositions r, p is true then also one of the propositions r, q is true”, which is
clear because if r is true r is true and if p is true q is true by assumption. So
whichever of the two propositions r, p is true always it has the consequence
that one of the propositions r, q is true.
J62.K Now let us ascertain the truth of these formulas by the truth-table
method, combining always as many cases as possible into one case.
1. If p is F this is an implication with a false first member, hence true
owing to the truth table of ⊃; if p is true then p∨q is also true according
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to the truth table of “or”, hence the formula is an implication with true
second member, hence again true.
2. If p is true this will be an implication with true second member, hence
true. If p is false then p∨p is a disjunction both of whose members are
false, hence false according to the truth table for ∨. Hence in this case
we have an implication with J63.K a false first member, which is true
by the truth table of ⊃.
3. Since the truth table for ∨ is symmetric in p, q it is clear that whenever
the left-hand side has the truth value true also the right-hand side has
it, and if the left-hand side is false the right-hand side will also be false;
but an implication both of whose members are true or both of whose
members are false is true by the truth table of implication, because
p ⊃ q is false only in the case when p is true and q false.
4. Here we have to consider only the following three cases:
1. one of r, q has the truth value T
2. both r, q are F and p true
3. both r, q are F and p false
J64.K These three cases evidently exhaust all possibilities.
1. In the first case r∨ q is true, hence also (r∨p) ⊃ (r∨ q) is true because
it is an implication with second member true; (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r∨ p ⊃ r∨ q)
is true for the same reason.
2. In the second case p is true and q false, hence p ⊃ q false, hence the
whole expression is an implication with false first member, hence true.
3. In the third case all of r, q and p are false; then r∨p and r∨q are false,
hence the implication r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q is true, hence the whole formula is
true because it is an implication with true second member.
So we see that the whole formula is always true.
1.1.10 Theorems and derived rules of the system for
propositional logic
Now I can begin with deriving other tautologies from these three axioms by
means of the three rules of inference, namely the rule of substitution and
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implication and defined symbol, in order to prove later on that all logically
true formulas can be derived from them.
Let us first substitute
∼ r
r
in (4) to get (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ r∨p ⊃ ∼ r∨q), but
for ∼ r ∨ p we can substitute r ⊃ p and likewise for ∼ r ∨ q, J65.K getting:
5. (p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(r ⊃ p) ⊃ (r ⊃ q)] Syllogism
This is the so called formula of syllogism, which has a certain similarity to
the mood Barbara in so far as it says: If from p follows q then if from r
follows p from r follows q.
6. Now substitute
p
q
in (1) p ⊃ p∨p and now make the following substitution:
p ∨ p
p
p
q
p
r
in Syllogism
(p ∨ p ⊃ p) ⊃ [(p ⊃ p ∨ p) ⊃ (p ⊃ p)]
This is an implication and the first member of it reads p ∨ p ⊃ p, which is
nothing else but the second axiom. Hence we can apply the rule of implication
to the J66.K two premises and get
(p ⊃ p ∨ p) ⊃ (p ⊃ p)
This is again an implication and the first member of it was proved before;
hence we can again apply the rule of implication and get
7. p ⊃ p law of identity
Using the third rule
8*. we have ∼ p ∨ p the law of excluded middle
Now let us substitute
∼ p
p
in this formula to get ∼∼ p ∨ ∼ p and now apply
to it the commutative law for ∨, i.e. substitute ∼∼ p
p
∼ p
q
in (3) to get
∼∼ p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ ∼ p ∨ ∼∼ p rule of implication
∼ p ∨ ∼∼ p
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J67.K 9.* p ⊃ ∼∼ p
I have to make an important remark on how we deduced p ⊃ p from the
axioms. We had at first the two formulas p ⊃ p ∨ p and p ∨ p ⊃ p. Now
substitute them in a certain way in the formula of Syllogism
p
r
p ∨ p
p
p
q
and then by applying twice the rule of implication we get p ⊃ p. If P,Q,R
are any arbitrary expressions and if we have succeeded in deriving P ⊃ Q and
Q ⊃ R from the four axioms by means of the three rules of inference then we
can also derive J68.K P ⊃ R. Because we can simply substitute Q
p
R
q
P
r
in Syllogism getting (Q ⊃ R) ⊃ [(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)]. Then we apply the
rule of implication to this formula and Q ⊃ R getting (P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)
and then we apply again the rule of implication to this formula and P ⊃ Q
getting P ⊃ R.
So we know quite generally if P ⊃ Q and Q ⊃ R are both demonstrable
then P ⊃ R is also demonstrable whatever formula P,Q,R may be because
we can obtain P ⊃ R always in the manner just described. This fact allows
us to save the trouble of repeating the whole argument by which we derived
the conclusion from the two premises in each particular case, but we can
state it once for all as a new J69.K rule of inference as follows:
From the two premises P ⊃ Q, Q ⊃ R we can conclude P ⊃ R whatever
the formulas P,Q,R may be. 4.R.
So this is a fourth rule of inference, which I call Rule of syllogism. But note
that this rule of syllogism is not a new independent rule, but can be derived
from the other three rules and the four axioms. Therefore it is called a derived
rule of inference. So we see that in our system we cannot only derive formulas
but also new rules of inference and the latter is very helpful for shortening
the proofs. In principle it is superfluous to introduce such derived rules of
inference because whatever can be proved with their help can also be proved
without them. It is exactly this what we have shown before introducing this
new rule of inference, namely we have shown that the conclusion of it can be
obtained also by the former axioms and rules of inference and this was the
justification for introducing it.
J70.K But although these derived rules of inference are superfluous in
principle they are very helpful for shortening the proofs and therefore we
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shall introduce a great many of them. We now apply this rule immediately
to the (1) and (3) axioms because they have this form P ⊃ Q, Q ⊃ R for p
P
p ∨ q
Q
q ∨ p
R
, and get because (1), (3)
10.* p ⊃ q ∨ p
paradox: 11. p ⊃ (q ⊃ p) p ⊃ (∼ q ∨ p)
Add *
∼ q
q
in last formula 10.*
12. [∼ p ⊃ (p ⊃ q) ∼ p ⊃ (∼ p ∨ q)
Add
∼ p
p
q
q
] in (1)
Other derived rules:
4·1′R P1 ⊃ P2 P2 ⊃ P3 P3 ⊃ P4 : P1 ⊃ P4 generalized rule of syllogism
P1 ⊃ P3
5.R* P ⊃ Q : R ∨ P ⊃ R ∨Q addition from the left
This rule is similar to the rules by which one calculates with inequalities
a < b : c+ a < c+ b
[6R P ⊃ Q : (R ⊃ P ) ⊃ (R ⊃ Q) ]
5·1R* P ⊃ Q : P ∨R ⊃ Q ∨R addition from the right
J71.K 1. P ∨ R ⊃ R ∨ P P
p
R
q
in (3)
2. R ∨ P ⊃ R ∨Q by rule addition from the left
3. R ∨Q ⊃ Q ∨ R R
p
Q
q
in (3)
P ∨ R ⊃ Q ∨ R by rule Syllogism
7R* P ⊃ Q R ⊃ S : P ∨R ⊃ Q ∨ S
Rule of addition of two implications
P ∨ R ⊃ Q ∨ R addition from the right to the
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first premise (R)
Q ∨R ⊃ Q ∨ S addition from the left ′′ second ′′ (Q)
P ∨ R ⊃ Q ∨ S Syllogism, but this is the conclusion to be
proved
8R* P ⊃ Q R ⊃ Q : P ∨R ⊃ Q Dilemma
P ∨ R ⊃ Q ∨Q
Q ∨Q ⊃ Q Q
p
in (2)
P ∨ R ⊃ Q Syllogism
J72.K Application to derive formulas
p ⊃ ∼∼ p proved before, substitute ∼ p
p
∼ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p addition from the right
∼ p ∨ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ∨ p rule of implication
∼∼∼ p ∨ p rule of defined symbol
13. ∼∼ p ⊃ p
14. Transposition (p ⊃ ∼ q) ⊃ (q ⊃ ∼ p)
Proof (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃ (∼ q ∨ ∼ p) substitution in (3)
rule of defined symbol
14·1 (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ ∼ p)
(∼ p ∨ q) ⊃ (∼∼ q ∨ ∼ p)
Proof q ⊃ ∼∼ q
∼ p ∨ q ⊃ ∼ p ∨ ∼∼ q
∼ p ∨ ∼∼ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ ∼ p Permutation (3)
∼ p ∨ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ ∼ p rule of defined symbol
14·1 (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ ∼ p) ∼ p ∨ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ ∼ p
14·2 (∼ p ⊃ ∼ q) ⊃ (q ⊃ p) ∼∼ q ∨ ∼ p ⊃ ∼ p ∨ q21
14·3* (p ⊃ ∼ q) ⊃ (q ⊃ ∼ p) ∼ p ∨ ∼ q ⊃ ∼ q ∨ ∼ p
14·4* (∼ p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ p) ∼∼ p ∨ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ p
14·2 (∼ p ⊃ ∼ q) ⊃ (q ⊃ p)
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Proof ∼∼ p ⊃ p
∼∼ p ∨ ∼ q ⊃ p ∨ ∼ q
p ∨ ∼ q ⊃ ∼ q ∨ p
∼∼ p ∨ ∼ q ⊃ ∼ q ∨ p
(∼ p ⊃ ∼ q) ⊃ (q ⊃ p)
J73.K
14·4* (∼ p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ p)
∼∼ p ∨ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ p
Proof ∼∼ p ⊃ p
q ⊃ ∼∼ q
∼∼ p ∨ q ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼ q Addition of two implications
p ∨ ∼∼ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ p Permutation
∼∼ p ∨ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ p q.e.d. rule of defined symbol
Four transposition rules of inference:
9R P ⊃ ∼ Q : Q ⊃ ∼ P 9·1R P ⊃ Q : ∼ Q ⊃ ∼ P
9·2R ∼ P ⊃ Q : ∼ Q ⊃ P 9·3R ∼ P ⊃ ∼ Q : Q ⊃ P
By them the laws for . correspond to laws for ∨ or can be derived, e.g.
15.* p . q ⊃ p p . q ⊃ q
∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃ p ∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃ q Formula 10.*
Proof ∼ p ⊃ ∼ p ∨ ∼ q ∼ q ⊃ ∼ p ∨ ∼ q Transposition 9·2R
∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃ p ∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃ q
15.2 Similarly for products of any number of factors we can prove that the
product implies any factor, e.g.
p . q . r ⊃ p because (p . q) . r ⊃ p . q
p . q . r ⊃ q p . q ⊃ p, p . q ⊃ q
p . q . r ⊃ r (p . q) . r ⊃ r
and for any number of factors.
From this one has the following rules of inference:
21∼∼ p ∨ ∼ q ⊃ ∼ q ∨ p, as in the proof below
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10R P ⊃ Q : P . R ⊃ Q adjoining a new hypothesis
10·1R P ⊃ Q : R . P ⊃ Q
because P . R ⊃ P by substitution
P ⊃ Q by assumption
P . R ⊃ Q Syllogism
10·2R Q : P ⊃ Q from paradox
J74.K Associativity: Recall (1) p ⊃ p ∨ q, II p ⊃ q ∨ p
15.* (p ∨ q) ∨ r ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r)
1. p ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r) Addition (1) q ∨ r
q
q ⊃ q ∨ r q ∨ r ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r) Formula 10.*
Addition*
q ∨ r
p
p
q
(p ⊃ q ∨ p q ∨ r
p
p
q
)
2. q ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r) Syllogism
a.) p ∨ q ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r) Dilemma
r ⊃ q ∨ r (II r
p
) q ∨ r ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r) see before
b.) r ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r)
(p ∨ q) ∨ r ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r) inverse similar
15·1 p ∨ (q ∨ r) ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r
p ⊃ p ∨ q p ∨ q ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r (p ⊃ p ∨ q p ∨ q
p
r
q
)
p ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r
q ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r
r ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r [II p ⊃ q ∨ p r
p
p ∨ q
q
]
q ∨ r ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r
p ∨ (q ∨ r) ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r
Exportation and importation
16.* (p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] Exportation
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J75.K (∼ (p . q) ∨ r) ⊃∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r)
∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r ⊃ ∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r)
Proof ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃ ∼ p ∨ ∼ q double negation
substitute
∼ p ∨ ∼ q
p
∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r ⊃ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r addition from the right
(∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r ⊃ ∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) associative law
Syllogism ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r ⊃ ∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) q.e.d.
[p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] ⊃ (p . q ⊃ r) Importation
∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) ⊃ ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r
Proof × ∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) ⊃ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r Associativity
∼ p ∨ ∼ q ⊃ ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q)
× (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r ⊃ ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r Addition right
∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) ⊃ ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r Syllogism ××
[p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] ⊃ [q ⊃ (p ⊃ r)]
× ∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) ⊃ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r
J76.K ∼ p ∨ ∼ q ⊃ ∼ q ∨ ∼ p
× (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r ⊃ (∼ q ∨ ∼ p) ∨ r
× (∼ q ∨ ∼ p) ∨ r ⊃ ∼ q ∨ (∼ p ∨ r)
∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) ⊃ ∼ q ∨ (∼ p ∨ r) Syllogism ×××
Rule of exportation or importation or commutativity
11 P . Q ⊃ R : P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) Exportation
11·1 P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) : P . Q ⊃ R Importation
11·2 P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) : Q ⊃ (P ⊃ R) Commutativity
JNotebook IIIK
J1.K (p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(r ⊃ p) ⊃ (r ⊃ q)]
(q ⊃ r) ⊃ [(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ r)]
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p ⊃ r)] Commutativity q ⊃ r
P
p ⊃ q
Q
p ⊃ r
R
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(p ⊃ q) . (q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p ⊃ r) Importation p ⊃ q
P
q ⊃ r
Q
p ⊃ r
R
(q ⊃ r) . (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ r)
(p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q) p ⊃ q
P
p
Q
q
R
(p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q Importation
J2.K
17 p . q ⊃ q . p
Proof ∼ q ∨ ∼ p ⊃∼ p ∨ ∼ q (3) ∼ q
p
∼ p
q
∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃∼ (∼ q ∨ ∼ p) Transposition
p . q ⊃ q . p rule of defined symbol
18. p ⊃ p . p
Proof ∼ p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ ∼ p
p ⊃ ∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ p) Transposition
p ⊃ p . p defined symbol
19. p ⊃ (q ⊃ p . q)
(p . q ⊃ p . q) ⊃ (p ⊃ (q ⊃ p . q)) exportation p . q
r
p ⊃ (q ⊃ p . q)
19.1 p ⊃ (q ⊃ q . p)
(p . q ⊃ q . p) ⊃ (p ⊃ (q ⊃ q . p)) exportation q . p
r
J3.K
12R P , Q : P . Q rule of product
P ⊃ (Q ⊃ P . Q)
Q ⊃ P . Q
P . Q
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Inversion P . Q : P , Q rule of product
P . Q ⊃ P P . Q ⊃ Q
13R P ⊃ Q R ⊃ S : P . R ⊃ Q . S Rule of multiplication
∼ Q ⊃∼ P ∼ S ⊃∼ R
∼ Q ∨ ∼ S ⊃∼ P ∨ ∼ R
∼ (∼ P ∨ ∼ R) ⊃∼ (∼ Q ∨ ∼ S)
J4.K
13.1R P ⊃ Q : R . P ⊃ R . Q
because R ⊃ R and other side
13.2R P ⊃ Q P ⊃ S : P ⊃ Q . S
P . P ⊃ Q . S
P ⊃ P . P
P ⊃ Q . S rule of composition
F 22. p . (q ∨ r) ≡ p . q ∨ p . r
I. q ⊃ q ∨ r
p . q ⊃ p . (q ∨ r)
r ⊃ q ∨ r
p . r ⊃ p . (q ∨ r)
p . q ∨ p . r ⊃ p . (q ∨ r)
II.
× q ⊃ (p ⊃ p . q) q ⊃ (p ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r)
+ r ⊃ (p ⊃ p . r) + (p ⊃ p . r) ⊃ (p ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r)
p . q ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r r ⊃ (p ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r)
p . r ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r q ∨ r ⊃ (p ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r)
× (p ⊃ p . q) ⊃ (p ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r) (q ∨ r) . p ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r
J5.K Equivalences
P ⊃ Q . Q ⊃ P : P ≡ Q
because (P ⊃ Q) . (Q ⊃ P ) rule of defined symbol
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P ≡ Q : P ⊃ Q . Q ⊃ P
Transposition:
P ≡ Q : ∼ P ≡∼ Q
P ≡∼ Q : ∼ P ≡ Q
Proof P ≡ Q P ⊃ Q Q ⊃ P
∼ Q ⊃∼ P ∼ P ⊃∼ Q ∼ P ≡∼ Q
Addition and Multiplication
P ≡ Q R ≡ S
{
P ∨ R ≡ Q ∨ S
P . R ≡ Q . S
J6.K P ⊃ Q R ⊃ S Q ⊃ P S ⊃ R
P ∨R ⊃ Q ∨ S Q ∨ S ⊃ P ∨ R
P ∨ R ≡ Q ∨ S.
Syllogism
P ≡ Q , Q ≡ S : P ≡ S
P ≡ Q : Q ≡ P
p ≡ p p ⊃ p p ⊃ p (P
p
Q
p
)
p ≡∼∼ p p ⊃∼∼ p ∼∼ p ⊃ p
∼ (p . q) ≡∼ p ∨ ∼ q
∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ≡∼ p ∨ ∼ q
∼ (p ∨ q) ≡∼ p . ∼ q
≡∼ (∼∼ p ∨ ∼∼ q)
p ≡∼∼ p
q ≡∼∼ q
p ∨ q ≡∼∼ p ∨ ∼∼ q | ∼ (p ∨ q) ≡∼ (∼∼ p ∨ ∼∼ q)
J6a.K
23. p ∨ (q . r) ≡ (p ∨ q) . (p ∨ r)
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1.) p ⊃ p ∨ q
p ⊃ p ∨ r
x p ⊃ (p ∨ q) . (p ∨ r)
q . r ⊃ p ∨ q because q . r ⊃ q
q . r ⊃ p ∨ r
x q . r ⊃ (p ∨ q) . (p ∨ r)
2.) x p ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)] ×[
r ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)]
]
r ⊃ [q ⊃ q . r]
q ⊃ q . r ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)] Summation
x r ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)]
(p ∨ r) ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)]
(p ∨ r) . (p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)
× because p ⊃ p ∨ q . r
p ∨ q . r ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)]
p ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)]
J7.K Syllogism under an assumption
14R P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) , P ⊃ (R ⊃ S) : P ⊃ (Q ⊃ S)
and similarly for any number of premises
P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) . (R ⊃ S)
(Q ⊃ R) . (R ⊃ S) ⊃ Q ⊃ S exportation syllogism
P ⊃ (Q ⊃ S) also generalized
14.1R P ⊃ Q P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) : P ⊃ R
P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) . Q
(Q ⊃ R) . Q ⊃ R
P ⊃ R Syllogism

J8.K (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ s)
1. p ∨ r ⊃ r ∨ p
2. (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)
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3. r ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ r
4. (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (q ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ s)
5. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ r ∨ p)
6. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)
7. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (r ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ r)
8. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (q ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ r)
9. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ s)
(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q)
(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ q) q
s
(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ q) ⊃ (q ∨ q ⊃ q)
(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q)
J9.K (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p . r ⊃ q . s)
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃∼ p)
(r ⊃ s) ⊃ (∼ s ⊃∼ r)
A. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃∼ p) . (∼ s ⊃∼ r)
B. (∼ q ⊃∼ p) . (∼ s ⊃∼ r) ⊃ (∼ q ∨ ∼ s ⊃∼ p ∨ ∼ r)
C. (∼ q ∨ ∼ s ⊃∼ p ∨ ∼ r) ⊃ (p . r ⊃ q . s)
(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p . r ⊃ q . s) A,B,C
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ⊃ q . s)
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃ s) ⊃ (p . p ⊃ q . s)
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ⊃ p . p)
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ⊃ q . s)
(p ⊃∼ p) ⊃∼ p
∼ p ∨ ∼ p ⊃∼ p
J10.K (∼ p ⊃ p) ⊃ p
(∼∼ p ∨ p) ⊃ p
∼∼ p ⊃ p
p ⊃ p
(∼∼ p ∨ p) ⊃ p
∼ (p . ∼ p) see below∗
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(p ⊃ q).(p ⊃∼ q) ⊃∼ p
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃∼ q) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q . ∼ q)]
p ⊃ (q . ∼ q) ⊃ (∼ (q . ∼ q) ⊃∼ p)
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃∼ q) ⊃ (∼ (q . ∼ q) ⊃∼ p) 
Principle of Commutativity
∼ (q . ∼ q) ⊃ [(p ⊃ q).(p ⊃∼ q) ⊃∼ p] upslope
(p ⊃ q).(p ⊃∼ q) ⊃∼ p
∼ (p . ∼ p)
∗ ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼∼ p)
JNotebook IVK
Jnewpage iK22 (p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(r ⊃ p) ⊃ (r ⊃ q)] 1.
p ⊃ ∼∼ p 2.
R: ∼ p
S: ∼∼∼ p
T : p
Su 2. ∼ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p R ⊃ S
∼ p ∨ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ∨ p R ∨ T ⊃ S ∨ T
Su (3) ∼ p ∨ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼ p 3. R ∨ T ⊃ T ∨ R
Su (4) (∼ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p) ⊃ [p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p] 4.
Imp 2., 4. p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p 5. T ∨ R ⊃ T ∨ S
Su (3) p ∨ ∼∼∼ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ∨ p 6. T ∨ S ⊃ S ∨ T
Su 1. (p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p) ⊃
[(∼ p ∨ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼ p) ⊃ (∼ p ∨ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p)] 7.
Imp twice 5., 7.; 3. ∼ p ∨ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p 8.
Su 1. (p ∨ ∼∼∼ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ∨ p) ⊃
[(∼ p ∨ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p) ⊃ (∼ p ∨ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ∨ p)] 10.
Imp twice 6., 10.; 8. ∼ p ∨ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ∨ p
22Before p. 7., the first numbered page in Notebook IV, there are in the manuscript four
not numbered pages with theorems of the axiom system for propositional logic. These
pages are here numbered with the prefix newpage and inserted within Notebook III, at
the end of the present Section 1.1.10, to which they belong by their subject matter.
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Jnewpage iiK p ⊃ q ∨ p
p ⊃ p ∨ q (1)
p ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ p (3)
Su 1. (p ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ p) ⊃ [(p ⊃ p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q ∨ p)] 2.
Su
p ∨ q
p
q ∨ p
q
p
r
Imp (2., (3)) (p ⊃ p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q ∨ p) 3.
Imp (3., (1)) p ⊃ q ∨ p 4.
Jnewpage iiiK
1. (∼ p ⊃ p) ⊃ p (∼∼ p ∨ p) ⊃ p
A. p ⊃ p
∼∼ p ⊃ p
∼∼ p ∨ p ⊃ p Dilemma
2. (p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p . ∼ r ⊃ ∼ q)
1. (p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] Exportation
(q ⊃ r) ⊃ (∼ r ⊃∼ q) Transposition
2. [p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] ⊃ [p ⊃ (∼ r ⊃∼ q)] Addition from the left
3. [p ⊃ (∼ r ⊃∼ q)] ⊃ [p . ∼ r ⊃∼ q] Importation
(p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p . ∼ r ⊃ ∼ q) 1., 2., 3. Syllogism
3.1 (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ (p ⊃ q))
r ⊃ (p ⊃ r) p ⊃ q
r
3.2 [p ⊃ (p ⊃ q)] ⊃ (p ⊃ q) ∼ p ∨ (∼ p ∨ q) ⊃ ∼ p ∨ q
Jnewpage ivK
1. ∼ p ∨ (∼ p ∨ q) ⊃ (∼ p ∨ ∼ p) ∨ q
∼ p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ ∼ p
2. (∼ p ∨ ∼ p) ∨ q ⊃ ∼ p ∨ q Addition from the right
∼ p ∨ (∼ p ∨ q) ⊃ ∼ p ∨ q Syllogism 1., 2.
[p ⊃ (p ⊃ q)] ⊃ (p ⊃ q) Rule of defined symbol
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1.1.11 Completeness of the axiom system for
propositional logic
JNotebook IIIK J11.K Now I can proceed to the proof of the completeness
theorem announced in the beginning which says that any tautology whatso-
ever can actually be derived in a finite number of steps from our four axioms
by application of the three primitive rules of inference (substitution, impli-
cation, defined symbol) or shortly “Every tautology is demonstrable”. We
have already proved the inverse theorem which says: “Every demonstrable
expression is a tautology”.
J12.K But the proposition which we are interested in now is the inverse
one, which says “Any tautology is demonstrable”. In order to prove it we have
to use again the formulas Pi which we used for proving that any truth table
function can be expressed by ∼ and ∨. If we have say n propositional vari-
ables p1, p2, p3, . . . , pn then consider the conjunction of them p1 .p2 .p3 . . . . .pn
and call a “fundamental conjunction” of these J13.K letters p1, . . . , pn any
expression obtained from this conjunction by negating some or all of the
variables p1, . . . , pn. So e.g. p1 . ∼ p2 . p3 . . . . . pn would be a fundamen-
tal conjunction, another one ∼ p1 . p2 . ∼ p3 . p4 . . . . . pn etc.; in particular
we count also p1 . . . . . pn itself and ∼ p1 . ∼ p2 . . . . . ∼ pn (in which all
variables are negated) as fundamental conjunctions.
2 for one p1, ∼ p1
22 4 for two p1 . p2, p1 . ∼ p2, ∼ p1 . p2, ∼ p1 . ∼ p2
23 8 for three p1 . p2 . p3, p1 . p2 . ∼ p3, p1 . ∼ p2 . p3, p1 . ∼ p2 . ∼ p3
∼ p1 . p2 . p3, ∼ p1 . p2 . ∼ p3, ∼ p1 . ∼ p2 . p3, ∼ p1 . ∼ p2 . ∼ p3
So for the n variables p1, . . . , pn there are exactly 2
n fundamental conjunc-
tions in general; 2n because you see by adding a new variable pn+1 the
number of fundamental conjunctions is doubled, because we can combine
pn+1 and ∼ pn+1 with any of the previous J14.K fundamental conjunctions
(as e.g. here p3 with any of the previous four and ∼ p3 getting eight). I
denote those 2n fundamental conjunctions for the variables p1, . . . , pn by
P
(n)
1 , P
(n)
2 , . . . , P
(n)
i , . . . , P
(n)
2n . I am using
(n) as an upper index to indicate
that we mean the fundamental conjunction of the n variables p1, . . . , pn. The
order in which they are enumerated is arbitrary. [We may stick e.g. to the
order which we used in the truth tables.] From our formulas considered for
n = 3 we know J14.1K that to each of these fundamental conjunctions P
(n)
i
52 EDITED TEXT
corresponds exactly one line in a truth table for a function of the n variables
p1, . . . , pn in such a way that P
(n)
i will be true in this line and false in all the
others. So if we numerate the lines correspondingly we can say P
(n)
i will be
true in the ith line and false in all other lines.
J15.K Now in order to prove the completeness theorem I prove first the
following auxiliary theorem.
Let E be any expression which contains no other propositional variables
but p1, . . . , pn and P
(n)
i any fundamental conjunction of the variables
p1, . . . , pn. Then either P
(n)
i ⊃ E or P (n)i ⊃∼ E is demonstrable
where by either or I mean at least one.23
E
Example p1 . p2 . p3 ⊃ [p . q ⊃ r] p1 . ∼ p2 . p3
p1 . ∼ p2 . p3 ⊃ (p1 . p2 ⊃ p3) or
p1 . ∼ p2 . p3 ⊃∼ (p1 . p2 ⊃ p3)
∼ p . ∼ q . r ⊃∼ (p . q ⊃ r)
It is to be noted that E need not actually contain all the variables
p1, . . . , pn; it is only required that it contains no other variables but p1, . . . , pn.
So e.g. p1 ∨ p2 would be an expression for which the theorem applies, i.e.
P
(n)
i ⊃ (p1 ∨ p2)
⊃ ∼ (p1 ∨ p2)
}
demonstrable
J19.K24 I shall prove the auxiliary theorem only for such expressions as
contain only the primitive symbols ∼,∨ (but do not contain ⊃,≡) because
that is sufficient for our purpose, and I prove it by a kind of complete induc-
tion, which we used already once in order to show that ∨ cannot be defined
in terms of ∼,≡ . J20.K Namely I shall prove the following three lemmas:
1. The theorem is true for the simplest kind of expression E, namely the
variables p1, . . . , pn themselves, i.e. for any variable pk of the above
series p1, . . . , pk and any fundamental conjunction P
(n)
i , P
(n)
i ⊃ pk or
P
(n)
i ⊃∼ pk is demonstrable.
23perhaps “at most one”, or “exactly one”
24The text that follows should be a continuation of p. 15. of the present Notebook III,
according to a note at the bottom of that page. Page 16. is crossed out in the manuscript
and pages 17.-18. are missing in the scanned manuscript.
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2. If the theorem is true for an expression E, then it is also true for the
negation ∼ E.
3. If it is true for two expressions G,H then it is also true for the expression
G ∨H .
After having proved these three lemmas we are finished. Because any
expression J21.K E containing only the variables p1, . . . , pn and the operations
∼,∨ is formed by iterated application of the operations ∼,∨ beginning with
the variables p1, . . . , pn. Now by (1.) we know that the theorem is true for
the variables p1, . . . , pn and by (2.) and (3.) we know that it remains true if
we form new expressions by application of ∼ and ∨ to expressions for which
it is true. Hence it will be true for any expression of the considered type. So
it remains only to prove these three auxiliary propositions.
J22.K (1.) means: For any variable pk (of the series p1, . . . , pn) and any
fundamental conjunction P
(n)
i either P
(n)
i ⊃ pk or P (n)i ⊃∼ pk is demonstra-
ble. But now the letter pk or the negation ∼ pk must occur among the
members of this fundamental conjunction P
(n)
i by definition of a fundamental
conjunction. On the other hand we know that for any conjunction it is
demonstrable that the conjunction implies any of its members. (I proved
that explicitly for conjunctions of two and three members and remarked
that the same method will prove it for conjunctions of any J23.K number of
members. The exact proof would have to go by an induction on the number
of members. For two, proved. Assume P (n) has n members and p is a variable
among them. Then P (n) is P (n−1) . r:
1. p occurs in P (n−1); then P (n−1) ⊃ p, hence P (n−1) . r ⊃ p.
2. r is p; then P (n−1) . p ⊃ p is demonstrable.) Hence if pk occurs among
the members of P
(n)
i then P
(n)
i ⊃ pk is demonstrable and if ∼ pk occurs
among them then P
(n)
i ⊃∼ pk is demonstrable. So one of these two formulas
is demonstrable in any case and that is exactly the assertion of lemma (1.).
Now to (2.), i.e. let us assume the theorem is true for E, i.e. for any
fundamental conjunction P
(n)
i either P
(n)
i ⊃ E or P (n)i ⊃∼ E is demonstrable
and let us show that the theorem is true also for the expression ∼ E, i.e. for
any P
(n)
i either P
(n)
i ⊃∼ E or P (n)i ⊃∼ (∼ E) is demonstrable for any P (n)i
P
(n)
i ⊃ E P (n)i ⊃∼ E
P
(n)
i ⊃∼ E P (n)i ⊃∼ (∼ E)
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(because it is J24.K this what the theorem says if applied to ∼ E). But
now in the first case if P
(n)
i ⊃ E is demonstrable then P (n)i ⊃ ∼ (∼ E) is
also demonstrable because E ⊃∼ (∼ E) is demonstrable by substitution in
the law of double negation, and if both P
(n)
i ⊃ E and E ⊃ ∼ (∼ E) are
demonstrable then also P
(n)
i ⊃ ∼ (∼ E) by the rule of syllogism. So we see
if the first case is realized for E then the second case is realized for ∼ E and
of course if the second case is realized for E the first case is realized for ∼ E
(because they say the same thing). J25.K So if one of the two cases is realized
for E then also one of the two cases is realized for ∼ E, i.e. if the theorem is
true for E it is also true for ∼ E which was to be proved.
Now to (3.). Assume the theorem true for G,H and let P
(n)
i be any arbi-
trary fundamental conjunction of p1, . . . , pn. Then P
(n)
i ⊃ G is demonstrable
or P
(n)
i ⊃∼ G is demonstrable and P (n)i ⊃ H is demonstrable or P (n)i ⊃∼ H
is demonstrable by assumption and we have to prove from these assumptions
that also:
P
(n)
i ⊃ G ∨H or
P
(n)
i ⊃∼ (G ∨H) is demonstrable.
In order to do that distinguish three cases:
J26.K
1. [For G first case realized, i.e.] P
(n)
i ⊃ G is demonstrable; then we
have G ⊃ G ∨ H also by substitution in axiom, hence P (n)i ⊃ G ∨ H
demonstrable by rule of syllogism [hence first case realized for G ∨H ].
2. case [ForH first case realized] P
(n)
i ⊃ H is demonstrable; then H ⊃ G∨
H by substitution in formula 10.*, hence P
(n)
i ⊃ G∨H is demonstrable
by rule of syllogism [hence first case realized for G ∨H ].
3. case Neither for G is P
(n)
i ⊃ G nor for H is P (n)i ⊃ H the first case
realized. Thus for both of them second case happens, i.e. P
(n)
i ⊃ ∼ G
and P
(n)
i ⊃ ∼ H are both demonstrable by assumption, but then by
rule of transposition G ⊃ ∼ P (n)i and H ⊃ ∼ P (n)i are demonstrable.
Hence G ∨H ⊃ ∼ P (n)i by rule of Dilemma. Hence P (n)i ⊃ ∼ (G ∨H)
by transposition [i.e. second case realized for G ∨H ].
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J27.K So we see in each of the three cases which exhaust all possibilities
either P
(n)
i ⊃ G ∨ H or P (n)i ⊃ ∼ (G ∨ H) is demonstrable, namely the
first happens in case 1 and 2, the second in case 3. But that means that
the theorem is true for G ∨ H since P (n)i was any arbitrary fundamental
conjunction. So we have proved the three lemmas and therefore the auxiliary
theorem for all expressions E containing only ∼,∨.
Now let us assume in particular that E is a tautology of this kind (i.e.
containing only the letters p1, . . . , pn and only ∼,∨); then I maintain J28.K
that P
(n)
i ⊃ E is demonstrable for any fundamental conjunction P (n)i . Now
we know from the preceding theorem that certainly either P
(n)
i ⊃ E or P (n)i ⊃
∼ E is demonstrable. So it remains only to be shown that the second case,
that P
(n)
i ⊃∼ E is demonstrable, can never occur if E is a tautology and that
can be shown as follows: As I mentioned before any demonstrable proposition
is a tautology. But on the other hand we can easily see that P
(n)
i ⊃ ∼ E
is certainly not a tautology if E is a tautology because the truth value of
P
(n)
i ⊃∼ E will be false J29.K in the ith line of its truth table. For in the ith
line P
(n)
i is true as we saw before and E is also true in the i
th line because it
is assumed to be a tautology, hence true in any line. Therefore ∼ E will be
false in the ith line, therefore Pi ⊃ ∼ E will be false in the ith line because
Pi is true and ∼ E false and therefore Pi ⊃ ∼ E false by the truth table of
⊃. So this expression Pi ⊃∼ E has F in the ith line of its truth table, hence
is not a tautology, hence cannot be demonstrable and therefore P
(n)
i ⊃ E is
demonstrable for any fundamental conjunction P
(n)
i , if E J30.K is a tautology
containing only ∼,∨, p1, . . . , pn.
But from the fact that P
(n)
i ⊃ E is demonstrable for any P (n)i it follows
that E is demonstrable in the following way: We can show first that also
for any fundamental conjunction P
(n−1)
i of the n− 1 variables p1, . . . , pn−1,
P
(n−1)
i ⊃ E is demonstrable because if P (n−1)i is a fundamental conjunction of
the n− 1 variables p1, . . . , pn−1 then P (n−1)i . pn is a fundamental conjunction
of the n variables p1, . . . , pn and likewise P
(n−1)
i . ∼ pn is a fundamental
conjunction of the n variables p1, . . . , pn; therefore by our previous theorem
J31.K P
(n−1)
i .pn ⊃ E and P (n−1)i . ∼ pn ⊃ E are both demonstrable. Applying
the rule of exportation and commutativity to those two expressions we get
pn ⊃ (P (n−1)i ⊃ E) and ∼ pn ⊃ (P (n−1)i ⊃ E) are both demonstrable.
To be more exact we have to apply first the rule of exportation and then
the rule of commutativity because the rule of exportation gives P
(n−1)
i ⊃
(pn ⊃ E). But now we can apply the rule of dilemma to these two formulas
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(P ⊃ R,Q ⊃ R : P ∨ Q ⊃ R) and obtain ∼ pn ∨ pn ⊃ (P (n−1)i ⊃ E) is
demonstrable; and now since ∼ pn ∨ pn is demonstrable we can apply the
rule of implication again and obtain P
(n−1)
i ⊃ E is demonstrable which was
to be shown. Now since this holds J32.K for any fundamental conjunction
P
(n−1)
i of the n− 1 variables p1, . . . , pn−1 it is clear that we can apply the same
argument again and prove that also for any fundamental conjunction P
(n−2)
i of
the n−2 variables p1, . . . , pn−2, P (n−2)i ⊃ E is demonstrable. So by repeating
this argument n− 1 times we can finally show that for any fundamental
conjunction of the one variable p1 this implication is demonstrable, but that
means p1 ⊃ E is demonstrable and ∼ p1 ⊃ E is demonstrable (because p1
and ∼ p1 are the fundamental conjunction of the one variable J33.K p1), but
then ∼ p1 ∨ p1 ⊃ E is demonstrable by rule of dilemma and therefore E is
demonstrable by rule of implication.
Incidentally so we have shown that any tautology containing only ∼ and
∨ is demonstrable, but from this it follows that any tautology whatsoever is
demonstrable because: let P be one containing the defined symbols . ,⊃,≡ .
I then denote by P ′ the expression obtained from P by replacing . ,⊃,≡ by
their definiens, i.e. R.S by ∼ (∼ R∨ ∼ S) wherever it occurs in P etc. Then
P ′ will also be a tautology. But P ′ is a tautology containing only ∼,∨ hence
P ′ is demonstrable, but then also P is demonstrable because it is obtained
from P ′ by one or several applications of the rule of defined symbol, namely
since P ′ was obtained from P by replacing p . q by ∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) etc. P is
obtained from P ′ by the inverse substitution, but each such substitution is
an application of rule of defined symbol, hence: If P ′ is demonstrable then
also P is demonstrable.
As an example take the formula (p ⊃ q) ∨ (q ⊃ p) which is a tautology.
1. Without defined symbols (∼ p ∨ q) ∨ (∼ q ∨ p) = E
2. Fundamental conjunctions in p, q
p . q, p . ∼ q, ∼ p . q, ∼ p . ∼ q
To prove that p . q ⊃ E etc. are all demonstrable we have to verify our
auxiliary theorem successively for all particular formulas, i.e. for p, q, ∼ p,
∼ q, ∼ p ∨ q, ∼ q ∨ p, E.
J34.K
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p q ∼ p ∼ q ∼ p ∨ q ∼ q ∨ p
p . q ⊃ p q ∼ (∼ p) ∼ (∼ q) ∼ p ∨ q ∼ q ∨ p
p . ∼ q ⊃ p ∼ q ∼ (∼ p) ∼ q ∼ (∼ p ∨ q) ∼ q ∨ p
∼ p . q ⊃ ∼ p q ∼ p ∼ (∼ q) ∼ p ∨ q ∼ (∼ q ∨ p)
∼ p . ∼ q ⊃ ∼ p ∼ q ∼ p ∼ q ∼ p ∨ q ∼ q ∨ p
(∼ p ∨ q) ∨ (∼ q ∨ p)
E
E
E
E
p . ∼ q ⊃∼ (∼ p) ∼ p ⊃∼ (p . ∼ q)
p . ∼ q ⊃∼ q q ⊃∼ (p . ∼ q)
∼ p ∨ q ⊃∼ (p . ∼ q)
p . ∼ q ⊃∼ (∼ p ∨ q)
p . q ⊃ E p ⊃ (q ⊃ E)
∼ p . q ⊃ E ∼ p ⊃ (q ⊃ E)
∼ p ∨ p ⊃ (q ⊃ E)
q ⊃ E
p . ∼ q ⊃ E p ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ E)
∼ p . ∼ q ⊃ E ∼ p ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ E)
∼ p ∨ p ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ E)
∼ q ⊃ E
J35.K ∼ q ∨ q ⊃ E E
1.1.12 Independence of the axioms
Now after having proved that any tautology can be derived from the four
axioms, the next question which arises is whether all of those four axioms
are really necessary to derive them or whether perhaps one or the other of
them is superfluous. That would mean one of them could be left out and
nevertheless the remaining three would allow to derive all tautologies. If
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this were the case then in particular also the superfluous axiom (since it is a
tautology) could be derived from the three other, J36.K i.e. it would not be
independent from the other. So the question comes down to investigating the
independence of the four axioms from each other. That such an investigation
is really necessary is shown very strikingly by the last development. Namely
when Russell first set up this system of axioms for the calculus of propositions
he assumed a fifth axiom, namely the associative law for disjunction and only
many years later it was proved by P. Bernays that this associative law was
superfluous, i.e. could J37.K be derived from the others. You have seen in
one of the previous lectures how this derivation can be accomplished. But
Bernays has shown at the same time that a similar thing cannot happen for
the four remaining axioms, i.e. that they are really independent from each
other.
Again here as in the completeness proof the interest does not lie so much in
proving that these particular four axioms are independent but in the method
to prove it, because so far we have only had an opportunity to prove that
certain propositions follow from other propositions. But now we are con-
fronted with the opposite problem to show that certain propositions do not
follow from certain others and this problem requires evidently an entirely
new method for its solution. This method is very interesting and somewhat
connected with the questions of many-valued logics.
You know the calculus of propositions can be interpreted as an algebra in
which J38.K we have the two operations of logical addition and multiplication
as in usual algebra but in addition to them a third operation, the negation and
besides some operations defined in terms of them (⊃,≡ etc.). The objects to
which those operations are applied are the propositions. So the propositions
can be made to correspond to the numbers of ordinary algebra. But as you
know all the operations . ,∨ etc. which we introduced are “truth functions”
and therefore it is only the truth value of the propositions that really matters
in this algebra, J39.K i.e. we can consider them as the numbers of our algebra
instead of the propositions (simply the two “truth values” T and F). And
this is what we shall do, i.e. our algebra (as opposed to usual algebra) has
only two numbers T, F and the result of the operations . ,∨,∼ applied to
these two numbers is given by the truth table, i.e. T ∨ F = T (i.e. the sum
of the two numbers T and F is T) T ∨ T = T, F ∨ T = T, F ∨ F = F,
∼T = F, ∼F = T. In order to stress J40.K more the analogy to algebra I
shall also write 1 instead of T and 0 instead of F. Then in this notation
the rules for logical multiplication would look like this: 1 . 1 = 1 , 0 . 1 = 0,
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1.0 = 0, 0.0 = 0. If you look at this table you see that logical and arithmetical
multiplication exactly coincide in this notation. Now what are the tautologies
considered from this algebraic standpoint? They are expressions f(p, q, r, . . .)
which have always the value 1 whatever numbers p, q, r may be, J41.K i.e.
in algebraic language expressions identically equal to one f(p, q, . . .) = 1
and the contradictions expressions identically zero f(p, q, . . .) = 0. So an
expression of usual algebra which would correspond to a contradiction would
be e.g. x2 − y2 − (x+ y)(x− y); this is equal to 0.
But now from this algebraic standpoint nothing can prevent us to con-
sider also other similar algebras with say three numbers 0, 1, 2 instead of
two and with the operations ∨, . ,∼ defined in some different manner. For
any such algebra we shall have tautologies, J42.K i.e. formulas equal to 1
and contradictions equal to 0, but they will of course be different formulas
for different algebras. Now such algebra with three and more numbers were
used by Bernays for the proof of independence, e.g. in order to prove the
independence of the second axiom Bernays considers the following algebra:
3 numbers 0, 1, 2
negation ∼ 0 = 1 ∼ 1 = 0 ∼ 2 = 2
addition 1 ∨ x = x ∨ 1 = 1 2 ∨ 2 = 1
0 ∨ 0 = 0 2 ∨ 0 = 0 ∨ 2 = 2
Implication and other operations need not be defined separately because
p ⊃ q = ∼ p ∨ q.
J43.K A tautology is a formula equal to 1, e.g. ∼ p ∨ p because for p
equal to 0 or 1 it is equal to 1, because the operations for 0, 1 as arguments
coincide with the operations of the usual calculus of propositions; if p = 2
then ∼ p = 2 and 2 ∨ 2 = 1 is also true. Also p ⊃ p is a tautology because
by definition it is the same as ∼ p ∨ p.
Now for this algebra one can prove the following proposition:
1. Axioms (1), (3), (4) are tautologies in this algebra.
2. For each of the three rules of inference we have: If the premises are
tautologies in this algebra then so is the conclusion.
J44.K I.e.
1. If P and P ⊃ Q are tautologies then Q is a tautology.
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2. If Q′ by substitution from Q and Q is a tautology then also Q′ is
a tautology.
3. If Q′ is obtained from Q by replacing P ⊃ Q by ∼ P ∨Q etc. and
Q is a tautology then also Q′ is a tautology.
3. The axiom (2) is not a tautology in this algebra.
After having shown these three lemmas we are finished because by 1, 2:
Any formula demonstrable from axioms (1), (3), (4) by the three rules of
inference is a tautology for our algebra but axiom (2) is not a tautology for
our J45.K algebra. Hence it cannot be demonstrable from (1), (3), (4).
Now to the proof of the lemmas 1, 2, 3. First some auxiliary theorems
(for 1 I say true and for 0 false because for 1 and 0 the tables of our algebra
coincide with those for T and F):
1. p ⊃ p (we had that before, because ∼ p ∨ p = 1 also ∼ 2 ∨ 2 = 1)
2. 1 ∨ p = p ∨ 1 = 1 0 ∨ p = p ∨ 0 = p
3. p ∨ q = q ∨ p
4. Also in our three-valued algebra we have: An implication whose first
member is 0 is 1 and an implication whose second member is 1 is also
1 whatever the other member may be, i.e. 0 ⊃ p = 1 and p ⊃ 1 = 1
because:
1.) 0 ⊃ p =∼ 0 ∨ p = 1 ∨ p = 1
J46.K
2.) p ⊃ 1 =∼ p ∨ 1 = 1
Now (1) p ⊃ p ∨ q = 1
1. p = 0 → p ⊃ p ∨ q = 1
2. p = 1 → 1 ⊃ 1 ∨ q = 1 ⊃ 1 = 1
(3) p ∨ q = q ∨ p → p ∨ q = q ∨ p = 1
(4) (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q) E
1. r = 0 r ∨ p = p r ∨ q = q E = (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q) = 1
2. r = 1 r ∨ p = r ∨ q = 1 E = (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (1 ⊃ 1) = (p ⊃ q) ⊃ 1 = 1
NOTEBOOK III — 1.1.12 Independence of the axioms 61
J47.K
3. r = 2
α.) q = 1, 2 r ∨ q = 2 ∨ 1 = 1
= 2 ∨ 2 = 1
r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q = 1
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q) = 1
β.) q = 0
1. p = 0 r ∨ p = r ∨ q
(r ∨ p) ⊃ (r ∨ q) = 1
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ⊃ p) ⊃ (r ∨ q) = 1
2. p = 1 p ⊃ q = 0
E = 1
3. p = 2
(2 ⊃ 0) ⊃ (2 ∨ 2 ⊃ 2 ∨ 0) = 2 ⊃ (1 ⊃ 2) = 2 ⊃ 2 = 1
J48.K Lemma 2. A. p = 1 p ⊃ q = 1 → q = 1
1 =∼ p ∨ q = 0 ∨ q = q
Hence if f(p, q, . . .) = 1 then
f(p, q, . . .) ⊃ g(p, q, . . .) = 1
g(p, q, . . .) = 1
B. Rule of substitution holds for any truth-value algebra, i.e. if f(p, q, . . .) =
1 then f(g(p, q, . . .), q, . . .) = 1.
C. Rule of defined symbol likewise holds because p ⊃ q and ∼ p ∨ q have
the same truth table.
J49.K Lemma 3. (2) p ∨ p ⊃ p is not a tautology, i.e.
2 ∨ 2 ⊃ 2 = 1 ⊃ 2 =∼ 1 ∨ 2 = 0 ∨ 2 = 2 6= 1
So the lemmas are proved and therefore also the theorem about the indepen-
dence of Axiom (2).
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1.1.13 Remark on disjunctive and conjunctive normal
forms
We have already developed a method for deciding of any given expression
whether or not it is a tautology, namely the truth-table method. I want
to develop another method which uses the analogy of the rules of the J50.K
calculus of proposition with the rules of algebra. We have the two distributive
laws:
p . (q ∨ r) ≡ (p . q) ∨ (p . r) p . q ≡ q
p ∨ (q . r) ≡ (p ∨ q) . (p ∨ r) p ∨ q ≡ q
In order to prove them by the shortened truth-table method I use the fol-
lowing facts which I mentioned already once at the occasion of one of the
exercises:
if p is true p . q ≡ q
if p is false p ∨ q ≡ q
In order to prove those equivalences I distinguish two cases: 1. p true and 2.
p false.25
J51.K Now the distributive laws in algebra make it possible to decide
of any given expression containing only letters and +,−, · whether or not
it is identically zero, namely by factorizing out all products of sums, e.g.
x2− y2− (x+ y)(x− y) = 0. A similar thing is to be expected in the algebra
of logic. Only two differences: 1. In logic we have the negation which has
no analogue in algebra. But for negation we have also a kind of distributive
law given by the De Morgan formulas ∼ (p ∨ q) ≡ ∼ p . ∼ q J52.K and
∼ (p . q) ≡∼ p∨ ∼ q. (Proved very easily by the truth-table method.) These
formulas allow us to get rid of the negations by shifting them inwards to the
letters occurring in the expression. The second difference is that we have two
distributive laws and therefore two possible ways of factorizing. If we use the
first law we shall get as the final result a sum of products of single letters as
in algebra. By using the other law of distribution we get a product of sums
unlike in algebra. I think it is best to explain that on an J53.K example:
× 1. (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃∼ p)
25There seems to be a gap in the text here.
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∼ (∼ p ∨ q) ∨ (q ∨ ∼ p)
(p . ∼ q) ∨ q ∨ ∼ p disjunctive
(p ∨ q ∨ ∼ p) . (∼ q ∨ q∨ ∼ p) conjunctive
× 2. (p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃∼ q) . p
(∼ p ∨ q) . (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) . p conjunctive
(∼ p . ∼ p ∨ q . ∼ p ∨ ∼ p . ∼ q ∨ q . ∼ q) . p
(∼ p . p) ∨ (q . ∼ p . p) ∨ (∼ p . ∼ q . p) ∨ (q . ∼ q . p) disjunctive
3. (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)
∼ (∼ p ∨ q) ∨ [∼ (r ∨ p) ∨ r ∨ q]
(p . ∼ q) ∨ (∼ r . ∼ p) ∨ r ∨ q disjunctive
(p ∨ ∼ r ∨ r ∨ q) . (p ∨ ∼ p ∨ r ∨ q) .
(∼ q ∨ ∼ r ∨ r ∨ q) . (∼ q ∨ ∼ p ∨ r ∨ q) conjunctive
1.1.14 Sequents and natural deduction system
J1.K26 In the last two lectures a proof for the completeness of our system of
axioms for the calculus of propositions was given, i.e. it was shown that any
tautology is demonstrable from these axioms. Now a tautology is exactly
what in traditional logic would be called a law of logic or a logically true
proposition. J2.K Therefore this completeness proof solves for the calculus
of propositions the second of the two problems which I announced in the
beginning of my lectures, namely it shows how all laws of a certain part of
logic namely of the calculus of propositions can be deduced from a finite
number of logical axioms and rules of inference.
I wish to stress that the interest of this result does not lie so much in
this that our particular four axioms and three rules are sufficient to deduce
everything, J3.K but the real interest consists in this that here for the first
time in the history of logic it has really been proved that one can reduce
all laws of a certain part of logic to a few logical axioms. You know it has
often been claimed that this can be done and sometimes the laws of identity,
contradiction, excluded middle have been considered as the logical axioms.
But not even the shadow of a proof was given that every logical inference
can be derived from them. Moreover the assertion to be proved was not even
26Here the numbering of pages in the present Notebook III starts anew with 1.
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clearly formulated, because J4.K it means nothing to say that something can
be derived e.g. from the law of contradiction unless you specify in addition
the rules of inference which are to be used in the derivation.
As I said before it is not so very important that just our four axioms are
sufficient. After the method has once been developed, it is possible to give
many other sets of axioms which are also sufficient to derive all tautologies
of the calculus J5.K of propositions, e.g.
p ⊃ (∼ p ⊃ q)
(∼ p ⊃ p) ⊃ p
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p ⊃ r)]
I have chosen the above four axioms because they are used in the standard
textbooks of logistics. But I do not at all want to say that this choice was
particularly fortunate. On the contrary our system of axioms is open to some
objections from the aesthetic point of view; e.g. one of the aesthetic require-
ments for a set of axioms is that the axioms should be as simple and evident
as possible, in any case simpler than the theorems to be proved, whereas in
our system J6.K e.g. the last axiom is pretty complicated and on the other
hand the very simple law of identity p ⊃ p appears as a theorem. So in
our system it happens sometimes that simpler propositions are proved from
more complicated axioms, which is to be avoided if possible. Recently by the
mathematician G. Gentzen a system was set up which avoids these disad-
vantages. I want to reference briefly about this system27 JNotebook IVK
J7.K28 or to be more exact on a system which is based on Gentzen’s idea, but
simpler than his. The idea consists in introducing another kind of implication
(denoted by an arrow →).29
27At the end of Notebook III there are in the manuscript thirteen not numbered pages
with formulae, sometimes significant, and jottings. Since it would be too intrusive to make
a selection of what would be appropriate for the edited text, they are not given here.
28The present p. 7., is in the manuscript the first numbered page of Notebook IV. It
is there preceded by four pages, which have been fitted in this edited text at the end of
Section 1.1.10 Theorems and derived rules of the system for propositional logic.
29The remainder of p. 7. is crossed out in the manuscript, but since pp. 8.-9. in the
present Notebook IV are missing in the scanned manuscript, and because of the interest
of this part of the text, this crossed out remainder is cited here: “such that P → Q means
Q is true under the assumption P . The difference of this implication as opposed to our
former one is
1. There can be any number of premises, e.g. P,Q → R means R holds under the
NOTEBOOK IV — 1.1.14 Sequents and natural deduction system 65
J10.K system with altogether three primitive terms →, ∼, ⊃. We have
now to distinguish between expressions in the former sense, i.e. containing
only ∼, ⊃ and variables, e.g. p ⊃ q, ∼ p ⊃ q, q ⊃ p ∨ r, etc., and secondary
formulas containing the arrow, e.g. p, p ⊃ q → q. I shall use capital Latin
letters P,Q only to denote expressions of the first kind, i.e. expressions in
our former sense, and I use capital Greek letters ∆,Γ to denote sequences of
an arbitrary number of assumptions P,Q,R . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
J11.K Hence a formula of Gentzen’s system will always have the form ∆→
S, a certain sequence of expressions of the first kind implies an expression of
the first kind. Now to the axioms and rules of inference.
I Any formula P → P where P is an arbitrary expression of the first
kind is an axiom and only those formulas are axioms.
J12.K So that is the law of identity which appears here as an axiom and as
the only axiom.
As to the rules of inference we have four, namely
1. The rule of addition of premises, i.e. from ∆ → A one can conclude
∆, P → A and P,∆ → A, i.e. if A is true under the assumptions ∆ then it
is a fortiori true under the assumptions ∆ and the further assumption P .
J13.K
2. The Rule of exportation:
∆, P → Q : ∆→ (P ⊃ Q)
If the propositions ∆ and P imply Q then the propositions ∆ imply that P
implies Q.
3. The Rule of implication:
∆→ P
∆→ Q
∆→ (P ⊃ Q)
So that is so to speak the rule of implication under some assumptions: If A
and A ⊃ B both hold under the assumptions ∆ then B also holds under the
assumptions ∆.
assumptions P,Q (i.e. the same thing which would be denoted by P .Q ⊃ R. In particular
the number of premises. . . ”
The next page, p. 10., begins with the second part of a broken sentence.
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4. Rule of Reductio ad absurdum or rule of indirect proof:
∆,∼ P → Q
∆→ P
∆,∼ P → ∼ Q
Here the premises mean that from the assumptions ∆ and ∼ P a contradic-
tion follows, i.e. ∼ P is incompatible J14.K with the assumptions ∆, i.e. from
∆ follows P .
Again it can be proved that every tautology follows from the axioms and
rules of inference. Of course only the tautologies which can be expressed in
terms of the symbols introduced, i.e. ∼, ⊃ and →. If we want to introduce
also ∨, . etc. we have to add the rule of the defined symbol . or other rules
concerning ∨, . etc.
Now you see that in this system the aforementioned disadvantages have
been avoided. All the axioms are really very simple and J15.K evident. It is
particularly interesting that also the pseudo-paradoxical propositions about
the implication follow from our system of axioms although nobody will have
any objections against the axioms themselves, i.e. everybody would admit
them if we interpret both the → and the ⊃ to mean “if. . . then”. Perhaps
I shall derive these pseudo-paradoxes as examples for derivations from this
system. The first reads:
q → p ⊃ q Proof:
J16.K
By I q → q
′′ 1 q, p→ q
′′ 2 q → (p ⊃ q)
Incidentally, again applying 2 we get → q ⊃ (p ⊃ q) which is another form
for the same theorem. The second paradox reads like this:
∼ p→ p ⊃ q Proof:
I p→ p
1 ∼ p, p,∼ q → p
I ∼ p→∼ p
1 ∼ p, p,∼ q →∼ p
4 ∼ p, p→ q
2 ∼ p→ (p ⊃ q)
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J17.K Incidentally this formula ∼ p, p → q which we derived as an in-
termediate step of the proof is interesting also on its own account; it says:
From a contradictory assumption everything follows since the formula is true
whatever the proposition q may be. I am sorry I have no time left to go into
more details about this Gentzen system. I want to conclude now this chapter
about the calculus of proposition.30
1.2 Predicate logic
1.2.1 First-order languages and valid formulas
J24.K I am concluding now the chapter about the calculus of propositions and
begin with the next chapter which is to deal with the so called calculus of
functions or predicates. As I explained formerly the calculus of propositions
is characterized by this that only propositions as a whole occur in it. The
letters p, q, r etc. denoted arbitrary propositions and all the formulas and
rules which we proved are valid whatever propositions p, q, r may be, i.e. they
are independent of the structure of the propositions involved. Therefore we
could use single letters p, q . . . to denote whole propositions.
J25.K But now we shall be concerned with inferences which depend on the
structure of the propositions involved and therefore we shall have to study at
first how propositions are built up of their constituents. To this end we ask
at first what do the simplest propositions which one can imagine look like.
Now evidently the simplest kind of propositions are those in which simply
some predicate is asserted of some subject, e.g. Socrates is mortal. Here the
predicate mortal is asserted to belong to the subject Socrates. Thus far we
are in agree- J26.K ment with classical logic.
But there is another type of simple proposition which was very much
neglected in classical logic, although this second type is more important for
the applications of logic in mathematics and other sciences. This second
type of simple proposition consists in this that a predicate is asserted of
several subjects, e.g. New York is larger than Washington. Here you have
two subjects, New York and Washington, and the predicate larger says that
a certain relation subsists between those two subjects. Another example is
“Socrates is the teacher of Plato”. So you see there are two different kinds
30Here p. 17. ends and pp. 18.-23. are missing in the scanned manuscript from the
present Notebook IV.
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J27.K of predicates, namely predicates with one subject as e.g. mortal and
predicates with several subjects as e.g. greater.
The predicates of the first kind may be called properties, those of the
second kind are called relations. So e.g. “mortal” is a property, “greater” is
a relation. Most of the predicates of everyday language are relations and not
properties. The relation “greater” as you see requires two subjects and there-
fore is called a dyadic relation. There are also relations which require three or
more subjects, e.g. betweenness is a relation with three subjects, i.e. triadic
relation. If I say e.g. New York J28.K lies between Washington and Boston.,
the relation of betweenness is asserted to subsist for the three subjects New
York, Washington and Boston, and always if I form a meaningful proposition
involving the word between I must mention three objects of which one is to
be in between the others. Therefore “betweenness” is called a triadic relation
and similarly there are tetradic, pentadic relations etc. Properties may be
called monadic predicates in this order of ideas.
I don’t want to go into any discussions of what predicates are (that could
lead J29.K to a discussion of nominalism and realism). I want to say about
the essence of a predicate only this. In order that a predicate be well-defined
it must be (uniquely and) unambiguously determined of any objects (what-
soever) whether the predicate belongs to them or not. So e.g. a property is
given if it is uniquely determined of any object whether or not the predicate
belongs to it and a dyadic relation is given if it is . . . uniquely determined
of any two objects whether or not the relation subsists between them. I
shall use capital letters M,P, to denote individual predicates—as e.g. mor-
tal, greater etc. J30.K and small letters a, b, c to denote individual objects as
e.g. Socrates, New York etc. (of which the predicates M,P . . . are asserted).
Those objects are usually called individuals in mathematical logic.
Now letM be a monadic predicate, e.g. “mortal”, and a an individual, e.g.
Socrates. Then the proposition that M belongs to a is denoted by M(a). So
M(a) means “Socrates is mortal” and similarly if G is a dyadic relation, e.g.
larger, and b, c two individuals, e.g. New York and Washington, then G(b, c)
means “The relation G subsists between b and c”, i.e. in our case “New
York is larger than Washington”. So in this notation there is no copula,
but e.g. the proposition “Socrates is mortal” J31.K has to be expressed like
this Mortality(Socrates), and that New York is greater than Washington by
Larger(New York, Washington).
That much I have to say about the simplest type of propositions which
say that some definite predicate belongs to some definite subject or subjects.
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These propositions are sometimes called atomic propositions because they
constitute so to speak the atoms of which the more complex propositions
are built up. But now how are they built up? We know already one way of
forming J32.K compound propositions namely by means of the operations of
the propositional calculus . ,∨,⊃ etc., e.g. from the two atomic propositions
“Socrates is a man” and “Socrates is mortal” we can form the composit
proposition “If Socrates is a man Socrates is mortal”; in symbols, if T denotes
the predicate of mortality it would read M(a) ⊃ T (a), or e.g. M(a) ∨ ∼
M(a) would mean “Either Socrates is a man or Socrates is not a man”.
M(a) . T (a) would mean “Socrates is a man and Socrates is mortal”, and
so on. The propositions which we can obtain in this way, i.e. by combining
atomic propositions by means J31.aK of the truth functions ∨, . etc. are
sometimes called molecular propositions.
But there is still another way of forming compound propositions which
we have not yet taken account of in our symbolism, namely by means of the
particles “every” and “some”. These are expressed in logistics by the use of
variables as follows: Take e.g. the proposition “Every man is mortal”. We
can express that in other words like this: “Every object which is a man is
mortal” or “For every object x it is true that M(x) ⊃ T (x)”. Now in order
to indicate that this implication J32.aK is asserted of any object x one puts
x in brackets in front of the proposition and includes the whole proposition
in brackets to indicate that the whole proposition is asserted to be true for
every x. And generally if we have an arbitrary expression, say Φ(x) which
involves a variable x, then (x)[Φ(x)] means “For every object x, Φ(x) is
true”, i.e. if you take an arbitrary individual a and substitute it for x then
the resulting proposition Φ(a) is true. As in our example (x)[M(x) ⊃ T (x)],
J33.K if you substitute Socrates for x you get the true proposition. And
generally if you substitute for x something which is a man you get a true
proposition because then the first and second term of the implication are
true. If however you substitute something which is not a man you also get a
true proposition because. . . So for any arbitrary object which you substitute
for x you get a true proposition and this is indicated by writing (x) in front
of the proposition. (x) is called the universal quantifier.
J34.K As to the particle “some” or “there exists” it is expressed by a
reversed ∃ put in brackets together with a variable (∃x). So that means:
there is an object x; e.g. if we want to express that some men are not mortal
we have to write (∃x)[M(x) . ∼ T (x)] and generally if Φ(x) is a propositional
function with the variable x, (∃x)[Φ(x)] means J35.K “There exits some object
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a such that Φ(a) is true”. Nothing is said about the number of objects for
which Φ(a) is true; there may be one or several. (∃x)Φ(x) only means there is
at least one object x such that Φ(x). (∃x) is called the existential quantifier.
From this definition you see at once that we have the following equivalences:
(∃x)Φ(x) ≡ ∼ (x)[∼ Φ(x)]
(x)Φ(x) ≡ ∼ (∃x)[∼ Φ(x)]
Generally (x)[∼ Φ(x)] means Φ(x) holds for no object and ∼ (∃x)[Φ(x)]
means there is no object x such that Φ(x). Again you see that these two
statements are equivalent with each other. It is easy e.g. to express the
traditional four J36.K types of propositions a, e, i, o in our notation. In each
case we have two predicates, say P , S and
SaP means every S is a P i.e. (x)[S(x) ⊃ P (x)]
SiP means some S are P i.e. (∃x)[S(x) . P (x)]
SeP means no S is a P i.e. (x)[S(x) ⊃ ∼ P (x)]
SoP means some S are ∼ P i.e. (∃x)[S(x) . ∼ P (x)]
You see the universal propositions have the universal quantifier in front of
them and the particular propositions the existential quantifier. I want to
mention that in classical logic two entirely different types of propositions are
counted as universal affirmative, namely propositions of the type “Socrates
is mortal” expressed by P (a) and “Every man is mortal” (x)[S(x) ⊃ P (x)].
J37.K Now the existential and universal quantifier can be combined with
each other and with the truth functions ∼, . . . in many ways so as to express
more complicated propositions.
J37.1K31 Thereby one uses some abbreviations, namely: Let Φ(xy) be
an expression containing two variables; then we may form: (x)[(y)[Φ(xy)]].
That means “For any object x it is true that for any object y Φ(xy)” that
evidently means “Φ(xy) is true whatever objects you take for x, y” and this is
denoted by (x, y)Φ(xy). Evidently the order of the variables is arbitrary here,
i.e. (x, y)Φ(xy) ≡ (y, x)Φ(xy). Similarly (∃x)[(∃y)[Φ(xy)]] means “There are
some objects x, y such that Φ(xy)” and this is abbreviated by (∃x, y)Φ(xy)
and means:. . . But it has to be noted that this does not mean that there
are really two different objects x, y satisfying Φ(xy). This formula is also
31This page followed by the new page below is inserted within p. 37, which continues
with the paragraph after the next starting with “I want now to give”.
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true if there is one object a such that Φ(aa) because then there exists an x,
namely a, such that there exists a y, namely again a, such that etc. Again
(∃x, y)Φ(xy) ≡ (∃y, x)Φ(xy).
But it is to be noted that this interchangeability holds JnewpageK only
for two universal or two existential quantifiers. It does not hold for an uni-
versal and an existential quantifier, i.e. (x)[(∃y)[Φ(yx)]] 6≡ (∃y)[(x)[Φ(yx)]].
Take e.g. for Φ(yx) the proposition “y greater than x”; then the first means
“For any object x it is true that there exists an object y greater than x”; in
other words “For any object there exists something greater”. The right-hand
side however means “There exists an object y such that for any x y is greater
than x”, there exists a greatest object. So that in our case the right side says
just the opposite of what the left side says. The above abbreviation is also
used for more than two variables, i.e. (x, y, z)[Φ(xyz)] (∃x, y, z)[Φ(xyz)].
I want now to give some examples for the notation introduced. Take e.g.
the proposition “For any integer there exists a greater one”. The predicates
occurring in this proposition are: 1. integer and 2. greater. Let us denote
them by I and > so I(x) is to be read “x is an integer” and > (xy) is to be
read “x greater y” or “y smaller x”. Then the proposition is expressed in
logistic symbolism as follows:
(x)[I(x) ⊃ (∃y)[I(y) . >(yx)]].
We can express the same fact by saying J38.K there is no greatest integer.
What would that look like in logistic symbolism:
∼(∃x)[I(x) . such that no integer is greater i.e. (y)[I(y) ⊃ ∼ >(yx)]].
As another example take the proposition “There is a smallest integer” that
would read:
(∃x)[I(x) . such that no integer is smaller i.e. (y)[I(y) ⊃ ∼ >(xy)]].
I wish to call your attention to a near at hand mistake. It would be wrong
to express this last proposition like this:
(∃x)[I(x) . (y)[I(y) ⊃ >(yx)]]
because that would mean there is an integer smaller than every integer. But
such an integer does not exist J39.K since it would have to be smaller than
itself. An integer smaller than every integer would have to be smaller than
itself—that is clear. So the second proposition is false whereas the first is
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true, because it says only there exists an integer x which is not greater than
any integer.
Another example for our notation may be taken from Geometry. Con-
sider the proposition “Through any two different points there is exactly one
straight line”. The predicates which occur in this proposition are 1. point
P (x), J40.K 2. straight line L(x), 3. different that is the negation of identity.
Identity is denoted by = and difference by 6=. = (xy) means x and y are
the same thing, e.g. = (Shakespeare, author of Hamlet), and 6= (xy) means
x and y are different from each other. There is still another relation that
occurs in our geometric proposition, namely the one expressed by the word
“through”. That is the relation which holds between a point x and a line
y if “y passes through x” or in other words if “x lies on y”. Let us denote
that relation by J(xy). Then the geometric proposition mentioned, in or-
der to be expressed in logistic symbolism, has to be splitted into two parts,
namely there is at least one line and there is at most one line. The first reads:
(x, y)[P (x) . P (y) . 6= (xy) ⊃ J41.K (∃u)[L(u) . J(xu) . J(yu)]]. So that means
that through any two different points there is. . . But it is not excluded by
that statement that there are two or three different lines passing through two
points. That there are no two different lines could be expressed like this
(x, y)[P (x) . P (y) . 6= (xy) ⊃ ∼ (∃u, v)[L(u) . L(v) . 6= (uv) .
J(xu) . J(yu) . J(xv) . J(yv)]]
I hope these examples will suffice to make clear how the quantifiers are to
be used. For any quantifier occurring in an expression there is a definite por-
tion of the expression to which it relates (called the scope of the expression),
e.g. scope of x whole expression, of y only this portion. . . So the scope is
the proposition of which it is asserted that it holds for all or every object. It
is indicated by the brackets which begin immediately behind the quantifier.
There are some conventions about leaving out these brackets, namely they
may be left out 1. if the scope is atomic, e.g. (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ p : (x)[ϕ(x)] ⊃ p,
not (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ p], 2. if the scope begins with ∼ or a quantifier, e.g.
(x) ∼ [ϕ(x) . ψ(x)] ∨ p : (x)[∼ [ϕ(x) . ψ(x)]] ∨ p
(x)(∃y)ϕ(x) ∨ p : (x)[(∃y)[ϕ(x)]] ∨ p
But these rules are only facultative, i.e. we may also write all the brackets if
it is expedient for the sake of clarity.
A variable to which a quantifier (x), (y), (∃x), (∃y) refers is called a
“bound variable”. In the examples which I gave, all variables J42.K are
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bound (e.g. to this x relates this quantifier etc.) and similarly to any variable
occurring in those expressions you can associate a quantifier which refers to
it. If however you take e.g. the expression: I(y) . (∃x)[I(x) . > (yx)], which
means: there is an integer x smaller than y, then here x is a bound variable
because the quantifier (∃x) refers to it. But y is not bound because the
expression contains no quantifier referring to it. Therefore y is called a free
variable of this expression. An expression containing free variables is not
a proposition, but it only becomes a proposition if the free variables are
replaced by individual objects, e.g. this expression here means J43.K “There
is an integer smaller than the integer y”. That evidently is not a definite
assertion which is either true or wrong. But if you substitute for the free
variable y a definite object, e.g. 7, then you obtain a definite proposition,
namely: “There is an integer smaller than 7”.
The bound variables have the property that it is entirely irrelevant by
which letters they are denoted; e.g. (x)(∃y)[Φ(xy)] means exactly the same
thing as (u)(∃v)[Φ(uv)]. The only requirement is that you must use differ-
ent letters for different bound variables. But even that is only necessary
for variables J44.K one of whom is contained in the scope of the other as
e.g. in (x)[(∃y)Φ(xy)], where y is in the scope of x which is the whole ex-
pression, and therefor it has to be denoted by a letter different from x;
(x)[(∃x)Φ(xx)] would be ambiguous. Bound variables whose scopes lie out-
side of each other however can be denoted by the same letter without any
ambiguity, e.g. (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ψ(x). For the sake of clarity we also require
that the free variables in a propositional function should always be denoted
by letters different from the bound variables; so e.g. ϕ(x) . (x)ψ(x) is not a
correctly formed propositional function, but ϕ(x) . (y)ψ(y) is one.
The examples of formulas which I gave last time and also the problems
to be solved were propositions concerning certain definite predicates I, <,
=, etc. They are true only for those particular predicates occurring in them.
But now exactly as in the calculus of propositions there are certain formulas
which are true whatever propositions the letters p, q, r may be so also in the
calculus of predicates J45.K there will be certain formulas which are true for
any arbitrary predicates. I denote arbitrary predicates by small Greek letters
ϕ, ψ. So these are supposed to be variables for predicates exactly as p, q . . .
are variables for propositions and x, y, z are variables for objects.
Now take e.g. the proposition (x)ϕ(x) ∨ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x), i.e. “Either every
individual has the property ϕ or there is an individual which has not the
property ϕ”. That will be true for any arbitrary monadic predicate ϕ. We
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had other examples before, e.g. (x)ϕ(x) ≡∼ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x) that again is true
for any arbitrary monadic predicate ϕ. Now exactly as in the calculus of
propositions such expressions which are true for all predicates are called
tautologies or universally true. Among them are e.g. all the formulas which
express the Aristotelian J46.K moods of inference, e.g. the mood Barbara is
expressed like this:
(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)[ψ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] ⊃ (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ χ(x)]
The mood Darii like this
ϕ MaP ψ
χ SiM ϕ
SiP
(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (∃x)[χ(x) . ϕ(x)] ⊃ (∃x)[χ(x) . ψ(x)]
1.2.2 Decidability and completeness in predicate logic
It is of course the chief aim of logic to investigate the tautologies and ex-
actly as in the calculus of propositions there are again two chief problems
which arise. Namely: 1. To develop methods for finding out about a given
expression whether or not it is a tautology, 2. To reduce all tautologies to a
finite number of logical axioms and rules of inference from which they can
be derived. I wish to mention right now that only J47.K the second problem
can be solved for the calculus of predicates. One has actually succeeded in
setting up a system of axioms for it and in proving its completeness (i.e. that
every tautology can be derived from it).
As to the first problem, the so called decision problem, it has also been
solved in a sense but in the negative, i.e. one has succeeded in proving that
there does not exist any mechanical procedure to decide of any given ex-
pression whether or not it is a tautology of the calculus of predicates. That
does not mean that there are any individual formulas of which one could
not decide whether or not they are J48.K tautologies. It only means that
it is not possible to decide that by a purely mechanical procedure. For the
calculus of propositions this was possible, e.g. the truth-table method is a
purely mechanical procedure which allows to decide of any given expression
whether or not it is a tautology. So what has been proved is only that a
similar thing cannot exist for the calculus of predicates. However for certain
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special kinds of formulas such methods of decision have been developed, e.g.
for all formulas with only monadic predicates (i.e. formulas without relations
in it); J49.K e.g. all formulas expressing the Aristotelian moods are of this
type because no relations occur in the Aristotelian moods.
Before going into more detail about that I must say a few more words
about the notion of a tautology of the calculus of predicates.
There are also tautologies which involve variables both for propositions
and for predicates, e.g.
p . (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[p . ϕ(x)]
i.e. if p is an arbitrary proposition and ϕ an arbitrary predicate then the
assertion on the left, i.e. “p is true and for every x, ϕ(x) is true” is equivalent
with the assertion on the right, i.e. “for every object J50.K x the conjunction
p . ϕ(x) is true”. Let us prove that, i.e. let us prove that the left side implies
the right side and vice versa the right side implies the left side. If the left
side is true that means: p is true and for every x, ϕ(x) is true, but then the
right side is also true because then for every x, p . ϕ(x) is evidently true.
But also vice versa: If for every x, p . ϕ(x) is true then 1. p must be true
because otherwise p . ϕ(x) would be true for no x and 2. ϕ(x) must be true
for every x since by assumption even p . ϕ(x) is true for every x. So you see
this equivalence holds for any predicate ϕ, J51.K i.e. it is a tautology.
There are four analogous tautologies obtained by replacing . by ∨ and
the universal quantifier by the existential quantifier, namely
2. p ∨ (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)]
3. p . (∃x)ϕ(x) ≡ (∃x)[p . ϕ(x)]
4. p ∨ (∃x)ϕ(x) ≡ (∃x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)]
I shall give the proof for them later on. These four formulas are of a great
importance because they allow to shift a quantifier over a symbol of con-
junction or disjunction. If you write ∼ p instead of p in the first you get
[p ⊃ (x)ϕ(x)] ≡ (x)[p ⊃ ϕ(x)]. This law of logic is used particularly fre-
quently in proofs as you will see later. Other examples of tautologies are
e.g.
(x)ϕ(x) . (x)ψ(x) ≡ (x)[ϕ(x) . ψ(x)]
(∃x)ϕ(x) ∨ (∃x)ψ(x) ≡ (∃x)[ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)]
or e.g.
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∼ (x)(∃y)ϕ(xy) ≡ (∃x)(y) ∼ ϕ(xy)
J52.K That means:
Proof. ∼ (x)(∃y)ϕ(xy) ≡
means
(∃x) ∼ (∃y)ϕ(xy), but ∼ (∃y)ϕ(xy) ≡ (y) ∼
ϕ(xy) as we saw before. Hence the whole expression is equivalent with ≡
(∃x)(y) ∼ ϕ(xy) which was to be proved.
Another example: (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x), i.e. If every individual has the
property ϕ then a fortiori there are individuals which have the property ϕ.
The inverse of this proposition is no tautology, i.e.
(∃x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) is not a tautology
because if there is an object x which has the property ϕ that does not imply
that every individual has the property ϕ.
But here there is an important remark J53.K to be made. Namely: In
order to prove that this formula here is not a tautology we must know that
there exists more than one object in the world. For if we assume that there
exists only one object in the world then this formula would be true for every
predicate ϕ, hence would be universally true because if there is only one
object, say a, in the world then if there is an object x for which ϕ(x) is
true this object must be a (since by assumption there is no other object),
hence ϕ(a) is true; but then ϕ is true for every object because by assumption
there exists only this object a. I.e. in a world with only one J54.K object
(∃x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) is a tautology. It is easy to find some expressions which
are universally true if there are only two individuals in the world etc., e.g.
(∃x, y)[ψ(x) . ψ(y) . ϕ(x) . ∼ ϕ(y)] ⊃ (x)[ψ(x)]
At present I only wanted to point out that the notion of a tautology of the
calculus of predicates needs a further specification in order to be precise. This
specification consists in this that an expression is called a tautology only if it
is universally true no matter how many individuals are in the world assuming
only that there is at least one (otherwise the meaning of the quantifiers is
not definite). So e.g. (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)ϕ(y); this is a tautology because it is
true. . . but this inverse is not because. . . It can be proved that this means
the same thing as if I said: An expression is a tautology if it is true in a
world with infinitely many individuals, i.e. one can prove that whenever an
expression is universally true in a world JNotebook VK J55.K with infinitely
many objects it is true in any world no matter how many individuals there
NOTEBOOK V — 1.2.2 Decidability and completeness in predicate. . . 77
may be and of course also vice versa. I shall not prove this equivalence but
shall stick to the first definition.
The formulas by which we expressed the tautologies contain free variables
(not for individuals) but for predicates and for propositions, e.g. ϕ here is a
free variable in this expression (no quantifier related to it, i.e. no (ϕ) (∃ϕ)
occurs); similarly here, so these formulas are really propositional functions
since they contain free variables.
And the definition of a tautology was that whatever particular propo-
sition or predicate you substitute for those free variables of predicates or
propositions you get a true proposition. The variables for individuals were
all bound.
We can extend the notion of a J56.K tautology also to such expressions
as contain free variables for individuals, e.g.
ϕ(x) ∨ ∼ ϕ(x)
This is a propositional function containing one free functional variable and
one free individual variable x and whatever object and predicate you substi-
tute for ϕ, x you get a true proposition. Formula
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y)
contains ϕ, y and is universally true because if M is an arbitrary predicate
and a an arbitrary individual then
(x)M(x) ⊃M(a)
So in general a tautological logical formula of the calculus of functions is a
propositional function composed of the above mentioned symbols and which
is true whatever particular J57.K objects and predicates and propositions you
substitute for free variables no matter how many individuals there exist. We
can of course express this fact, namely that a certain formula is a universally
true, by writing quantifiers in front, e.g.
(ϕ, x)[ϕ(x) ∨ ∼ ϕ(x)]
or
(ϕ, y)[(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y)]
For the tautology of the calculus of propositions
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(p, q)[p ⊃ p ∨ q]
But it is more convenient to make the convention that universal quantifiers
whose scope is the whole expression may be left out. So if a formula contain-
ing free variables is written down as an assertion, e.g. as an axiom or theorem,
it means that it holds for everything substituted for the free variables, i.e.
it means the same thing as if all variables were bound by quantifiers whose
scope is the whole expression. This convention is in agreement with the way
in which theorems are expressed in mathematics, e.g. the law of raising a sum
to the square is written (x+ y)2 = x2 + 2xy + y2, i.e. with free variables x, y
which express that this holds for any numbers. J57.1K It is also in agreement
with our use of variables for propositions in the calculus of propositions. The
axioms and theorems of the propositional calculus were written with free
variables, e.g. p ⊃ p∨q, and a formula like this was understood to mean that
it holds for any propositions p, q.
1.2.3 Axiom system for predicate logic
J58.K I hope that these examples will be sufficient and that I can now begin
with setting up the axiomatic system for the calculus of predicates which
allows to derive all tautologies of the calculus of predicates. The primitive
notions will be 1. the former ∼,∨ 2. the universal quantifier (x), (y). The
existential quantifier need not be taken as a primitive notion because it can
be defined in terms of ∼ and (x) by (∃x)ϕ(x) ≡∼ (x) ∼ ϕ(x). The formulas
of the calculus of predicates will be composed of three kinds of letters: p, q, . . .
propositional variables, ϕ, ψ, . . . functional variables for predicates, x, y, . . .
variables for individuals. Furthermore they will contain J59.K (x), (y),∼,∨
and the notions defined by those three, i.e. (∃x), (∃y),⊃, . ,≡, | etc. So the
quantifiers apply only to individual variables, propositional and functional
variables are free, i.e. that something holds for all p, ϕ is to be expressed by
free variables according to the convention mentioned before.
So all formulas given as examples before are examples for expressions of
the calculus of functions but also e.g. (∃x)ψ(xy) and [p . (∃x)ψ(xy)] ∨ ϕ(y)
would be examples etc. I am using the letters Φ,Ψ,Π to denote arbitrary
expressions of the calculus of predicates and if I wish to indicate that some
variable say x occurs in a formula as a free variable denote the formula by
Φ(x) ∨Ψ(xy) if x, y occur both free, which does not exclude that there may
be other free variables besides x, or x and y, in the formula.
NOTEBOOK V — 1.2.3 Axiom system for predicate logic 79
The axioms are like this:
I. The four axioms of the calculus of propositions
p ⊃ p ∨ q p ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ p
p ∨ p ⊃ p (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)
II. One specific axiom for the universal quantifier
Ax. 5 (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y)
This is the formula mentioned before which says: “For any y, ϕ it is true
that if ϕ holds for every x then it holds for y”.
These are all axioms which we need. The rules of inference are the fol-
lowing four:
J60.K
1 The rule of implication which reads exactly as for the calculus of propo-
sitions: If Φ,Ψ are any expressions then from Φ,Φ ⊃ Ψ you can con-
clude Ψ.
The only difference is that now Φ,Ψ are expressions which may involve quan-
tifiers and functional variables and individual variables in addition to the
symbols occurring in the calculus of propositions. So e.g.
from [p ∨ (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x)]] ⊃ ϕ(y) ∨ ∼ ϕ(y)
and [p ∨ (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x)]]
conclude ϕ(y) ∨ ∼ ϕ(y)
2 The rule of Substitution which has now three parts (according to the
three kinds of variables):
a) For individual variables x, y bound or free any other individual
variable may be substituted as long as our conventions about the
notion of free variables are observed, i.e. bound variable whose
scopes do not lie outside of each other must be denoted by differ-
ent letters and all free variables must be denoted by letters differ-
ent from all bound variables – [Rule of renaming the individual
variables].
J61.K b) For a propositional variable any expression may be substituted
with a certain restriction formulated later.
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c) If you have an expression Π and ϕ a functional variable occurring
in Π perhaps on several places and with different arguments ϕ(x),
ϕ(y),. . . and if Φ(x) is an expression containing x free then you
may substitute Φ(x) for ϕ(x), Φ(y) for ϕ(y) etc. simultaneously
in all places where ϕ occurs. Similarly for ϕ(xy) and Φ(xy).
J61.1K It is clear that this is a correct inference, i.e. gives a tautology
if the formula in which we substitute is a tautology, because if a formula is
a tautology that means that it holds for any property or relation ϕ, ψ, but
any propositional function with one or several free variables defines a certain
property or relation; therefore the formula must hold for them. Take e.g.
the tautology (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y) and substitute for ϕ the expression (∃z)ψ(zx)
which has one free individual variable. Now the last formula says that for
every property ϕ and any individual y we have: “If for any x ϕ(x) then ϕ(y)”.
But if ψ is an arbitrary relation then (∃z)ψ(zx) defines a certain property
because it is a propositional function with one free variable x. Hence the
above formula must hold also for this property, i.e. we have: If for every object
(x)[(∃z)ψ(zx)] then also for y (∃z)ψ(zy) and that will be true whatever the
relation ψ and the object y may be, i.e. it is again a tautology.
J62.K You see in this process of substitution we have sometimes to change
the free variables, as here we have to change x into y because the ϕ occurs
with the variable y here; if the ϕ occurred with the variable u ϕ(u) we would
have to substitute (∃z)ψ(zu) in this place. In this example we substituted an
expression containing x as the only free variable, but we can substitute for
ϕ(x) here also an expression which contains other free individual variables
besides x, i.e. also in this case we shall obtain a tautology. Take e.g. the
expression (∃z)χ(zxu). This is a propositional function with the free indi-
vidual variable x but it has the free individual variable u in addition. Now if
we replace χ by a special triadic relation R and u by a special object a then
(∃z)R(zxa) is a propositional function with one free variable x; hence J63.1K
it defines a certain property, hence the above formula holds, i.e.
(x)(∃z)R(zxa) ⊃ (∃z)R(zya)
whatever y may be, but this will be true whatever R, a may be; therefore if
we replace them by variables χ, u the formula obtained:
(x)(∃z)χ(zxu) ⊃ (∃z)χ(zyu)
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will be true for any χ, u, y, i.e. it is a tautology. So the rule of substitution
is also correct for expressions containing additional free variables u, and
therefore this Φ(x) is to mean an expression containing the free variable x
but perhaps some other free variables in addition.
J64.K Examples for the other two rules of substitution:
For propositional variable
p . (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[p . ϕ(x)]
substitute (∃z)ψ(z). Since this holds for every proposition it holds also for
(∃z)ψ(z) which is a proposition if ψ is any arbitrary predicate. Hence we
have for any predicates ψ, ϕ
(∃z)ψ(z) . (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[(∃z)ψ(z) . ϕ(x)]
But we are also allowed to substitute expressions containing free variables
and propositional variables e.g. (z)χ(zu) (free variable u) because if you take
for u any individual object a [and p any individual proposition pi] and χ any
relation R then J65.K this will be a proposition. And p.(x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[p.ϕ(x)]
holds for any proposition. So it will also hold for this, i.e.
[(z)χ(zu)] . (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[(z)χ(zu) . ϕ(x)]
will be true whatever p, χ, ϕ, u may be, i.e. a tautology.
Finally an example for substitution of individual variables:
For a bound (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y) : (z)ϕ(z) ⊃ ϕ(y). So this inference
merely brings out the fact that the notation of bound variables is ar-
bitrary.
The rule of substitution applied for free variables is more essential;
e.g. from (x, y)ϕ(xy) ⊃ ϕ(uv) we can conclude (x, y)ϕ(xy) ⊃ ϕ(uu)
by substituting u for v. This is an allowable substitution because the
variable which you substitute, u, does not occur as a bound variable.
It occurs as a free variable but that does not matter.
Of course if a variable occurs in several places it has to be replaced by
the same other variable J66.K in all places where it occurs. In the rule of
substitution for propositional and functional variable there is one restriction
to be made as I mentioned before, namely one has to be careful about the
letters which one uses for the bound variables, e.g.
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(∃x)[p . ϕ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)[p . ϕ(x)]
is a tautology. Here we cannot substitute ψ(x) for p because
(∃x)[ψ(x) . ϕ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)[ψ(x) . ϕ(x)]
is not a tautology, because here the expression which we substituted contains
a variable x which is bound in the expression in which we substitute. Rea-
son: This formula holds for any proposition p but not for any propositional
function with the free variable x.
Now if we substitute for p an expression Φ containing perhaps free vari-
ables y, z, . . . (but not the free variable x) then y, z will be free in the whole
expression. Therefore if y, z, . . . are replaced by definite things then Φ will
become a proposition because then all free variables contained in it are re-
placed by definite objects.
Therefore the expression to be substituted must not contain x as a free
variable because it would play the role of a propositional function and not of
a proposition. In order to avoid such occurrences we have to make in the rule
of substitution the stipulation that the expression to be substituted should
contain no variable J67.K (bound or free) which occurs in the expression in
which we substitute bound or free, excluding of course the variable x here. If
you add this restriction you obtain the formulation of the rule of substitution
which you have in your notes that were distributed.
So far I formulated two rules of inference (implication, substitution). The
third is
3 the rule of defined symbol which reads:
1. For any expressions Φ,Ψ , Φ ⊃ Ψ may be replaced by ∼ Φ ∨ Ψ
and similarly for . and ≡.
J68.K
2. (∃x)Φ(x) may be replaced by ∼ (x) ∼ Φ(x) and vice versa where
Φ(x) is any expression containing the free variable x. (So that
means that the existential quantifier is defined by means of the
universal quantifier in our system.)
The three rules of inference mentioned so far (implication, substitution,
defined symbol) correspond exactly to the three rules of inference which we
had in the calculus of propositions. Now we set up a fourth one which is
specific for the universal quantifier, namely:
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4 Rule of the universal quantifier: From Π ⊃ Φ(x), if Π does not contain
x as a free variable we can conclude J69.K Π ⊃ (x)Φ(x).
That this inference is correct can be seen like this: Assume pi is a definite
proposition and M(x) a definite propositional function with exactly one free
variable x and let us assume we know: pi ⊃ M(x) holds for every x. Then I
say we can conclude: pi ⊃ (x)M(x). For 1. if pi is false the conclusion holds,
2. if pi is true then by assumption M(x) is true for every x, i.e. (x)M(x) is
true; hence the conclusion again holds because it is an implication both terms
of which are true. So we have proved that in any case pi ⊃ (x)M(x) is true if
pi ⊃M(x) is true for every x. But from this consideration about a particular
proposition pi and a particular propositional J70.K function with one free
variable M(x) it follows that the above rule of inference yields tautologies if
applied to tautologies. Because assume Π ⊃ Φ(x) is a tautology. Now then Π
will contain some free variables for propositions p, q, . . . for functions ϕ, ψ, . . .
and for individuals y, z, . . . (x does not occur among them) and Φ(x) will
also contain free variables p, q, . . . , ϕ, ψ, . . . and free variables for individuals
x, y, z (x among them). Now if you substitute definite propositions for p, q,
definite predicates for ϕ, ψ and definite objects for y, z, . . . but leave x where
it stands then J71.K by this substitution all free variables of Π are replaced
by individual objects, hence Π becomes a definite proposition pi and all free
variables of Φ excluding x are replaced by objects; hence Φ(x) becomes a
propositional function with one free variable M(x) and we know pi ⊃ M(x)
is true for any object x because it is obtained by substitution of individual
predicates, propositions and objects in a tautology. But then as we have just
seen under this assumption pi ⊃ (x)M(x) is true. But this argument applies
whatever particular predicate, J72.K proposition etc. we substitute; always
the result pi ⊃ (x)M(x) is true, i.e. Π ⊃ (x)Φ(x) is a tautology. This rule of
course is meant to apply to any other individual variable y, z instead of x.
So these are the axioms and rules of inference of which one can prove that
they are complete: i.e. every tautology of the calculus of functions can be
derived.
Now I want to give some examples for derivations from these axioms.
Again an expression will be called demonstrable or derivable if it can be
obtained from Axioms (1). . . (4) and Ax. 5 by rules 1–4. First of all I wish
to remark that, since among our axioms and rules all axioms and rules of
the calculus of propositions occur, we can derive from our axioms and rules
all formulas and rules which we formerly derived in the calculus of proposi-
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tions. But the rules are now formulated for all expressions of the calculus of
predicates, e.g. if Φ,Ψ are such expressions
Φ ⊃ Ψ
Ψ ⊃ Π
Φ ⊃ Π
So we are justified to use them in the subsequent J73.K derivations. At first I
mention some further rules of the calculus of propositions which I shall need:
1. P ≡ Q : P ⊃ Q, Q ⊃ P and vice versa
2. P ≡ Q : ∼ P ≡∼ Q
1′. p ≡∼∼ p (2′. p ≡ p)
3′. (p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q) Importation
1. ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x)
(x)[∼ ϕ(x)] ⊃∼ ϕ(y) Substitution, Ax. 5
ϕ(y) ⊃∼ (x)[∼ ϕ(x)] Transposition ∼ ϕ(x)
ϕ(x)
ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) defined symbol
2. (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x)
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y) Ax. 5
ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) 1.
1.2.4 Remarks on the term “tautology” and “thinking
machines”
J73.1K Last time I set up a system of axioms and rules of inference from which
it is possible to derive all tautologies of the calculus of predicates. Incidentally
I wish to mention that the technical term tautology is somewhat out of
fashion at present, the word analytical (which goes back to Kant) is used in
its place, and that has certain advantages because analytical is an indifferent
term whereas the term tautological suggests a certain philosophy of logic,
namely the theory that the propositions of logic are in some sense void of
content, that they say nothing. Of course it is by no means necessary for
a J73.2K mathematical logician to adopt this theory, because mathematical
NOTEBOOK V — 1.2.4 Remarks on the terms “tautology” and. . . 85
logic is a purely mathematical theory which is wholly indifferent towards any
philosophical question. So if I use this term tautological I don’t want to
imply by that any definite standpoint as to the essence of logic, but the term
tautological is only to be understood as a shorter expression for universally
true. Now as to our axiomatic system the Axioms were as follows 1.32
2. Rules of inference
1 Implication Φ,Φ ⊃ Ψ : Ψ
2 Substitution a) individual variables
b) propositional variables
c) functional variables
3 Rule of defined symbol
1. For . , ⊃, ≡ as formerly
2. (∃x)Φ(x) may be replaced by ∼ (x) ∼ Φ(x) and vice versa
4 Rule of the universal quantifier Φ ⊃ Ψ(x) : Φ ⊃ (x)Ψ(x)
J73.3K It may seem superfluous to formulate so carefully the stipulations
about the letters which we have to use for the bound variables here in rule
2 because if you take account of the meaning of the expressions involved
you will observe these rules automatically, because otherwise they would
either be ambiguous or not have the intended meaning. To this it is to be
answered that it is exactly the chief purpose of the axiomatization of logic
to avoid this reference to the meaning of the formulas, i.e. we want to set up
a calculus which can be handled purely mechanically (i.e. a calculus which
makes thinking superfluous J73.4K and which can replace thinking for certain
questions).
In other words we want to put into effect as far as possible Leibnitz’s
program of a “calculus ratiocinator” which he characterizes by saying that
he expects there will be a time in the future when there will be no discussion
or reasoning necessary for deciding logical questions but when one will be able
simply to say “calculemus”, let us reckon exactly as in questions of elementary
arithmetic. This program has been partly carried out by this axiomatic
system for logic. For you see that the rules of inference can be applied J73.5K
purely mechanically, e.g. in order to apply the rule of syllogism Φ, Φ ⊃ Ψ
32These axioms, which are omitted at this place in the manuscript, are presumably those
on p. 59. of the present Notebook V.
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you don’t have to know what Φ or Ψ or the sign of implication means, but
you have only to look at the outward structure of the two premises. All you
have to know in order to apply this rule to two premises is that the second
premise contains the ⊃ and that the part preceding the ⊃ is conform with
the first premise. And similar remarks apply to the other axioms.
Therefore as I mentioned already it would actually be possible to con-
struct a machine which would do the following thing: The supposed machine
is to have a crank and whenever you turn the crank once around the ma-
chine would write down a tautology of the calculus of predicates and it would
write down every existing tautology of the calculus of predicates J73.6K if you
turn the crank sufficiently often. So this machine would really replace think-
ing completely as far as deriving of formulas of the calculus of predicates is
concerned. It would be a thinking machine in the literal sense of the word.
For the calculus of propositions you can do even more. You could con-
struct a machine in the form of a typewriter such that if you type down a
formula of the calculus of propositions then the machine would ring a bell if
it is a tautology and if it is not it would not. You could do the same thing
for the calculus J73.7K of monadic predicates. But one can prove that it is
impossible to construct a machine which would do the same thing for the
whole calculus of predicates. So here already one can prove that Leibnitz’s
program of the “calculemus” cannot be carried through, i.e. one knows that
the human mind will never be able to be replaced by a machine already for
this comparatively simple question to decide whether a formula is a tautology
or not.
1.2.5 Theorems and derived rules of the system for
predicate logic
J74K (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) Syllogism
3. ∼ (∃x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x) ∼ ϕ(x)
∼∼ (x) ∼ ϕ(x) ≡ (x) ∼ ϕ(x) p ≡∼∼ p (x) ∼ ϕ(x)
p
∼ (∃x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x) ∼ ϕ(x) defined symbol
4. p . (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[p . ϕ(x)]
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x)
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p . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ p . ϕ(y) Multiplication from left
p . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (y)[p . ϕ(y)] Rule 4 Φ : p . (x)ϕ(x) Ψ(y) : p . ϕ(y)
(x)[p . ϕ(x)] ⊃ p . ϕ(y) Ax. 5 Substitution p . ϕ(x)
ϕ(x)
p . ϕ(y) ⊃ ϕ(y) p . q ⊃ q ϕ(y)
q
p . ϕ(y) ⊃ p p . q ⊃ p
(x)[p . ϕ(x)] ⊃ ϕ(y) Syllogism
(x)[p . ϕ(x)] ⊃ p Syllogism
J75K (x)[p . ϕ(x)] ⊃ (y)ϕ(y) Rule 4
(x)[p . ϕ(x)] ⊃ p . (y)ϕ(y) Composition
5.? p ∨ (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)]
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y) Ax. 5
p ∨ (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ p ∨ ϕ(y) Addition from left
p ∨ (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (y)[p ∨ ϕ(y)] Rule 4
(x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)] ⊃ p ∨ ϕ(y) Ax. 5
p ∨ ϕ(y) ⊃ (∼ p ⊃ ϕ(y)) p ∨ q ⊃ (∼ p ⊃ q)
(x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)] ⊃ (∼ p ⊃ ϕ(y)) Syllogism
(x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)] . ∼ p ⊃ ϕ(y) Importation
(x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)] . ∼ p ⊃ (y)ϕ(y) Rule 4
(x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)]⊃ [∼ p ⊃ (y)ϕ(y)] Exportation
⊃ [p ∨ (y)ϕ(y)]
J76K
6. (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ψ(x)]
(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y)] Ax. 5 ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)
ϕ(x)
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y) Ax. 5
(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ [ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y)] . ϕ(y) Multiplication
[ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y)] . ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y) (p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q ϕ(y)
p
ψ(y)
q
(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x)⊃ ψ(y) Syllogism
88 EDITED TEXT
⊃ (y)ψ(y) Rule 4
(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (y)ψ(y)] Exportation
7. Derived Rule I
Φ(x) : (x)Φ(x)
P ⊃ Q : P . R ⊃ Q
p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ Φ(x) by addition of premises Q : P ⊃ Q
J77K p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ (x)Φ(x) Rule 4
p ∨ ∼ p
(x)Φ(x) Rule of implication
8. Derived rule II
Φ(x) ⊃ Ψ(x) : (x)Φ(x) ⊃ (x)Ψ(x)
1. (x)[Φ(x) ⊃ Ψ(x)]
2. Substitution: (x)[Φ(x) ⊃ Ψ(x)] ⊃ (x)Φ(x) ⊃ (x)Ψ(x)
3. Implication
?9. Derived rule III
Φ(x) ≡ Ψ(x) : (x)Φ(x) ≡ (x)Ψ(x)
Φ(x) ⊃ Ψ(x) (x)Φ(x) ⊃ (x)Ψ(x)
Ψ(x) ⊃ Φ(x) (x)Ψ(x) ⊃ (x)Φ(x)
. . .
J78K
?10. ∼ (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x)
ϕ(x) ≡∼∼ ϕ(x) double negation
(x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x) ∼∼ ϕ(x) Rule II
∼ (x)ϕ(x)≡∼ (x) ∼∼ ϕ(x) Transposition
≡ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x) defined symbol
?10′. (x)ϕ(x) ∨ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x)
(x)ϕ(x) ∨ ∼ (x)ϕ(x) Excluded middle
∼ (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x) ?10.
(x)ϕ(x) ∨ ∼ (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) ∨ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x) Implication
?11. (x)[ϕ(x) . ψ(x)] ≡ (x)ϕ(x) . (x)ψ(x)
NOTEBOOK V — 1.2.5 Theorems and derived rules of the system. . . 89
ϕ(x) . ψ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x)
(x)[ϕ(x) . ψ(x)] ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) Rule II
(x)[ϕ(x) . ψ(x)] ⊃ (x)ψ(x) ′′
(x)[ϕ(x) . ψ(x)] ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) . (x)ψ(x) Composition
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y)
(x)ψ(x) ⊃ ψ(y)
}
Ax. 5
(x)ϕ(x) . (x)ψ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x) . ψ(x) Composition
J79K (x)ϕ(x) . (x)ψ(x) ⊃ (x)[ϕ(x) . ψ(x)] Rule 4
?12. (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)[ψ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] ⊃ (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ χ(x)]
* (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)[ψ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] ⊃ (x){[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] .
[ψ(x) ⊃ χ(x)]} Substitution ?11.
[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . [ψ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] ⊃ [ϕ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] Substitution Syllogism
** (x){[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . [ψ(x) ⊃ χ(x)]} ⊃ (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] Rule II
* and ** with Syllogism give the result.
J80.K
13. Rule Ψ(x) ⊃ Φ : (∃x)Ψ(x) ⊃ Ψ
∼ Φ ⊃∼ Ψ(x)
∼ Φ ⊃ (x) ∼ Ψ(x)
∼ (x) ∼ Ψ(x) ⊃ Φ
(∃x)Ψ(x) ⊃ Φ
13′. ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x)
(x) ∼ ϕ(x) ⊃∼ ϕ(y)
ϕ(y) ⊃∼ (x) ∼ ϕ(x) defined symbol
14. (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [(∃x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ψ(x)]
[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [∼ ψ(x) ⊃∼ ϕ(x)]
× (x) ′′ (x) ′′
× (x)[∼ ψ(x) ⊃∼ ϕ(x)] ⊃ (x) ∼ ψ(x) ⊃ (x) ∼ ϕ(x)
× [(x) ∼ ψ(x) ⊃ (x) ∼ ϕ(x)] ⊃∼ (x) ∼ ϕ(x) ⊃∼ (x) ∼ ψ(x)
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃∼ p) (x) ∼ ψ(x)
p
(x) ∼ ϕ(x)
q
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(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [∼ (x) ∼ ϕ(x) ⊃∼ (x) ∼ ψ(x)] Rule of defined
symbol
J81.K
15. Rule corresponding to 14.
16. (∃x)[ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)] ≡ (∃x)ϕ(x) ∨ (∃x)ψ(x)
ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)
(∃x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)[ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)]
. . .
Dilemma
ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x)
ψ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ψ(x)
ϕ(y) ∨ ψ(y)⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) ∨ (∃x)ψ(x)
(∃y)[ ′′ ] ⊃ ′′ ′′
An example where we have to substitute for ϕ(x) something containing
other free variables besides x:
(y)(x)ψ(xy) ≡ (x)(y)ψ(xy)
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y)
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(u) ψ(xy)
ϕ(x)
* (x)ψ(xy) ⊃ ψ(uy)
(z)ϕ(z) ⊃ ϕ(y) (x)ψ(xz)
ϕ(z)
* (z)(x)ψ(xz) ⊃ (x)ψ(xy) * * Syllogism
(z)(x)ψ(xz) ⊃ ψ(uy) Rule 4 y
(z)(x)ψ(xz) ⊃ (y)ψ(uy) ′′ u
(z)(x)ψ(xz) ⊃ (u)(y)ψ(uy)
y x
(y)(x)ψ(xz) ⊃ (x)(y)ψ(uy)
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1.2.6 Existential presuppositions
J82.K I have mentioned already that among the tautological formulas of the
calculus of predicates are in particular those which express the Aristotelian
moods of inference, but that not all of the 19 Aristotelian moods are really
valid in the calculus of propositions. Some of them require an additional
third premise in order to be valid, namely that the predicates involved be
not vacuous; e.g. the mood Darapti is one of those not valid, it says
MaS, MaP : SiP , in symbols:
(x)[M(x) ⊃ S(x)] . (x)[M(x) ⊃ P (x)] ⊃ (∃x)[S(x) . P (x)]
But this is not a tautological formula because that would mean it holds for
any monadic predicates M,S, P whatsoever. But J83.K we can easily name
predicates for which it is wrong; namely if you take forM a vacuous predicate
which belongs to no object, say e.g. the predicate president of America born
in South Bend and for S and P any two mutually exclusive predicates, i.e.
such that no S is P , then the above formula will be wrong because the
two premises are both true. Since J84.K M(x) is false for every x we have
M(x) ⊃ S(x) is true for every x (because it is an implication with false
first term); likewise M(x) ⊃ P (x) is true for every x. I.e. the premises are
both true but the conclusion is false because S, P are supposed to be two
predicates such that there is no S which is a P . Hence for the particular
predicate we chose the first term of this whole implication is true and the
second is false, i.e. the whole formula is false. So there are predicates which
substituted in this formula yield a false proposition, hence this formula is not
a tautology. If we want to transform that expression into a real tautology we
have to add the further premise that M is not J85.K vacuous, i.e.
(∃x)M(x) . (x)[M(x) ⊃ S(x)] . (x)[M(x) ⊃ P (x)] ⊃ (∃x)[S(x) . P (x)]
would really be a tautology. Altogether there are four of the 19 Aristotelian
moods which require this additional premise. Furthermore SaP ⊃ SiP , P iS
(conversion) as I mentioned last time also requires that S is non-vacuous.
Also SaP ⊃∼ (SeP ), i.e. SaP and SeP cannot both be true, does not hold
in the logical calculus because if S is vacuous both SaP and SeP are true
(x)[S(x) ⊃ P (x)] . (x)[S(x) ⊃∼ P (x)]; S(x) = x is a president of the States
born in South Bend, P (x) = x is bald, then both
Every president. . . is bald
No president. . . is bald
92 EDITED TEXT
So we see Aristotle makes the implicit assumption that all predicates
which he speaks of are non-vacuous; in the logistic calculus however we do
not make this assumption, i.e. all tautologies and all formulas derivable from
our axioms hold for any predicates whatsoever they may be, vacuous or not.
J86.K Now one may ask: which procedure is preferable, to formulate the laws
of logic in such a way that they hold for all predicates vacuous and non-
vacuous or in such a way that they hold only for non-vacuous. I think there
can be no doubt that the logistic way is preferable for many reasons:
1. As we saw it may depend on purely empirical facts whether or not
a predicate is vacuous (as we saw in the example of a president of America
born in South Bend). Therefore if we don’t admit vacuous predicates it
will depend on empirical facts which predicates are to be admitted in logical
reasonings or which inferences are valid, but that J87.K is very undesirable.
Whether a predicate can be used in reasoning (drawing inferences) should
depend only on mere logical considerations and not on empirical facts.
But a second and still more important argument is this: that to exclude
vacuous predicates would be a very serious hampering, e.g. in mathematical
reasoning, because it happens frequently that we have to form predicates of
which we don’t know in the beginning of an argument whether or not they are
vacuous, e.g. in indirect proofs. If we want to prove that there does not exist
an algebraic equation whose root is pi we operate J88.K with the predicate
“algebraic equation with root pi” and use it in conclusions, and later on it
turns out that this predicate is vacuous. But also in everyday life it happens
frequently that we have to make general assertions about predicates of which
we don’t know whether they are vacuous. E.g. assume that in a university
there is the rule that examinations may be repeated arbitrarily often; then we
can make the statement: A student which has. . . ten times is allowed to. . .
for an eleventh time. But if we want to exclude vacuous predicates we cannot
express this true proposition if we don’t know whether there exists a student
who has. . . But of course this proposition (rule) has nothing to do with
the existence of a student. . . Or e.g. excluding vacuous predicates has the
consequence that we cannot always form the conjunction of two predicates,
e.g. president of U.S.A. is an admissible predicate, born in South Bend is
admissible, but president of America born in South Bend is not admissible.
So if we want to avoid absolutely unnecessary complications we must not
exclude the vacuous predicates and have to formulate the laws of logic in such
a way that they apply both to vacuous and non-vacuous predicates. I don’t
say that it is false to exclude them, but it leads to absolutely unnecessary
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complications.
1.2.7 Classes
As to the 15 valid moods of Aristotle they can all be expressed by one logistic
formula. However in order to do that I have first to embody the calculus of
monadic predicates in a different form, namely in the form of the calculus of
classes. J89.K The calculus of classes also yields the solution of the decision
problem for formulas with only monadic predicates.
If we have an arbitrary monadic predicate, say P , then we can consider
the extension of this predicate, i.e. the totality of all objects satisfying P ;
it is denoted by xˆ[P (x)]. These extensions of monadic predicates are all
called classes. So this symbol xˆ means: the class of objects x such that
the subsequent is true. It is applied also to propositional functions, e.g.
xˆ[I(x) . x > 7] means “the class of integers greater than seven”. J90.K So to
any monadic predicate belongs a uniquely determined class of objects as its
“extension”, but of course there may be different predicates with the same
extension, as e.g. the two predicates: heat conducting, elasticity conducting.
These are two entirely different predicates, but every object which has the
first property also has the second one and vice versa; therefore their extension
is the same, i.e. if H,E denotes them, xˆ[H(x)] = xˆ[E(x)] although H 6= E.
I am writing the symbol of identity and distinctness in between the two
identical objects as is usual in mathematics. I shall speak about this way
of writing in more detail later. In general we have if ϕ, ψ are two monadic
predicates then
xˆ[ϕ(x)] = xˆ[ψ(x)] ≡ (x)[ϕ(x) ≡ ψ(x)]
This equivalence expresses the essential property of extensions of predicates.
It is to be noted that we have not defined what classes are because we ex-
plained it by the term extension, and extensions we explained by the term
totality, and a totality is the same thing as a class. So this definition would
be circular. The real state of affairs is this: that we consider xˆ as a new
primitive (undefined) term, which satisfies this axiom here. Russell however
has shown that one can dispense with this xˆ as a primitive term by intro-
ducing it by a kind of implicit definition, but that would take too much time
to explain it; so we simply can consider it as a primitive.
The letters α, β, γ, . . . are used as variables for classes and the statement
that JNotebook VIK J91.K an object a belongs to α (or is an element of α)
94 EDITED TEXT
by a ε α. Hence
y ε xˆ[ϕ(x)] ≡ ϕ(y) Furthermore
{
α = xˆ[x ε α]
(x)[x ε α ≡ x ε β] ⊃ α = β
So far we spoke only of extensions of monadic predicates; we can also intro-
duce extensions of dyadic (and polyadic) predicates. If e.g. Q is a dyadic
predicate then xˆyˆ[Q(xy)] (called the extension of Q) will be something that
satisfies the condition:
xˆyˆ[ψ(xy)] = xˆyˆ[χ(xy)]. ≡ .(x, y)[ψ(xy) ≡ χ(xy)]
e.g. the class of pairs (x, y) such that Q(xy) would J92.K be something which
satisfies this condition, but the extension of a relation is not defined as the
class of ordered pairs, but is considered as an undefined term because or-
dered pair is defined in terms of extension of relations. An example for this
formula, i.e. an example of two different dyadic predicates which have the
same extension would be x < y, x > y ∨ x = y, x exerts an electrostatic
attraction on y, x and y are loaded by electricities of different sign.
Extensions of monadic predicates are called classes, extensions of polyadic
predicates are called relations in logistic. So in logistic the term relation is
used not for the polyadic predicates themselves but for their extensions, that
conflicts with the meaning of the term relation in everyday life and also
with the meaning in which I introduced this term a few lectures ago, but
since it is usual to use this term relation in this extensional sense I shall
stick to this use and the trouble is that there is no better term. If R is a
relation, the statement that x bears R J93.K to y is denoted by xRy. This
way of writing, namely to write the symbol denoting the relation between
the symbols denoting the objects for which the relation is asserted to hold, is
adapted to the notation of mathematics, e.g. <, x < y, =, x = y. Of course
we have:
(x, y)[xRy ≡ xSy] ⊃ R = S
for any two relations R, S, exactly as before (x)[x ε α ≡ x ε β] ⊃ α = β. So
a relation is uniquely determined if you know all the pairs which have this
relation because by this formula there cannot exist two different relations
which subsist between the same pairs (although there can exist many different
dyadic predicates).
Therefore a relation can be represented e.g. by a figure of arrows
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❜❜
❜ ❜
❜❅
❅
 
 
a
b
c
d
e✛
❘ ✒
✲
or by a quadratic scheme e.g.
a b c d e
a •
b •
c • •
d
e
Such a figure determines a unique relation; in general it will be infinite.
The letters R, S, T are mostly used as variables for relations. But now let
us return to the extensions of monadic predicates, i.e. the classes for which
we want to set up a calculus.
First we have two particular classes
∧
(vacuous class),
∨
(the universal
class) which are defined as the extension J94.K of a vacuous predicate and of
a predicate that belongs to everything. So∧
= xˆ[ϕ(x) . ∼ ϕ(x)]∨
= xˆ[ϕ(x) ∨ ∼ ϕ(x)]
It makes no difference which vacuous predicate I take for defining
∧
. If
A, B are two different vacuous predicates then xˆ[A(x)] = xˆ[B(x)] because
(x)[A(x) ≡ B(x)]. And similarly if C,D are two different predicates belong-
ing to everything xˆ[C(x)] = xˆ[D(x)] because (x)[C(x) ≡ D(x)], i.e. there
exists exactly one 0-class and exactly one J95.K universal class, although of
course there exist many different vacuous predicates. But they all have the
same extension, namely nothing which is denoted by
∧
. So the zero class
is the class with no elements (x)[∼ x ε ∧], the universal class is the class of
which every object is an element (x)(x ε
∨
);
∧
and
∨
are sometimes denoted
by 0 and 1 because of certain analogies with arithmetic.
Next we can introduce certain operations for classes which are analogous
to the arithmetical operations: namely
Addition or sum α + β = xˆ[x ε α ∨ x ε β]
y ε α+ β ≡ y ε xˆ[x ε α ∨ x ε β] ≡ y ε α ∨ y ε β
mathematician or democrat
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Multiplication or intersection α · β = xˆ[x ε α . x ε β]
mathematician democrat
Opposite or complement −α = xˆ[∼ x ε α] or α
non mathematician
Difference α− β = α · (−β) = xˆ[x ε α . ∼ x ε β]
mathematician not democrat
(New Yorker not sick)33
Furthermore we have a relation classes which corresponds to the arith-
metic relation of <, namely the relation of subclass
α ⊆ β ≡ (x)[x ε α ⊃ x ε β] Man ⊆ Mortal
All these operations obey laws very similar J96.K to the corresponding arith-
metical laws: e.g.
α+ β = β + α α · β = β · α
(α+ β) + γ = α + (β + γ) (α · β) · γ = α · (β · γ)
(α+ β) · γ = α · γ + β · γ
(α · β) + γ = (α + γ) · (β + γ)
They follow from the corresponding laws of the calculus of propositions: e.g.
x ε(α+ β) ≡ x ε α ∨ x ε β ≡ x ε β ∨ x ε α ≡ x ε(β + α)
x ε(α+ β) · γ ≡ x ε(α + β) . x ε γ ≡ (x ε α ∨ x ε β) . x ε γ
≡ (x ε α . x ε γ) ∨ (x ε β . x ε γ) ≡ x ε α · γ ∨ x ε β · γ ≡ x ε(α · γ + β · γ)
α+ 0 = α α · 0 = 0
α · 1 = α α + 1= 1
(x) ∼ (x ε 0) x ε(α + 0) ≡ x ε α ∨ x ε 0 ≡ x ε α
(x)(x ε 1)34
33On the right of this table, two intersecting circles, as in Euler or Venn diagrams, are
drawn in the manuscript.
34On the right of this table, three intersecting circles, as in Euler or Venn diagrams, with
α, β and perhaps γ marked in them, and some areas shaded, are drawn in the manuscript.
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α ⊆ β α ⊆ β . β ⊆ γ ⊃ α ⊆ γ
γ ⊆ δ Law of transitivity
α + γ ⊆ β + δ
α · γ ⊆ β · δ α ⊆ β . β ⊆ α ⊃ α = β.
Laws different from arithmetical:
α + α = α · α = α x ε α+ α ≡ x ε α ∨ x ε α ≡ x ε α
α ⊆ β ⊃ [α + β = β . α · β = α] β ⊆ α + β α ⊆ β
β ⊆ β
α+ β ⊆ β + β = β
J97.K
−(α + β) = (−α) · (−β) De Morgan
x ε − (α+ β) ≡ ∼ x ε (α+ β) ≡ ∼ (x ε α ∨ x ε β) ≡ ∼ (x ε α) . ∼ (x ε β) ≡
x ε − α . x ε − β ≡ x ε (−α) · (−β)
−(α · β) = (−α) + (−β)
α · (−α) = 0 α + (−α) = 1
−(−α) = α
The complement of α is sometimes also denoted by α (so that α = −α).
Exercise Law for difference:
α · (β − γ) = α · β − α · γ
α · β = α− (α− β)
α ⊆ β ⊃ β ⊆ α
1.2.8 Classes and Aristotelian moods
If α · β = 0, that means the classes α and β have no common element,
then α and β are called mutually exclusive. We can now formulate the four
Aristotelian types of judgement a, e, i, o also in the symbolism of the calculus
of classes as follows:
α a β ≡ α ⊆ β ≡ α · β = 0
J98.K
α e β ≡ α ⊆ β ≡ α · β = 0
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α i β ≡ ∼ (α ⊆ β) ≡ α · β 6= 0
α o β ≡ ∼ (α ⊆ β) ≡ α · β 6= 0
So all of these four types of judgements can be expressed by the vanishing,
respectively not vanishing, of certain intersections.
Now the formula which compresses all of the 15 valid Aristotelian infer-
ences reads like this
∼ (α · β = 0 . α · γ = 0 . β · γ 6= 0)
So this is a universally true formula because α · β = 0 means β outside of α,
α · γ = 0 means γ inside of α. If β outside γ inside they can have no element
in J99.K common, i.e. the two first propositions imply β · γ = 0, i.e. it cannot
be that all three of them are true. Now since this says that all three of them
cannot be true you can always conclude the negation of the third from the
two others; e.g.
α · β = 0 . α · γ = 0 ⊃ β · γ = 0
α · β = 0 . β · γ 6= 0 ⊃ α · γ 6= 0 etc.
and in this way you obtain all valid 15 moods if you substitute for α, β, γ in
an appropriate way the minor term, the major term and the middle term or
their negation, e.g.
J100.K
I Barbara
MaP
SaP
SaM
M · P = 0 . S ·M = 0 ⊃ S · P = 0
∼ (M · P = 0 . S ·M = 0 . S · P 6= 0)
α =M β = P γ = S
III Feriso
MeP
SoP
M iS
M · P = 0 . M · S 6= 0 ⊃ S · P 6= 0
∼ (M · P = 0 . M · S 6= 0 . S · P = 0)
α = P β =M γ = S.
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The four moods which require an additional premise can also be expressed
by one formula, namely:
∼ (α 6= 0 . α · β = 0 . α · γ = 0 . β · γ = 0)
J101.K Darapti
MaP
MaS
SiP
e.g. is obtained by taking
α =M β = P γ = S
MaP . MaS ⊃ SiP
M · P = 0 . M · S = 0 ⊃ S · P 6= 0
However, this second formula is an easy consequence of the first, i.e. we can
derive it by two applications of the first. To this end we have only to note
that α 6= 0 can be expressed by α iα because
ϕ iψ ≡ (∃x)[ϕ(x).ψ(x)]
ϕ iϕ ≡ (∃x)[ϕ(x) . ϕ(x)] ≡ (∃x)ϕ(x)
∼ (α · β = 0 . α · γ = 0 . β · γ 6= 0)
α · α 6= 0 α · β = 0 α · β = 0
α : β β : α γ : α
α · β 6= 0 α · γ = 0 β · γ = 0
α : γ β : α γ : β
III Feriso α · α 6= 0 . α · β = 0 . α · γ = 0 ⊃ β · γ 6= 0
α · α 6= 0 α · β = 0
α · β 6= 0 α · γ = 0
β · γ 6= 0
J102.K In general it can be shown that every correct formula expressed by
the Aristotelian terms a, e, i, o and operations of the calculus of propositions
can be derived from this principle; to be more exact, fundamental notions
a, i
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def α e β ≡ ∼ (α i β)
α o β ≡ ∼ (α a β)
1. α aα Identity
2. α a β . β a γ ⊃ α a γ I Barbara
3. α i β . β a γ ⊃ γ iα IV Dimatis
and all axioms of the propositional calculus; then if we have a formula com-
posed only of such expressions α a β, α i γ and ∼,∨ . . . and which is univer-
sally true, i.e. holds for all classes α, β, γ involved, then it is derivable from
these axioms by rule of substitution and implication and defined symbol.
J103.K I am sorry I have no time to give the proof.
So we can say that the Aristotelian theory of syllogisms for expressions of
this particular type a, e, i, o is complete, i.e. every true formula follows from
the Aristotelian moods. But those Aristotelian moods are even abundant
because those two moods alone are already sufficient to obtain everything
else. The incompleteness of the Aristotelian theory lies in this that there
are many J104.K propositions which cannot be expressed in terms of the
Aristotelian primitive terms. E.g. all formulas which I wrote down for +, ·,−
(distributive law, De Morgan law etc.) because those symbols +, ·,− do not
occur in Aristotle. But there are even simpler things not expressible in
Aristotelian terms; e.g. a · c = 0 (some not a are not c), e.g. α eβ
β o γ
according to
Aristotle there is no conclusion from that (there is a principle that from two
negative premises no conclusion can be drawn) J105.K and that is true if we
take account only of propositions expressible by the a, e, i, o. But there is a
conclusion to be drawn from that, namely “Some not α are not γ” α · γ 6= 0.
Since some β are not γ and every β is not α we have some not α (namely the
β) are not γ. The relation which holds between two classes α, γ if α · γ 6= 0
cannot be expressed by a, e, i, o, but it is arbitrary to exclude that relation.
Another example
α i β
α o β
α contains at least two elements
J106.K Such propositions: “There are two different objects to which the
predicate α belongs” can of course not be expressed by a, e, i, o, but they
can in the logistic calculus by
(∃x, y)[x 6= y . x ε α . y ε α].
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1.2.9 Relations
J107.K Last time I developed in outline the calculus of classes in which we
introduced certain operations +, ·, − which obey laws similar to those of
arithmetic. One can develop a similar calculus for relations. First of all we
can introduce for relations operations +, ·, − in a manner perfectly analogous
to the calculus of classes.
J108.K If R and S are any two dyadic relations I put
R + S = xˆyˆ[xRy ∨ xSy]
R · S = xˆyˆ[xRy . xSy]
−R = xˆyˆ[∼ xRy] p. 110
R− S = xˆyˆ[xRy . ∼ xSy]
So e.g. if R is the relation of father, S the relation of mother one has for
the relation of parent:
parent = father + mother
x is a parent of y ≡ x is a father of y ∨ x is a mother of y
≤ = (< + =)
child = son + daughter
J109.K Or consider similarity for polygons and the relation of same size
and the relation of congruence, then Congruence = Similarity · Same size,
or consider the four relations parallelism, without common points, coplanar,
and skew, then we have
Parallelism = without common point · coplanar,
or Parallelism = without common point · − skew
or −brother will subsist between two objects x, y if 1. x, y are two human
beings and x is not a brother of y or 2. if x or y is not a human being because
x brother y is true only if x and y are human beings and in addition x is a
brother of y. So if x or y are not human beings the relation eo ipso will not
J110.K hold, i.e. the relation −brother will hold. Exactly as for classes there
will exist also a vacuous and a universal relation denoted by Λ˙ and V˙. Λ˙ is
the relation which subsists between no objects (x, y) ∼ xΛ˙y, and (x, y)xV˙y,
e.g.
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greater · smaller = Λ˙
greater + (not greater) = V˙
Also there exists an analogon to the notion of subclass, namely R ⊆ S if
xRy ⊃ xSy, e.g.
father ⊆ ancestor
brother⊆ relative
smaller ⊆ not greater
These operations for relations (i.e. +, ·, −) are exactly analogous to the
corresponding for classes and therefore will obey the same laws, e.g. (R +
S) · T = R · T + S · T . But in addition to them there are certain operations
specific for relations and therefore more interesting, e.g. for any relation R
we can form what is called the inverse of R (denoted by R˘ or R−1 ) where
R˘ = xˆyˆ[yRx], hence xR˘y ≡ yRx, i.e. if y has the relation R to x then x has
the relation R˘ J111.K to y, e.g.
child = (parent)−1
x child y ≡ y parent x
< = (>)−1
smaller = (greater)−1
(nephew + niece) = (uncle + aunt)−1
There are also relations which are identical with their inverse, i.e. xRy ≡
yRx. Such relations are called symmetric. Other example (brother + sister)
is symmetric because –. . . ; brother is not symmetric, sister isn’t either.
J112.K Another operation specific for relations and particularly important
is the so called relative product of two relations rendered by R|S and defined
by
R|S = xˆyˆ[(∃z)(xRz . zSy)]
i.e. R|S subsists between x and y if there is some object z to which x has
the relation R and which has the relation S to y, e.g.
nephew = son|(brother or sister)
J113.K x is a nephew to y if x is son of some person z which is brother or
sister of y. In everyday language the proposition xRy is usually expressed
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by x is an R of y or x is the R of y. Using this we can say xR|Sy means x
is an R of an S of y, e.g. x is a nephew of y means x is a son of a brother or
sister of y. Other example:35
paternal uncle = brother|father
The relative product can also be applied to a relation and the same relation
again, i.e. we can form R|R (by def= R2) square of a relation, J114.K e.g.
paternal grandfather = (father)2
grandchild = (child)2
Similarly we can form (R|R)|R = R3, e.g.36
great grandchild = (child)3
The relative product again follows laws very similar to the arithmetic
ones, e.g.
Associativity: (R|S)|T = R|(S|T )
Distributivity: R|(S + T ) = R|S +R|T
also R|(S · T ) ⊆ R|S · R|T
but not commutativity
R|S = S|R is false
brother|father 6= father|brother
J115.K37 Identity I is a unity for this product, i.e. R|I = I|R = R because
xR|Iy ≡ xIz . zRy for some z
≡ xRy
Monotonicity: R ⊆ S, P ⊆ R ⊃ R|P ⊆ S|Q
J117.K38 A relation R is called transitive if
35A note inserted in the manuscript at this example mentions a continuation on p. 119.
36A note inserted in the manuscript at this example mentions a continuation on p. 117.
37The whole of pages 115. and 116. are crossed out, but the beginning of the present
page, p. 115., is given here because it completes naturally what was said before about the
relative product, i.e. composition, of relations.
38see the preceding footnote, at the beginning of p. 115.
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(x, y, z)[xRy . yRz ⊃ xRz] ≡ R is transitive
In other words if an R of an R of z is an R of z; e.g. brother is transitive, a
brother of a brother of a person is a brother of this person, in other words
x brother y . y brother z ⊃ x brother z
Smaller is also transitive, i.e.
x < y . y < z ⊃ x < z
Very many relations in mathematics are transitive: congruence, parallelism,
isomorphism, ancestor. Son is not transitive, a son of a son of a person is
not a son of a person.
J118.K Therefore called intransitive; friend is an example of a relation
which is neither transitive nor intransitive. A friend of a friend of x is not al-
ways a friend of x, but is sometimes a friend of x. By means of the previously
introduced operation transitivity can be expressed by
R2 ⊆ R because
xR2y .⊃ (∃z)(xRz . zRy) ⊃ xRy
if R is transitive, but also vice versa if R satisfies the condition R2 ⊆ R then
R is transitive
xRy . yRz ⊃ xR2z ⊃ xRz
J119.K A very important property of relations is the following one: A
binary relation R is called one-many if for any object y there exists at most
one object x such that xRy:
(x, y, z)[xRy . zRy ⊃ x = z] ≡ R is one-many
and many-one if R−1 is one-many; e.g. father is one-many, every object x can
have at most one father, it can have no father if it is no man, but it never
has two or more fathers. The relation < is not one-many: for any number
there are many different numbers smaller than it.
The 39 relation x is the reciprocal of number y is one-many. Every number
has at most J120.K one reciprocal. Some numbers have no reciprocal, namely
39This sentence and the beginning of the next one, until the end of p. 119., are crossed
out in the manuscript, though the remainder of the paragraph on p. 120. is not.
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0 (but that makes no difference). The relation of reciprocal is at the same
time many-one; such relations are called one-one.
The relation of husband in Christian countries e.g. is an example of a
one-one relation. The relation smaller is neither one-many nor many-one; for
any number there exist many different numbers smaller than it and many
different numbers greater than it.
One-many-ness can also be defined for polyadic relations. J121.K A triadic
relation M is called one-many if
(x, y, z, u)[xM(zu) . yM(zu) ⊃ x = y]
e.g. xˆyˆzˆ(x = y + z), xˆyˆzˆ[x = y
z
] have this property. For any two numbers y
and z there exists at most one x which is the sum or difference. xˆyˆ(x is a
square root of y) is not one-many because there are in general two different
numbers which are square roots of y. You see the one-many relations are
exactly the same thing which is called “functions” in mathematics. The
dyadic one-many relations are the functions with one argument as e.g. x2,
the J122.K triadic one-many relations are the functions with two arguments
as e.g. x+ y.
In order to make statements about functions, i.e. one-many relations it
is very convenient to introduce a notation usual in mathematics and also in
everyday language; namely R‘x denotes the y which has the relation R to x,
i.e. the y such that yRx provided that this y exists and is unique. Similarly
for a triadic relation M ‘(yz) denotes the x such that. . . Instead of this also
yMz is written, e.g. + denotes a triadic relation between J123.K numbers
(sum) and y+ z denotes the number which has this triadic relation to y and
z provided that it exists. In everyday language the ‘ is expressed by the
words The. . . of, e.g. The sum of x and y, The father of y.
There40 is only one tricky point in this notation. Namely what meaning
are we to assign to propositions containing this symbol R‘x if there does not
exist a unique y such that yRx (i.e. none or several), e.g. The present king of
J124.K France is bald. We may convene that such propositions are meaning-
less (neither true nor false). But that has certain undesirable consequences,
namely whether or not the present king of France exists or not is an empirical
question. Therefore it would depend on an empirical fact whether or not this
sequence of words is a meaningful statement or nonsense whereas one should
40The text in this paragraph, until the end of p. 125., is crossed out in the manuscript,
but because of its interest it is given here.
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expect that it can depend only on the grammar of the language concerned
whether something makes sense. J125.K Russell makes the convention that
such statements are false and not meaningless. The convention is: That every
atomic proposition in which such an R‘x (describing something nonexistent)
occurs is false, i.e.
ϕ(R‘x) ≡ (∃y)[(z)[zRx ≡ z = y] . ϕ(y)]
1.2.10 Type theory and paradoxes
J126.K All aforementioned notions of the calculus of classes and relations
are themselves relations; e.g. α ⊆ β is a binary relation between classes,
α + β is a dyadic function, i.e. a triadic relation between classes (which
subsists between α, β, γ if γ = α+ β). The operation of inverse is a relation
between relations subsisting between R and S if R = S−1 or the relative
product is a triadic relation between relations subsisting between R, S, T
if R = S|T . Symmetry defines a certain class of relations (the class of
symmetric relations). So we see that we have obtained a J127.K new kind
of concepts (called concepts of second type or second order) which refer to
the concepts of first order, i.e. which expresses properties of concepts of
first order or relations between concepts of first order or to be more exact
properties and relations of extensions of concepts of first order. But this is
not very essential since we can define corresponding concepts which express
properties and relations of the predicates themselves, e.g. χ sum of ϕ, ψ if
χ(x) ≡ ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x) etc.
And it is possible to (go on) continue in this way, i.e. we can define
concepts of third type or order, which refer to the concepts of second order.
An example would be: “mutually exclusive”; a class of classes U , i.e. a class
whose elements are themselves classes, is called a mutually exclusive class
of classes if α, β ε U ⊃ α · β = Λ. This concept of “mutually exclusive
class of classes” expresses a property of classes of classes, i.e. of an object
of third order, therefore is of third order. So you see in this way we get a
whole hierarchy of concepts J128.K which is called the hierarchy of types.
In fact there are two different hierarchies of types, namely the hierarchy of
extensions and the hierarchy of predicates.
An interesting example of predicates of higher type are the natural num-
bers. According to Russell and Frege the natural numbers are properties of
predicates. If I say e.g.: There are eight planets, this expresses a property of
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the predicate J129.K “planet”. So the number 8 can be defined to be a prop-
erty of predicates which belongs to a predicate ϕ if there are exactly 8 objects
falling under this predicate. If this definition is followed up it turns out that
all notions of arithmetic can be defined in terms of logical notions and that
the laws of arithmetic can be derived from the laws of logic except for one
thing, namely for building up arithmetic one needs the proposition that there
are infinitely many objects, which cannot be proved from the axioms of logic.
J130.K The lowest layer in the hierarchy of types described are the indi-
viduals or objects of the world; what these individuals are is an extralogical
question which depends on the theory of the world which we assume; in a
materialist theory it would be the atoms or the points of space and time,
in a spiritualist theory it would be the spirits and so on. As to the higher
types (classes, classes of classes, predicates of predicates etc.) each type must
be distinguished very carefully from any other as can be shown e.g. by the
following J131.K example. If a is an object one can form the class whose
only element is a (denoted by ι‘a). So this ι‘a would be the extension of a
predicate, which belongs to a and only to a. It is near at hand to identify this
a and ι‘a, i.e. to assume that the object a and the class whose only element
is a are the same. However it can be shown that this is not admissible, i.e.
it would lead to contradictions to J132.K assume this identity ι‘a = a to be
generally true because if we take for x a class (which has several elements)
then certainly ι‘α and α are distinct from each other; since ι‘α is a class
which has only one element, namely α, whereas α is a class which has several
elements, so they are certainly distinct from each other. But although we
have to distinguish very carefully between the different types there is on the
other hand a very close analogy between the different types. E.g. classes of
individuals J133.K and classes of classes of individuals will obey exactly the
same laws. For both of them we can define an addition and a multiplication
and the same laws of calculus will hold for them. Therefore it is desirable
not to formulate these laws separately for classes of classes and classes of
individuals, but to introduce a general notion of a class comprising in it all
those particular cases: classes of individuals, classes of relations, classes of
classes etc. And it was actually in J134.K this way that the logistic calculus
was first set up (with such a general notion of a class and of a predicate and
of a relation and so on embracing under it all types) and this way also cor-
responds more to natural thinking. In ordinary language e.g. we have such
a general notion of a class without a distinction of different types.
The more detailed working out of logic on this typeless base has led to
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the discovery of the most interesting J135.K facts in modern logic. Namely to
the fact that the evidences of natural thinking are not consistent with them-
selves, i.e. lead to contradictions which are called “logical paradoxes”. The
first of these contradictions was discovered by the mathematician Burali-Forti
in 1897. A few years later Russell produced a similar contradiction which
however avoided the unessential mathematical by-work of Burali-Forti’s con-
tradiction and showed the real logical structure of the contradiction much
clearer. This so J136.K called Russell paradox has remained up to now the
classical example of a logical paradox and I want to explain it now in detail.
I shall first enumerate some apparently evident propositions from which the
paradox follows in a few steps.
The paradox under consideration involves only the following notions:
1. object in the most general sense, which embraces everything that can
be made an object of thinking; in particular it embraces the individuals,
classes, predicates of all types
J137.K41
2. monadic predicate (briefly predicate), also in the most general sense
comprising predicates of individuals as well as predicates of predicates
etc. And this term predicate is to be so understood that it is an es-
sential requirement of a predicate that it is well-defined for any object
whatsoever whether the given predicate belongs to it or not
Now of these two notions “object” and “predicate” we have the following
apparently evident propositions:
1. If ϕ is a predicate and x an object then it is uniquely determined whether
ϕ belongs to x or not.
Let us denote the proposition ϕ belongs to x by ϕ(x). So we have if ϕ is
a well-defined predicate and x an object then ϕ(x) is always a meaningful
proposition J138.K which is either true or false.
41A note in the manuscript at the bottom of the preceding page, p. 136., and at the
top of this page, seem to suggest that pp. 137.-140. of the present Notebook VI are to
be superseded by pages in Notebook VII starting with p. 137., the first numbered page
in Notebook VII. These four pages of Notebook VI are nevertheless given here.
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2. Vice versa: If we have a combination of words or symbols A(x) which
contains the letter x and is such that it becomes a meaningful propo-
sition for any arbitrary object which you substitute for x then A(x)
defines a certain predicate ϕ which belongs to an object x if and only
if A(x) is true.
So the assumption means that if you substitute for x the name of an ar-
bitrary object then it is always uniquely determined whether the resulting
proposition is true or false.
3. It is uniquely determined of any object whether or not it is a predicate.
Let us denote by P (x) the proposition “x is a predicate” so that P (red),
∼ P (smaller), ∼ P (New York); then by 3 P (x) is always a meaningful propo-
sition whatever x J139.K may be.
4. Any predicate is an object.
I think these four propositions are all evident to natural thinking. 1 and
2 can be considered as a definition of the term predicate and 3 says that the
notion of predicate thus defined is well-defined.
And now let us consider the following statement P (x) . ∼ x(x) that means
x is a predicate and it belongs to x (i.e. to itself). According to our four
assumptions that is a meaningful proposition which is either true or false
whatever you substitute for x. Namely, at first by 3 it is uniquely defined:
if you J140.K substitute for x something which is not a predicate it becomes
false, if you substitute for x a predicate then P (x) is true but x(y) is either
true or false for any object y written over x by 1. But x is a predicate, hence
an object by assumption 4, hence x(x) is either true or false, hence the whole
statement is always meaningful, i.e. either true or false. Therefore by 2 it
defines a certain predicate Φ such that Φ(x) ≡
means
P (x) . ∼ x(x).
JNotebook VIIK J137.K42
2. The notion of a “well-defined monadic predicate”.
42see the footnote at the top of p. 137. of the preceding Notebook VI. Notebook VII
starts with nine, not numbered, pages of remarks and questions mostly theological, partly
unreadable, partly in shorthand, and all seemingly not closely related to the remaining
notes for the course. They are rendered as far as possible in the source version and deleted
here.
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That is a monadic predicate ϕ such that for any object x whatsoever it is
uniquely determined by the definition of ϕ whether or not ϕ belongs to x,
so that for any arbitrary object x ϕ(x) is a meaningful proposition which is
either true or false. Since I need no other kind of predicate in the subsequent
considerations but only well-defined monadic predicates, I shall use the term
“predicate” in the sense of monadic well-defined predicate.
3. The concept which is expressed by the word “is” or “belongs” in or-
dinary language and which we expressed by ϕ(x), which means the
predicate ϕ belongs to x.
Now for these notions (of object and predicate) we have the following
apparently evident propositions:
J138.K
1. For any object x it is uniquely determined whether or not it is a predi-
cate; in other words well-defined predicate is itself a well-defined pred-
icate.
2. If y is a predicate and x an object then it is well-defined whether the
predicate y belongs to x. This is an immediate consequence of the
definition of a well-defined predicate.
Let us denote for any two objects y, x by y(x) the proposition y is a pred-
icate and belongs to x. So for any two objects y, x y(x) will be a meaningful
proposition of which it is uniquely determined whether it is true or false,
namely if y is no predicate it is false whatever x may be, if it is a predicate
then it is true or false according as the predicate y belongs to x or does not
belong to x, which is uniquely determined.
J139.K
3. If we have a combination of symbols or words containing the letter x
(denote it by A(x)) and if this combination is such that it becomes a
meaningful proposition whatever object you substitute for x then A(x)
defines a certain well-defined predicate ϕ which belongs to an object x
if and only if A(x) is true.
(I repeat the hypothesis of this statement: It is as follows, that if you sub-
stitute for x the name of an arbitrary object then the resulting expression is
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always a meaningful proposition of which it is uniquely determined whether
it is true or false.) Now this statement too could be considered as a conse-
quence of the definition of a well-defined predicate.
4. Any predicate is an object. That J140.K follows because we took the
term object in the most general sense according to which anything one
can think of is an object.
I think these four propositions are all evident to natural thinking. But
nevertheless they lead to contradictions, namely in the following way. Con-
sider the expression ∼ x(x) that is an expression involving the variable x
and such that for any object substituted for this variable x you do obtain a
meaningful proposition of which it is uniquely determined whether it is true
or false. J141.K Namely if x is not a predicate this becomes false by the
above definition of y(x); if x is a predicate then by 1 for any object y it is
uniquely determined whether x belongs to y, hence also for x it is uniquely
determined because x is a predicate, hence an object (by 4). ∼ x(x) means
x is a predicate not belonging to itself. It is easy to name predicates which
do belong to themselves, e.g. the predicate “predicate”; we have the concept
“predicate” is a predicate. Most of the predicates of course do not belong to
themselves. Say e.g. the predicate man is not a man, J142.K so it does not
belong to itself. But e.g. the predicate not man does belong to itself since
the predicate not man is certainly not a man, so it is a not man, i.e. belongs
to itself.
Now since ∼ x(x) is either true or false for any object x it defines a
certain predicate by 3. Call this well-defined predicate Φ, so that Φ(x) ≡ ∼
x(x). For Φ even a term in ordinary language was introduced, namely the
word “impredicable”, and for the negation of it the word “predicable”; so an
object is called predicable if it J143.K is a predicate belonging to itself and
impredicable in the opposite case, i.e. if it is either not a predicate or is a
predicate and does not belong to itself. So predicate is predicable, not man
is predicable, man is impredicable, Socrates is impredicable.
And now we ask is the predicate “impredicable” predicable or impredica-
ble. Now we know this equivalence holds for any object x (it is the definition
of impredicable); Φ is a predicate, hence an object, hence this equivalence
holds for Φ, i.e. Φ(Φ) ≡ ∼ Φ(Φ). What does Φ(Φ) say? Since Φ means
impredicable it says impredicable is impredicable. So we see that this propo-
sition is equivalent with its own negation.
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J144.K But from that it follows that it must be both true and false,
because we can conclude from this equivalence:
Φ(Φ) ⊃ ∼ Φ(Φ)
∼ Φ(Φ) ⊃ Φ(Φ)
By the first implication, Φ(Φ) cannot be true, because the assumption that
it is true leads to the conclusion that it is false, i.e. it leads to a contradic-
tion; but Φ(Φ) cannot be false either because by the second implication the
assumption that it is false leads to the conclusion that it is true., i.e. again
to a contradiction. So this Φ(Φ) would be a proposition which is neither true
nor false, hence it would be both true and false J145.K because that it is not
true implies that it is false and that it is not false implies that it is true. So
we apparently have discovered a proposition which is both true and false,
which is impossible by the law of contradiction.
The same argument can be given without logical symbols in the following
form. The question is: Is the predicate “impredicable” predicable or impred-
icable. 1. If impredicable were predicable that would mean that it belongs
to itself, i.e. then impredicable is impredicable. So from the assumption that
impredicable is predicable we derived that it is impredicable; so it is not
predicable. 2. On the other hand assume impredicable is impredicable; then
it belongs to itself, hence is predicable. So from the assumption that it is
impredicable we derived that it is predicable. So it is certainly not impredi-
cable. So it is neither predicable nor impredicable. But then it must be both
predicable and impredicable because since it is not predicable it is impred-
icable and since it is not impredicable it is predicable. So again we have a
proposition which is both true and false.
Now what are we to do about this situation? One may first try to say:
Well, the law of contradiction is an error. There do exist such strange things
as propositions which are both true and false. But this way out of the dif-
ficulty is evidently not possible J146.K because that would imply that every
proposition whatsoever is both true and false. We had in the calculus of
propositions the formula p . ∼ p ⊃ q for any p, q, hence also p . ∼ p ⊃ ∼ q
where p and q are arbitrary propositions. So if we have one proposition p
which is both true and false then any proposition q has the undesirable prop-
erty of being both true and false, which would make any thinking completely
meaningless. So we have to conclude that we arrived at this contradictory
conclusion
Φ(Φ) and ∼ Φ(Φ)
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J147.K by some error or fallacy, and the question is what does this error
consist in [i.e. which one of our evident propositions is wrong].
The nearest at hand conjecture about this error is that there is some cir-
cular fallacy hidden in this argument, because we are speaking of predicates
belonging to themselves or not belonging to themselves. One may say that
it is meaningless to apply a predicate to itself. I don’t think that this is the
correct solution. For the following reasons:
1. It is not possible to except for any predicate P J148.K just this predicate
P itself from the things to which it can be applied
i.e. we cannot modify the assumption 1. by saying the property ϕ(x) is well-
defined for any x except ϕ itself because if you define e.g. a predicate µ by
two predicates ϕ, ψ by µ(x) ≡ ϕ(x) . ψ(x) then we would have already three
predicates µ, ϕ and ψ to which µ cannot be applied:
µ(ϕ) ≡
Df
ϕ(ϕ) . ψ(ϕ) where this makes no sense.
J149.K So it is certainly not sufficient to exclude just self-reflexivity of a
predicate because that entails automatically that we have to exclude also
other things and it is very difficult and leads to very undesirable results if
one tries to formulate what is to be excluded on the basis of this idea to
avoid self-reflexivities. That was done by Russell in his so called ramified
theory of types which since has been abandoned by practically all logicians.
On the other hand it is not even justified to exclude self-reflexivities of every
formula because self-reflexivity does not always lead to contradiction but
is perfectly legitimate in many cases. If e.g. I say: “Any sentence of the
English language contains a verb” then it is perfectly alright to apply this
proposition to itself and to conclude from it that also this proposition under
consideration contains a verb.
Therefore the real fallacy seems to lie J150.K in something else than the
self-reflexivity, namely in these notions of object and predicate in the most
general sense embracing objects of all logical types. The Russell paradox
seems to show that there does not exist such a concept of everything. As we
saw the logical objects form a hierarchy of types and however far you may
proceed in the construction of these types you will always be able to continue
the process still farther and therefore it is illegitimate and makes no sense to
speak of the totality of all objects.
J151.K One might think that one could obtain the totality of all objects in
the following way: take first the individuals and call them objects of type 0,
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then take the concepts of type 1, then the concepts of type 2, 3 etc. for any
natural number. But it is by no means true that we obtain in this manner the
totality of all concepts, because e.g. the concept of the totality of concepts
thus obtained for all integers n as types is itself a concept not occurring
in this totality, i.e. it is a concept of a type higher than J152.K any finite
number, i.e. of an infinite type. It is denoted as a concept of type ω. But
even with this type ω we are by no means at an end, because we can define
e.g. relations between concepts of type ω and they would be of a still higher
type ω + 1. So we see there are in a sense much more than infinitely many
logical types; there are so many that it is not possible to form a concept of
the totality of all of them, because whichever concept we form we can define
a concept of a higher type, hence not falling under J153.K the given concept.
So if we want to take account of this fundamental fact of logic that there
does not exist a concept of the totality of all objects whatsoever, we must
drop the words “object”, “predicate”, “everything” from our language and
replace them by the words: object of a given type, predicate of a given type,
everything which belongs to a given type. In particular, proposition 4 has
now to be formulated like this. If A(x) is an expression which becomes a
meaningful proposition for any object x of a given type α then it defines
a concept of type α + 1. We cannot even formulate the proposition in its
previous form, because we don’t have such words as object, predicate etc. in
our language. Then the Russell paradox disappears immediately because we
can form the concept Φ defined by Φ(x) ≡ ∼ x(x) only for x’s of a given type
α, i.e. J154.K we can define a concept Φ such that this equivalence holds for
every x of type α. (We cannot even formulate that it holds for every object
because we have dropped these words from our language). But then Φ will
be a concept of next higher type because it is a property of objects of type α.
Therefore we cannot substitute Φ here for x because this equivalence holds
only for objects of type α.
So this seems to me to be the (satisfactory) true solution of the J155.K
Russell paradox. I only wish to mention that the hierarchy of types as I
sketched it here is considerably more general than it was when it was first
presented by its inventor B. Russell. Russell’s theory of types was given in
two different forms, the so called simplified and the ramified theory of types,
both of which are much more restrictive then the one I explained here; e.g.
in both of them it would be impossible to form concepts of type ω, also the
statement x(x) would always be meaningless. Russell’s theory of J156.K types
is more based on the first idea of solving the paradoxes (namely to exclude
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self-reflexivities) and the totality of all objects is only excluded because it
would be self-reflexive (since it would itself be an object). However the
development of axioms of set theory has shown that Russell’s system is too
restrictive, i.e. it excludes many arguments which (as far as one can see) do
not lead to contradictions and which are necessary for building up abstract
set theory.
There are other logical paradoxes which are solved by the theory of types,
i.e. by excluding the terms object, every etc. But there are others in which
the fallacy is of an entirely different nature. They are the so called epistemo-
logical paradoxes. J157.K The oldest of them is the Epimenides. In the form
it is usually presented, it is no paradox. But if a man says “I am lying now”
and says nothing else, or if he says: The proposition which I am pronouncing
right now is false, then this statement can be proved to be both true and
false, because this proposition p says that p is false; so we have p ≡ (p is
false), p ≡ ∼ p, from which it follows that p is both true and false as we saw
before. The same paradox can be brought to a much more conclusive form
as follows:43
1.2.11 Examples and samples of previous subjects
J1.K All four rules are purely formal, i.e. for applying them it is not necessary
to know the meaning of the expressions. Examples of derivations from the
axioms. Since all axioms and rules of the calculus of propositions are also
axioms and rules of the calculus of functions we are justified in assuming all
formulas and rules formerly derived in the calculus of propositions.
1. Example44 ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x)
Derivation:
(1) (x)[∼ ϕ(x)] ⊃ ∼ ϕ(y) obtained by substituting ∼ ϕ(x) for ϕ(x)
in Ax. 5
(2) ϕ(y) ⊃ ∼ (x)[∼ ϕ(x)] by rule of transposition applied to (1)
(3) ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) by rule of defined symbol from (2)
J2.K 2. Example45 (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ψ(x)]
43Here the text in the manuscript is interrupted and the subsequent numbering of pages
in the present Notebook VII starts anew from 1.
44see 13′. on p. 80. of Notebook V
45see 6. on p. 76. of Notebook V
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(1) (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y)] by substituting ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)
for ϕ(x) in Ax. 5
(2) (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y) Ax. 5
(3) (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ [ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y)] . ϕ(y) by rule of
multiplication of implications applied to (1) and (2)
(4) [ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y)] . ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y) by substituting ϕ(y) for p and ψ(y)
for q in the demonstrable formula (p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q
J3.K(5) (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(y) by rule of syllogism applied to
(3) and (4)
(6) (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (y)ψ(y) by rule of quantifier from (5)
(7) (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (y)ψ(y)] by rule of exportation
from (6)
(8) (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ψ(x)] by rule of substitution for
individual variables
Predicates which belong to no object are called vacuous (e.g. president
of U.S.A. born in South Bend). SaP and SeP are both true if S is vacuous
whatever P may be. J4.K All tautologies are true also for vacuous predicates
but some of the Aristotelian inferences are not, e.g.
SaP ⊃ SiP (false if S is vacuous)
SaP ⊃ ∼ (SeP ) (false ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ),
the mood Darapti MaP .MaS ⊃ SiP is false if M is vacuous and if S, P are
any two predicates such that ∼ (SiP ).
The totality of all objects to which a monadic predicate P belongs is
called the extension of P and denoted by xˆ[P (x)], so that the characteristic
J5.K property of the symbol xˆ is:
xˆϕ(x) = xˆψ(x) ≡ (x)[ϕ(x) ≡ ψ(x)]
Extensions of monadic predicates are called classes (denoted by α, β, γ . . .).
That y belongs to the class α is expressed by yεα so that yεxˆϕ(x) ≡ ϕ(y). xˆ is
applied to arbitrary propositional functions Φ(x), i.e. xˆΦ(x) means the class
of objects satisfying Φ(x), e.g. xˆ[I(x) . x > 7] = class of integers greater than
seven. Also for dyadic predicates Q(xy) extensions denoted by xˆyˆ[Q(xy)] are
introduced, which satisfy the equivalence
xˆyˆ[ψ(xy)] = xˆyˆ[χ(xy)] ≡ (x, y)[ψ(xy) ≡ χ(xy)]
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J6.K It is usual to call these extensions (not the dyadic predicates them-
selves) relations. If Φ(xy) is a propositional function with two variables
xˆyˆΦ(xy) denotes the relation which is defined by Φ(xy). If R is a relation
xRy means that x bears the relation R to y so that
u{xˆyˆ[ϕ(xy)]}v ≡ ϕ(uv)
The extension of a vacuous predicate is called zero class and denoted by
0 (or Λ); the extension of a predicate belonging to every object is called
universal class and denoted by 1 (or V).
J7.K For classes operation of +, · , − which obey laws similar to the
arithmetic laws are introduced by the following definitions:46
α + β = xˆ[x ε α ∨ x ε β] (sum)
α · β = xˆ[x ε α . x ε β] (intersection)
−α = xˆ[∼ x ε α] (complement)
α− β = α · (−β) (difference)
46see p. 95. of Notebook VI
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Chapter 2
SOURCE TEXT
2.0 Notebook 0
⌊Folder 58, on the front cover of the notebook “Vorl.⌊esungen⌋ Log.⌊ik⌋
⌊German: Lectures Logic⌋ N.D.⌊Notre Dame⌋ 0” together with some crossed
out practically unreadable text in which one can recognize what is presum-
ably: Arb, Beg., Res, Vol, N.D.⌋
⌊Before p. 1. one finds on a page not numbered the following apparently
incomplete note, which does not seem directly related to the text that follows:
x is called D-pair (resp⌊ectively⌋ D-trip⌊le⌋) if z = 〈 〉 (resp⌊ectively⌋ z =
〈 〉) where the x, y, z are then evid.⌊ently⌋ uniquely det.⌊ermined⌋ by z
⌊unreadable text⌋⌋
J1.K Log⌊ic⌋ is usually def.⌊ined⌋ a⌊s⌋ the science of the laws of ⌊presuma-
bly “corr”, which abbreviates “correct”; if “corr” is read instead as “con”,
then this would abbreviate “consistent”⌋ thinking. Accord.⌊ing⌋ to this def⌊i-
nition⌋ the centr.⌊al⌋ part of log.⌊ic⌋ must be the theory of inf⌊erence⌋ and
the theory of logically true prop⌊ositions⌋. By a log⌊ically⌋ true prop.⌊osition⌋
I mean a prop.⌊osition⌋ which is true for merely log⌊ical⌋ reasons as e.g. the
law of excluded middle⌊,⌋ which says that for any prop⌊osition⌋ p either p or
∼ p is true. \ I intend to go in med⌊ias⌋ res right away an⌊d⌋ to begin with
this centr.⌊al⌋ part. /
⌊new paragraph⌋ As Prof⌊essor⌋ M⌊enger⌋ has pointed out in his intro-
ductory lecture the treatment of these things⌊,⌋ \ inferences and log.⌊ically⌋
true prop.⌊ositions,⌋ / in traditional logic and in most of the current textbooks
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is unsatisfactory in some resp⌊ect⌋. ⌊1.⌋ First with resp.⌊ect⌋ to complete-
ness. What the J2.K trad⌊itional⌋ logic gives is a more or less arbitrary
selection from the infinity of the laws of logic⌊,⌋ whereas in a systematic
treatment we shall have to develop methods which allow us to obtain \ as far
as possible / all logically true prop.⌊ositions⌋ and \ least for cert. domains of
logic, and furthermore / methods \ which allow / to decide of arbitrary given
prop.⌊ositions⌋ ⌊of⌋ \ these domains / whether or not they are logically true.
But the classical treatment is unsatisfactory also from in another respect.⌊;⌋
namely as to the question of reducing the laws of logic to a cert.⌊ain⌋ num-
ber of prim.⌊itive⌋ laws from which J3.K all the others can be deduced. Al-
though it is sometimes claimed that everything can be deduced from the law
of contradiction or from the first Aristotelian figure⌊,⌋ this claim has never
been proved or even clearly formulated in traditional logic. ⌊dash from the
manuscript deleted⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ The chief aim in the first part of this seminary will be
to fill these two gaps \ of trad.⌊itional⌋ log⌊ic⌋ / ⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. 1. to give as far as
possible to give a complete theory of log.⌊ical⌋ inf⌊erence⌋ and of log.⌊ically⌋
true prop.⌊ositions⌋ and 2. to show how \ all of them / can be deduced from
a minimum number of prim.⌊itive⌋ laws.
J4.K The theory of inf⌊erence⌋ as present.⌊ed⌋ in the current textbooks is
usually divided into two parts⌊:⌋
1. The Arist⌊otelian⌋ figures and moods including the inf.⌊erences⌋ with
one prem.⌊ise,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. conv.⌊ersion,⌋ contr.⌊aposition⌋ etc.
2. Inferences of an entirely different kind⌊,⌋ which are treated under the
heading of hyp.⌊othetical⌋ disj.⌊unctive⌋ conj⌊unctive⌋ inf.⌊erence,⌋ and
which are a Stoic addition to the Arist.⌊otelian⌋ figures⌊.⌋
Let us begin with these inf⌊erences⌋ of the sec.⌊ond⌋ kind⌊,⌋ which turn
out to be much more fundamental than the Arist⌊otelian⌋ figures.
Take the following example⌊s⌋ of the disj.⌊unctive⌋ inf.⌊erence⌋ tollendo
ponens:
J5.K From the two premis⌊s⌋es
1. Nero was either insane or a criminal⌊,⌋
2. Nero was not insane⌊,⌋
we can conclude
Nero was a criminal⌊.⌋
NOTEBOOK 0 125
⌊“Nero” above, in all three instances, is written almost as “New”.⌋
\ ⌊1.⌋ Today is either Sunday or a holiday⌊,⌋
⌊2.⌋ Today is not Sunday⌊,⌋
Today is a holiday⌊.⌋ /
Generally⌊, i⌋f p, q are \ two / arbitrary prop⌊ositions⌋⌊inserted !! from
the manuscript deleted⌋ and we have the two premis⌊s⌋es
1. Either p or q⌊,⌋
2. not-q⌊not-p,⌋
we can conclude
p⌊q.⌋
It is possible to express this syll⌊ogism⌋ by one log.⌊ically⌋ true prop.⌊osition⌋
as follows:
,,⌊“⌋(If either p or q and if not-p) then q” ⌊!! from the manuscript dele-
ted⌋
This whole prop.⌊osition⌋ under quotation marks will be true whatever the
prop.⌊ositions⌋ p and q may be⌊.⌋
J6.K Now what is the caract.⌊er⌋ of this inf.⌊erence⌋ which distinguishes
them ⌊it⌋ from the Arist.⌊otelian⌋ figures? It is this that in order to make
this inf.⌊erence⌋ it is not necessary to know anything about the structure
of \ the prop⌊ositions⌋ / p and q. p and q may be ⌊may be⌋ aff.⌊irmative⌋
or neg.⌊ative⌋ prop.⌊ositions,⌋ they may be simple or complicated⌊,⌋ they
may themselves be disj.⌊unctive⌋ or hyp.⌊othetical⌋ prop.⌊ositions;⌋ all this
is indifferent for this syllogism⌊,⌋ i.e. only prop⌊ositions⌋ as a whole occur in
it⌊,⌋ and it is this \ caract.⌊er⌋ / that makes this kind of syl⌊logism⌋ simpler
and more fund.⌊amental⌋ than \ e.g. / the Arist⌊otelian⌋ J7.K figures⌊,⌋
which depend on the structure of the prop.⌊ositions⌋ involved. ⌊E⌋.g. in
order to make an inf⌊erence⌋ by mood Barbara you must know that the two
prem.⌊ises⌋ are universal affirmative. Another example of a log.⌊ical⌋ law in
which only prop⌊ositions⌋ as a whole occur would be the law of excl.⌊uded⌋
middle⌊,⌋ which says: For any prop⌊osition⌋ p either p or not-p is true.
⌊dash from the manuscript deleted, and new paragraph introduced⌋ Now
the theory of those laws of logic in which only prop.⌊ositions⌋ as a whole
occur is called calculus of proposition⌊s,⌋ and it is exclusively with this part
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of math.⌊ematical⌋ logic that we shall have J8.K to do in the next \ few /
lectures⌊.⌋ ⌊dash from the manuscript deleted⌋ We have to begin with exam-
ining in more detail the connections between prop.⌊ositions⌋ which occur in
the inf.⌊erences⌋ concerned⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. the or, and, if, not. One has introduced
special symbols to denote them. ⌊“N⌋ot⌊”⌋ is denoted by a circumflex⌊,⌋
⌊“⌋and⌊”⌋ by a dot⌊,⌋ ,,⌊“⌋or” by a kind of \ abbrev.⌊ated⌋ / v (derived
from vel)⌊,⌋ ⌊“⌋if then⌊”⌋ is denoted by this symbol similar to a horseshoe
\ ⌊!! from the manuscript deleted; it indicated presumably where the follow-
ing table should be inserted.⌋ / ⌊:⌋
\ ⌊p, 2 > 1, q and 3 > 2, which are presumably given as examples in the
manuscript, are here deleted⌋
not ∼ \ which is an abbrev⌊iated⌋ N / ∼ p
and . p . q
or ∨ p ∨ q
if. . . then ⊃ p ⊃ q
equivalent ≡ p ≡ q /
i.e⌊.⌋ if p and q are arbitrary prop.⌊ositions⌋ ∼ p m.⌊eans⌋ p is false⌊,⌋ p . q
means both p and q is true⌊,⌋ p∨ q means either p or q⌊,⌋ p ⊃ q means ⌊i⌋f p
then q⌊,⌋ or in other words p implies q⌊.⌋ So if e.g. p is the prop⌊osition⌋today
it will rain and q ⌊is⌋ J9.K the prop.⌊osition⌋tomorrow it will snow then ⌊text
in the manuscript broken⌋
⌊A⌋bout the ⌊“⌋or⌊”:⌋ namely⌊,⌋ this log⌊ical⌋ symb.⌊ol⌋ means that at
least one of the two prop.⌊ositions⌋ p, q is true but does not exclude the case
where both are true⌊,⌋ \ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ it means one or both of them are true⌊,⌋
/ i e it corresponds to the latin vel whereas the ⌊“⌋or⌊”⌋ in trad.⌊itional⌋
logic is the exclusive ⌊“⌋or⌊”⌋ which corresp. to the latin aut and means that
exactly one of the two prop⌊ositions⌋ p, q is true and the other one false.
\ Take e.g. the sentence ⌊“⌋Anybody who has a salary or interests \ from
cap⌊ital⌋ / is liable to income tax⌊”⌋. Here the ⌊“⌋or⌊”⌋ is meant in the
sense of the log⌊ical⌋ ⌊“⌋or⌊”,⌋ because someone who has both is also liable
to income tax⌊.⌋ On the other hand⌊,⌋ in the prop.⌊osition⌋⌊“A⌋ny number
⌊minus written over another sign; should be: except⌋ 1 is either greater
or smaller ⌊than⌋ 1⌊”⌋ we mean the excl.⌊usive⌋⌊“⌋or⌊”⌋. This excl.⌊usive⌋
⌊“⌋or⌊”⌋ corresp.⌊onds⌋ to the ⌊L⌋at.⌊in⌋ aut⌊aut,⌋ the log.⌊ical⌋ ⌊“⌋or⌊”⌋ to
the ⌊L⌋at.⌊in⌋ vel⌊vel⌋. As we shall see later⌊.⌋ /
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The excl.⌊usive⌋ ,,⌊“⌋or” can be expressed by a comb.⌊ination⌋ J10.K of
the other logical symb.⌊ols,⌋ but no special symbol \ has been / introduced
for it, because it is not very often used. Finally⌊,⌋ I introduce a fifth
connection⌊,⌋ \ the so⌊⌋called / ,,⌊“⌋equivalence” denoted by three horiz.⌊on-
tal⌋ lines. p ≡ q means that both p implies q and q implies p. This relation of
equivalence would hold e.g. between the two prop⌊ositions: ⌊“⌋T⌊w⌋omorrow
is a weekday⌊”⌋ and ⌊“Tw⌋omorrow is not \ a / holiday⌊”⌋⌊full stop added
here, which in the manuscript is followed by the words: “because we have —
\ If. . . but also vice versa / ”⌋
The five notions which we have introduced so far are called resp.⌊ectively⌋
\ operation of / neg⌊ation⌋, conj⌊unction⌋, disj⌊unction⌋, implic.⌊ation,⌋
equivalence. By a common name they are called f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ of the calc.⌊u-
lus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋ \ or ⌊missing text, full stop from the manuscript
deleted⌋ Disj⌊unction⌋ is also called J11.K log.⌊ical⌋ sum and conj.⌊unction⌋
log.⌊ical⌋ prod.⌊uct⌋ because of cert⌊ain⌋ analogies with the arithmetic sum
and the ar.⌊ithmetic⌋ prod⌊uct⌋. A prop⌊osition⌋ of the form p ∨ q is called
a disj.⌊unction⌋ or a logical sum and p, q its first and sec.⌊ond⌋ member⌊;⌋
similarly a prop⌊osition⌋ of the form p ⊃ q is called an impl⌊ication⌋ and p, q
its first and sec.⌊ond⌋ member⌊,⌋ and similarly for the other op⌊erations⌋. Of
course⌊,⌋ if p, q are prop.⌊ositions,⌋ then ∼ p⌊,⌋ ∼ q⌊,⌋ p ∨ q⌊,⌋ p . q⌊,⌋ p ⊃ q
⌊underlining omitted in the edited version⌋ are also prop.⌊ositions⌋ and there-
fore to them the functions of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋ can again be ap-
plied so as to get more complicated expr⌊essions;⌋ e.g. p ∨ (q . r)⌊underlining
omitted in the edited version⌋⌊,⌋ which would mean: Either p is true or q
and r are both true.
⌊new paragraph⌋ The disj.⌊unctive⌋ syllogism J12.K I mentioned before
can be expressed in our symbolism as follows: [(p ∨ q) . ∼ q] ⊃ p⌊underlining
omitted in the edited version⌋⌊.⌋ You see in more complicated expressions
as e.g. this one brackets have to be used exactly as in algebra to indi-
cate in what order the op.⌊erations⌋ have to be carried out. If e.g. I put
the brackets in a diff.⌊erent⌋ way in this expr.⌊ession,⌋ namely like this
(p ∨ q) . r⌊underlining omitted in the edited version⌋⌊,⌋ it would mean some-
thing entirely diff.⌊erent,⌋ namely \ it would mean / either p or q is true and
in addition r is true.
⌊new paragraph⌋ There is an interesting remark due to the Polish log.⌊i-
cian⌋ L⌊ L⌋ukasiewicz⌊,⌋ namely that one can dispense entirely with brackets
if one writes the J13.K ⌊the⌋ operational symb.⌊ols⌋ ∨, ⊃ etc⌊.⌋ always in
front of the prop⌊osition⌋ to which they are applied⌊,⌋ e.g. ⊃ p q⌊underlining
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omitted in the edited version⌋ instead of p ⊃ q⌊underlining omitted in the
edited version⌋. \ Inc.⌊identally,⌋ the word ⌊“⌋if⌊”⌋ \ of ordinary lang⌊uage⌋
/ is used in exactly this way. We say e.g. ⌊“⌋If it is possible I shall ⌊do
it⌋⌊”⌋ putting the ⌊“⌋if⌊”⌋ in front of the \ two / prop⌊ositions⌋ to which
we apply it. / \ Now / in this notation \ where the op.⌊erations⌋ are put
in front / the two diff.⌊erent⌋ possibilities of this expression p ∨ q⌊.⌋r would
be dist⌊inguished⌋ automatically without the use of brackets because the
sec.⌊ond⌋ would read . ∨ p q r⌊underlining omitted in the edited version⌋⌊,
with⌋ ,,⌊“⌋or” appl⌊ied⌋ to p, q and the ,,⌊“⌋and” applied to this form.⌊ula⌋
and r⌊,⌋ whereas the first would read ,,⌊“⌋and” applied to q, r and the ∨
applied to p and this form⌊ula⌋ ∨p . qr⌊underlining omitted in the edited
version⌋⌊.⌋ \ As you see⌊,⌋ / t⌊written over T⌋hese two form⌊ulas⌋ differ
from each other without the use of brackets and it can be shown that J14.K
it is quite generally so. Since however the formulas in the bracket notation
are more easily readable I shall keep the brackets and put the operat.⌊ion⌋
symb.⌊ol⌋ in between the prop.⌊ositions⌋ to which they are applied.
⌊new paragraph⌋ You know in algebra one can save many brackets by the
conv.⌊ention⌋ that multipl⌊ication⌋ is of greater force than addition⌊,⌋ and
one can do something similar here by stipulating an order of force between
the op.⌊erations⌋ of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions,⌋ and this order is to be
exactly the same in which I introduced them⌊,⌋ namely
∼ . ∨ ⊃≡
⌊N⌋o order of force is def.⌊ined⌋ for ⊃≡⌊,⌋ they are to have equal force.
Hence
J15.K
∼ p ∨ q means (∼ p) ∨ q not ∼ (p ∨ q)
p . q ∨ r ′′ (p . q) ∨ r ′′ p . (q ∨ r)
\ exactly as for arith.⌊metical⌋ sum and prod.⌊uct⌋ /
p ∨ q ⊃ r ′′ (p ∨ q) ⊃ r ′′ p ∨ (q ⊃ r)
∼ p ⊃ q ′′ (∼ p) ⊃ q ′′ ∼ (p ⊃ q)
∼ p . q ′′ (∼ p) . q ′′ ∼ (p . q)
∼ p ≡ q ′′ (∼ p) ≡ q ′′ ∼ (p ≡ q)
\ ⌊I⌋n all these cases the expr⌊ession⌋ written without brackets has the mean-
ing of the prop⌊osition⌋ in the sec.⌊ond⌋ col⌊umn⌋. If we have the form⌊ula⌋
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of the 3⌊third⌋ col⌊umn⌋ in mind we have to write the brackets. /
Another conv⌊ention⌋ used in arithm.⌊etic⌋ for saving brack.⌊ets⌋ is this
that inst⌊ead⌋ of (a + b) + c we can write a + b + c. We make the same
conventions for log.⌊ical⌋ addition and mult.⌊iplication,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ p ∨ q ∨ r
mean⌊s⌋ (p ∨ q) ∨ r⌊,⌋ p . q . r ⌊means⌋ (p . q) . r⌊.⌋ \ ⌊
⌊new paragraph⌋ T⌋he letters p, q, r which den.⌊ote⌋ arb.⌊itrary⌋ prop.⌊o-
sitions⌋ are called prop.⌊ositional⌋ variables⌊,⌋ and any expression composed
of prop.⌊ositional⌋ var.⌊iables⌋ and the oper.⌊ations⌋ ∼⌊,⌋ ∨⌊,⌋ .⌊,⌋ ⊃⌊,⌋ ≡ is
called meaningful expression or formula of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions,⌋
where also the letters p, q themselves are considered as the simplest kind of
expressions⌊.⌋
After those merely symbolic conventions the next thing we have to do is to
examine in more detail the meaning of the op.⌊erations⌋ of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of
prop⌊ositions⌋. Take e.g. the disj.⌊unction⌋ ∨⌊.⌋ If J16.K any two prop.⌊osi-
tions⌋ p, q are given p ∨ q will again be a prop⌊osition⌋. But now (and this
is the decisive point) this op.⌊eration⌋ of ⌊“⌋or⌊”⌋ is such that the truth or
falsehood of the composit⌊e⌋ prop.⌊osition⌋ p∨q depends in a def.⌊inite⌋ way
on the truth or falsehood of the const.⌊ituents⌋ p, q. This dependence can
be expressed most clearly in ⌊the⌋ form of a table as follows: Let us form
three col.⌊umns,⌋ one headed by p⌊,⌋ one by by q⌊,⌋ one by p ∨ q⌊,⌋ and
let us write T for true and F for false. Then for the prop⌊ositions⌋ p, q we
have the foll.⌊owing⌋ four possibilities ⌊dots pointing in the manuscript to
the following tables deleted⌋
p q p ∨ q p ◦ q p . q
T T T F T
T F T T F
F T T T F
F F F F F
Now for each of these 4⌊four⌋ cases we can easily determine J17.K \ whether
/ p ∨ q will be true or false⌊;⌋ namely⌊,⌋ since p ∨ q means that one or both
of the prop⌊ositions⌋ p ⌊∨ ,⌋ q are true it will be true in the first⌊,⌋ sec.⌊ond⌋
and third case⌊,⌋ and false only in the fourth case.\ We can consider this
table (called the truth⌊ ⌋table \ for ∨ / ) as the most precise def.⌊inition⌋ of
what ∨ means. /
⌊new paragraph⌋ It is usual to call truth and falsehood the truth values
and to say of a true prop.⌊osition⌋ that it has the truth value ,,⌊“⌋Truth”⌊,⌋
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and of a false prop.⌊osition⌋ that it has the truth value ,,⌊“⌋Falsehood”⌊.⌋ T
and F then denote the truth values and the this table called the truth table
\ for ∨ / shows how the truth value of the composit⌊e⌋ expr⌊ession⌋ \ p ∨ q
/ depends on the truth values of the constituents. The exclusive ⌊“⌋or⌊”⌋
would have another truth J18.K table⌊;⌋ namely if I denote it by ◦ for the
moment, we have p ◦ q is false in the case when both p and q are true and
in the case when both ′′ ′′ ′′ ⌊p and q⌋ are false⌊,⌋ and it is true in the other
cases, where one of the two prop.⌊ositions⌋ p, q is true and the other one is
false. The op.⌊eration⌋ ∼ has the following truth⌊ ⌋table
p ∼ p
T F
F T
Here we have only two poss.⌊ibilities:⌋ p is true and p is false⌊,⌋ and if p
is true not-p is false and if p is false not-p is true. The truth⌊ ⌋table for
,,⌊“⌋and” can also easily be determined⌊:⌋ p . q is true only in the case where
p both p and q are true and false in all the other three cases.
⌊new paragraph⌋ A little more J19.K difficult is the question of the truth⌊ ⌋
table for ⊃. p ⊃ q was defined to mean: If p is true then q is also true. So
\ in order to determine the truth⌊ ⌋table / let us assume that for two given
prop⌊ositions⌋ p, q p ⊃ q holds⌊,⌋ i.e⌊.⌋ let us assume we know ⌊“⌋If p then
q⌊”⌋ but nothing else ⌊underlining replaced partially in the edited version by
italics⌋⌊,⌋ and let us ask what can \ we conclude about / the truth values
of p and q from this assumption. ⌊It is not indicated in the manuscript
where the following table should be inserted. The text in the manuscript
that follows it is a comment upon it. In this table the first three lines in the
columns beneath p and q are put in a box, which in the edited text is printed
separately in the next display, further down.⌋
Ass⌊umption⌋ p ⊃ q p q ∼ p ∼ p ∨ q
T F T T T
T F F T T
T T T F T
F T F F F
First it may certainly happen that p is false⌊,⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ the ass.⌊umption⌋
,,⌊“⌋If p then q” says nothing about the truth or falsehood of p⌊,⌋ and in this
case when p is false q may be true as well as false⌊,⌋ because the ass.⌊umption⌋
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says nothing about what happens to q if p is false⌊,⌋ but only if p is true⌊.⌋
J20.K So we have both these poss.⌊ibilities:⌋ p F q T⌊,⌋ p F q F. Next
we have the poss.⌊ibility⌋ that p is true⌊,⌋ but in this case q must also be
true owing to the ass.⌊umption;⌋ so that the poss.⌊ibility⌋ p true q false is
excluded and it is the only of the four possibilities that is excluded by the
ass.⌊umption⌋ p ⊃ q. It follows that either one of those three possib.⌊ilities,⌋
⌊(⌋ which I frame in ⌊
p q
F T
F F
T T
⌋⌊)⌋ occurs. But we have also vice versa: If one of these three possib⌊ilities⌋
for the truth⌊ ⌋val.⌊ue⌋ of p and q is realized then p ⊃ q holds. For let us
assume we know that one of the three marked J21.K cases occurs⌊;⌋ then we
know also ,,⌊“⌋If p is true q is true”⌊,⌋ because if p is true only the third of the
three marked cases can be realized and in this case q is true. So we see that
the statement ⌊“⌋If p then q⌊”⌋ is exactly equivalent with the statement that
one of the three marked cases for the truth values of p and q is realized⌊,⌋
i.e. p ⊃ q will be true in each of the three marked cases and false in the last
case. And this gives the desired truth⌊ ⌋table for implication. However there
are two important remarks about it⌊,⌋ namely⌊:⌋
1. Exactly the same truth⌊ ⌋table can also be J22.K obtained by a combi-
nation of operations introduced previously⌊,⌋ namely ∼ p ∨ q⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. either
p is false or q is true has the same truth table. For ∼ p is true whenever p
is false⌊,⌋ i.e⌊.⌋ in the first two cases and ∼ p ∨ q is then true if either ∼ p
or q is true⌊,⌋ and as you see that happens in exactly the cases where p ⊃ q
is true⌊.⌋ So we see p ⊃ q and ∼ p ∨ q are equivalent⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ whenever
p ⊃ q holds then also ∼ p ∨ q holds and vice versa. This makes possible to
define p ⊃ q by ∼ p ∨ q and \ this / is the usual way of introducing the
impl.⌊ication \ in math.⌊ematical⌋ log⌊ic⌋ / ⌊.⌋
⌊new paragraph, 2.⌋ The sec.⌊ond⌋ remark about the truth⌊ ⌋table for
impl.⌊ication⌋ is this. We must J23.K not forget that p ⊃ q was understood
to mean simply ⌊“⌋If p then q⌊”⌋ and nothing else⌊,⌋ and only this made
the constr.⌊uction⌋ of the truth⌊ ⌋table possible. There are other interpre-
tations of the term ,,⌊“⌋implic.⌊ation⌋” for which our truth⌊ ⌋table would
be completely inadequate⌊.⌋ E.g. p ⊃ q could be given the meaning: q is
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a log.⌊ical⌋ consequence of p⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. q can be derived from p by means of
a chain of syllogisms. In this sense e.g. the prop.⌊osition⌋⌊“⌋Jup.⌊iter⌋ is a
planet⌊”⌋ would imply the prop⌊osition⌋⌊“⌋Jup.⌊iter⌋ is not a fix⌊ed⌋ star⌊”⌋
because no planet can be a fix⌊ed⌋ star by def.⌊inition,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. J24.K by merely
log⌊ical⌋ reasons.
⌊new paragraph⌋ This kind \ and also some other similar kinds / of
impl.⌊ication⌋ is⌊are⌋ usually called strict impl.⌊ication⌋ and denoted by this
symbol \ ≺ / and the implication defined before \ by the truth⌊ ⌋table /
is called material impl.⌊ication⌋ if it is to be distinguished from ≺. Now
it is easy to see not only that our truth⌊ ⌋table would be false for strict
impl.⌊ication⌋ and even more⌊,⌋ namely that there exists no truth⌊ ⌋table
at all for strict implication. In order to prove this consider the first line
of our truth table, where p and q are both true and let us ask what will
the truth⌊ ⌋value of p ≺ q be in this case⌊.⌋ J25.K It turns out that this
truth⌊ ⌋value is not be uniquely det⌊ermined⌋. For take e.g. for p the prop⌊osi-
tion⌋⌊“⌋Jup⌊iter⌋ is a planet⌊”⌋ and for q ⌊“⌋Ju.⌊piter⌋ is not a fix⌊ed⌋
star⌊”,⌋ then p, q are both true \ and / p ≺ q is also true⌊.⌋ On the other
hand if you take for p again ⌊“⌋Ju.⌊piter⌋ is a planet⌊”⌋ and for q ⌊“⌋France
is a republic⌊”⌋ then again both p and q are true⌊,⌋ but p ≺ q is false because
⌊“⌋France is a republic⌊”⌋ is not a log.⌊ical⌋ consequ.⌊ence⌋ of ⌊“⌋Ju.⌊piter⌋ is
a planet⌊”⌋. So we see the truth value of p ≺ q is not uniquely det.⌊ermined⌋
by the truth values of p and q and therefore no truth⌊ ⌋table exists⌊.⌋ J26.K
Such functions of prop.⌊ositions⌋ for which no truth⌊ ⌋table exists are called
intensional as opposed to extensional ones for which a truth⌊ ⌋table does ex-
ist. The ext.⌊ensional⌋ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ are also called truth⌊ ⌋functions, be-
cause they depend only on the truth or falsehood of the prop.⌊ositions⌋
involved⌊.⌋
So we see logical consequ⌊ence⌋ is an intensional rel.⌊ation⌋ \ betw.⌊een⌋
prop.⌊ositions⌋ / and ⌊there are⌋⌊the⌋mat⌊erial⌋ impl.⌊ication⌋ introd⌊uced⌋
by our a truth⌊ ⌋table cannot mean logical consequence⌊.⌋ Its meaning is
best given by the word ⌊“⌋if⌊”⌋ of ordinary language which has a much
wider sign.⌊ification⌋ than just log.⌊ical⌋ cons.⌊equence;⌋ e.g. ⌊if⌋ \ someone
/ says: ⌊“⌋If I don’t come I J27.K shall call you⌊”⌋ that does not indicate that
this telephoning is a log.⌊ical⌋ consequ.⌊ence⌋ of \ his not / coming⌊,⌋ but it
means simply he will either come or telephone⌊,⌋ which is exactly the meaning
expressed by the truth⌊ ⌋table. \ Hence mat.⌊erial⌋ implication introduced
by the truth table⌊s⌋ corresponds as closely to ⌊“⌋if then⌊”⌋ as a precise
notion can correspond to a not precise notion of ordinary language⌊.⌋ /
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⌊dash from the manuscript deleted, and new paragraph introduced⌋ If
we are now confronted with the question which one of the two kinds of
impl.⌊ication⌋ we shall use in developing the theory of inf.⌊erence⌋ we have
to consider two things⌊:⌋ 1. mat.⌊erial⌋ implication is the much simpler
and clearer notion and 2. it is quite sufficient for developing the theory
of inf.⌊erence⌋ because in order to conclude q from p it is quite sufficient
J28.K to know p implies mat⌊erially⌋ q and not nec.⌊essary⌋ to know that
p impl.⌊ies⌋ strictly q⌊.⌋ \ For if we know p ⊃ q we know that either p
is false or q is true. Hence if we know in add.⌊ition⌋ that p is true the
first of the two poss.⌊ibilities⌋ that p is false is not realized⌊.⌋ Hence the
sec.⌊ond⌋ must be realized⌊,⌋ namely q is true⌊.⌋ / For these two reasons
\ that mat.⌊erial⌋ impl.⌊ication⌋ is simpler and sufficient / I shall use only
mat.⌊erial⌋ impl.⌊ication⌋ at least in th⌊e⌋ \ first / introductory part of my
lectures⌊,⌋ and shall use the terms ,,⌊“⌋implies” and ,,⌊“⌋follows” only in the
sense \ of mat⌊erial⌋ imp.⌊lication⌋ / . I do not want to say by this that
a theory of strict impl⌊ication⌋ may not be interesting and important for
cert.⌊ain⌋ purposes. In fact I hope it will be discussed in the sec⌊ond⌋ half
of this seminary. But this theory bel⌊ongs⌋ to an entirely diff.⌊erent⌋ part
of logic than the one I am dealing with now⌊,⌋ J29.K namely to the logic of
modalities.
I come now to some apparently parad.⌊oxical⌋ consequences of our def⌊ini-
tion⌋ of mat⌊erial⌋ impl.⌊ication⌋ whose parad⌊oxicality; one finds however
“paradoxity” on p. 22. of Notebook I⌋ however disappears if we remem-
ber that it does not mean log.⌊ical⌋ consequ⌊ence⌋. The first of these con-
sequ.⌊ences⌋ is that a true prop.⌊osition⌋ is implied by any prop.⌊osition⌋
whatsoever. We see this at once from the truth⌊ ⌋table which shows that
p ⊃ q is always true if q is true whatever p may be. \ You see there are
only two cases where q is true ⌊namely⌋ and in both of them p ⊃ q is true.
/ But sec.⌊ondly⌋ we see also that p ⊃ q is always true if p is false whatever
q may be. ⌊\ bec. you see / ⌋ So that means that ⌊a⌋ false propo⌊osition⌋
implies any prop.⌊osition⌋ whatsoever⌊,⌋ which is the sec⌊ond⌋ of the para-
doxical consequences. These properties of impl.⌊ication⌋ J30.K can also be
expressed by saying⌊: “⌋An implication with true sec.⌊ond⌋ member is al-
ways true whatever the first member may be and an impl.⌊ication⌋ with false
first member is always true whatever the second member may be⌊”;⌋ we can
express that also by formulas like this q ⊃ (p ⊃ q)⌊,⌋ ∼ p ⊃ (p ⊃ q)⌊.⌋ Both
of these form⌊ulas⌋ are also immediate consequences of the fact that p ⊃ q
is equiv⌊alent⌋ with ∼ p∨ q because what ∼ p∨ q says is exactly that either
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p is false or q is true⌊;⌋ so ∼ p ∨ q will always be true if p is false and \ will
be also true / if q is true whatever the other prop⌊osition⌋ may be. If we
apply J31.K these formulas to special cases we get strange cons.⌊equences;⌋
e.g. ⌊“⌋J.⌊upiter⌋ is a fix⌊ed⌋ star⌊”⌋ implies ⌊“⌋France is a republic⌊”,⌋ but
it also implies ⌊“⌋France is not a republic⌊”⌋ because a false prop⌊osition⌋
implies any prop⌊osition⌋ whatsoever. Similarly ⌊“⌋France is a republic⌊”⌋ is
implied by ⌊“⌋Ju.⌊piter⌋ is a planet⌊”⌋ but also by ⌊“⌋Ju.⌊piter⌋ is a fix⌊ed⌋
star⌊”⌋. But as I mentioned before these consequ⌊ences⌋ are only paradoxical
only for strict impl⌊ication⌋. They are in pretty good agreement with the
meaning which the word ⌊“⌋if⌊”⌋ has in ord.⌊inary⌋ langu⌊age⌋. if the Be-
cause the first formula then says if q is true q is also true if p is true \ which
is not paradoxical but trivial / and the sec.⌊ond⌋ says if p is false then if p
is true anything J32.K is true. That this is in \ good / agreement with the
meaning which the word ,,⌊“⌋if” has can be seen from many colloquialisms⌊;⌋
e.g⌊.⌋ if something is obviously false one says sometimes ⌊“I⌋f this is true I
am a Chinaman⌊”,⌋ which is another way of saying ⌊“I⌋f this is true anything
is true⌊”.⌋ Another of these so called parad.⌊oxical⌋ cons.⌊equences⌋ is e.g⌊.⌋
that for any two arbitrary prop⌊ositions⌋ one must imply the other⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e.
for any p, q (p ⊃ q) ∨ (q ⊃ p)⌊;⌋ in fact q must be either true or false⌊—⌋if
it is true the first member of the disj.⌊unction⌋ is true bec.⌊ause⌋ it is an
impl.⌊ication⌋ with true sec⌊ond⌋ member⌊,⌋ if it is false the second member
of the disj⌊unction⌋ is J33.K true. \ So this disjunction is always true⌊.⌋ /
⌊new paragraph⌋ Those three formulas⌊,⌋ as well as the form⌊ula⌋ of
disj.⌊unctive⌋ inf⌊erence⌋ we had before⌊,⌋ are examples of \ so called /
universally true formulas⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. formulas which are true whatever the pro-
p⌊ositions⌋ p, q, r occurring in them may be. Such form.⌊ulas⌋ are also
called logically true or tautological⌊,⌋ and it is exactly the chief aim of the
calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋ to investigate these tautol⌊ogical⌋ formulas.
⌊new paragraph⌋ I shall begin with discussing a few more examples before
going \ over / to more general considerations⌊.⌋ I mention at first \ some of
/ the trad⌊itional⌋ hyp.⌊othetical⌋ and J34.K disj.⌊unctive⌋ inferences which
in our notation read as follows:
1. (p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q pon⌊endo⌋ pon.⌊ens⌋ (Assertion)
2. (p ⊃ q) . ∼ q ⊃ ∼ p toll⌊endo⌋ toll⌊ens⌋
3. (p ∨ q) . ∼ q ⊃ p toll.⌊endo⌋ pon.⌊ens⌋ as we had bef.⌊ore⌋
(the mod.⌊us⌋ pon.⌊endo⌋ toll⌊ens⌋ holds only for the exc⌊lusive⌋ ∨)
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4. An inf⌊erence⌋ which is also treated in many of the textbooks under
the heading of ,,⌊“⌋dilemma” is this
(p ⊃ r) . (q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p ∨ q ⊃ r)
If both p ⊃ r and q ⊃ r then from p ∨ q follows r. It is usually written
as an inf⌊erence⌋ with three prem.⌊ises,⌋ J35.K namely from the three
premis⌊s⌋es (p ⊃ r) . (q ⊃ r) . (p ∨ q) one \ can / conclude⌊s⌋ r⌊.⌋
\ This is nothing else but the principle of proof by cases⌊,⌋ namely the
prem.⌊ises⌋ say: one of the two cases p, q must occur and from both of
them follows r⌊.⌋ That this \ form⌊ula⌋ with 3⌊three⌋ prem⌊ises⌋ / means
the same thing as the form⌊ula⌋ under cons⌊ideration⌋ is clear because this
earlier form⌊ula⌋ \ says: / ⌊“⌋If the first two prem⌊ises⌋ are true then if the
third is true r is true⌊”,⌋ which means exactly the same thing as ⌊“⌋If all
the three premis⌊s⌋es are true r is true⌊.⌋ The possibility of going over from
one of these two form⌊ulas⌋ to the other is due to another \ import⌊ant⌋
/ log.⌊ical⌋ principle which is called importation and reads like this
[p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] ⊃ (p . q ⊃ r) imp.⌊ortation⌋
and its inverse which is called exp.⌊ortation⌋ and reads like this
(p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] exp⌊ortation⌋.
So owing to these two impl⌊ications⌋ we have also an equiv.⌊alence⌋ between
the left and right⌊-⌋h.⌊and⌋ side⌊.⌋ /
Next we have the \ three / law⌊s⌋ of identity⌊,⌋ excl⌊uded⌋ middle and
contr.⌊adiction⌋ which read as follows in our not.⌊ation⌋
1. p ⊃ p 2. p ∨ ∼ p 3. ∼(p . ∼ p)
⌊W⌋e can add another sim⌊ilar⌋ law⌊,⌋ the law of double neg⌊ation⌋ which
says ∼(∼ p) ≡ p⌊.⌋
Next we have the very important formulas of transpos⌊ition⌋:
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃∼ p) ⌊if from p foll⌊ows⌋ q then . . . ⌋
⌊O⌋ther forms of this form⌊ula⌋ of trans⌊position⌋ would be
(p ⊃∼ q) ⊃ (q ⊃∼ p) ⌊if.⌋
(∼ p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ p) proved in the same way⌊.⌋
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⌊I⌋n all those formulas of transp⌊osition⌋ we can write equ.⌊ivalence⌋ in-
st.⌊ead⌋ of ⌊identity the main implication,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. J36.K we have also (p ⊃ q) ≡
(∼ q ⊃∼ p)⌊.⌋ ⌊A⌋nother form \ of transpos⌊ition,⌋ namely with two prem-
⌊ises,⌋ is this / (p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p . ∼ r ⊃∼ q) because under the ass.⌊umption⌋
p . q ⊃ r if we know p . ∼ r⌊, then⌋ q cannot be \ true / because r would be
true in this case⌊.⌋
Next we have diff.⌊erent⌋ so called red.⌊uctio⌋ ad abs⌊urdum,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃∼ q) ⊃∼ p
⌊A⌋ part.⌊icularly⌋ interest⌊ing⌋⌊the⌋ form of red⌊uctio⌋ ad abs.⌊urdum⌋ is
the one which Prof.⌊essor⌋ M.⌊enger⌋ mentioned in his intr.⌊oductory⌋ talk
and which reads as foll.⌊ows⌋
(∼ p ⊃ p) ⊃ p
Other ex⌊amples of log⌊ically⌋ true form⌊ulas⌋ are the commut⌊ative⌋
and associative law for disj⌊unction⌋ and conj⌊unction⌋
1. p ∨ q ≡ q ∨ p
2. (p ∨ q) ∨ r ≡ p ∨ (q ∨ r) \ ⌊If either the disj⌊unction⌋ of p and q is
true or r is true then⌋ /
3. similar formulas hold for add.⌊ition⌋
p . q ≡ q . p⌊,⌋ (p . q) . r ≡ p . (q . r)
J37.K Next we have some form⌊ulas⌋ connecting ∨ and . namely at first
the famous so called De Morg.⌊an⌋ formulas:
∼ (p . q) ≡ ∼ p ∨ ∼ q
∼ (p ∨ q) ≡ ∼ p . ∼ q
The left⌊-⌋h.⌊and⌋ side of the first means not both p, q are true⌊,⌋ the right⌊-
⌋h⌊and⌋ side at least one is false ⌊which is..⌋. ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ⌊The left⌊-⌋h.⌊and⌋
side of the⌋ sec⌊ond⌋ ′′ ⌊means⌋ not at least one ⌊is⌋ true⌊,⌋ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ⌊the
right⌊-⌋h⌊and⌋ side⌋ both are false⌊.⌋
These formulas give a means to distribute \ so to speak / the neg⌊ation⌋
of a product on the two fact⌊ors⌋ and also the neg⌊ation⌋ of a sum on the
two terms⌊,⌋ where however sum has to be changed into prod⌊uct⌋ and
prod⌊uct⌋ into sum in this distrib.⌊ution⌋ process⌊.⌋ Another tautologie⌊y⌋
conn⌊ecting⌋ sum and prod⌊uct⌋ is J38.K the distr⌊ibutive⌋ law which reads
exactly analogously as in arith.⌊metic⌋
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1. p . (q ∨ r) ≡ p . q ∨ p . r
\ bec.⌊ause⌋ let us ass⌊ume⌋ left is true then we have ⌊then⌋ p ⌊full stop
deleted⌋ and two cases q⌊,⌋ r⌊;⌋ in the first case p . q⌊,⌋ in the sec⌊ond⌋ p . r
is true⌊,⌋ hence in any case ⌊right is true⌋ /
and 2. p ∨ q . r ≡ (p ∨ q) . (p ∨ r)
3. (p ⊃ q) . (q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p ⊃ r) Syllog⌊ism,⌋ \ Transitivity of ⊃ /
4. (p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p ⊃ r)]
(p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] Export
inverse Import
5. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p . r ⊃ q . s) factor Leibnitz theorema praeclarum
\ (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p . r ⊃ q . r) factor /
6. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ s)
\ (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ r) Sum /
7. p ⊃ p ∨ q ⌊unreadable word⌋ 7′. p . q ⊃ p
8. p ∨ p ⊃ p ⌊taut⌋ 8′. p ⊃ p . p
≡ ≡
9. p ⊃ (q ⊃ p . q)
⌊On a page after p. 38., which is not numbered, one finds the following
short text containing perhaps exercises or examination questions, which does
not seem directly related to the preceding and succeeding pages of the course:
Log⌊ic⌋ Notre Dame
1. ⌊a text in shorthand⌋
2. Trans⌊itivity and⌋ irrefl⌊exivity⌋ ⊃ As⌊s⌋ym.⌊metry⌋
On the last page of the notebook, which is also not numbered, there are just
two letters “aq” or “ag”.⌋
2.1 Notebook I
⌊Folder 59, on the front cover of the notebook “Log.⌊ik⌋ Vorl.⌊esungen⌋
⌊German: Logic Lectures⌋ Notre Dame I”⌋
J1.K Log⌊ic⌋ is usually def⌊ined⌋ as the science whose object are the laws
of ⌊presumably “corr.”, which abbreviates “correct”; if “corr.” is read instead
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as “con.”, then this would abbreviate “consistent”⌋ thinking. According to
this def⌊inition⌋ the cent.⌊ral⌋ part of log.⌊ic⌋ must be the theory of inference
and the theory of logically true prop.⌊ositions⌋ [as e.g. the law of excl.⌊uded⌋
middle ⌊right square bracket put before the inserted text which follows⌋ \ and
in order to get acqu.⌊ainted⌋ with math.⌊ematical⌋ log⌊ic⌋ it is perhaps best
to go in medias res⌊in medias res⌋ and begin with this centr.⌊al⌋ part. / ⌊full
stop and right square bracket deleted⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ Prof⌊essor⌋Men.⌊ger⌋ has pointed out in his introduct⌊o-
ry⌋ lecture that the treatment of these things in trad.⌊itional⌋ logic and in
the current textbooks is very unsatisfactory⌊.⌋ Unsatisfactory \ from sev-
eral standp⌊oints⌋. / 1.⌊First⌋ from the standpoint of completeness⌊.⌋ What
the textbooks give and also what Arist.⌊otle⌋ gives is a more or less arbi-
trary selection of the \ infinity of / ⌊the⌋ laws of logic⌊,⌋ whereas in \ a
/ systematic treatment as is given in math.⌊ematical⌋ log.⌊ic⌋ we shall have
to develop methods which allow J2.K us to obtain all possible logically true
prop.⌊ositions⌋ and to decide of any given prop.⌊osition⌋ whether or not they
are⌊it is⌋ logically ⌊true⌋ or of an inf.⌊erence⌋ whether it is correct or not. But
2.⌊secondly⌋ the class.⌊ical⌋ treatment is also unsatisf.⌊actory⌋ as to the ques-
tion of reducing the inf. \ laws / of logic true prop. to a cert.⌊ain⌋ number of
primitive laws to \ from / which they can be deduced. Although it is some-
times claimed that everything can be deduced from the three fund⌊amental⌋
laws of contr.⌊adiction,⌋ excl.⌊uded⌋ middle and identity or \ from / the
modus ⌊B⌋arbara this claim has never been ⌊unreadable symbol⌋ proved in
trad⌊itional⌋ or even clearly formul.⌊ated⌋ in trad.⌊itional⌋ logic.
⌊new paragraph⌋ The chief aim in the first part of these lectures will be
to \ fill those two gaps ⌊unreadable word⌋ [solve those two probl.⌊ems⌋ in a
satisf.⌊actory⌋ way]⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. to give \ as far as possible / a complete theory of
log⌊ical⌋ \ inf⌊erence⌋ and log⌊ically⌋ / true prop.⌊ositions,⌋ J3.K \ complete
at least for a cert.⌊ain⌋ very wide domain of prop.⌊ositions,⌋ / and \ ⌊2
followed by unreadable symbols, perhaps “.1”⌋ / to show how they can be
reduced to a cert⌊ain⌋ number of primitive laws.
⌊dash from the manuscript deleted, and new paragraph introduced⌋ The
theory of syl.⌊abbreviation for “syllogisms” or “syllogistic”⌋ as presented in
the current textbook⌊s⌋ is \ usually / divided into two parts⌊:⌋
⌊display⌋ 1. The Arist.⌊otelian⌋ figures and moods of inf.⌊erence⌋ incl.⌊ud-
ing⌋ the inf.⌊erences⌋ with one premise (e.g. contrad.⌊iction⌋)⌊,⌋
⌊display⌋ 2. inf.⌊erences⌋ of ⌊unreadable word, should be “an”⌋ \ entirely
/ diff.⌊erent⌋ kind which are treated under the heading of hypoth.⌊etical⌋
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disj.⌊unc-tive⌋ conj.⌊unctive⌋ inferences \ ⌊unreadable text⌋ ⌊they⌋ / and
which seem to be a Stoic add.⌊ition⌋ to the Arist.⌊otelian⌋ figures.
Let us begin with the syl.⌊logisms⌋ of the sec⌊ond⌋ kind which turn out to
be much more fundamental. We have for inst.⌊ance⌋ the modus ponendo
ponens⌊.⌋
J4.K From the two premises
1. If Leibn⌊itz⌋ has inv⌊ented⌋ the inf.⌊initesimal⌋ calc⌊ulus⌋ he was a
great math.⌊ematician,⌋
2. Leibn⌊itz⌋ has ⌊invented the infinitesimal calculus,⌋
we conclude
Leibn.⌊itz⌋ was a great math.⌊ematician.⌋
⌊From the next paragraph until the end of p. 21. the lower-case propo-
sitional letters p, q and r are written first as capital P , Q and R, which are
later on alternated with the lower-case letters. In the edited text they are
all uniformly lower-case, while in the present source text they are as in the
manuscript.⌋
Generally⌊,⌋ if p ⌊and⌋ q are arbitr.⌊ary⌋ prop.⌊ositions⌋ and if we have
the two premises
1. If P so Q⌊,⌋
2. P ⌊,⌋
we \ can / conclude
Q⌊.⌋
⌊O⌋r \ take / a disjunctive inf.⌊erence⌋ \ tollendo ponens⌊.⌋ / If we have the
two premises
1. Either P or Q⌊,⌋
2. Not P ⌊,⌋
we \ can / conclude
Q⌊.⌋
It is possible to write \ express / those \ ⌊th⌋is / syllogism⌊s⌋ ⌊“as” or
“is” and a superscripted minus from the manuscript deleted⌋ by one logically
true prop.⌊osition⌋ as follows:
If either P or Q and if not-P then Q.
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\ Other examples of log.⌊ically⌋ true prop⌊ositions⌋ of this kind would be
This whole statement will be true whatever P,Q may be⌊.⌋ /
⌊new paragraph⌋Now what is the most striking caract⌊er⌋ of these inf.⌊er-
ences⌋ which distinguishes them from the Arist.⌊otelian⌋ syll.⌊ogistic⌋ \ fig-
ures / ? It is this⌊:⌋ J5.K that in order to make those inf.⌊erences⌋ it is not
nec.⌊essary⌋ to know anything about the structure of P and Q. P or Q (may
themselves be disju.⌊nctive⌋ or hyp.⌊othetical⌋ prop.⌊ositions⌋)⌊,⌋ they may
be aff⌊irmative⌋ or neg.⌊ative⌋ prop.⌊ositions,⌋ or they may be s⌊i⌋mple or
as compl.⌊icated⌋ as you want⌊;⌋ ⌊\ (. . . ) / from the manuscript deleted⌋
all this is indiff.⌊erent⌋ for this syl.⌊logism,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ only prop⌊ositions⌋ as
a whole occur in it and it is this fact that makes this kind of syl⌊logism⌋
simpler and more fundamental than the Arist⌊otelian⌋. \ ⌊T⌋he law of
contrad.⌊iction⌋ and excl.⌊uded⌋ middle would be \ an / other ex.⌊amples⌋
of log.⌊ical⌋ true prop.⌊ositions⌋ \ laws / of this kind. Bec.⌊ause⌋ ause e.g.
the l.⌊aw⌋ of e.⌊xcluded⌋ m.⌊iddle⌋ say⌊s⌋ for any prop⌊osition⌋ P either P
or ∼ P is true and this quite indep.⌊endently⌋ of the struct.⌊ure⌋ of P . /
\With / t⌊written over T⌋hese Arist.⌊otelian⌋ \ log.⌊ical⌋ syl.⌊logisms⌋ it is
of course quite diff.⌊erent;⌋ moods of course they / depend on the struct.⌊ure⌋
of the prop.⌊ositions⌋ \ involved⌊,⌋ / e.g. in order to apply the mood Barbara
you must know \ e.g. / that the two premises are gen.⌊eral⌋ affirmat.⌊ive⌋
prop⌊ositions.⌋⌊insertion sign crossed out in the manuscript⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ Now the theory J6.K of log.⌊ically⌋ true prop.⌊ositions⌋
and log ⌊ical⌋ inferences in which only prop.⌊ositions⌋ as a whole occur is
called calcul.⌊us⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋. In order to ⌊unreadable word, “subject”
or perhaps “bring”⌋ it to a syst.⌊ematic⌋ treatment we have first to examine
more in detail the ⌊unreadable word, presumably “connection”⌋ between
prop.⌊ositions⌋ which \ can / occur in there inf.⌊erences,⌋ i.e. the or, and, if. . .
so, and the not. One has introduced special symbols to denote them⌊,⌋ in
fact there are two diff.⌊erent⌋ symbol.⌊isms⌋ for them⌊,⌋ the Russell and the
Hilb.⌊ert⌋ symb⌊olism⌋. I shall use in these lect.⌊ures⌋ Russell’s symb⌊olism⌋.
In this not is den.⌊oted⌋ by ∼⌊,⌋ and by a point \ dot / .⌊,⌋ or by ∨ and \ the
/ if. . . so i.e. the ⌊crossed out unreadable word, presumably “connection”⌋
of impl.⌊ication⌋ by ⊃⌊,⌋ J7.K i.e. if P,Q are arbitrary prop⌊ositions⌋ then
∼ P means P is wrong \ false⌊,⌋ / P . Q means \ both / P \ and / Q are
both \ are / true⌊,⌋ P ∨ Q means at least one of the prop⌊ositions⌋ P,Q is
true⌊,⌋ \ either both are true or one is true and the other one wrong \ false
/ / . This is ⌊a⌋ diff⌊erent⌋ from the mean.⌊ing⌋ that is given to \ the / or
in trad.⌊itional⌋ logic. There we have to do with the exclusive or⌊,⌋ \ in
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⌊L⌋at⌊in⌋ aut⌊. . . ⌋ aut⌊,⌋ / which means \ that exactly / one of the two
prop.⌊ositions⌋ P,Q is true and the other one is wrong \ false⌊,⌋ / whereas
this log.⌊ical⌋ symb⌊ol⌋ for or has the meaning of the ⌊L⌋at⌊in⌋ sive. . . sive⌊,⌋
⌊a right parenthesis in the manuscript over the second sive deleted⌋ i.e⌊.⌋ one
of the two prop⌊ositions⌋ is true where it is not excl.⌊uded⌋ that both are true.
Of course ⌊T⌋he excl.⌊usive⌋ or \ as we shall see later / can be expressed by
a comb.⌊ination⌋ of the other logistic symb.⌊ols,⌋ but one has not introduced
a proper symb.⌊ol⌋ for it because it turns out not to be a⌊s⌋ fund.⌊amental⌋
as the sive sive or in the sense of sive-⌊. . . ⌋ sive⌊;⌋ J8.K it ⌊is⌋ not very often
used. The ⌊n⌋ext symb⌊ol⌋ is the ⊃⌊.⌋ If P,Q are two prop⌊ositions⌋ ⌊dash
from the manuscript deleted⌋ P ⊃ Q \ read as P implies Q / means I⌊i⌋f
P so Q⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ P implies Q⌊.⌋ \ So this ⊃ is the symb⌊ol⌋ of implication
Finally we introduce a fifth ⌊unreadable word, presumably “connection”⌋
p ≡ q (p equiv.⌊alent to⌋ q⌊)⌋ which means both p ⊃ q and q ⊃ p⌊.⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ The 5⌊five⌋⌊written over presumably 4⌋ ⌊unreadable
word, presumably “connections”⌋ introd⌊uced⌋ so far are called resp.⌊ective-
ly⌋ negation, conj⌊unction⌋, disj⌊unction⌋, implic⌊ation,⌋ \ equivalence⌊,⌋ /
and all of them are called ⌊unreadable word, presumably “connections”⌋ or
operations of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋. inst.⌊ead⌋ of ⌊C⌋onj⌊unction⌋
and disj⌊unction⌋ one s are also called logical prod⌊uct⌋ and log⌊ical⌋ sum
respectively⌊.⌋ ⌊A⌋ll of the ment.⌊ioned⌋ log⌊ical⌋ op.⌊erations⌋ \ exc.⌊lud-
ing⌋ neg.⌊ation⌋ / are op⌊erations⌋ with two arg.⌊uments,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. they form
a new prop⌊osition⌋ out of two given ones⌊,⌋ exp⌊should be “for example,”⌋
P∨Q⌊.⌋ Only the neg⌊ation⌋ is an op.⌊era-tion⌋ with one arg⌊ument⌋ forming
a new prop⌊osition⌋ ∼ P out of any⌊written over something else⌋ single given
prop⌊osition.⌋ P,Q⌈
Not only the symb. op⌊erations⌋ ⊃⌊,⌋ ∨ ⌊and⌋ . are called impl.⌊ication,⌋
disj⌊unction and⌋ conj⌊unction,⌋ but also an expr.⌊ession⌋ of the form p ⊃ q
⌊,⌋ p ∨ q is⌊written over “are”⌋ called ⌊unreadable word⌋ an impl.⌊ication⌋
etc⌊.,⌋ where p, q may again be expressions inv.⌊olving⌋ again ⊃⌊,⌋ ∨ etc⌊.⌋
and p⌊,⌋ q are called resp.⌊ectively⌋ first and sec.⌊ond⌋ member ⌊of⌋.
Of course if P ⌊and⌋ Q are prop⌊ositions⌋ then ∼ P ⌊,⌋ ∼ Q⌊,⌋ P ∨Q⌊,⌋
P . Q ⌊and⌋ P ⊃ Q are again \ also / prop.⌊ositions⌋ and hence to them the
op.⌊erations⌋ of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋ can again be applied⌊,⌋ so
as to get more compl.⌊ex⌋ expr.⌊essions,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ P ∨ (Q . R) ⌊in this formula
a left parenthesis before P and a right parenthesis after Q have been crossed
out in the manuscript⌋⌊,⌋ eithe⌊r⌋ P is true or Q and R are both true⌊.⌋ /
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The disj.⌊unctive⌋ inf.⌊erence⌋ I mentioned before would read in this sym-
bolism as follows: [(P ∨Q) . ∼ P ] ⊃ Q⌊.⌋ ⌊The text to be inserted to which
the sign ⊗ in the manuscript at this place should refer to is missing.⌋ Of
course \ You see / in more comp⌊icated⌋ expressions as this one brack.⌊ets⌋
have to be used exactly as in algebra in order to indicate the order in which
the operations have to be applied. E.g. if ⌊unreadable symbol, perhaps “I”⌋
put the \ round / brackets in this expr.⌊ession⌋ like this P ∨ (Q . ∼ P )⌊,⌋ it
would have a diff⌊erent⌋ mean⌊ing,⌋ namely either P is true or Q and ∼ P
are both true.
⌊new paragraph⌋ There is an interest.⌊ing⌋ J9.K remark ⌊a small super-
scribed ∨ from the manuscript deleted⌋ due to L⌊ L⌋uk.⌊asiewicz⌋ that one
can dispense with the brackets if one writes the operational symb⌊ols⌋ ∨⌊,⌋
⊃ ⌊a dot in the manuscript under ⊃ deleted⌋ etc⌊.⌋ always in front of the
prop⌊ositions⌋ to which they are applied⌊,⌋ e.g.⊃p q inst⌊ead of⌋ p ⊃ q. Then
\ e.g. / the two diff.⌊erent⌋ possibilities for the expr.⌊ession⌋ in squ.⌊are⌋
brackets would be aut. distinguished \ aut⌊omatically⌋ / bec.⌊ause⌋ the
first would be written as foll⌊ows⌋ . ∨ PQ ∼ P ⌊;⌋the sec.⌊ond⌋ would read
∨P . Q ∼ P ⌊,⌋ so its \ that / ⌊they⌋ diff⌊er⌋\ from each other without the
use of brack.⌊ets⌋ / as you see and it can be proved that it is quite generally
so. \ But since the formulas in the bracket notation are more easily readable
I shall stick to this \ not.⌊ation⌋ / and put the op.⌊erational⌋ symb.⌊ols⌋ in
betw.⌊een⌋ the prop.⌊ositions⌋. /
⌊new paragraph⌋ You know in algebra one can spare the many brackets
by the convention that the J10.K mult.⌊iplication⌋ connects stronger than
add⌊ition⌋; \ e.g⌊.⌋ a · b + c means (a · b) + c and not a · (b + c)⌊.⌋ ⌊The ·
in the manuscript, here and in later notebooks, in particular Notebook VI,
where · is meant to stand for set intersection, is often indistinguishable from
., but the meaning of the text makes it possible to make the distinction, and
this will be done without notice.⌋ / We can do something similar here by
stipulating an order of the strength in which the log⌊ical⌋ symb.⌊ols⌋⌊bind⌋
⌊, so⌋ that⌊:⌋
1. the ∼ (and similarly any op.⌊eration⌋ with just one prop.⌊osition⌋ as
arg⌊ument⌋) connects stronger than any op.⌊eration⌋ with two arg⌊u-
ments,⌋ as ∨⌊,⌋ ⊃ ⌊and⌋ .⌊,⌋ so that ∼ p ∨ q means (∼ p) ∨ q and not
∼ (p ∨ q);
2. the disj.⌊unction⌋ and conj.⌊unction⌋ bind stronge.⌊r⌋ than implic.⌊a-
tion⌋ and equiv⌊alence,⌋ so that e.g. p∨ q ⊃ r . s means (p∨ q) ⊃ (r . s)
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and not \ ⌊unreadable word, perhaps: perh⌊aps⌋⌋ / p ∨ [(q ⊃ r) . s]⌊.⌋
\ ⌊A⌋ third conv.⌊ention⌋ consists in leaving out brack.⌊ets⌋ in such ⌊expres-
sions⌋ as (p ∨ q) ∨ r exactly as in ⌊(⌋a + b) + c ⌊here, after “whereas”, the
sentence in the manuscript is broken⌋⌊.⌋ A similar convention is made for . .
/
After those merely symb.⌊olic⌋ conventions the next thing we have to
do is to examine in more detail the meaning of the op.⌊erations⌋ of the
calc⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋. J11.K Take e.g. disj.⌊unction⌋ ∨. If any two
prop⌊ositions⌋ P,Q are given P ∨ Q will again be a prop⌊osition⌋. Hence
the disj.⌊unction⌋ is an operation which applied to any two prop.⌊ositions⌋
gives again a prop⌊osition.⌋ But now (and this is the dec.⌊isive⌋ point)
\ this op.⌊eration⌋ is such that / the truth or falsehood of the composite
prop⌊osition⌋ P ∨ Q depends in a def.⌊inite⌋ way on the truth or falsehood
of the const.⌊ituents⌋ P,Q⌊.⌋ \ and depends only on the truth or falsehood
of the const. / This dependence can be expressed most clearly in ⌊the⌋ form
of a table as follows⌊: l⌋et us form three col⌊umns,⌋ one headed by \ p⌊,⌋
/ one by q⌊,⌋ one by p ∨ q⌊,⌋ and let us write + for true and − for wrong
\ false⌊.⌋ / Then for the prop⌊osition⌋ p∨ q we have the foll.⌊owing⌋ 4⌊four⌋
possibilities⌊:⌋
p q p ∨ q p o q
+ + + −
+ − + +
− + + +
− − − −
Now J12.K for each of these fo⌊u⌋r cases we can det.⌊ermine⌋ wheth.⌊er⌋
p ∨ q will be true or false⌊,⌋ namely since p ∨ q means that one or both of
the prop⌊ositions⌋ p, q are true it will be true in the first⌊,⌋ sec.⌊ond and⌋
third case⌊,⌋ and wrong \ false / in the last case. And we can consider this
table as the most precise def⌊inition⌋ of what ∨ means.
⌊new paragraph⌋ \ One also \ It is usual to / call truth and falsehood the
truth values⌊,⌋ \ so there are exactly two truth values⌊,⌋ / and say⌊s⌋ that a
true prop⌊osition⌋ has the truth value ,,⌊“⌋truth” ⌊(⌋den⌊oted⌋ by +) and a
false prop.⌊osition⌋ has the truth value ⌊“⌋false⌊”⌋ (den⌊oted⌋ by −)⌊,⌋ \ so
that any prop.⌊osition⌋ has a un.⌊iquely⌋ det.⌊ermined⌋ truth value⌊.⌋ / The
truth table then shows how the truth value of the comp⌊osite⌋ expr⌊essions⌋
depends on the truth value of the constituents. / The excl.⌊usive⌋ or would
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have another truth table⌊;⌋ namely if we denote it by o for the moment we
have ⌊that⌋ p o q is wrong \ false / if both p and q are true⌊,⌋ and it is wrong
\ false / if both are wrong ⌊false⌋ but true in the two other cases. ⌊It is
not clear what the words “where exactly” inserted in the manuscript at this
place refer to, and they will be deleted.⌋ The op.⌊eration⌋ ∼ J13.K has of
course the foll.⌊owing⌋ truth table⌊:⌋
p ∼ p
+ −
− +
Here we have only two poss.⌊ibilities:⌋ p true or p wrong⌊,⌋ and in the first
case we have ⌊that⌋ not-p is wrong ⌊while⌋ in the sec⌊ond⌋ it ⌊is⌋ true. Also
the truth table for . can easily be det.⌊ermined:⌋
p q p . q
+ + +
+ − −
− + −
− − −
(I think ⌊unreadable text, possibly “I will” or “I can”⌋ leave that to you).⌊.)⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ A little more diff.⌊icult⌋ is the question of the truth
table for ⊃. ⌊The following text, until the end of p. 13., is crossed out in
the manuscript: In fact ⊂⌊⊃⌋ can be interpreted in different ways⌊,⌋ and for
cert.⌊ain⌋ interpret.⌊ations⌋ there exist no truth table⌊,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ if we define
P ⊃ Q to mean ,,⌊“⌋From P Q follows logically” then the truth value of
P ⊃ Q is not determined at all by the⌋ J14.K p ⊃ q was defined to mean
⌊“⌋If p is true q is \ also / true⌊“⌋. So let us assume that we know for two
given prop.⌊ositions⌋ P,Q we know that P ⊃ Q is true⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. \ assume that
/ we know ⌊“⌋If P then Q⌊”⌋ \ but nothing else / ⌊. W⌋hat can we conclude
then about the \ possible / truth values of P and Q.⌊?⌋ ⌊As for the analogous
table on p. 19. of Notebook 0, it is not indicated in the manuscript where
the following table should be inserted. The text that follows is a comment
upon it.⌋
Ass.⌊umption⌋ p ⊃ Q
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P Q
− +
− −
+ +
 possible truth val.⌊ues⌋ for P,Q⌊full stop deleted⌋
+ − } impossible
First it may \ cert.⌊ainly⌋ / happen that P is false because the \ assump-
tion / stat⌊written over another letter⌋ement ⌊“⌋If P then Q⌊”⌋ says nothing
about the truth \ or falsehood / of P . \ And⌊written over another word,
perhaps “Now”⌋ / ⌊i⌋n this case where P is false \ Q may be true as well as
false because / the assumption ⌊“⌋If P then Q⌊”⌋ determines nothing about
the truth of Q because it only says ⌊“⌋if P is true Q is true⌊”⌋ but it says
nothing about the case where P is false \ says nothing about what happens
to Q if P is false but only if P is true⌊.⌋ ⌊crossed out unreadable word⌋ / So
we have both possib⌊ilities:⌋ P false Q true⌊,⌋ P f⌊alse⌋ Q f⌊alse.⌋ Next we
have the case in which \ possibility that / P is true⌊.⌋ J15.K \ But / I⌊i⌋n this
case it follows from the assumption p ⊃ q that \ owing to the ass.⌊umption⌋
/ q is \ must / also ⌊be⌋ true. So that the poss⌊ibility⌋ P true Q false is
excluded and we have only this third possibility p true q true⌊,⌋ \ and this
poss.⌊ibility⌋ may of course really happen / . So from the ass.⌊umption⌋
P ⊃ Q it follows that either one of the first three cases happens⌊.⌋ \ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋
if P ⊃ Q then / (∼ P . Q) ∨ (∼ P . ∼ Q) ∨ (P . Q) But als \ we have / also
vice versa⌊:⌋ If (∼ P . Q) ∨ (∼ P . ∼ Q) ∨ (P . Q) \ one of the first three
poss.⌊ibilities⌋ of the truth values is realis⌊z⌋ed / then (p ⊃ q) \ is true / .
Because let us assume we know that one ⌊of⌋ the three \ cases / written
down happens \ is realis⌊z⌋ed⌊.⌋ / \ I claim / then we know also: ,,⌊“⌋If p
\ is true / then q \ is true⌊”⌋ / . Because \ That’s easy bec.⌊ause⌋ / If p
is true only the third of the three poss.⌊ibilities⌋ can be realis⌊z⌋ed (in \ all
/ the other⌊s⌋ p is false)⌊,⌋ but in this third possib.⌊ility⌋ Q is true⌊.⌋
⌊Here begins a page with its number 16. crossed out, and the following
crossed out text: this third \ poss.⌊ibility⌋ / once Q is also true so we have
If P then Q ⌊new paragraph in the manuscript⌋ it is the only one of the first
three in which P is true of the three possible cases can hold and in this case
Q is also true. . . ⌋
⌊The following text on the remainder of this page with number 16.
crossed out is not very clearly crossed out, but a text with the same content
can be found on the next page numbered 16.: So we have proved a com-
plete equiv.⌊alence⌋ between p ⊃ q on the one hand and the disj.⌊unction⌋
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(∼ p . q) ∨ (∼ p . ∼ q) ∨ (p ⌊.⌋ q) on the other hand⌊,⌋ so that we can define
impl⌊ication⌋ by this disj⌊unction⌋. But this disj⌊unction⌋ can be written in
a simpler form as follows ∼ p∨q⌊.⌋ ⌊I⌋t is easy to see that this disj.⌊unction⌋
of three cases is equivalent with the ⌊here the text in the manuscript breaks⌋⌋
J16.K So we see that the statement p ⊃ q is exactly equivalent with the state-
ment that one of the three marked cases \ for the / distr.⌊ibution⌋ of truth
values is realis⌊z⌋ed⌊,⌋ and not the fourth one i⌊.⌋e. p ⊃ q is true in each of
the three marked cases realis⌊z⌋ed and only then i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ it is and false in
the last case (where none of these three poss.⌊ibilities⌋ is realis⌊z⌋ed)⌊.⌋ So
we have obtained the a truth table for implication. However there a⌊re⌋ two
imp.⌊ortant⌋ remarks about it⌊,⌋ namely⌊:⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ 1. Exactly the same \ truth / table can also be obtained
by a combin.⌊ation⌋ of op.⌊erations⌋ introd⌊uced⌋ previously⌊,⌋ namely ∼
p ∨ q has the same truth table ⌊deleted “for. . . ” from the manuscript⌋
p q ∼ p ∼ p ∨ q
− ⌊−⌋ + +
⌊−⌋ ⌊+⌋ + +
⌊+⌋ ⌊−⌋ − −
⌊+⌋ ⌊+⌋ − +
J17.K Hence Since p ⊃ q and ∼ p ∨ q have the same truth table they will
be equ.⌊ivalent,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. whenever the one expr.⌊ession⌋ is true the other one
will also be true and vice versa. This makes ⌊it⌋ possible to define p ⊃ q
by ∼ p ∨ q and this is the standard way of introd.⌊ucing⌋ impl.⌊ication⌋ in
math⌊ematical⌋ log⌊ic⌋.
⌊new paragraph, 2.⌋ The sec.⌊ond⌋ remark \ about impl.⌊ication⌋ / is
this more imp⌊ortant⌋. We must be careful not to forget that ⌊ | from the
manuscript deleted⌋ p ⊃ q was understood to mean simply ⌊“⌋If p then q⌊”⌋
and only this made the const.⌊ruction⌋ of the truth table possible⌊.⌋ ⌊ | from
the manuscript deleted⌋ \We have deduced the truth table for impl⌊ication⌋
from the ass⌊umption⌋ that p ⊃ q means ⌊“⌋If p then q⌊”⌋ and nothing else⌊.⌋
/ There are other meanings J18.K perhaps even more suggested by the term
impl.⌊ication⌋ for which our truth table would be completely inadequate.
E.g. if we assume \ P ⊃ Q could be / given ⌊P ⊃ Q⌋ the meaning of: Q is a
log⌊ical⌋ consequence of P ⌊written over Q⌋ ⌊,⌋ i.e. Q can be derived from P
by means of \ a chain of / syllogisms⌊.⌋ ⌊then⌋ it is easy to see that there can
exist no truth table at all for this impl⌊ication⌋ thus defined⌊.⌋ For consider
the first line of the supp.⌊osed⌋
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This kind of impl⌊ication⌋ is usually called strict impl.⌊ication⌋ and de-
noted in this way ⌊≺⌋ \ as opposed to \ and the impl⌊ication⌋ p ⊃ q def⌊ined⌋
before is called / material impl.⌊ication⌋ \ if it is to be distinguished⌊.⌋ /
p ⊃ q def.⌊ined⌋ by ∼ p ∨ q Now it is easy to see that our truth table is false
for strict impl⌊ication.⌋ ⌊but that ′′ I⌋n order to prove that that there exists
no truth t.⌊able⌋ for it / Now \ ⌊unreadable word⌋ / consider the first line
\ of / a supp.⌊osed⌋ such table
p q p ≺ q
+ +
where p and J19.K q are both true and ask what will be the truth value of p ≺
strictly q⌊. I⌋t is clear that this truth value will not be uniquely det⌊ermined⌋.
For take e.g. for p the prop.⌊osition “⌋The earth is a sphere⌊”⌋ and for q
⌊“T⌋he earth is not a disk⌊”.⌋ ⌊T⌋hen p ⌊and⌋ q are both true and p ≺ q is
also true bec.⌊ause⌋ If \ from the prop⌊osition⌋ that / the earth is a sp⌊here⌋
it foll.⌊ows⌋ by log⌊ical⌋ inf⌊erence⌋ that it is not a disk⌊;⌋ on the other
hand if you take for p again. . . ⌊the same proposition⌋ and for q ⌊“⌋France
is a rep.⌊ublic”⌋ then again both p and q are true but p ≺ q is wrong⌊.⌋
⌊“bec from. . . ” from the manuscript deleted⌋ J20.K So we see the truth
value of p ≺ ⌊q⌋ is not extens.⌊ionally⌋ uniquely det.⌊ermined⌋ by the truth
values of P and Q⌊,⌋ and therefore no truth table exists. Such ⌊unreadable
word, presumably “connections”⌋ for which no truth t⌊able⌋ exists are called
intensional as opposed to extensional ones for which they \ do / exist. \ The
ext.⌊ensional⌋ conn.⌊ections⌋ are als called also truth⌊ ⌋functions⌋.
⌊new paragraph⌋ So we see the impl.⌊ication⌋ which we introd.⌊uced⌋
does not mean log.⌊ical⌋ consequence. Its meaning is best given by the
simple ⌊“⌋if then⌊”⌋ which is used in many cases where the \ has much wider
signif⌊icance⌋ than just / logical consequ⌊ence⌋. E.g⌊.⌋ if I say ⌊“⌋If I cannot
\ he cannot / come ⌊I⌋ shall \ he will / telephone to you⌊”,⌋ that has nothing
to do with log⌊ical⌋ rel⌊ations⌋ betw⌊een⌋ J21.K my \ his / coming and the
\ his / telephoning⌊,⌋ but it simply means he will either come or telephone
which is exactly the meaning expressed by the truth table. \ Now the decisive
point is that we don’t need any other kind of impl⌊ication⌋ besides material
in order to develop ⌊full stop and crossed out unreadable word from the
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manuscript deleted⌋ the theory of inf.⌊erence⌋ And therefore because in order
to make the concl.⌊usion⌋ from a prop⌊osition⌋ P to a prop⌊osition⌋ Q it is
not necessary to know that Q is a log.⌊ical⌋ cons.⌊equence⌋ of P . It is quite
sufficient to know⌊”⌋If P is true Q is true⌊”.⌋ ⌊“e.g” from the manuscript
deleted⌋ Therefore I shall not introduce material strict \ use only mat⌊erial⌋
impl⌊ication,⌋ / at least in the first half of my lectures⌊,⌋ and use als the
terms ⌊“⌋implies⌊”⌋ and ⌊“⌋it follows⌊”⌋ only in this sense. /
⌊The following text within square brackets until the end of p. 21. seems
to be crossed out: [Perhaps the term impl.⌊ication⌋ is not very well chosen
from this st.⌊andpoint⌋ because it convey suggests something like log.⌊ical⌋
consequ⌊ence⌋ but since it \ has been / ⌊in⌋ comm⌊on⌋ use for this notion
\ for many years / it is not adv.⌊antageous⌋ to change it and it is not
nec⌊essary⌋ if we keep in ⌊mind⌋ what it means. I shall also use the term ⌊“⌋it
follows⌊”⌋ to denote ⊃ sometimes because in more complicated expr.⌊essions⌋
it is desirable to have sev.⌊eral⌋ diff.⌊erent⌋ words for implic⌊ation⌋. So I
don’t want to use the word ⌊“⌋follow⌊”⌋ in the sense of log.⌊ical⌋ conse-
qu.⌊ence⌋ but of consequence in a more general sense⌊.⌋]⌋
J22.K ⌊This page in the manuscript begins with the following sentence,
which seems to be crossed out: A confusion with strict impl⌊ication⌋ is not
to be feared because I shall confine myself to mat.⌊erial⌋ impl.⌊ication⌋ in
the whole develop.⌊ement⌋ of ⌊the⌋ calc⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋]⌋ \ This
simplifies very much the whole theory of inf.⌊erence⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ mat⌊erial⌋
impl.⌊ication⌋ def⌊ined⌋ by the truth table is a much simpler notion. I do not
want to say by this that \ a theory / ⌊of⌋ strict impl.⌊ication⌋ may not be
interesting and important for certain purp.⌊oses;⌋ in fact I hope to develop
it speak about it later on in my lectures. But its theory bel⌊ongs⌋ to an
entirely diff⌊erent⌋ part of logic than that ⌊with⌋ which we are deal.⌊ing⌋ at
present⌊,⌋ namely \ it bel.⌊ongs⌋ / to the log.⌊ic⌋ of modalities⌊.⌋
⌊The following words to be deleted from the manuscript are presum-
ably superseded by the inserted words above them immediately after: Our
def⌊inition⌋ of impli⌊cation⌋ has some⌋ \ Now I come to some / apparently
parad.⌊oxical⌋ consequ⌊ences⌋ \ of our def⌊inition⌋ of impl⌊ication⌋ / whose
paradoxity ⌊replaced by “paradoxicality” in the edited text; see also the be-
ginning of p. 29. of Notebook 0⌋ however disappears if we remember that
it \ implic.⌊ation⌋ / does not mean log⌊ical⌋ consequ⌊ence⌋. We have at
first \We have / ⌊colon from the manuscript deleted⌋ Namely since p ⊃ q is
equiv⌊alent⌋ with ∼ p ∨ q we have ⌊i⌋f we look at the truth table for p ⊃ q we
see at once ⌊that⌋ p ⊃ q is always true if q is true what⌊e⌋ver p may be. So
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that means a true prop⌊osition⌋ is implied by any prop⌊osition⌋. Sec.⌊ondly⌋
we see that p ⊃ q is always true if p is false whatever q J23. IK may be
i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ ⌊a⌋ false prop.⌊osition⌋ implies any prop.⌊osition⌋ whatsoever⌊.⌋ In
other words: ⌊“⌋An impl⌊ication⌋ with true sec⌊ond⌋ member is true (what-
ever. . . ⌊the first member may be⌋) and an impl.⌊ication⌋ with a false first
member is always true (what⌊ever⌋ the sec⌊ond⌋. . . ⌊member may be⌋).⌊”⌋
Or written in formulas this means q ⊃ (p ⊃ q), ∼ p ⊃ (p ⊃ q). Of course
this is \ Both of these form.⌊ulas⌋ are / also an im⌊mediate⌋ consequ⌊ences⌋
of the fact that p ⊃ q is equiv⌊alent⌋ with ∼ p ∨ q because \ ∼ p ∨ q that
says just \ exactly / either p is false or q is true⌊,⌋ so it will \ always /
be true if p is false and if q is true whatever the other prop⌊osition⌋ may
be. But \ These formula⌊s⌋ are rather unexp.⌊ected⌋ and / if we apply
them formulas to spec⌊ial⌋ cases we get strange consequences. E.g. J24.K
⌊“⌋The earth is not a sphere⌊”⌋ implies that France is a rep⌊ublic,⌋ but it
also impl.⌊ies⌋ that France is no⌊t a⌋ rep.⌊ublic⌋ because a false prop.⌊osition⌋
implies any prop⌊osition⌋ whatsoever. Similarly the prop.⌊osition⌋⌊“⌋France
is a rep.⌊ublic”⌋ is implied by any other prop.⌊osition⌋ whatsoever⌊,⌋ ⌊it may
be⌋ true or false. But these consequences are only paradoxical if we under-
stand implic.⌊ation⌋ to mean logical consequence. For the ⌊“⌋if. . . so⌊”⌋
meaning they are quite natural⌊,⌋ e.g. ⌊the⌋ first q ⊃ (p ⊃ q) means: If q is
true then q is \ also / true \ also / if p is true⌊,⌋ and ∼ p ⊃ (p ⊃ q) If we have
a false prop.⌊osition⌋ p then if p is true anything is true⌊.⌋ J25. IK Another of
this⌊these⌋ so called parad⌊oxical⌋ consequences is this (p ⊃ q) ∨ (q ⊃ p).⌊,⌋
i⌊.⌋e. of any two arbitrary prop.⌊ositions⌋ one must imply the other one.
That it must be so is proved as foll.⌊ows:⌋ \ is / clear because \ of the
foll⌊owing⌋ reason / q must be either true ⌊unreadable word⌋ or false⌊;⌋ if
q is true the first member of the disj⌊unction⌋ is true ⌊bec.⌊ause⌋ inserted
in the manuscript deleted⌋ ⌊and⌋ if q is false the sec.⌊ond⌋ member is true
because a false prop⌊osition⌋ implies any other. So (one of the two members
of the impl⌊ication⌋ is true) \ either p ⊃ q or q ⊃ p / in any case. \
⌊new paragraph⌋We have here three examples of logically true formulas⌊,⌋
i⌊.⌋e. formulas which are true whatever the prop.⌊ositions⌋ p, q may be. Such
formulas are called ⌊unreadable text, probably in shorthand⌋ tautological
and ⌊unreadable word⌋ It is in their and it is exactly the chief aim of the
calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋ to investigate those tautolog⌊ical⌋ form⌊ulas⌋.
In order to get more acquainted with the our symbolism and \ also with the
our notation / the fund.⌊amental op.⌊erations⌋ of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊osi-
tions⌋
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I shall \ begin with / discussing now a few \ more / examples of \ such
/ logically true prop.⌊ositions⌋ before going \ over / to general con\ sider
/ ⌊ations.⌋ J26. IK We have at first the trad.⌊itional⌋ hyp.⌊othetical⌋ inf.⌊er-
ences⌋ and disj⌊unctive⌋ inferences which in our notation read as follows⌊:⌋
1. p ⌊.⌋ (p ⊃ q) ⊃ q pon.⌊endo⌋ pon⌊ens⌋
[2. ∼ q . (p ⊃ q) ⊃∼ p toll.⌊endo⌋ toll.⌊ens⌋]
3. (p ∨ q) . ∼ q ⊃ p toll.⌊endo⌋ pon⌊ens⌋
disj.⌊unctive⌋ toll pon.⌊endo⌋ tollens does not hold for the not excl.⌊u-
sive⌋ ∨ which we have
4⌊.⌋ The inf⌊erence⌋ which is called dilemma by
(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q)
J38.1 IIK ⌊Notebook 0 ends with p. 38., and hence judging by the num-
ber given to the present page, it might be a continuation of Notebook 0.
The content of this page does not make obvious this supposition, but does
not exclude it.⌋ Last time and also t⌊written over another symbol⌋oday in
the ⌊unreadable symbol⌋ classes we set up the truth tables for some of the
funct⌊ions⌋ which occur in the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋. ⌊For an inser-
tion sign in the manuscript at this place no text to be inserted is given on this
page, but this might point to the crossed out text “because all f⌊u⌋nct.⌊ions⌋
involved are truth functions but” on p. 40. II preceded by an insertion sign,
for which text it is not indicated where on p. 40. II it is to be inserted.
The insertion sign at this place is deleted, because anyway the text from
p. 40. II is crossed out.⌋ Their purp⌊ose⌋ is to give a⌊n⌋ absolutely pre-
cise def.⌊inition⌋ of the funct⌊ions⌋ concerned because they state exactly the
cond⌊itions⌋ under which \ the prop.⌊osition⌋ to be def.⌊ined,⌋ / e.g. p∨ q⌊,⌋
is true and under which cond⌊itions⌋ it is not true. In ordinary language we
have also ⌊the⌋ notions and, or, I⌊i⌋f etc⌊.⌋ which have \ very⌊underlined
or crossed out⌋ / approximately the same meaning⌊,⌋ but for setting up a
math.⌊ematical⌋ theory it is nec.⌊essary⌋ that the not.⌊ions⌋ involved have a
higher degree of preciseness than the notions of ordinary language and and⌊.⌋
It is exactly this what is accompli⌊shed⌋ by the truth tables⌊. and in⌋
J40. IIK ⌊There is no page numbered 39.⌋ the truth tables give us almost
immediately such a method Take e.g. the formula p . ⌊(⌋p ⊃ q) ⊃ q⌊,⌋ the
mod⌊us⌋ ponendo ponens⌊.⌋
⌈
In order to ascertain that it is logically true we
NOTEBOOK I 151
have to make sure that it is true whatever the prop⌊ositions⌋ p and qmay be
⌋
Here we have two prop.⌊ositional⌋ var.⌊iables⌋ p, q and therefore \ because
all f⌊u⌋nct.⌊ions⌋ involved are truth functions but / are only four possibilities
for these truth values⌊,⌋ namely
p q p ⊃ q p . (p ⊃ q) p . (p ⊃ q) ⊃ q
T T T T T
T F F F T
F T T F T
F F T F T
J41. IIK and what we have to do is simply to check that the truth value of
the whole expr⌊ession⌋ is true if in each of these four cases⌊,⌋ \ i⌊.⌋e. we
have to ascertain that the truth table of the whole expression consists of T’s
only⌊.⌋ / That⌊’⌋s very simple. Let us write down all the parts of which it
\ this expr.⌊ession⌋ / is built u⌊written over another symbol⌋p⌊.⌋ We have
first p ⊃ q p is a part⌊,⌋ then p . (p ⊃ q) and finally the whole expr⌊ession⌋.
⌊Now in the first case . . . ⌋ So we see \ actually / in all four cases the
\ whole / formula is true⌊.⌋ Hence it is universally true. It is clear that this
purely mech⌊anical⌋ method of checking all possibilities will always give a
dec.⌊ision⌋ whether a ⌊given⌋ formula is or is not a J42. IIK tautologie⌊y⌋.
Only if the nu⌊mber⌋ of variables p, q \ occurring in the expr⌊ession⌋ / is
large this method is very cumbersome⌊,⌋ because the number of cases which
we have to deal with is 2n if the number of var.⌊iables⌋ is n \ and the
nu.⌊mber⌋ of cases is the same as the nu.⌊mber⌋ of lines in the truth table
/ . Here we had as 4 2 var.⌊iables⌋ p, q and therefore 22 = 4 cases. With 3
var.⌊iables⌋ we would have 23 = 8 cases and in gen.⌊eral⌋ if the number of
var⌊iables⌋ is increased by one we the number of cases \ to be considered / is
doubled, because each of the previous cases is split into two \ new / cases
according as to the truth value of the new var⌊iable⌋ is truth or falsehood.
Therefore we have J43. IIK that the ⌊number⌋ 2n \ cases / for n variables⌊.⌋
In the appl.⌊ications⌋ however \ usually / the number of cases actually to be
considered is much smaller bec.⌊ause⌋ mostly several cases can be combined
into one⌊,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ in our ex.⌊ample⌋ case 1 and 2 can be treated together
bec⌊ause⌋ if q is true the whole exp⌊ression⌋ is cert⌊ainly⌋ true whatever
\ p may be because it is then an impl.⌊ication⌋ with true second member
/ ⌊repeated line: because it is then an impl.⌊ication⌋ with a true sec⌊ond⌋
member⌋.
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So we see that for the calc⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋ we have a very simple
procedure to decide for any given formula whether or not it is log.⌊ically⌋ true.
\ This solves the first of the two gen.⌊eral⌋ problems which I ment⌊ioned⌋
in the beginning \ for the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions,⌋ / namely \ the
probl.⌊em⌋ / to give a complete theory of logically true form⌊ulas⌋. We have
even more⌊,⌋ namely a procedure to decide of any form⌊ula⌋ whether. . . ⌊at
the beginning of this paragraph we find “or not it is logically true”⌋ / .
That this problem J44. IIK could be solved in such a simple way is chiefly
due to the fact that we introduced only ext⌊ensional⌋ operations (only truth
funct.⌊ions⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋)⌊.⌋ If we had introd.⌊uced⌋ strict impl⌊ication⌋
the question would have been very much more compl⌊icated⌋. It is only very
recently \ that / one has discovered general procedures for deciding whether
a formula involving the not strict implication are ⌊should be “is”⌋ logically
true under cert.⌊ain⌋ assumptions about strict ⌊implication.⌋
Now after having solved this so called decision probl.⌊em⌋ ⌊For an inser-
tion sign in the manuscript at this place no text to be inserted is given on
this page.⌋ for the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋ I can go over to the second
probl.⌊em⌋ I have announced in the beg.⌊inning.⌋ ⌊the text in the manuscript
breaks at the end of this page after: namely the probl⌊em⌋ of reducing
⌋
⌋
J56.K ⌊Pages numbered from 45., with or without II, up to 55. are miss-
ing in the present notebook.⌋ Now it has turned out that three rules of
inf⌊erence⌋ are sufficient for our purp⌊oses,⌋ \ namely for deriving all tau-
tologies from these form.⌊ulas⌋ ⌊unreadable symbol⌋ / . Namely first the so
called ⌊in italics in the edited text: rule of subst.⌊itution⌋⌋ which says: If we
have a formula F (of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋) which involves the
prop⌊ositional⌋ var.⌊iables⌋ say p1, . . . , pn then it is permissible to conclude
from it any form.⌊ula⌋ obtained obtained from it \ by / subst.⌊ituting⌋ \ in
F / for \ all or some of / the prop.⌊ositional⌋ var.⌊iables⌋ \ p1, . . . , pn / any
arb.⌊itrary⌋ expressions⌊,⌋ but in such a way that if a letter pi occurs in
several places \ in F / we have to subst⌊itute⌋ the same form.⌊ula⌋ in all
places where it occurs⌊.⌋ ⌊E⌋.g. take the formula (p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)]
which is ⌊called exportation.⌋According to the rule of subst.⌊itution⌋ we can
conclude \ from it the for⌊mula⌋ obt⌊ained⌋ by subst⌊ituting⌋ / p . q for r⌊,⌋
i.e. ⌊unreadable word ending in “ing”⌋ (p.q ⊃ p.q) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ p.q)]⌊.⌋ The
expression which we \ substitute⌊,⌋ in our case p . q⌊,⌋ / is quite arbitrary
J57.K ⌊unreadable text, perhaps “and it”⌋ need not be a tautologie⌊y⌋ \ or
a proved formula⌊.⌋ / ⌊\ must be a ⌊unreadable word⌋ / ⌋ The only require-
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ment is that if the same letter occurs on several places in the formula in which
we subst⌊itute⌋ (as in out case the r) then we have to subst⌊itute⌋ the same
expression in all the places where r occurs as we did here⌊.⌋ \ But it is per-
fectly allowable to subst⌊itute⌋ for different letters the same formula⌊,⌋ e.g.
for q and r and it is also allowable to subst.⌊itute⌋ ⌊unreadable crossed out
word, perhaps “for”⌋ expr⌊essions⌋ containing variables which occur on some
other places in the form.⌊ula,⌋ as e.g. here p⌊.⌋q⌊.⌋ / in our case It is clear that
by such a subst⌊itution⌋ we get always a tautologie⌊y⌋ if the \ expr.⌊ession⌋
/ form⌊ula⌋ in which we subst⌊itute⌋ is a taut.⌊ology,⌋ because e.g. that this
formul.⌊a⌋ of export.⌊ation⌋ is a tautol.⌊ogy⌋ says \ exactly / that it is true
whatever p⌊, q,⌋r may be⌊.⌋ So it will in part.⌊icular⌋ be true if we take p . q
for r the prop⌊osition⌋ p . q, whatever p and q may be J58.K and that means
that the form.⌊ula⌋ obt.⌊ained⌋ by the \ subst.⌊itution⌋ / is a tautologie⌊y⌋.
⌊new paragraph⌋ The sec.⌊ond⌋ rule of inf.⌊erence⌋ we need is the so
called ⌊in italics in the edited text: rule of impl.⌊ication,⌋⌋ which reads as
follows:
If P and Q are arbitrary expressions then from the two premises P ,
P ⊃ Q it is allowable to conclude Q.
⌊A⌋n example⌊:⌋ take for P the form⌊ula⌋ p ⌊.⌋ q ⊃ p ⌊.⌋ q and ⌊for⌋ Q the
form⌊ula⌋ p ⊃ (q ⊃ p . q)) \ so that P ⊃ Q will be the for⌊mula⌋ (p ⌊.⌋ q ⊃
p ⌊.⌋ q) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ p ⌊.⌋ q)]⌊.⌋ / Then from those two premises we can
conclude p ⊃ (q ⊃ p . q)⌊.⌋ \ Again we can prove that this rule of inf⌊erence⌋
is corr.⌊ect,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ if the two premises are tautologies then the concl⌊usion⌋
\ is / . Bec⌊ause⌋⌊i⌋f we assign any partic.⌊ular⌋ truth values to the prop⌊osi-
tional⌋ var.⌊iables⌋ occurring in P and Q⌊,⌋ P and P ⊃ Q will both get the
truth value truth because they are taut⌊ologies⌋. Hence Q will also get the
truth value true if any part.⌊icular⌋ truth values are assigned to its variables.
⌊B⌋ec.⌊ause⌋ if P and P ⊃ Q both have the truth value truth Q has also the
truth \ ⌊according to⌋ / . So Q will have the truth v.⌊alue⌋ T whatever truth
v.⌊alues⌋ are ass.⌊igned⌋ to the var.⌊iables⌋ occur⌊r⌋ing in it which means
that it is a tautol⌊ogy⌋. /
Finally as the third rule of inf⌊erence⌋ we have the rule of defined sym-
b.⌊ol⌋ which ⌊\ (-) / ⌋ says (roughly speak⌊ing⌋) that within any form.⌊ula⌋
the def⌊iniens⌋ can be replaced by the definiendum \ and vice versa⌊,⌋ / or
formulated J59.K more precisely for a part.⌊icular⌋ def.⌊iniens⌋ say p ⊃ q we
had it says⌊:⌋ From a formula F we can conclude any form⌊ula⌋ G obtained
from F by replacing for a part of F which has the form P ⊃ Q by the
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expr.⌊ession⌋ ∼ P ∨Q and vice versa. (⌊S⌋imilarly for the other def⌊initions⌋
we had⌊.⌋)
As ⌊an⌋ ex.⌊ample:⌋
1. ∼ p ∨ (p ∨ q) from the first⌊axiom by replacing⌋ p ⊃ q⌊Q⌋ by
∼ p ∨ q⌊Q⌋
2. ∼ p ⊃ (∼ p ∨ q) | ⌊(⌋ Again clear that taut⌊ology⌋ of taut⌊ology⌋.⌊)⌋
∼ p ⊃ (p ⊃ q)
This \ last / rule is sometimes not explicitly form.⌊ulated⌋ because it is
only nec⌊essary⌋ if one introd.⌊uces⌋ def.⌊initions⌋ and it is superfluous ⌊in⌋
principle \ to introduce ⌊them⌋ / because whatever can be expr.⌊essed⌋ by a
defined symbol ⌊can be done without⌋ | ⌊(⌋ only it would sometimes be very
long and cumbersome⌊)⌋. If however one introduces def.⌊initions⌋ \ as we
did / this third rule of inf.⌊erence⌋ is indispensable⌊.⌋
\ Now what we shall prove is that any taut⌊ology⌋ can be derived from
these four ax⌊ioms⌋ by means of the \ ment⌊ioned⌋ / 3⌊three⌋ rules of
inf.⌊erence:⌋ but before proving this we shall first make sure that all the
ax.⌊ioms⌋ really are taut⌊ologies⌋ and then give examples of derivations of
indiv⌊idual⌋ formulas from ⌊crossed out “it”⌋ them /
J60.K \ ⌊unreadable text, probably in shorthand⌋ /
1.⌊(1)⌋ p ⊃ p ∨ q
2 ⌊(2)⌋ p ∨ p ⊃ p
3.⌊(3)⌋ p ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ p
4.⌊(4)⌋ ⌊(⌋p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)
Let us first asc.⌊ertain⌋ that all of these form⌊ulas⌋ form are tautologies
\ and let us ascert.⌊ain⌋ that ⌊fa⌋ct first by their mean⌊ing⌋ and then by
their truth table⌊.⌋ /
⌈
The first means: If p is true p ∨ q is true. That is
clear bec⌊ause⌋ p ∨ q means at least one of the prop⌊ositions⌋ p, q is true⌊,⌋
but if p is true then ⌊the expression p ∨ q is true.⌋ The sec⌊ond⌋ means⌊:⌋
If \ the disj⌊unction⌋ / p ∨ p is true p is true⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. ⌊we k⌋now that the
disj⌊unction⌋ p∨ p is true means that one of the two members is true⌊,⌋ but
since both members are p that means that p is true. The third that says⌊:
I⌋f p ∨ q is true q ∨ p is also true⌊.⌋
⌊at the bottom of this page: Forts p 60 Heft II Anfang. ⌊German: con-
tinued on p. 60. Notebook II, beginning⌋⌋
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⌊On the last page of the present notebook, which is not numbered, one
finds various notes, at the beginning and at the end consisting of formulae,
which do not seem directly related to the preceding and succeeding pages of
the course.⌋
p ⊃ q . ⊃ p . ≡ p p . q, T, p ⊃ q, q ⊃ p, p ∨ q
+ + + p . q ∨ (p ⊃ q) ≡ (p ⊃ q) T
+ − + ∼ p ∨ (p . q)
− − − ⌊unreadable symbol⌋
− + −
⌊Then one finds in the middle part of that page four notes numbered 1.-4.
written almost entirely in what seems to be shorthand, which contain perhaps
exercises or examination questions. In the fourth of them one recognizes the
following words that are not in shorthand: strict impl.⌊ication⌋, taut⌊ology⌋,
if then, mat⌊erial⌋ impl.⌊ication⌋, mod⌊us⌋ pon⌊endo⌋ pon⌊ens⌋.⌋
T, F, p, q, ∼ p, ∼ q, p . q, p . ∼ q, ∼ p . q, ∼ p . ∼ q
p ∨ q, p ⊃ q, q ⊃ p, p ≡ q, p | q, p ≡∼ q
2.2 Notebook II
⌊Folder 60, on the front cover of the notebook “Log.⌊ik⌋ Vorl.⌊esungen⌋
⌊German: Logic Lectures⌋ Notre⌊ ⌋Dame II”⌋
⌊Before p. 61. one finds on a page not numbered the formulae
p . q .∨ (∼ p . ∼ q)
(p ∨ q) . (∼ p ∨ ∼ q)
and a few scattered letters and symbols from partly missing unreadable
formulae.⌋
J61.K This does⌊ ⌋not need further explan⌊ation⌋ because the ⌊“⌋or⌊”⌋
is evidently sim⌊symmetric⌋ in the two members. Finally the fourth means
\ this⌊: “⌋If p ⊃ q then if r ∨ p is true ⌊then r ∨ q is also⌋ true ⌊”,⌋ i.e.
/ ⌊“⌋I⌊written over i⌋f you⌊written over “we”⌋ have a correct impl.⌊ication⌋
p ⊃ q then you can get again a corr.⌊ect⌋ \ impl.⌊ication⌋ / by adding a
third prop.⌊osition⌋ r to both sides of it getting r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q⌊”.⌋
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⌊The following text in big square brackets is crossed out in the manuscript:[
That ⌊has a very analogie is very analogous⌋ to the laws by which one
calculates with equations or inequalities in math.⌊ematics,⌋ e.g. from a < b
you can conclude c+a < c+b⌊,⌋ \ i.e. it is allowable to add an \ arb.⌊itrary⌋
/ number to both sides of an inequality and likewise it is allowable to ⌊add?⌋
a prop⌊osition⌋ to both sides of an impl⌊ication.⌋ /
]
⌋
That this \ is so / can be seen like this⌊:⌋ it means ⌊“⌋If p ⊃ q then
if one of the prop⌊ositions⌋ ⌊(⌋r⌊written over p⌋, p⌊)⌋ is true then also one
of the prop⌊ositions⌋ r, q ⌊is true”,⌋ which is clear bec.⌊ause⌋ if r is true r
is true and if p is true q is true by ass⌊umption.⌋ So whichever of the two
prop⌊ositions⌋ r, p is true always it has the cons.⌊equence⌋ that one of the
prop⌊ositions⌋ r, q is true⌊.⌋
⌋
J62.K
⌈
Now let us ascertain the truth of these form⌊ulas⌋ by the truth⌊-
⌋table method, combining always as many cases as possible into one case⌊.⌋
1. If p is F this is an impl⌊ication⌋ with a false first member⌊,⌋ hence true
owing to the truth⌊ ⌋table of ⊃⌊;⌋ if p is true then p ∨ q is also true
acc⌊ording⌋ to the truth ⌊table⌋ of ⌊“⌋or⌊”,⌋ hence the form⌊ula⌋ is an
implic⌊ation⌋ with true sec.⌊ond⌋ memb.⌊er,⌋ hence true again true⌊.⌋
2. If p is true this will be an impl⌊ication⌋ with true sec⌊ond⌋ mem⌊ber,⌋
hence true⌊.⌋ If p is false then p ∨ p is a disj.⌊unction⌋ both of whose
memb⌊ers⌋ are false⌊,⌋ hence false acc.⌊ording⌋ to the truth ⌊table⌋ for
∨⌊.⌋ Hence in this case we have an impl⌊ication⌋ with J63.K a false first
member, which is true by the truth⌊ ⌋table of or ⊃⌊.⌋
3. Since the truth⌊ ⌋t⌊able⌋ for ∨ is sy⌊written over i⌋m⌊m⌋etric in p, q
it is clear that whenever the left⌊-⌋hand side has the truth value true
also the right⌊-⌋h⌊and⌋ side ⌊has it,⌋ and if the left⌊-⌋hand side is false
the right⌊-⌋h⌊and⌋ side will also be false⌊;⌋ but an impl.⌊ication⌋ both
of whose mem⌊bers⌋ are true or both ⌊of⌋ whose ⌊members⌋ are false
is true by the truth⌊ ⌋t⌊able⌋ of impl.⌊ication,⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ p ⊃ q ⌊is⌋
false ⌊only in?⌋ the case when p is true and q false⌊.⌋
4. Here we have to consider only the foll.⌊owing⌋ three cases⌊:⌋
1. one ⌊of⌋ the tw⌊o?⌋ r, q ⌊has the has the⌋ truth⌊ ⌋v.⌊value⌋
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T ⌊“th” in “truth” written over “e”⌋
2. both r, q ⌊are⌋ F and p true
3. ⌊ditto marks interpreted as “both r, q are”⌋ F and p false
J64.K These three cases evid.⌊ently⌋ exhaust all poss⌊ibilities⌋.
1. ⌊I⌋n the first case r∨q ⌊unclear sign⌋ is true, hence also (r∨p) ⊃ (r∨q)
is true bec.⌊ause⌋ it is an impl⌊ication⌋ with ⌊false⌋ sec.⌊ond⌋ memb⌊er
true;⌋ (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q) is true for the same reas⌊on.⌋
2. ⌊I⌋n the 2.⌊second⌋ case p ⌊is true and⌋ q false⌊,⌋ hence p ⊃ q false⌊,⌋
hence the whole expr⌊ession⌋ is an impl⌊ication⌋ with false first mem-
ber⌊,⌋ hence true⌊.⌋
3. ⌊In the⌋ 3⌊third⌋ case all ⌊unreadable text, perhaps: of them all, should
be: of r, q and p⌋ are false⌊;⌋ then ⌊unreadable text, should be: r∨p and
r∨q⌋ are false⌊,⌋ hence ⌊the⌋ ⌊unreadable text, perhaps: impl⌊ication⌋,
should be: r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q is⌋ true, hence ⌊the⌋ whole form⌊ula is⌋ true
bec⌊ause it is an⌋ impl⌊ication⌋ with true sec⌊ond⌋ member⌊.⌋
So we see that the whole formula is always true.
Now I can begin with deriving other taut.⌊ologies⌋ from these 3⌊three⌋
ax⌊ioms⌋ by means of the two⌊three⌋ rules of inf.⌊erence,⌋ namely ⌊the⌋
rule of subst⌊itution⌋ and implication \ and def.⌊ined⌋ symb⌊ol,⌋ / in order
to prove later on that all logic.⌊ally⌋ true form⌊ulas⌋ can be derived from
them⌊.⌋
Let us first ⌊substitute⌋ ∼ r
r
(4) in 4⌊(4) to get⌋ (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ r ∨ p ⊃
∼ r ∨ q) ⌊,⌋ but for ∼ r ∨ p we can subs.⌊titute⌋ r ⊃ p and likewise for ∼
⌊∼ r∨q,⌋ J65.K so this means the same thing as getting: ⌊Some of the figures
of the numbered formulae below are written over other symbols, not always
recognizable, but sometimes they are, as for example with 7. and 8*, which
are written over 3 and 4.⌋
5. (p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(r ⊃ p) ⊃ (r ⊃ q)] Syl.⌊logism⌋
This is the so called form⌊ula⌋ of syllog⌊ism,⌋ which has a cert⌊ain⌋ simil.⌊ari-
ty⌋ to \ the / mood ⌊B⌋arbara in so far as it says: If from p follows q then
if from r foll⌊ows⌋ p from r foll⌊ows⌋ q.
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6. Now subst.⌊itute⌋ p
q
in (1) p ⊃ p ∨ p and now make the foll.⌊owing⌋ subst-
⌊itution:⌋ in Syl.⌊logism⌋
p ∨ p
p
p
q
p
r
in Syl⌊logism⌋
(p ∨ p ⊃ p) ⊃ [(p ⊃ p ∨ p) ⊃ (p ⊃ p)]
⌊T⌋his is an impl.⌊ication⌋ and the first memb.⌊er⌋ of it reads p ∨ p ⊃ p⌊,⌋
which is nothing else but the ⌊first second⌋ ax⌊iom.⌋ Hence we can apply the
rule of imp.⌊lication⌋ to the J66.K two prem⌊ises⌋ and get
(p ⊃ p ∨ p) ⊃ (p ⊃ p)
This is again an impl.⌊ication⌋ and the first memb⌊er⌋ of it was proved
before⌊;⌋ hence we can again apply the rule of implic.⌊ation⌋ and get
7. p ⊃ p law of identity
⌊U⌋sing the third rule
8*⌊. we⌋ have ∼ p ∨ p the law of excl.⌊uded⌋ middle
Now let us subst⌊itute⌋ p∼ p ⌊
∼ p
p
⌋ in this form.⌊ula to get⌋ ∼∼ p ∨ ∼ p
and now apply to \ it the / com.⌊mutative⌋ law for ∨⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. subst⌊itute⌋
∼∼ p
p
∼ p
q
⌊in⌋ (3) ⌊to get⌋
∼∼ p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ ∼ p ∨ ∼∼ p rule of impl.⌊ication⌋
∼ p ∨ ∼∼ p
J67.K 9.* p ⊃ ∼∼ p
⌊The following inserted text is crossed out in the manuscript: \ Here
we have some ex.⌊amples⌋ of form.⌊ulas⌋ derived from ax.⌊ioms⌋ by rules
of inf.⌊erence;⌋ form.⌊ulas⌋ for which this is the case I call demonstr.⌊able⌋
(⌊unreadable text⌋ from the 4 ax.⌊ioms,⌋ but I leave that expl.⌊unreadable
text⌋)/ ⌋⌊The following inserted text from the manuscript is deleted: \ So
these form.⌊ulas⌋ are dem⌊onstrable⌋ |before going on ⌊unreadable text⌋| / ⌋
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Now I have to make an imp.⌊ortant⌋ remark ⌊unreadable text⌋ ⌊on⌋ how
we ded.⌊uced⌋ p ⊃ p from the ax⌊ioms⌋. We had at first the two ⌊formulas
p ⊃ p ∨ p and p ∨ p ⊃ p. Now⌋ subst.⌊itute⌋ them in a certain way in the
form.⌊ula of S⌋yllog⌊ism⌋ \ p
r
p ∨ p
p
p
q
/ and then by appl⌊ying⌋ twice the
rule of impl⌊ication⌋ we get p ⊃ p⌊.⌋ ⌊unreadable scarcely visible text in more
than two lines, where one can recognize the words: this, the two, not, to these
two, p ∨ p but⌋ \ If P,Q,R are any arb.⌊itrary⌋ expr.⌊essions⌋ and / if we
have succeeded in deriving P ⊃ Q ⌊and⌋ Q ⊃ R from the four ax⌊ioms⌋ by
means of the two⌊three⌋ rules of proc⌊should be: inference⌋ then we can also
derive J68.K P ⊃ R⌊.⌋ Because we can simply subst⌊itute⌋ P
p
Q
q
R
r
⌊Q
p
R
q
P
r
⌋ in Syl.⌊logism⌋ getting (Q ⊃ R) ⊃ [(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)]. Then
we apply the rule of impl⌊ication⌋ to this form⌊ula⌋ and P ⊃ Q ⌊Q ⊃ R⌋
getting \ . . . ⌊(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)⌋ / and then we apply \ again the rule of
/ impl⌊ication⌋ to this form⌊ula⌋ ⌊unreadable text; should be: and P ⊃ Q⌋
⌊gett⌋ing P ⊃ R⌊.⌋
So we know \ ⌊quite⌋ / generally if P ⊃ Q and Q ⊃ R are both provable
\ demonstrable / then also P ⊃ R is provable \ also demonstrable / whatever
formula P,Q,R may be \ because we can obtain P ⊃ R always in the manner
just described⌊.⌋ and ⌊T⌋his cogn. \ fact / allows us to save the trouble of
repeating the whole arg⌊ument⌋ by which we derived the concl.⌊usion⌋ from
the two prem.⌊ises⌋ in each part.⌊icular⌋ case, but we can state it once for
all as a new \ Since we know that it can ⌊unreadable text⌋ and how it can
be done i.e / J69.K rule of inf⌊erence⌋ as foll⌊ows⌋:
From the two prem⌊ises⌋ P ⊃ Q, Q ⊃ R we can conclude \ P ⊃ R
/ \ whatever the form⌊ulas⌋ P,Q,R may be⌊.⌋ 4.R.
So this is a 4th⌊fourth⌋ rule of inf.⌊erence,⌋ which I call Rule of syllogism⌊.⌋
/ But note \ that / this rule of syllogism is not a new indep.⌊endent⌋ rule,
but can be derived from the other two⌊three⌋ rules and the 4⌊four⌋ axioms.
Therefore it is called a derived rule of inf⌊erence⌋. So we see that ⌊unreadable
text, should be: in⌋ our syst⌊em⌋⌊unreadable text⌋ we cannot only derive
formul.⌊as⌋ but also new rules of inf.⌊erence⌋ and the \ latter / is very help-
ful for shortening the proofs⌊.⌋ O⌊I⌋n principle it is of course superfluous to
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introduce such derived rules of inf⌊erence⌋ because whatever can be proved
with their help can also be proved without them. It is exactly this what
we have shown before introd⌊ucing⌋ ⌊unreadable text⌋ this \ new / rule
of inf.⌊erence⌋, namely we have shown that the conclusion of it can be ob-
tained also by the former axioms and rules of inf.⌊erence⌋ and this was the
justification for introducing it.
⌊new paragraph⌋ J70.K But although these \ derived / rules of inf⌊erence⌋
are superfl⌊uous⌋ \ o⌊i⌋n principle / they are very helpful for shortening the
proofs and shorter \ therefore we shall introduce a great ⌊many⌋ of them⌊.⌋
⌊We now⌋ apply this rule immediately to ⌊unreadable text, could be: the
1⌊(1)⌋ and 3⌊(3)⌋ ax⌊ioms⌋⌋ because they have this form P ⊃ Q⌊,⌋ Q ⊃ R
⌊unreadable text, should be: for⌋ p
P
p ∨ q
Q
q ∨ p
R
⌊,⌋ and get ⌊unreadable
symbol or left parenthesis⌋ bec⌊ause⌋ (1)⌊,⌋ (3)
10.* p ⊃ q ∨ p
parad⌊ox⌋: 11. p ⊃ (q ⊃ p) p ⊃ (∼ q ∨ p)
\ Add * ⌊crossed out what seems to be: q
p
⌋ ∼ q
q
⌊written
over something unreadable⌋ ⌊in⌋ last formula (10)⌊10.*⌋ /
12. [∼ p ⊃ (p ⊃ q) ∼ p ⊃ (∼ p ∨ q)
\ Add ∼ p
p
q
q
] ⌊in⌋ (1) /
Other derived rules⌊:⌋
4·1′R P1 ⊃ P2 P2 ⊃ P3 P3 ⊃ P4 : P1 ⊃ P4 generalized rule of syll.⌊ogism⌋
P1 ⊃ P3
5.R* P ⊃ Q : R ∨ P ⊃ R ∨Q ⌊addition from the left⌋
This rule is sim⌊ilar⌋ to the rules by which one calc.⌊ulates⌋ with inequ.⌊alities⌋
a < b ⌊:⌋ c+ a < c+ b⌊.⌋ ⌊ie.⌋
⌊The name of the formula in the following deleted text is transferred next to
5.R* above: Call⌊ed⌋ i⌊.⌋e. addition from \ the / left.⌋
[6R P ⊃ Q : (R ⊃ P ) ⊃ (R ⊃ Q) ]
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5·1R⌊R⌋* P ⊃ Q : P ∨ R ⊃ Q ∨R add.⌊ition⌋ from ⌊the⌋ right
J71.K 1. P ∨ R ⊃ R ∨ P P
p
R
q
in (3.)⌊(3)⌋
2. R ∨ P ⊃ R ∨Q by rule add.⌊ition from the⌋ left
3. R ∨Q ⊃ Q ∨ R R
p
Q
q
in (3.)⌊(3)⌋
P ∨ R ⊃ Q ∨ R by rule Syllog.⌊ism⌋
7R* P ⊃ Q R ⊃ S : P ∨R ⊃ Q ∨ S
Rule of addition of two impl⌊ications⌋
P ∨ R ⊃ Q ∨ R add⌊ition⌋ from ⌊the⌋ right ⌊to the⌋
first premis⌊s⌋e (R)
Q ∨ R ⊃ Q ∨ S ⌊addition from the⌋ left ′′ sec⌊ond⌋ ′′ (Q)
P ∨ R ⊃ Q ∨ S ⌊S⌋yllog⌊ism,⌋ but this is the conclusion to
be proved
8R* P ⊃ Q R ⊃ Q : P ∨ R ⊃ Q Dilemma
P ∨ R ⊃ Q ∨Q
Q ∨Q ⊃ Q Q
p
⌊in⌋ (2)
P ∨ R ⊃ Q ⌊S⌋yll⌊ogism⌋
J72.K Applic.⌊ation⌋ to derive formulas
p ⊃ ∼∼ p proved before⌊,⌋ subst.⌊itute⌋ ∼ p
p
∼ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ad⌊dition from the⌋ right
∼ p ∨ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ∨ p rule of impl⌊ication⌋
∼∼∼ p ∨ p ⌊abbr⌋ rule of def⌊ined⌋ symb.⌊ol⌋
13. ∼∼ p ⊃ p
14⌊.⌋ ⌊Trans⌋pos⌊ition⌋ ⌊to d⌋ (p ⊃ ∼ q) ⊃ (q ⊃ ∼ p) to
Proof (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃ (∼ q ∨ ∼ p) subst⌊itution⌋ in (3)
rule ⌊of defined⌋ symb⌊ol⌋
14·1 (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ ∼ p)
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(∼ p ∨ q) ⊃ (∼∼ q ∨ ∼ p)
Proof q ⊃ ∼∼ q
∼ p ∨ q ⊃ ∼ p ∨ ∼∼ q
∼ p ∨ ∼∼ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ ∼ p Perm⌊utation⌋ (3)
∼ p ∨ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ ∼ p q.e.d. ⌊rule of⌋ def.⌊ined⌋ symb.⌊ol⌋
14·1 (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ ∼ p) ∼ p ∨ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ ∼ p
14·2 (∼ p ⊃ ∼ q) ⊃ (q ⊃ p) ∼∼ q ∨ ∼ p ⊃ ∼ p ∨ q
14·3* (p ⊃ ∼ q) ⊃ (q ⊃ ∼ p) |∼ p ∨ ∼ q ⊃ ∼ q ∨ ∼ p |
14·4* (∼ p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ p) ∼∼ p ∨ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ p
⌊14·2⌋ (∼ p ⊃ ∼ q) ⊃ (q ⊃ p)
Proof ∼∼ p ⊃ p
∼∼ p ∨ ∼ q ⊃ p ∨ ∼ q
p ∨ ∼ q ⊃ ∼ q ∨ p
∼∼ p ∨ ∼ q ⊃ ∼ q ∨ p
⌊(⌋ ∼ p ⊃ ∼ q⌊)⌋ ⊃ ⌊(⌋q ⊃ p⌊)⌋
J73.K
14·2⌊14·4*⌋ (∼ p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ p)
∼∼ p ∨ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ p
Proof ∼∼ p ⊃ p
q ⊃ ∼∼ q
∼∼ p ∨ q ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼ q Add.⌊ition of two implications⌋
p ∨ ∼∼ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ p Perm⌊utation⌋
∼∼ p ∨ q ⊃ ∼∼ q ∨ p q.e.d. rule of def⌊ined⌋ symb.⌊ol⌋
4⌊Four⌋⌊unreadable text, perhaps: transposition⌋ rules of inf⌊erence:⌋
9R⌊R⌋ P ⊃ ∼ Q : Q ⊃ ∼ P 9·1R⌊R⌋ P ⊃ Q : ∼ Q ⊃ ∼ P
9·2R⌊R⌋ ∼ P ⊃ Q : ∼ Q ⊃ P ⌊9·3R⌋ ∼ P ⊃ ∼ Q : Q ⊃ P
By ⌊them⌋ the laws for . corresp⌊ond⌋ to laws for ∨ or can be derived⌊,⌋
e⌊.⌋g.
15.* p . q ⊃ p p . q ⊃ q
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∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃ p ∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃ q Form⌊ula⌋ 10⌊10.*⌋
Proof ∼ p ⊃ ∼ p ∨ ∼ q ∼ q ⊃ ∼ p ∨ ∼ q Transp⌊osition⌋ 2.
⌊9·2R⌋
∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃ p ∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃ q
\ 15.2 Similarly for prod.⌊ucts⌋ of any number of fact.⌊ors⌋ we can prove
that the prod.⌊uct⌋ implies any fact.⌊or,⌋ e.g.
p . q . r ⊃ p bec.⌊ause⌋ (p . q) . r ⊃ p . q
p . q . r ⊃ q p . q ⊃ p⌊,⌋ p . q ⊃ q
p . q . r ⊃ r (p . q) . r ⊃ r
and for any numb.⌊er⌋ of fact⌊ors⌋. /
\
⌈
From this ⌊one has⌋ the ⌊following rules of inference:⌋
10R⌊R⌋ P ⊃ Q : P . R ⊃ Q adjoining ⌊a⌋ new hyp.⌊othesis⌋
10·1R⌊R⌋ P ⊃ Q : R . P ⊃ Q
bec⌊ause⌋ P . R ⊃ P by subst⌊itution⌋
P ⊃ Q by ass⌊umption⌋
P . R ⊃ Q ⌊S⌋yll.⌊ogism⌋⌊
10·2R⌊R⌋ Q : P ⊃ Q from paradox /
J74.K Assoc⌊iativity⌋ bes⌊?⌋: Recall |I.⌊(1)⌋ p ⊃ p ∨ q⌊,⌋ II p ⊃ q ∨ p |
15.* (p ∨ q) ∨ r ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r)
1. p ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r) Add⌊ition⌋ (1) q ∨ r
q
q ⊃ q ∨ r q ∨ r ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r) Form⌊ula⌋ 10⌊10.*⌋
\ Add.⌊ition⌋* q ∨ r
p
p
q
(p ⊃ q ∨ p q ∨ r
p
p
q
) /
2. q ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r) ⌊S⌋yll⌊ogism⌋
a.) p ∨ q ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r) Dilemma
r ⊃ q ∨ r (II r
p
) q ∨ r ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r) ⌊see⌋ before
⌊an arrow is drawn from before to the same formula three lines above⌋
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b.) r ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r)
(p ∨ q) ∨ r ⊃ p ∨ (q ∨ r) inverse similar
15·1 p ∨ (q ∨ r) ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r
\ p ⊃ p ∨ q p ∨ q ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r (p ⊃ p ∨ q p ∨ q
p
r
q
)
p ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r
q ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r
r ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r [II p ⊃ q ∨ p r
p
p ∨ q
q
]
q ∨ r ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r
p ∨ (q ∨ r) ⊃ (p ∨ q) ∨ r /
Export⌊ation⌋ and import.⌊ation⌋
16.* (p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] Export⌊ation⌋
J75.K (∼ (p . q) ∨ r) ⊃∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r)
∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r ⊃ ∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r)
Proof ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃ ∼ p ∨ ∼ q double neg.⌊ation⌋
subst⌊itute⌋ ∼ p ∨ ∼ q
p
∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r ⊃ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r add.⌊ition⌋ from ⌊the⌋ right
(∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r ⊃ ∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) associat.⌊ive⌋ law
S⌊y⌋ll.⌊ogism⌋ ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r ⊃ ∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) q.e.d.
[p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] ⊃ (p . q ⊃ r) Importation
∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) ⊃ ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r
Pr.⌊oof⌋ × ∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) ⊃ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r Associat⌊ivity⌋
∼ p ∨ ∼ q ⊃ ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q)
× (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r ⊃ ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r Add.⌊ition⌋ right
∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) ⊃ ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r Syll⌊ogism⌋ ××
[p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] ⊃ [q ⊃ (p ⊃ r)]
× ∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) ⊃ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r
J76.K ∼ p ∨ ∼ q ⊃ ∼ q ∨ ∼ p
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× (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ∨ r ⊃ (∼ q ∨ ∼ p) ∨ r
× (∼ q ∨ ∼ p) ∨ r ⊃ ∼ q ∨ (∼ p ∨ r)
∼ p ∨ (∼ q ∨ r) ⊃ ∼ q ∨ (∼ p ∨ r) Syll⌊ogism⌋ × × ×
⌊Here on p. 76., which is on the right of p. 75., one finds in a box on the left
margin three lines that belong to that preceding page; they are inserted at
appropriate places on p. 75. in the text above.⌋
Rule of exp.⌊ortation⌋ or import.⌊ation⌋ or commut.⌊ativity⌋
11 P . Q ⊃ R : P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) Exp.⌊ortation⌋
11·1 P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) : P . Q ⊃ R Imp.⌊ortation⌋
11·2 P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) : Q ⊃ (P ⊃ R) Commut.⌊ativity⌋
⌊After p. 76. in this notebook comes p. 33.⌋
J33.K After having solved last time the first of the two probl⌊ems⌋ I
announced in the beg.⌊inning,⌋ namely the probl.⌊em⌋ of dec.⌊iding⌋ of a
given expr⌊ession⌋ wheth.⌊er⌋ or not it is a taut.⌊ology,⌋ I come now to
the sec.⌊ond,⌋ namely to reduce the inf.⌊inite⌋ nu.⌊mber⌋ of taut⌊ologies⌋
to a finite nu.⌊mber⌋ of ax.⌊ioms⌋ from which they can be derived. So this
probl.⌊em⌋ consists in setting up what is called a deductive syst.⌊em⌋ for
the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋. Now if you think of other ex⌊amples⌋ of
ded.⌊uctive⌋ systems as e.g. geom.⌊etry⌋ you will see that their aim is not
truly to derive the theor.⌊ems⌋ of the science concerned from a min.⌊imal⌋
num.⌊ber⌋ of ax.⌊ioms⌋, but also to define the notions ⌊unreadable symbol⌋
of the disc.⌊ipline⌋ con.⌊cerned⌋ in terms of a min.⌊imal⌋ nu.⌊mber⌋ of un-
defined or J34.K primitive notions. So we shall do the same thing for ⌊the⌋
calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋.
⌊new paragraph⌋ We know already that some of the not.⌊ions⌋ intro-
d⌊uced⌋ ∼⌊,⌋ ∨⌊,⌋ . ⌊,⌋ ⊃⌊,⌋ ≡⌊,⌋ | can be defined in terms of others⌊,⌋
namely e.g⌊.⌋ p ⊃ q ≡∼ p ∨ q⌊,⌋ p ≡ q⌊≡⌋p ⊃ q . q ⊃ p⌊,⌋ but now we want
to choose some of them in terms of which all others can be def⌊ined⌋. And I
claim that e.g. ∼ and ∨ are suff⌊icient⌋ for this purp.⌊ose⌋ bec⌊ause⌋
1. p . q ≡ ∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q)
2. p ⊃ q ≡ ∼ p ∨ q
3. p ≡ q ≡ (p ⊃ q) . (q ⊃ p)
4. p | q ≡ ∼ p ∨ ∼ q
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So it is possible to take ∼ and ∨ as J35.K prim.⌊itive⌋ terms for our ded.⌊uc-
tive⌋ syst⌊em⌋ and we shall actually do that \ make this choice / . But it
is important to remark that this choice is fairly arb⌊itrary⌋. There would be
other poss.⌊ibilities,⌋ e.g. to take ∼⌊,⌋ . bec.⌊ause⌋ ∨ can be expressed in
terms of ∼ and . by p ∨ q ≡ ∼ (∼ p . ∼ q) and by ∨ and ∼ the others can
be expr⌊essed⌋ as we have just seen. This fact that the choice of prim⌊itive⌋
terms is arb⌊itrary⌋ to a cert⌊ain⌋ ext.⌊ent⌋ is not surpr⌊ising⌋. The same
situat⌊ion⌋ prevails in any theory⌊,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ in geometrie⌊y⌋ we can take the
either the notion of movement of the space or the notion of congr⌊uence⌋
between ⌊unreadable symbol, could stand for “figures”⌋ as prim⌊itive⌋ be-
cause ⌊it is⌋ possible J36.K to define congr⌊uence⌋ of ⌊word missing, “figures”
suggested above⌋ in terms of movement of space and vice versa. The same
situat.⌊ion⌋ we have here. We can define ∨ in terms of ,,⌊“⌋and” and ,,⌊“⌋not”
but also vice versa ⌊or “and”⌋ in terms of ⌊“⌋or⌊”⌋ and ⌊“⌋not⌊”⌋. And there
are still further poss.⌊ibilities⌋ for the prim.⌊itive⌋ terms⌊,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ it would
be possible⌊p written over another letter⌋ to take ∼ and ⊃ as ⌊the⌋ only
prim⌊itive⌋ terms bec.⌊ause⌋ ∨ can be defined in t by
p ∨ q ≡ ∼ p ⊃ q since
∼ p ⊃ q ≡ ∼∼ p ∨ q ≡ p ∨ q by ⌊the⌋ law of double neg⌊ation⌋
In the three possible cases disc.⌊ussed⌋ so far we had always two prim⌊itive⌋
notions in terms of J37.K which the others could be def⌊ined⌋. It is an
interest⌊ing⌋ quest.⌊ion⌋ whether there might not be a single op.⌊eration⌋ in
terms of which all the others can be defined. This is actually the case as
was first disc.⌊overed⌋ by the log.⌊ician⌋ Sheffer. Namely the | f⌊u⌋nct.⌊ion⌋
suffices to define all the others bec⌊ause⌋ ∼ p ≡ p | pmeans at least one of the
⌊unreadable text, perhaps: two⌋ prop⌊ositions⌋ p, p is false⌊,⌋ but since they
are both p that means p is false⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ ∼ p⌊,⌋ \ so ∼ can be def⌊ined⌋ in
terms of | / and now the ,,⌊“⌋and” can be defined in terms of ∼ and | by since
p . q ≡ ∼ (p | q) for p | q means at least J38.K one of the two prop.⌊ositions⌋
is false⌊;⌋ hence the neg⌊ation⌋ means both are true. But in terms of ∼ and
the \ . / others can be def.⌊ined⌋ as we saw before. It is easy to see that
we have now exhausted all possibilities of choosing \ the / primit⌊ive⌋ terms
⌊unreadable symbol⌋ from the \ 6⌊six⌋ / operations written down here. In
part⌊icular⌋ we can prove \ e.g. / : ∼,≡ are not suff⌊icient⌋ to def.⌊ine⌋ the
others in terms of them. We can e.g⌊.⌋ show that p ∨ q cannot be def⌊ined⌋
in terms \ of them / ⌊.⌋
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⌊It is not indicated in the manuscript where exactly the following para-
graph is to be inserted:⌋ \ \ Now / Wwhat could it mean that ⌊unreadable
symbol⌋ e.g p . q ⌊or p ∨ q⌋ can be def⌊ined⌋ in terms of ∼,≡⌊?⌋ It would
mean that we can find an expr.⌊ession⌋ f(p, q) in two var.⌊iables⌋ containing
only the symb⌊ols⌋ ∼,≡ besides p, q and such that p∨
.
q ≡ f(p⌊, ⌋q)⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋
such that this expr.⌊ession⌋ would have the same truth table as p⌊∨
.
⌋q⌊.⌋ But
we shall prove now that such an expression does not exist. /⌈
Let’s write down the truth ⌊functions⌋ in two variables p, q which we cer-
tainly can define in terms of ∼,≡⌊;⌋ we get the following eight⌊:⌋ 1. p ≡ p⌊,⌋
2. ∼ (p ≡ p)⌊,⌋ 3. p⌊,⌋ 4. q⌊,⌋ 5. ∼ p⌊,⌋ 6. ∼ q⌊,⌋ JnewpageK 7. p ≡ q⌊,⌋
8. ∼ (p ≡ q)⌊,⌋ and now it can be shown that no others can be def.⌊ined⌋
exc.⌊ept⌋ those eight because we can show the foll⌊owing⌋ two things: 1. If
we take one of those eight f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ and negate it we get again one of
those eight f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions,⌋2. If we take any two of those eight f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋
and form a new one by connecting them by an equiv⌊alence⌋ symbol we
get again one of the eight. ⌊I.⌋e⌊.⌋ by appl.⌊ication⌋ of the op.⌊eration⌋ of
neg⌊ation⌋ and of the op⌊eration⌋ of equiv.⌊alence⌋ we never get outside of
the set of eight f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ written down here⌊.⌋ So let⌊’⌋s see at first
that by negating them JnewpageK we don’t get anything new. Now if we
neg.⌊ate⌋ the first ⌊text missing⌋. Now let⌊’⌋s connect any two of them
by ≡. If we connect ⌊the first⌋ with any form.⌊ula⌋ P we get P again⌊,⌋
i⌊.⌋e. ⌊unreadable symbols⌋ (⊤ ≡ P ) ≡ P \ bec.⌊ause⌋ / ⌊text missing⌋
and if connect a contrad.⌊iction⌋ C with any form⌊ula P ⌋ by ⌊unreadable
symbol, should be: ≡⌋ we get the neg⌊ation⌋ of P ⌊, i.e.⌋ (C ≡ P ) ≡ ∼ P
bec⌊ause⌋⌊text missing⌋. So by comb.⌊ining⌋ the first two form⌊ulas⌋ with
any other we get cert.⌊ainly⌋ nothing new. For the other cases it is very
helpful that (p ≡ ∼ q) ≡ ∼ (p ≡ q)⌊;⌋ this makes possible to factor out the
neg.⌊ation⌋ so to speak⌊.⌋ Now in order to apply that to the other form.⌊ulas⌋
we divide them in two groups. . . ⌊text missing⌋
⌋
J39.K For this purp.⌊ose⌋ we divide the 16 \ ⌊truth functions⌋ of two
var.⌊iables⌋ which we wrote down last time / into two classes according as
the number of letters T occurring in their ⌊their⌋ truth⌊ ⌋table is even or
odd⌊,⌋ or to be more exact \ accord⌊ing⌋ as / the nu.⌊mber⌋ \ of T⌊’s⌋
/ occurring in the last col⌊umn⌋. So e.g. p . q is odd⌊,⌋ p ≡ q is even
\ and an arb⌊itrary⌋ expr.⌊ession⌋ in two var.⌊iables⌋ will be called even if
its truth⌊ ⌋f⌊unction⌋ is even⌊.⌋ And now what we can show is this: Any
expr⌊ession⌋ in two var.⌊iables⌋ containing only ∼ ⌊and⌋ ≡ is even (i⌊.⌋e. its
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truth⌊ ⌋table contains an even ⌊)⌋ nu.⌊mber⌋ of T’s⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ either 0 or 2
or 4 T’s)⌊.⌋
And In order to show that we prove the following three lemmas.
1. The let⌊ter⌋ expr.⌊essions,⌋ ⌊unreadable text⌋ form⌊ulas⌋ namely the
letters p, q are even⌊.⌋
2. If an expr⌊ession⌋ f(p, q) is even then also the expr⌊ession⌋ ∼ f(p, q)
is even⌊.⌋
3. If two expr.⌊essions⌋ f(p, q)⌊,⌋ g(p, q) are even then also the exp⌊res-
sion⌋ f(p, q) ≡ g(p, q) \ obtained by connecting them with an equ⌊iva-
lence⌋ sign / is even⌊.⌋
J40.K So prop.⌊ositions⌋ 2, 3 have the consequence⌊:⌋
By applying the op⌊erations⌋ \ ∼ ⌊and⌋ ≡ to even expr⌊essions⌋ / as
many times as we wish we always get \ again / ⌊an⌋ even expression if
we start with \ even / expr⌊ession⌋ ⌊unreadable word⌋ the ⌊unreadable
word⌋.
But any expr.⌊ession⌋ cont.⌊aining⌋ only ∼ ⌊and⌋ ≡ is obtained from the
single letters p, q by an iterated appl⌊ication⌋ of the op.⌊erations⌋ ∼ ⌊and⌋
≡⌊;⌋ hence since p, q are even the expr.⌊ession⌋ thus obt.⌊ained⌋will also be
even. So our theorem that every exp⌊ression⌋ cont⌊aining⌋ only ∼ ⌊and⌋
≡ is even will be proved \ ⌊when⌋ we \ shall / have proved the 3⌊three⌋
lemmas⌊.⌋ ⌊(⌊unreadable symbol⌋) / ⌋
⌊The following from the manuscript is deleted: ⌊unreadable text⌋ how
to prove them ⌊unreadable text 3⌋⌋ One⌊1.⌋ is clear because ⌊of the truth
table⌋ for p. . . (and ⌊unreadable text, perhaps: and for q⌋ the same thing)⌊.⌋
2. also ⌊is⌋ clear because ∼ f(p, q) has T’s when f(p, q) had F’s⌊,⌋ i.e⌊.⌋ the
nu.⌊mber⌋ of T’s in the new expr.⌊ession⌋ is the same as the nu⌊mber⌋ of F’s
in the ⌊an insertion sign referring to nothing occurs in the manuscript on the
right-hand side of this page⌋ J41.K old one⌊.⌋ But the nu⌊mber⌋ of F’s in the
old one is even bec⌊ause the⌋ number of ⌊T’s is⌋ even and the nu⌊mber⌋ of
F’s is ⌊unreadable symbol, should be: equal to the⌋ nu.⌊mber⌋ of T’s⌊.⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ Now to the third⌊.⌋ ⌊unreadable text⌋ ⌊C⌋all the nu.⌊m-
ber⌋ of T⌊’s⌋ of the first t1⌊,⌋ the nu.⌊mber⌋ of T⌊’s⌋ of the sec⌊ond⌋ t2 and
call the nu.⌊mber⌋ of cases \ in the truth table / where both ⌊f⌋ and g
⌊unreadable text⌋ have ⌊the⌋ truth v⌊alue⌋ T r⌊.⌋ ⌊We have⌋ that ⌊t1 is⌋
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even and ⌊t2⌋ is even⌊,⌋ but ⌊unreadable text, should be: we do not⌋ know
anything about r⌊;⌋ it may be odd or even⌊.⌋ ⌊unreadable text, perhaps:
We shall try⌋ to find out in how many cases ⌊unreadable text, should be:
f(p, q) ≡ g(p, q), i.e. f ≡ g,⌋ will be true \ and to show that this number of
cases will be even⌊.⌋ / I prefer to find out in how many cases it will be false. If
we know that this nu.⌊mber⌋ is even we know also that the nu.⌊mber⌋ of cases
in which it is true will be even⌊.⌋ \ Now this whole ⌊expression⌋ / is false \ if
/ g ⌊and f⌋ have diff⌊erent⌋truth v⌊alues,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. if J42.K either ⌊unreadable
text, should be: we have g false and f true or we have⌋ g true ⌊and f⌋ false⌊.⌋
But The ⌊unreadable text, should be: cases where f is true and g false make⌋
t1 − r cases bec.⌊ause⌋⌊unreadable text, should be: from t1 cases where f
is true we should subtract cases⌋ when g is also true⌊, and⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ r
was the nu⌊mber⌋ of cases in which both are true⌊.⌋ ⌊H⌋ ence in t1− r cases
⌊unreadable text, should be: f is T and⌋ g ⌊is⌋ F, sim⌊ilarly⌋ in t2−r cases g
⌊is⌋ T ⌊and⌋ f ⌊is⌋ F⌊;⌋ hence alt.⌊ogether⌋ \ in / t1−r+ t2−r ) t1 + t2 − 2r
cases f ⌊and⌋ g have diff⌊erent⌋ truth values⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. in ⌊unreadable text,
should be: t1 + t2 − 2r⌋ cases f(p, q) ≡ g(p, q) is false⌊,⌋ and this is an even
nu⌊mber⌋ bec⌊ause⌋ t1⌊,⌋ t2 ⌊and⌋ 2r are even ⌊unreadable text⌋ and if you
add ⌊unreadable text, should be: an even number to an even number, after
subtracting an even number from the sum⌋you get again an even nu⌊mber⌋.
Hence the number of cases in which the whole expr.⌊ession⌋ \ is false / is an
even nu⌊mber⌋ and ⌊there are such is⌋ also the nu.⌊mber⌋ of cases in which
it is true⌊,⌋ i.e. f(p, q) ≡ g(p, q) is an even expr⌊ession⌋. q.e.d.
So this shows that only even ex truth⌊ ⌋f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ J43.K truth table an
even nu of T becau can be expr⌊essed⌋ in terms of ∼ ⌊and⌋ ≡⌊.⌋ Hence e.g⌊.⌋
∨ \ and . / cannot be expr.⌊essed⌋bec⌊ause⌋ three T⌊’s⌋ occur in . . . ⌊their
truth tables.⌋ It is easy to see that of the 16 truth⌊ ⌋f.⌊unctions⌋ exactly
half the nu.⌊mber⌋ is even and also that all even truth⌊ ⌋f.⌊unctions⌋ really
can be expressed in terms of ∼ ⌊and⌋ ≡ alone⌊.⌋ Expr.⌊essions⌋ for these
eight ⌊unreadable text, should be: truth functions⌋ in terms of ∼ ⌊and⌋ ≡
are given in the notes that were distributed ⌊(see p. 38. above)⌋. Our The
gen⌊eral⌋ theor⌊em⌋ ⌊seems to be German “u¨ber”, translatable as “on”) even
f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ I proved then has the consequ.⌊ence⌋ that these eight \ truth
/ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ must reproduce themselves by ⌊unreadable text⌋ negating
some of them or by connecting any two of them by ∼⌊;⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊. i⌋f you
neg⌊ate⌋ one of those \ ⌊unreadable word⌋ / expr⌊essions⌋ the result⌊ing⌋
expr⌊ession⌋ will be equiv.⌊alent⌋ to one of the eight and if you form a new
expr⌊ession⌋ by connect.⌊ing⌋ any two of them the resulting expression will
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again be equivalent to one of the eight⌊.⌋ I recom⌊mend⌋ ⌊that⌋ J44.K as an
exercise to show that in detail. \ It is an easy corol.⌊lary⌋ of / this result
about the undefinability of . ⌊and⌋ ∨ in terms of ≡ that also ∼ and the
excl.⌊usive⌋ or are not suff.⌊icient⌋ as primit⌊ive⌋ terms because as we saw
last time the excl.⌊usive⌋ or can be expr.⌊essed⌋ in terms of ∼ ⌊and⌋ ≡⌊,⌋
namely by ∼ (p ≡ q)⌊;⌋ hence if \ e.g. / ∨ could be def.⌊ined⌋ in terms of
∼ ⌊and⌋ ◦ ⌊(exclusive or)⌋ it could also be def⌊ined⌋in terms of ∼ ⌊and⌋ ≡
bec.⌊ause⌋the ◦ can be expr⌊essed⌋ in terms of ∼ ⌊and⌋ ≡. The reason for
that is of course that ◦ is also an even f.⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ and therefor only even
f.⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ can be def.⌊ined⌋ in terms of it⌊.⌋ So we see that whereas ∼
⌊and⌋ ∨ are suff⌊icient⌋as J45.K prim.⌊itive⌋ terms ∼ \ and / excl.⌊usive⌋ or
are not⌊,⌋ which is one of the reasons why the not excl.⌊usive⌋ or is used
in log⌊ic⌋. Another of those neg.⌊ative⌋ results about the poss.⌊ibility⌋ of
expressing some of the truth f.⌊unctions⌋ by others would be \ that / ∼
cannot be def⌊ined⌋ in terms of . ,∨,⊃⌊;⌋ even in terms of all three of them
it is impossible to expr.⌊ess⌋ ∼⌊.⌋ ⌊I will⌋ give that as a problem to prove.
⌈
As I announced before we shall choose from the diff.⌊erent⌋ possib.⌊ilities⌋
of primitive terms for our ded.⌊uctive⌋ syst.⌊em⌋ the case where \ one in
which / ∼ and ∨ ⌊is are⌋ taken as prim⌊itive⌋ and therefore it is of imp.⌊or-
tance⌋ to make sure that not only the part.⌊icular⌋ f⌊u⌋nct.⌊ions⌋ ≡⌊,⌋
. ⌊,⌋ ⊃⌊,⌋ | for which J46.K we introduced special symbols but that any
truth⌊ ⌋f⌊unction⌋ whatsoever in any number of var⌊iables⌋ can be expressed
by ∼ ⌊and⌋ ∨. For truth⌊ ⌋f⌊unctions⌋ with 2⌊two⌋ variables that follows
from the consid.⌊erations⌋ of last time since we have expr.⌊essed⌋ all 16
truth⌊ ⌋f⌊unctions⌋ by our logistic symbols and today we have seen that all
of them can be expr.⌊essed⌋ by ∼ ⌊and⌋ ∨. Now I shall prove the same thing
\ also / for truth⌊ ⌋f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ with 3⌊three⌋ variables and you will see
that the method of proof can be applied to f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ of any number of
variables. For the three var.⌊iables⌋ p.q, r we have eight J47.K possibilities
for the distr⌊ibution⌋ of truth values over them⌊,⌋ namely
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p q r f(p⌊, ⌋q⌊, ⌋r)
1⌊.⌋ T T T p . q . r P1
2⌊.⌋ T T F p . q . ∼ r P2
3. T F T p . ∼ q . r
⌊4.⌋ T F F
⌊5.⌋ F T T
6⌊.⌋ F T F
7⌊.⌋ F F T
8⌊.⌋ F F F P8
Now to define a truth \ fu⌊nction⌋ / in three var⌊iables⌋ means ⌊comma
from the manuscript deleted⌋ to stipulate a truth value \ T or F / for
f(p, q⌊, r⌋) for each of these eight cases. Now to each of these 8⌊eight⌋ cases
we can associate a cert.⌊ain⌋ expr⌊ession⌋ in the foll⌊owing⌋ way⌊:⌋ to 1.
\ we associate ⌊colon from the manuscript deleted⌋ / p . q . r⌊, to⌋ 2. ⌊we
associate⌋ p . q . ∼ r⌊, to⌋ 3. ⌊we associate⌋ p . ∼ q . r⌊,⌋ . . . So each of
these expr⌊essions⌋ will have a ∼ before those letters which have an F in
the corresp.⌊onding⌋ case. Denote the expr⌊essions⌋ associated with these
eight lines by P1⌊,⌋. . . ⌊,⌋P8. Then the expr⌊ession⌋ P2 e.g. will be true then
and only J48.K then if the sec⌊ond⌋ case is realis⌊z⌋ed for the truth values of
p, q, r (p . q . ∼ r will be true then and only then ⌊if⌋p ⌊is⌋T⌊,⌋ q ⌊is⌋T⌊and⌋
r ⌊is⌋ false⌊,⌋ which is exactly the case for the truth val⌊ues⌋ p, q⌊,⌋ r rep-
resented in the 3⌊second⌋ line⌊.⌋ And general⌊l⌋y Pi will be true then and
only then if the i th case for the truth values of p, q, r is realis⌊z⌋ed⌊.⌋ Now
the ⌊unreadable text⌋ truth⌊ ⌋f.⌊unction⌋⌊unreadable symbol⌋which we want
to expr.⌊ess⌋ by ∼ ⌊and⌋ ∨ will be true for cert.⌊ain⌋ of those 8⌊eight⌋ cases
and false for the others. Assume it is true for case numbe⌊r⌋ i1⌊,⌋i2⌊,⌋. . . ⌊,⌋in
and false for the others. Then form the disj.⌊unction⌋ Pi1 ∨ Pi2 . . . ∨ Pin⌊,⌋
i.e⌊.⌋ the disj⌊unction of those Pi which correspond to the cases in which the
given f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ is true. This \ disj⌊unction⌋ / is an expr.⌊ession⌋ in the
⌊the⌋ var⌊iables⌋ p, q, r containing only the op.⌊erations⌋ .⌊,⌋ ∼ ⌊and⌋ ∨⌊,⌋
and I claim its truth table J49.K will coincide with the truth table of the
given expr.⌊ession⌋ f(p, q⌊, ⌋r)⌊.⌋ For ⌊colon from the manuscript deleted⌋
f(p, q⌊, ⌋r) had the symb.⌊ol⌋ T in the i1⌊,⌋i2⌊,⌋. . . ⌊,⌋i thn line but in no oth-
ers and I claim the same thing is true for the expr⌊ession⌋ Pi1 ∨ . . . ∨ Pin⌊.⌋
Now
⌊new paragraph⌋ You see \ at ⌊last?⌋ / a disj⌊unction⌋ of an arb⌊itrary⌋
nu.⌊mber⌋ of members will be true then and only then if at least one of its
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members is true and it will be false only if all of its members are false (I
proved that in my last lecture for the case of 3⌊three⌋ members and the same
proof holds generally). Hence this disj⌊unction⌋ will cert⌊ainly⌋ be true in
⌊the⌋ i1⌊,⌋ . . . ⌊,⌋ i thn case because Pi1 \ e.g. / is true in the i th1 case as we
⌊unreadable text, perhaps: saw before⌋. Therefore the J50.K disj⌊unction⌋ is
\ also / true for the i th1 case \ because then one of its memb.⌊ers⌋ is true⌊.⌋
The same holds for i2 . . . etc. So the truth table for the disj⌊unction⌋ will
cert.⌊ainly⌋ have the \ letter T / in the i1⌊,⌋. . . ⌊,⌋in line. But it will have
F’s in all the other lines. Bec.⌊ause⌋ Pi1 was true only in the i th1 case and
false in all the others. Hence in a case diff⌊erent⌋ from \ the / i1⌊,⌋. . . ⌊,⌋i thn
Pi1⌊,⌋. . . ⌊,⌋Pin will all be false and hence the disj⌊unction⌋ will be false, i.e.
Pi1∨ . . .∨Pin will have the letter F in all lines other than the i1⌊,⌋. . . ⌊,⌋i thn ⌊,⌋
i⌊,⌋e. it has T in the i1⌊,⌋. . . ⌊,⌋in line and only in those. But the same thing
was true for the truth t⌊able⌋ of the given f(p, q, ⌊r⌋) \ by ass⌊umption.⌋
/ So they coincide⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. f(p⌊, ⌋q⌊, ⌋r) ≡ Pi1 ∨ . . . ∨ Pin⌊.⌋
J51.K So we have proved that an arb.⌊itrary⌋ truth funct⌊ion⌋ of 3⌊three⌋
variables can be expr.⌊essed by ∼⌊,⌋ ∨ ⌊and⌋ .⌊,⌋ but . can be expr.⌊essed⌋
by ∼ and ∨⌊,⌋ hence every truth⌊ ⌋f⌊unction⌋ of three var.⌊iables⌋ can be
expr.⌊essed⌋ by ∼ and ∨⌊,⌋ and I think it is perfectly clear that exactly the
same proof applies to truth⌊ ⌋f.⌊unctions⌋ of any number of variables. ⌊wavy
vertical line dividing the page⌋
Now after having ⌊unreadable text, should be: seen that⌋ two prim⌊itive⌋
notions \ ⌊∼,∨⌋ / really suffice to define any truth⌊ ⌋f⌊unction⌋ we can begin
to set up the ded.⌊uctive⌋ syst⌊em.⌋
I begin with ⌊writing⌋ three def.⌊initions⌋ in terms of our prim⌊itive⌋
notions⌊:⌋
P ⊃ Q =Df ∼ P ∨Q
P . Q =Df ∼ (∼ P ∨ ∼ Q)
P ≡ Q =Df P ⊃ Q . Q ⊃ P
J52.K I am writing cap.⌊ital⌋ letters because these def⌊initions⌋ are to apply
also if P ⌊and⌋ Q are form⌊ulas⌋, not only if they are single letters⌊,⌋ i.e.
e.g⌊.⌋ p ⊃ p ∨ q means ∼ p ∨ (p ∨ q) and so on⌊.⌋
The next thing to do in order to have a ded⌊uctive⌋ syst⌊em⌋ is to set
up the ax⌊ioms⌋. Again in the axioms one has a freed.⌊om⌋ of choice as in
the primit.⌊ive⌋ terms⌊,⌋ exactly as \ also / in other ded⌊uctive⌋ theories
also⌊,⌋ e.g. in geometr⌊y,⌋ many diff⌊erent⌋ syst⌊ems⌋ of ax.⌊ioms⌋⌊for⌋geo
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have been set up each of which is suff⌊icient⌋ to derive the whole geom⌊etry⌋.
The syst.⌊em⌋ of ax.⌊ioms⌋ \ for the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋ / which I
use is ess.⌊entially⌋ the one set up by first by Russell and then also adopted
by Hilbert. It has the foll.⌊owing⌋ four ax⌊ioms:⌋
J53.K
1.⌊(1)⌋ p ⊃ p ∨ q ⌊in the manuscript 1., 2. and 3. are in one line⌋
2.⌊(2)⌋ p ∨ p ⊃ p
3.⌊(3)⌋ p ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ p
4.⌊(4)⌋ (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)
I shall discuss the meaning of these ax⌊ioms⌋ later discuss later. A⌊t⌋
present I want only to say that an expr⌊ession⌋ written down in our theory as
an axiom or as a theorem always means that it is true for any prop⌊ositions⌋
p, q, r etc⌊.,⌋ e.g. p ⊃ (p ∨ q)⌊p ⊃ p ∨ q.⌋
Now in geom.⌊etry⌋ ⌊unreadable word⌋ and any other disc \ theor⌊y⌋
/ |exc⌊ept⌋ logic| the ded.⌊uctive⌋ syst.⌊em⌋ is completely given by stating
what the prim⌊itive⌋ terms and what the ax.⌊ioms⌋ are. It is important to
remark that it is different here for the following reason: in geom⌊etry⌋ \ and
other theor⌊ies⌋ / it is clear how the theorems are to be derived from the
ax.⌊ioms;⌋ they are to be derived by the rules of logic which are assumed to
be known. In our case however we cannot assume the rules of logic to be
known by the rules of log.⌊ic⌋ J54.K because we are just about to formulate
the rules of logic and to reduce them to a min⌊imum.⌋ So this will naturally
have to apply to the rules of inference as well as to the ax⌊ioms⌋ with which
we start. We shall have to formulate the⌊written over “them”⌋ \ rules of
inf.⌊erence⌋ / explicitly and with greatest possible precision and⌊,⌋ that is
in such a way there can never be a doubt whether a cert⌊ain⌋ rule can be
applied for any form⌊ula⌋ or not. And of course we shall try to⌊comma from
the manuscript deleted⌋⌊. . . text omitted in the manuscript, could be: work⌋
with as few as possible. I have to warn here against a⌊n⌋ error⌊.⌋ one might⌈
One might think that an expl⌊icit⌋ formulation of the rules of inf.⌊erence⌋
\ besides the ax.⌊ioms⌋ / is superfluous bec.⌊ause⌋ the ax.⌊ioms⌋ themselves
\ seem to / express rules of inf.⌊erence,⌋ e.g. p ⊃ p ∨ q \ the rule / that
from p a prop⌊osition⌋ p one can conclude p∨ q⌊,⌋ and ⌊unreadable symbol⌋
one might think that the ax.⌊ioms⌋ themselves contain at the same time the
rules by which the theorems are to be derived. But this way out of the
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diff⌊iculty⌋ would be entirely wrong J55.K bec.⌊ause⌋ e.g. p ⊃ p ∨ q does
not say that it is perm⌊itted⌋to conclude p ∨ q from p because those terms
⌊“⌋allowable to conclude⌊”⌋ do⌊ ⌋not occur in it. The notions ⌊unreadable
text, should be: in it are⌋ only p⌊,⌋ ⊃, ∨ and ⌊q.⌋ ⌊A⌋cc.⌊ording⌋ to our
def⌊inition⌋ of ⊃ it \ does not mean that⌊,⌋ but it / simply says p is false
or p ∨ q is true. It is true that the axioms suggest \ or make possible /
cert.⌊ain⌋ rule⌊s⌋ of inf.⌊erence,⌋e.g⌊.⌋ the just ⌊stated one,⌋ but it is not
even uniquely det.⌊ermined⌋ what rules of inf⌊erence⌋ it suggests⌊;⌋ e.g⌊.⌋
∼ p ∨ (p ∨ q) says either p is false or p ∨ q is true⌊,⌋ which sugg⌊ests⌋ the
rule of inf.⌊erence⌋ p⌊:⌋ p ∨ q⌊,⌋ but it also sug.⌊gests⌋ ∼ (p ∨ q)⌊:⌋ ∼ p⌊.⌋
So ⌊its we⌋ need written spec.⌊ifications,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. we have to formulate rules
of inf⌊erence⌋ in add.⌊ition⌋ to formulas⌊.⌋ ⌊Note in a box: p 56 - p 60 }
Heft⌊German: Notebook⌋ I⌋
It is only bec⌊ause⌋ the ⌊“⌋if then⌊”⌋ in ord.⌊inary⌋ langu⌊age⌋ is amb.⌊i-
valent⌋ and has besides the mean⌊ing⌋ given by the truth⌊ ⌋t⌊able⌋ also the
mean⌊ing⌋ ⌊unreadable symbol, should be “the second member⌋ can be in-
ferred from ⌊unreadable symbol, should be: the first”⌋ ⌊comma from the
manuscript deleted⌋ that the ax.⌊ioms⌋ seem to express \ uniquely ⌊unread-
able text⌋ / rules of inf⌊erence⌋.
J55.1K This remark applies gen.⌊erally⌋ to any quest⌊ion⌋ whether \ or
not / cert⌊ain⌋ laws of log.⌊ic⌋ can be derived from others (e.g. whether
⌊the⌋ law of excl.⌊uded⌋ middle are⌊is⌋ sufficient)⌊.⌋ Such quest.⌊ions⌋ have
only a precise mean⌊ing⌋ if you state the rules of inf⌊erence⌋ which are to be
accept⌊ed⌋ in the deriv⌊ation⌋. ⌊The remaining text on p. 55.1 is in a box⌋
It is diff.⌊rent⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ in geom⌊etry;⌋ there it has a precise mean⌊ing⌋ whether
it follows⌊,⌋ namely it means whether it foll⌊ows⌋ by log⌊ical⌋ inf⌊erence,⌋
but it cannot have this mean⌊ing⌋ in log⌊ic⌋ because then every log⌊ical⌋ law
would be der⌊ivable⌋ from any other. So it could J55.2K only mean derivable
by the inf.⌊erences⌋ made possible by the ax⌊ioms⌋. But as we have seen
that has no precise mean⌊ing⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ an ax.⌊iom⌋ may make possible or
sugg.⌊est⌋ many inferences.
⌊On a not numbered page after p. 55.2, which is the last page of the
present notebook, one finds the following crossed out text:⌋
which describe unambiguously how the mean.⌊ingful⌋ expr.⌊essions⌋ are to be
formed from the basic symb.⌊ols⌋ (rules of the grammar of the langu.⌊age⌋)
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2.3 Notebook III
⌊Folder 61, on the front cover of the notebook “Log.⌊ik⌋ Vorl.⌊esungen⌋
⌊German: Logic Lectures⌋ N.D⌊.⌋ ⌊Notre Dame⌋ III”⌋
J1.K (p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(r ⊃ p) ⊃ (r ⊃ q)]
(q ⊃ r) ⊃ [(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ r)⌊]⌋
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p ⊃ r)] Commut⌊ativity⌋ p ⊃ q
P
q ⊃ r
Q
p ⊃ r
R
⌊q ⊃ r
P
p ⊃ q
Q
p ⊃ r
R
⌋
(p ⊃ q) . (q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p ⊃ r) Import.⌊ation⌋ ′′ ′′ ′′
⌊p ⊃ q
P
q ⊃ r
Q
p ⊃ r
R
⌋
(q ⊃ r) . (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ r)
⌊in a box: p. 42, 45 Examples p 53⌋
(p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q) p ⊃ q
P
p
Q
q
R
(p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q Import.⌊ation⌋
J2.K
17 p . q ⊃ q . p
Pr.⌊oof⌋ ∼ q ∨ ∼ p ⊃∼ p ∨ ∼ q (3) ∼ q
p
∼ p
q
⌊fraction bars omitted in
the manuscript⌋
∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ⊃∼ (∼ q ∨ ∼ p) Transp.⌊osition⌋
p . q ⊃ q . p rule of def⌊ined⌋ symb⌊ol⌋
18. p ⊃ p . p
Pr⌊oof⌋ ∼ p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ ∼ p
p ⊃ ∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ p) Transp.⌊osition⌋
p ⊃ p . p def⌊ined⌋ symb⌊ol⌋
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19. p ⊃ (q ⊃ p⌊.⌋q)
(p⌊.⌋q ⊃ p⌊.⌋q) ⊃ (p ⊃ (q ⊃ p⌊.⌋q)) export⌊ation⌋
p⌊.⌋q
rp ⊃ (q ⊃ p⌊.⌋q)
19.1 p ⊃ (q ⊃ q⌊.⌋p)
(p⌊.⌋q ⊃ q⌊.⌋p) ⊃ (p ⊃ (q ⊃ q⌊.⌋p)) export.⌊ation⌋ q⌊.⌋p
r
J3.K
12⌊over 11⌋R⌊R⌋ P , Q . .⌊:⌋ P . Q rule of prod⌊uct⌋
P ⊃ (Q ⊃ P . Q)
Q ⊃ P . Q
P . Q
Inv.⌊ersion⌋ P . Q . .⌊:⌋ P , Q rule of prod.⌊uct⌋
P . Q ⊃ P P . Q ⊃ Q
⌊The following three lines, up to 13R⌊R⌋, are crossed out in the manuscript:⌋
21⌊.⌋ ∼ (p ⌊.⌋ q) ≡∼ p ∨ ∼ q
∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ≡∼ p ∨ ∼ q ∼ p ∨ ∼ q
p
⌈∼ (p ∨ q) ≡∼ p . ∼ q⌉
13R⌊R⌋ P ⊃ Q R ⊃ S . .⌊:⌋ P . R ⊃ Q . S Rule of multiplic.⌊ation⌋
∼ Q ⊃∼ P ∼ S ⊃∼ R
∼ Q ∨ ∼ S ⊃∼ P ∨ ∼ R
∼ (∼ P ∨ ∼ R) ⊃∼ (∼ Q ∨ ∼ S)
J4.K
13.1R⌊R⌋ P ⊃ Q . . . R . P ⊃ R . Q
bec⌊ause⌋ R ⊃ R and other side
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13.2R⌊R⌋ P ⊃ Q ⌊,⌋ P ⊃ S : P ⊃ Q . S
P . P ⊃ Q . S
P ⊃ P . P
P ⊃ Q . S rule of composition
⌊An insertion sign from the manuscript followed by “p 5-6” is deleted.⌋
F 22. p . (q ∨ r) ≡ p . q ∨ p . r
I. q ⊃ q ∨ r
p . q ⊃ p . (q ∨ r)
r ⊃ q ∨ r
p . r ⊃ p . (q ∨ r)
p . q ∨ p . r ⊃ p . (q ∨ r)
II. ⌊The following two columns of formulae are separated by a vertical line
in the manuscript:⌋
× q ⊃ (p ⊃ p . q) q ⊃ (p ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r)
+ r ⊃ (p ⊃ p . r) + (p ⊃ p . r) ⊃ (p ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r)
p . q ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r r ⊃ (p ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r)
p . r ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r q ∨ r ⊃ (p ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r)
× (p ⊃ p . q) ⊃ (p ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r) (q ∨ r) . p ⊃ p . q ∨ p . r
J5.K Ae⌊E⌋quivalences
P ⊃ Q . Q ⊃ P . .⌊:⌋ P ≡ Q
bec.⌊ause⌋ (P ⊃ Q) ⌊.⌋ (Q ⊃ P ) rule of def⌊ined⌋ symb⌊ol⌋
P ≡ Q . .⌊:⌋ P ⊃ Q ⌊.⌋Q ⊃ P
Transpos⌊ition⌋:
P ≡ Q . .⌊:⌋ ∼ P ≡∼ Q
P ≡∼ Q . .⌊:⌋ ∼ P ≡ Q
Proof P ≡ Q P ⊃ Q Q ⊃ P
∼ Q ⊃∼ P ∼ P ⊃∼ Q ∼ P ≡∼ Q
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Add.⌊ition⌋ and Multipl.⌊ication⌋
P ≡ Q R ≡ S
{
P ∨ R ≡ Q ∨ S
P . R ≡ Q . S
J6.K P ⊃ Q R ⊃ S Q ⊃ P S ⊃ R
P ∨ R ⊃ Q ∨ S Q ∨ S ⊃ P ∨ R
P ∨R ≡ Q ∨ S
Syll.⌊ogism⌋
P ≡ Q , Q ≡ S ⌊:⌋ P ≡ S
P ≡ Q ⌊:⌋ Q ≡ P
p ≡ p p ⊃ p p ⊃ p (P
p
Q
p
)
⌊fraction bars omitted in manuscript⌋
p ≡∼∼ p p ⊃∼∼ p ∼∼ p ⊃ p
∼ (p . q) ≡∼ p ∨ ∼ q
∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) ≡∼ p ∨ ∼ q
∼ (p ∨ q) ≡∼ p . ∼ q
≡∼ (∼∼ p ∨ ∼∼ q)
p ≡∼∼ p Forts⌊German: continued⌋ p 4. F
q ≡∼∼ q
p ∨ q ≡∼∼ p ∨ ∼∼ q | ∼ (p ∨ q) ≡∼ (∼∼ p ∨ ∼∼ q)
J6a.K
23.⌊written over unreadable figure⌋
p ∨ (q . r) ≡ (p ∨ q) . (p ∨ r)
1.) p ⊃ p ∨ q
p ⊃ p ∨ r
x p ⊃ (p ∨ q) . (p ∨ r)
q . r ⊃ p ∨ q bec.⌊ause⌋ q . r ⊃ q
q . r ⊃ p ∨ r
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x q . r ⊃ (p ∨ q) . (p ∨ r)
2.) x p ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)] × bec.⌊ause⌋ (p ∨ q) ⊃ [p ⊃ (p ∨ q . r⌊)]⌋[
⌊unreadable word⌋
r ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)]
]
because
r ⊃ [q ⊃ q . r]
q ⊃ q . r ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)] Summation
x r ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)]
(p ∨ r) ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)]
(p ∨ r) . (p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)
× bec.⌊ause⌋ p ⊃ p ∨ q . r
p ∨ q . r ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)]
p ⊃ [(p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q . r)]
⌊Here ends the page numbered 6a. The following not numbered page, until
p. 7., is crossed out.⌋
(p ⊃ p . q) ⊃ [(p ⊃ (p . q ∨ p . r)]
q ⊃ [p ⊃ (p . q ∨ p . r)]
r ⊃ [p ⊃ (p . q ∨ p . r)]
(q ∨ r) ⊃ [p ⊃ (p . q ∨ p . r)] importation
(q ∨ r) . p ⊃ (p . q ∨ p . r)
p . (q ∨ r) ⊃ (p . q ∨ p . r)
(p ∨ ∼ p)⌊.⌋(q ∨ ∼ q)⌊.⌋(r ∨ ∼ r)
p . q . (r ∨ ∼ r)∨ ∼ p . ∼ q
p . r⌊.⌋(q ∨ ∼ q)
⌊(⌋ ∼ p ∨ q)⌊.⌋(∼ p ∨ ∼ q)
∼ p ∨ q . ∼ p ∨ q . ∼ q
p . q ⊃ r
J7.K Syllog.⌊ism⌋ under an assumpt.⌊ion⌋
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14R⌊R⌋ P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) , P ⊃ (R ⊃ S) . .⌊:⌋ P ⊃ (Q ⊃ S)
and similarly for any num.⌊ber⌋ of premises
P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) . (R ⊃ S)
(Q ⊃ R) . (R ⊃ S) ⊃ Q ⊃ S exp.⌊ortation⌋ syll.⌊ogism⌋
P ⊃ (Q ⊃ S) also generalized

14.1R⌊R⌋ P ⊃ Q P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) ⌊:⌋ P ⊃ R
P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) . Q
(Q ⊃ R) . Q ⊃ R
P ⊃ R Syll⌊ogism⌋

⌊The following four lines, up to p. 8., are in a box in the manuscript and are
crossed out:
(r ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ r)
(r ⊃ s) ⊃ (q ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ r)
Add.⌊ition⌋ of assumpt.⌊ions⌋
(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ [(p ∨ r) ⊃ (q ∨ s)]⌋
J8.K (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ s)
1. p ∨ r ⊃ r ∨ p
2. (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)
3. r ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ r
4. (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (q ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ s)
5. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ r ∨ p)
6. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)
7. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (r ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ r)
8. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (q ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ r)
9. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ s)
(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q)
(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q ∨ q) q
s
(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ q) ⊃ (q ∨ q ⊃ q)
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(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q)
J9.K (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p . r ⊃ q . s)
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃∼ p)
(r ⊃ s) ⊃ (∼ s ⊃∼ r)
A. (p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃∼ p) . (∼ s ⊃∼ r)
B. (∼ q ⊃∼ p) . (∼ s ⊃∼ r) ⊃ (∼ q ∨ ∼ s ⊃∼ p ∨ ∼ r)
C. (∼ q ∨ ∼ s ⊃∼ p ∨ ∼ r) ⊃ (p . r ⊃ q . s)
(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ s) ⊃ (p . r ⊃ q . s) A,B,C
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ⊃ q . s)
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃ s) ⊃ (p . p ⊃ q . s)
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ⊃ p . p)
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃ s) ⊃ (p ⊃ q . s)
⌊(⌋p ⊃∼ p) ⊃∼ p
∼ p ∨ ∼ p ⊃∼ p
J10.K (∼ p ⊃ p) ⊃ p
(∼∼ p ∨ p) ⊃ p
∼∼ p ⊃ p
p ⊃ p
(∼∼ p ∨ p) ⊃ p
∼ (p . ∼ p) siehe unten∗ ⌊German: see below⌋
(p ⊃ q).(p ⊃∼ q) ⊃∼ p
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃∼ q) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q . ∼ q)]
p ⊃ (q . ∼ q) ⊃ (∼ (q . ∼ q) ⊃∼ p)
(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃∼ q) ⊃ (∼ (q . ∼ q) ⊃∼ p) 
Princ.⌊iple of⌋ Com⌊mutativity⌋
∼ (q . ∼ q) ⊃ [(p ⊃ q).(p ⊃∼ q) ⊃∼ p] upslope
(p ⊃ q).(p ⊃∼ q) ⊃∼ p
⌊The caption in the right margin in the following line from the manuscript
is deleted, as well as the dash connecting it to a crossed out formula.⌋
Princ.⌊iple of⌋ Com⌊mutativity⌋
(q∨ ∼ q) ⊃ [(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃∼ q) ⊃∼ p] upslope
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(p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃∼ q) ⊃∼ p
∼ (p . ∼ p)
∗ ∼∼ (∼ p ∨ ∼∼ p)
J11.K Now I can now \ proceed / to the \ proof of the / completeness
theorem announced in the beg.⌊inning⌋ which says that any tautology what-
soever can actually be derived in a finite number of steps from our four axioms
by application of the 3⌊three⌋ primitive rules of inf.⌊erence⌋ (subst⌊itution⌋,
implic⌊ation⌋, defined symbol) or shortly ,,⌊“⌋Every tautology is demonstra-
ble”⌊.⌋ ⌊the following inserted text is crossed out: \ since ,,⌊“⌋demonstrable”
was defined to mean derivable from the 4⌊four⌋ ax.⌊ioms⌋ by the 3⌊three⌋
rules of inf⌊erence.⌋ / ⌋We have already proved the inverse theor⌊em⌋ which
says: ,,⌊“⌋Every demonstrable prop⌊osition⌋ \ expression / is a taut⌊olo-
gy⌋”⌊.⌋ because of the following facts: ⌊The following assertions numbered
1. and 2. are crossed out in the manuscript:
1. Each of the four ax.⌊ioms⌋ is a tautology (as can \ easily / be checked
up⌊,⌋ \ e.g. / by the truth t⌊able⌋ method)
J12.K
2. The 3⌊three⌋ prim.⌊itive⌋ rules of inf⌊erence⌋ give only tautologies \ as
conclusions / if the premises are tautologies⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋ e⌊.⌋ applied to tau-
tologies they give again tautol⌊ogies⌋.⌋
But the prop.⌊osition⌋ which we are interested in now ⌊in⌋ is the other
\ inverse / one, which says ,,⌊“⌋Any tautology is dem.⌊onstrable⌋”. In or-
der to prove it we have to use again the formulas Pi which I (needed) \ we
used / for proving that any truth⌊ ⌋table f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ can be expressed by ∼
and ∨. If we have say n propositional var.⌊iables⌋ p1⌊, ⌋p2⌊, ⌋p3⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn
then consider the conj.⌊unction⌋ of them p1 . p2 . p3 . . . . . pn and call a
,,⌊“⌋fund.⌊amental⌋ conj⌊unction⌋” of these J13.K letters \ p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn /
any expression obtained from this conj.⌊unction⌋ by negating some or all
of the variables p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn. So e.g⌊.⌋ p1 . ∼ p2⌊.⌋p3⌊.⌋ . . . ⌊.⌋ pn would
be a fund.⌊amental conjunction,⌋ another one ∼ p1⌊.⌋p2⌊.⌋ ∼ p3⌊.⌋p4⌊.⌋
. . . ⌊.⌋pn etc.⌊;⌋ in part.⌊icular⌋ we count also p1⌊.⌋ . . . ⌊.⌋pn \ itself / and
∼ p1⌊.⌋ ∼ p2⌊.⌋ . . . ⌊.⌋ ∼ pn (⌊in⌋ which all \ var.⌊iables⌋ / are neg⌊ated⌋) as
fund.⌊amental⌋ conj⌊unctions⌋.
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\ 2 for 1⌊one⌋ p1⌊,⌋ ∼ p1
22 4 for two p1⌊.⌋p2⌊,⌋ p1⌊.⌋ ∼ p2⌊,⌋ ∼ p1⌊.⌋p2⌊,⌋ ∼ p1⌊.⌋ ∼ p2
23 8 for three p1⌊.⌋p2⌊.⌋p3⌊,⌋ p1⌊.⌋p2⌊.⌋ ∼ p3⌊,⌋
p1⌊.⌋ ∼ p2⌊.⌋p3⌊,⌋ p1⌊.⌋ ∼ p2⌊.⌋ ∼ p3⌊,⌋
∼ p1⌊.⌋p2⌊.⌋p3⌊,⌋ ∼ p1⌊.⌋p2⌊.⌋ ∼ p3⌊,⌋
∼ p1⌊.⌋ ∼ p2⌊.⌋p3⌊,⌋ ∼ p1⌊.⌋ ∼ p2⌊.⌋ ∼ p3 /
So for the n var.⌊iables⌋ p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn there are exactly 2n fund⌊amental⌋
conj.⌊unctions⌋ in gen⌊eral;⌋ 2n because \ you see / by adding a \ new /
variable \ pn+1 / the num.⌊ber⌋ of fund⌊amental⌋ conj.⌊unctions⌋ is doubled
⌊,⌋ bec⌊ause⌋ we can combine pn+1 and ∼ pn+1 with any of the previous J14.K
fund⌊amental⌋ conj.⌊unctions⌋ (as e.g. here p3 with any of the prev⌊ious⌋
4⌊four⌋ and ∼ p3 getting 8⌊eight⌋) with each of these two poss.⌊ibilities⌋
for any other var.⌊iable⌋ so that we have alt.⌊ogether⌋ 2× 2× . . . 2 = 2n
possibilities. ,⌊;⌋ I denote those 2n fund.⌊amental⌋ conj.⌊unctions⌋ for the
var.⌊iables⌋ p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn by P (n)1 ⌊,⌋P (n)2 ⌊,⌋ . . . ⌊,⌋P (n)i ⌊,⌋. . . ⌊,⌋P (n)2n . I am
using (n) as an upper ind.⌊ex⌋ to indicate that we mean the fund⌊amental⌋
conj.⌊unction⌋ of the n variables p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn . The order in which they
are enumerated is arb.⌊itrary⌋. [We may stick e.g. to the order which we
used in the truth⌊ ⌋tables⌊.⌋] From our formu⌊las⌋ consid.⌊ered⌋ for n = 3
we know also \ J14.1K that to each of these fund.⌊amental⌋ conj⌊unctions⌋
P
(n)
i corresp⌊onds⌋ exactly one line in a truth⌊ ⌋table for \ a funct⌊ion⌋ of the
/ n variables \ p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn / in such a way that P (n)i will be true in this
line and false in all the others. So if we numerate the lines correspondingly
we can say P
(n)
i will be true in the i
th line and false in all other lines. /
J15.K Now \ in order to prove the completeness theor.⌊em⌋ / I prove first
the foll⌊owing⌋ lemma \ aux.⌊iliary⌋ theorem⌊.⌋ /
Let E be any expr.⌊ession⌋ which contains no other prop⌊ositional⌋
var.⌊iables⌋ but p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn and P (n)i any fund⌊amental⌋ conj.⌊unc-
tion⌋ of the var.⌊iables⌋ p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn⌊.⌋ ⌊T⌋hen either P (n)i ⊃ E or
P
(n)
i ⊃∼ E is demonstrable
\ ⌊exclamation mark deleted⌋ ⌊where⌋ by either or I mean at least one
E
Ex.⌊ample⌋ p1⌊.⌋p2⌊.⌋p3 ⊃ [p . q ⊃ r] p1⌊.⌋ ∼ p2⌊.⌋p3
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|p1⌊.⌋ ∼ p2⌊.⌋p3 ⊃ (p1⌊.⌋p2 ⊃ p3)| or
p1⌊.⌋ ∼ p2⌊.⌋p3 ⊃∼ (p1⌊.⌋p2 ⊃ p3)
|∼ p . ∼ q . r ⊃∼ (p . q ⊃ r)| /
It is to be noted that E need not actually contain all the var.⌊iables⌋
p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋ pn⌊;⌋ it is only required that it contains no other variables but
p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn. So e.g. p1 ∨ p2 would be an expr.⌊ession⌋ for which the
theor.⌊em⌋ applies⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e.
P
(n)
i ⊃ (p1 ∨ p2)
⊃ ∼ (p1 ∨ p2)
}
dem.⌊onstrable⌋
Let us first consider what that means ⌊The note “|p19|” in the manuscript
at the bottom of this page, p. 15., is deleted.⌋
J16.K ⌊The number of the page as well as the following text until the
second half of p. 19. starting with “I shall prove” are crossed out in the
manuscript, while pp. 17.-18. are missing from it:⌋
It is clear \ at first / that under the ass.⌊umption⌋ ment.⌊ioned⌋ either
P
(n)
i ⊃ E or P (n)i ⊃∼ E must be a tautology bec⌊ause⌋: Let us write down
the truth⌊ ⌋t⌊able⌋ of the expr.⌊ession⌋ E it will have (Note that we can con-
sider E as a funct⌊ion⌋ in n var.⌊iables⌋ which is possible also if it should
not \ actually / cont.⌊ain⌋ all of the var.⌊iables⌋ we have⌊;⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ p consid-
ered \ p / as a f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ of p, q and written down its truth⌊ ⌋table and
gen⌊erally⌋ if E cont.⌊ains⌋ say \ only / p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pk then its truth⌊ ⌋value
is det⌊ermined⌋ by the truth values of p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pk hence a fortiori the truth
⌊ ⌋val.⌊ues⌋ of p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pk⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn) J19.K differ from each other only
in so far as some of the def.⌊ined⌋ symb.⌊ols⌋ are replaced by their definiens
in E ′. Sim.⌊ilarly⌋ P ⊃ ∼ E∗i can be der.⌊ived⌋ from P ⊃ ∼ E ′i. Hence we
have: If one of the
⌋
⌊The whole of the text from the beginning of this page
to this point is crossed out in the manuscript.⌋⌈
I shall prove that \ the aux.⌊iliary⌋ theor⌊em⌋ / only for such expressions
as contain only the primit.⌊ive⌋ symbols ∼,∨ (but \ do / not \ contain /
⊃ ⌊, ⌋ ≡) bec. ⌊ause⌋ that is suff.⌊icient⌋ for our purpose, and I prove it by
a kind of complete induction , which we used already once in order to show
that ∨ cannot be defined in terms of ∼,≡⌊.⌋ J20.K Namely I shall prove the
foll.⌊owing⌋ three lemmas:
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1. The theorem is true for the simplest kind of expr.⌊ession⌋ \ E / ⌊,⌋
namely the var⌊iables⌋ p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn themselves⌊,⌋ i.e. for any vari-
able pk \ of the above series p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pk / and any fund⌊amental⌋
conj⌊unction⌋ P (n)i ⌊,⌋ P (n)i ⊃ pk or P (n)i ⊃∼ pk is demonstrable⌊.⌋
2. If \ the theor⌊em⌋ / is true for an expr.⌊ession⌋ E⌊,⌋ then it is also
true for the neg⌊ation⌋ ∼ E⌊.⌋
3. If it \ is / true for two expr.⌊essions⌋ G,H then it is also true for the
expression G ∨H⌊.⌋
After having proved these three lemmas we are finished. Because any
expr.⌊ession⌋ J21.K E containing only the var⌊iables⌋ p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn and the
op.⌊erations⌋ ∼ ⌊, ⌋∨ is formed by iterated appl.⌊ication⌋ of the op⌊erations⌋
∼,∨ beginning with the var.⌊iables⌋ p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn. Now by (1⌊.⌋) we know
that the theorem is true for the variables p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn and by (2⌊.⌋) ⌊and⌋
(3⌊.⌋) we know that it remains true if we form new expr.⌊essions⌋ by appl⌊ica-
tion⌋ of ∼ ⌊and⌋ ∨ to expr.⌊essions⌋ for which it is true. Hence it will be true
for any expr.⌊ession⌋ of the considered ⌊unreadable word, perhaps “type” or
“kind”⌋. So it remains only to prove these three aux.⌊iliary⌋ propositions⌊.⌋
J22.K (1⌊.⌋) means: For any var.⌊iable⌋ pk (of the series p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn)
and any fund.⌊amental⌋ conj.⌊unction⌋ P (n)i either P (n)i ⊃ pk or P (n)i ⊃∼ pk
is dem⌊onstrable⌋. But now the letter pk or the neg⌊ation⌋ ∼ pk must occur
among the members of this \ fund⌊amental⌋ / conj.⌊unction⌋ \ P (n)i / by
def.⌊inition⌋ of a fund⌊amental⌋ conj⌊unction⌋. On the other hand we know
that ⌊f⌋or any conj.⌊unction⌋ it is demonstr.⌊able⌋ that the conj.⌊unction⌋
implies any of its memb.⌊ers.⌋ (I proved that explicitly for conj.⌊unctions⌋
of 2⌊two⌋and 3⌊three⌋ members and remarked that the same method will
prove it for conj.⌊unctions⌋ of any J23.K num.⌊ber⌋ of members. \ The exact
proof would have to go by an ind⌊uction⌋ on the num⌊ber⌋ of members⌊.⌋
For two⌊,⌋ proved. ⌊A⌋ssume P (n) ⌊has⌋ n members and p ⌊is⌋ a var.⌊iable⌋
among them⌊. T⌋hen P (n) ⌊is⌋ P (n−1) . r⌊:⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ 1. p occurs in P (n−1)⌊;⌋ then P (n−1) ⊃ p⌊,⌋ hence P (n−1).r
⊃ p⌊.⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ 2. r is p⌊; then⌋ P (n−1) . p ⊃ p ⌊is⌋ dem.⌊onstrable⌋ / .)
⌊H⌋ence if pk occurs among the members of P (n)i then P (n)i ⊃ pk is demon-
strable and if ∼ pk occurs among them then P (n)i ⊃∼ pk is demonstr⌊able⌋.
So one of these two form.⌊ulas⌋ is demonstr.⌊able⌋ in any case and that is
exactly the assertion of lemma (1⌊.⌋).
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⌊new paragraph⌋ Now to (2⌊.⌋)⌊,⌋ i.e. let us assume \ the theor⌊em⌋
is true for E⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. for any fund⌊amental⌋ conj⌊unction⌋ P (n)i either /
P
(n)
i ⊃ E or P (n)i ⊃∼ E is demonstrable and let us show that the theor⌊em⌋ is
true also for the expr.⌊ession⌋ ∼ E⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. \ for any P (n)i / either P (n)i ⊃∼ E
or P
(n)
i ⊃∼ (∼ E) is demonstr⌊able⌋ \ for any P (n)i / ⌊The following formulae
mentioned in this paragraph are in the manuscript on the right of the present
page:⌋
P
(n)
i ⊃ E P (n)i ⊃∼ E
P
(n)
i ⊃∼ E P (n)i ⊃∼ (∼ E)
(bec.⌊ause⌋ it is J24.K this what the theor.⌊em⌋ says if applied to ∼ E ⌊it
says:⌋)⌊.⌋ But now \ in the 1.⌊first⌋ case / if P (n)i ⊃ E \ is dem.⌊onstrable⌋
then P
(n)
i ⊃ ∼ (∼ E) is also dem.⌊onstrable⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ E ⊃ ∼ (∼ E)
is dem⌊onstrable⌋ by subst⌊itution⌋ in the law of double neg.⌊ation,⌋ and if
\ both / P (n)i ⊃ E and E ⊃∼ (∼ E) are dem⌊onstrable⌋ ⌊semicolon deleted⌋
then also P
(n)
i ⊃ ∼ (∼ E) by the rule of syllog⌊ism⌋. So we see if the first
case is real.⌊ized⌋ for E then the sec.⌊ond⌋ case is real⌊ized⌋ for ∼ E and of
course if the sec.⌊ond⌋ case is real.⌊ized⌋ for E the first case is realis⌊z⌋ed for
∼ E (bec⌊ause⌋ they say the same thing)⌊.⌋ J25.K So if one of the two cases
is real.⌊ized⌋ for E then also one of the two cases is real.⌊ized⌋ for ∼ E⌊,⌋
i.e. if ⌊the⌋ theor.⌊em⌋ is true for E it is also true for ∼ E which was to be
proved⌊.⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋Now to (3⌊.⌋)⌊.⌋ Assume ⌊the⌋ theor⌊em⌋ true forG⌊, ⌋H
and let P
(n)
i be any arb.⌊itrary⌋ fund.⌊amental⌋ conj⌊unction⌋ of p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋
pn. Then P
(n)
i ⊃ G ⌊is⌋ dem⌊onstrable⌋ or P (n)i ⊃∼ G ⌊is⌋ dem.⌊onstrable⌋
and P
(n)
i ⊃ H ⌊is⌋ dem⌊onstrable⌋ or P (n)i ⊃ ∼ H ⌊is⌋ dem⌊onstrable⌋ by
ass.⌊umption⌋ and we have to prove from these assump.⌊tions⌋ that also:
P
(n)
i ⊃ G ∨H or
P
(n)
i ⊃∼ (G ∨H) is demonst⌊rable⌋.
In order to do that dist.⌊inguish⌋ three cases⌊:⌋
J26.K
1. \ [ForG I ⌊first⌋ case real⌊ized,⌋ i⌊.⌋e.] / P (n)i ⊃ G ⌊is⌋ dem.⌊onstrable;⌋
then we have G ⊃ G ∨ H also by subst⌊itution⌋ in ax.⌊iom,⌋ hence
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P
(n)
i ⊃ G∨H ”⌊“demonstrable” in the edited text⌋ by rule of syll.⌊ogism⌋
[hence I ⌊first⌋ case real⌊ized⌋ for G ∨H ]⌊.⌋
2. case \ [For H I ⌊first⌋ case real.⌊ized⌋] / P (n)i ⊃ H ⌊is⌋ dem⌊onstrable;⌋
then H ⊃ G ∨ H by subst⌊itution⌋ in form⌊ula⌋ 10.⌊, hence⌋ P (n)i ⊃
G∨H ⌊is⌋ dem.⌊onstrable⌋ by rule of syl.⌊logism⌋ [hence I ⌊first⌋ case
real⌊ized⌋ for G ∨H .]⌊].⌋
3. case Neither for G ⌊is⌋ \ P (n)i ⊃ G ⌊nor⌋ / nor for H ⌊is⌋ \ P (n)i ⊃ H
/ the I⌊first⌋ case ⌊is⌋ real⌊ized.⌋ Thus for both of them sec.⌊ond⌋ case
happens⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. P (n)i ⊃∼ G and P (n)i ⊃∼ H ⌊are⌋ both dem.⌊onstrable⌋
⌊(bec⌊ause⌋⌋ by ass.⌊umption⌋ ⌊)⌋ ⌊,⌋ but then by rule of transpos.⌊i-
tion⌋ G ⊃ ∼ P (n)i ⌊and⌋ H ⊃ ∼ P (n)i ⌊are⌋ dem⌊onstrable.⌋ Hence
G ∨H ⊃ ∼ P (n)i by rule of ⌊Di⌋lemma⌊.⌋ Hence P (n)i ⊃ ∼ (G ∨H) by
transpos.⌊ition⌋ [i.e. sec⌊ond⌋ case realis⌊z⌋ed for G ∨H ]⌊.⌋
J27.K So we see in each of the 3⌊three⌋ cases which exh⌊aust⌋ all poss⌊ibili-
ties⌋ either P (n)i ⊃ G ∨ H or P (n)i ⊃ ∼ (G ∨ H) is dem⌊onstrable,⌋ namely
the first happens in case 1 ⌊and⌋ 2⌊,⌋ the sec.⌊ond⌋ in \ case / 3. But that
means that the theor⌊em⌋ is true for G ∨H since P (n)i was any arb.⌊itrary⌋
fund.⌊amental⌋ conj⌊unction⌋. So we have proved the 3⌊three⌋ lemmas and
therefore the auxil.⌊iary⌋ theor⌊em⌋ for all expr.⌊essions⌋ E containing only
∼,∨.
⌊new paragraph⌋ Now let us assume in part⌊icular⌋ that E is a tautolo-
gie⌊y⌋ of this kind (\ i.e. / containing only the letters p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn and only
∼ ⌊, ⌋∨)⌊;⌋ then I maintain J28.K that P (n)i ⊃ E is demonstr⌊able⌋ for any
fund.⌊amental⌋ conj.⌊unction⌋ P (n)i ⌊.⌋ Now we know from the prec⌊eding⌋
theor⌊em⌋ that cert.⌊ainly⌋ either P (n)i ⊃ E or P (n)i ⊃∼ E is demonstr⌊able⌋.
So it remains only to be shown that the sec.⌊ond⌋ \ case⌊,⌋ that P (n)i ⊃
∼ E is dem.⌊onstrable,⌋ / can never occur if E is ⌊a⌋ tautology and that
can be shown as foll⌊ows⌋: As I ment⌊ioned⌋ before any dem⌊onstrable⌋
prop.⌊osition⌋ is a taut⌊ology⌋. But on the other hand we can easily \ see
/ that P
(n)
i ⊃ ∼ E is certainly not a taut.⌊ology⌋ if E is ⌊a⌋ taut.⌊ology⌋
because the truth⌊ ⌋v⌊alue⌋ of P (n)i ⊃ ∼ E will be false J29.K in the ith line
of its truth⌊ ⌋t⌊able⌋. For in the ith line P (n)i is true as we saw before and
E is also true in the ith line bec⌊ause⌋ it is assumed to be a taut.⌊ology,⌋
hence true in any line. Therefore ∼ E will be false in the ith line⌊,⌋ and
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therefore Pi ⊃ ∼ E \ will be false in the ith line / because Pi is true and
∼ E false and therefore Pi ⊃∼ E false by the truth⌊ ⌋t.⌊able⌋ of ⊃. So this
expr.⌊ession⌋ \ Pi ⊃∼ E / has F in the ith line of its truth⌊ ⌋t⌊able,⌋ hence
is not a tautology, hence cannot be demonstr.⌊able⌋ and therefore P (n)i ⊃ E
is dem.⌊onstrable⌋ for any fund⌊amental conjunction⌋ P (n)i , if E J30.K is a
taut.⌊ology⌋ containing only ∼ ⌊, ⌋ ∨ ⌊, ⌋p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn⌊.⌋
But from the fact that P
(n)
i ⊃ E is demonstrable for any P (n)i it follows
that E is demonstr.⌊able⌋ in the following way: We can show first that also
for any fund⌊amental⌋ conj.⌊unction⌋ \ P (n−1)i / of the n − 1 var.⌊iables⌋
p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn−1⌊,⌋ P (n−1)i ⊃ E is dem.⌊onstrable⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ if P (n−1)i is
a fund⌊amental⌋ conj.⌊unction⌋ of the n− 1 variables p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn−1 then
P
(n−1)
i .pn is a fund⌊amental⌋ conj.⌊unction⌋ of the n var.⌊iables⌋ p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋
pn and likewise P
(n−1)
i . ∼ pn is a fund⌊amental⌋ conj⌊unction⌋ of the n var.⌊i-
ables⌋ p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn⌊;⌋ therefore by our previous theor.⌊em⌋ J31.K P (n−1)i .pn
⊃ E and P (n−1)i . ∼ pn ⊃ E are both demonst⌊rable.⌋ ⌊A⌋pplying the rule of
exp.⌊ortation⌋ \ and commut⌊ativity⌋ / to those two expr.⌊essions⌋ we get
pn ⊃ (P (n−1)i ⊃ E) ⌊and⌋ ∼ pn ⊃ (P (n−1)i ⊃ E) are both demonstr⌊able⌋.
\ ⌊t⌋o be more exact we have to apply first the rule of exp.⌊ortation⌋ and
then the rule of commut.⌊ativity⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ the rule of exp.⌊ortation⌋ gives
P
(n−1)
i ⊃ (pn ⊃ E) ⌊.⌋ / But now we can apply the rule of dilemma to these
two form⌊ulas⌋ (P ⊃ R,Q ⊃ R ⌊:⌋ P ∨ Q ⊃ R) and obt⌊ain⌋ ∼ pn ∨ pn ⊃
(P
(n−1)
i ⊃ E) \ is dem⌊onstrable;⌋ and now since ∼ pn∨pn is dem⌊onstrable⌋
we can apply the rule of impl.⌊ication⌋ \ again / and obt.⌊ain⌋ P (n−1)i ⊃ E is
dem.⌊onstrable⌋ which was to be shown. Now since this holds J32.K for any
fund⌊amental⌋ conj.⌊unction⌋ P (n−1)i of the n−1 var.⌊iables⌋ p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn−1
it is clear that we can apply the same arg.⌊ument⌋ again and prove that also
for any fund⌊amental⌋ conj.⌊unction⌋ \ P (n−2)i / of the n − 2 var.⌊iables⌋
p1⌊, ⌋ . . . ⌊, ⌋pn−2⌊,⌋ P (n−2)i ⊃ E is dem⌊onstrable⌋. So by repeating this
arg.⌊ument⌋ n − 1 times we can finally show that for any fund.⌊amental⌋
conj⌊unction⌋ of the one var⌊iable⌋ p1 this impl.⌊ication⌋ is dem.⌊onstrable,⌋
but that means p1 ⊃ E is dem⌊onstrable⌋ and ∼ p1 ⊃ E is dem.⌊onstrable⌋
(bec⌊ause⌋ p1 and ∼ p1 are the fund⌊amental⌋ conj.⌊unction⌋ of the one
var.⌊iable⌋ J33.K ⌊Above the page number in the manuscript the follow-
ing list of rules and tautologies is written: Syll⌊ogism⌋, Transp⌊osition⌋,
Dilemma, p ∨ ∼ p, Export⌊ation⌋ Com⌊mutativity⌋, p ⊃ ∼∼ p⌋ p1)⌊,⌋ but
then ∼ p1 ∨ p1 ⊃ E is dem⌊onstrable⌋ by rule of dil.⌊emma⌋ and therefore E
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is dem⌊onstrable⌋ by rule of impl⌊ication⌋.
\ Incident.⌊ally s⌋o we have shown that any taut.⌊ology⌋ cont.⌊aining⌋
only∼ ⌊and⌋ ∨ is demonstr.⌊able,⌋ but from this it follows that any taut.⌊olo-
gy⌋ whatsoever is dem.⌊onstrable⌋ bec⌊ause⌋: let P be one containing perhaps
the def.⌊ined⌋ symbols . ⌊, ⌋ ⊃ ⌊, ⌋ ≡⌊.⌋ I then denote by P ′ the expr.⌊ession⌋
form⌊ula⌋ obt.⌊ained⌋ from P by replacing .⌊, ⌋ ⊃ ⌊, ⌋ ≡ by their def.⌊iniens,⌋
i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ R.S by∼ (∼ R∨ ∼ S) wherever it occurs in P etc. Then P ′ will \ also
/ be a taut.⌊ology⌋ \ ⌊bec⌋ / . \ But P ′ is a taut⌊ology⌋ / containing only
∼,∨ (truth table not changed) hence P ′ ⌊is⌋ dem.⌊onstrable,⌋ but then also P
is dem⌊onstrable⌋ bec⌊ause⌋ it is obtained from P ′ by one or several applica-
tions of the rule of def.⌊ined⌋ symbol⌊,⌋ namely since P ′ was obt⌊ained⌋ from
P by rep⌊lacing⌋ p . q by ∼ (∼ p∨ ∼ q) etc⌊.⌋ P is obt⌊ained⌋ from P ′ by the
inv⌊erse⌋ subst.⌊itution,⌋ but each such subst.⌊itution⌋ is an applic⌊ation⌋
of rule of def.⌊ined⌋ symbol⌊,⌋ hence: If P ′ is demonstrable then also P ⌊is⌋
dem⌊onstrable⌋. /
As an example take ⌊the⌋ form⌊ula⌋ (p ⊃ q) ∨ (q ⊃ p) which is a
tautol⌊ogy⌋.
1. Without def⌊ined⌋ symb.⌊ols⌋ (∼ p ∨ q) ∨ (∼ q ∨ p) = E
2. Fund⌊amental⌋ conj⌊unctions⌋ \ in / p, q
p⌊.⌋q⌊,⌋ p⌊.⌋ ∼ q⌊,⌋ ∼ p⌊.⌋q⌊,⌋ ∼ p⌊.⌋ ∼ q
To prove that p .q ⊃ E etc⌊.⌋⌊are⌋ all dem⌊onstrable⌋⌊w⌋e have to verify our
aux.⌊iliary⌋ theor⌊em⌋ successively for all particul⌊ar⌋ form⌊ulas,⌋ i.e. for p,
q, ∼ p, ∼ q, ∼ p ∨ q, ∼ q ∨ p, E⌊.⌋
J34.K
p q ∼ p ∼ q ∼ p ∨ q ∼ q ∨ p
p⌊.⌋q ⊃ p q ∼ (∼ p) ∼ (∼ q) ∼ p ∨ q ∼ q ∨ p
p⌊.⌋∼ q ⊃ p ∼ q ∼ (∼ p) ∼ q ∼ (∼ p ∨ q) ∼ q ∨ p
∼ p⌊.⌋q ⊃ ∼ p q ∼ p ∼ (∼ q) ∼ p ∨ q ∼ (∼ q ∨ p)
∼ p⌊.⌋∼ q ⊃ ∼ p ∼ q ∼ p ∼ q ∼ p ∨ q ∼ q ∨ p
(∼ p ∨ q) ∨ (∼ q ∨ p)
E
E
E
E
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p . ∼ q ⊃∼ (∼ p) ∼ p ⊃∼ (p . ∼ q)
p . ∼ q ⊃∼ q q ⊃∼ (p . ∼ q)
∼ p ∨ q ⊃∼ (p . ∼ q)
p . ∼ q ⊃∼ (∼ p ∨ q)
p . q ⊃ E p ⊃ (q ⊃ E)
∼ p . q ⊃ E ∼ p ⊃ (q ⊃ E)
∼ p ∨ p ⊃ (q ⊃ E)
q ⊃ E
p . ∼ q ⊃ E p ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ E)
∼ p . ∼ q ⊃ E ∼ p ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ E)
∼ p ∨ p ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ E)
∼ q ⊃ E
⌊The following formulae, which in the manuscript are on the right of this
page, are deleted:
P
(n)
i ⊃∼ A ∼ (A ∨ B)
⊃∼ B P (n)i ⊃ A
A ⊃ (A ∨ B)
A ⊃∼ P (n)i
B ⊃∼ P (n)i
A ∨B ⊃∼ P (n)i
p ∨ q ⊃ E ∼ p . q
p ⊃ (q ⊃ E)
∼ p ⊃ (q ⊃ E)⌋
J35.K ∼ q ∨ q ⊃ E E
Now after having proved the⌊at⌋ any taut.⌊ology⌋ can be derived from
the 4⌊four⌋ ax.⌊ioms,⌋ the next quest.⌊ion⌋ which arises is⌊comma from the
manuscript deleted⌋ whether all of those 4⌊four⌋ ax⌊ioms⌋ are really nec-
essary to derive them or whether perhaps one \ or the other / of them is
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superfluous⌊.⌋ That would mean one of them could be left out and never-
theless the rem.⌊aining⌋ three would allow to derive all taut⌊ologies⌋. If this
were the case then in part.⌊icular⌋ also the superfluous ax.⌊iom⌋ (since it is a
taut.⌊ology⌋) could be derived from the three other, J36.K i⌊.⌋e. it would not
be independent from the other. So the question comes down to investigating
the indep.⌊endence⌋ of the 4⌊four⌋ ax.⌊ioms⌋ from each other. That such
an invest.⌊igation⌋ is really nec.⌊essary⌋ is shown very strikingly by the last
development. Namely when Russell first set up this sys.⌊tem⌋ of ax⌊ioms⌋
for the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋ he assumed a fifth ax.⌊iom,⌋ namely the
associat.⌊ive⌋ law for disj.⌊unction⌋ and only many years later it was proved
by \ P. / Bern.⌊ays⌋ that this ass.⌊ociative⌋ law was superfluous⌊,⌋ i.e. could
J37.K be derived from the others. You have seen in one of the prev.⌊ious⌋
lect.⌊ures⌋ how this derivation can be accomplished. But Bern⌊ays⌋ has
shown at the same time that a similar thing cannot happen for the 4⌊four⌋
rem.⌊aining⌋ axioms⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. that they are really ind.⌊ependent⌋ from each
other⌊.⌋ \
⌊new paragraph⌋ Again here as in the completeness proof the interest does
not ly⌊ie⌋ so much in proving that these part⌊icular⌋ 4⌊four⌋ ax.⌊ioms⌋ are in-
dependent but in the method to prove it, ⌊b⌋ecause so far we have only had an
opport.⌊unity⌋ to prove that ⌊unreadable word⌋ cert.⌊ain⌋ prop.⌊ositions⌋ fol-
low from other prop⌊ositions⌋. But now we are confronted with the \ opposite
/ problem to show that cert.⌊ain⌋ prop.⌊ositions⌋ do not follow from \ certain
/ others and this problem requires evidently an entirely new method for its
solution⌊.⌋ /
And I intend to give his proof \ here / for at least one of the ax.⌊ioms⌋
bec.⌊ause⌋ This method is very interest⌊ing⌋ and \ somewhat⌋ conn.⌊ected⌋
with the quest⌊ions⌋ of many⌊-⌋valued logics.
You know the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋ can be interpret.⌊ed⌋ as an
alg⌊ebra⌋ in which J38.K in which we have the two op.⌊erations⌋ of log.⌊ical⌋
add.⌊ition⌋ and mult.⌊iplication⌋ as in usual alg.⌊ebra⌋ but in add.⌊ition⌋ to
them a 3⌊third⌋ op.⌊eration,⌋ the negation and bes.⌊ides⌋ some op⌊erations⌋
def.⌊ined⌋ in terms of them (⊃,≡ etc⌊.⌋). The objects to which those
op.⌊erations⌋ are applied are the prop⌊ositions⌋. So the prop.⌊ositions⌋ can
be made to corresp.⌊ond⌋ to the numb.⌊ers⌋ of ord.⌊inary⌋ alg⌊ebra⌋. But
as you know all the op.⌊erations⌋ . ⌊, ⌋∨ etc⌊.⌋ which we introd.⌊uced⌋ are
,,⌊“⌋truth⌊,⌋f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ ” and therefore it is only the truth⌊ ⌋value of the
prop.⌊ositions⌋ that really matters in this alg.⌊ebra,⌋ J39.K i⌊.⌋e. we can con-
sider \ them / as the numbers of our alg.⌊ebra⌋ inst.⌊ead⌋ of the prop.⌊osi-
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tions⌋ (simply the two ,,⌊“⌋truth ⌊ ⌋values” T and F)⌊.⌋ And this is what we
shall do⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. our alg.⌊ebra⌋ (as opposed to usual alg.⌊ebra⌋) has only two
numbers T, F and the result of the op.⌊erations⌋ . ,∨,∼ applied to these two
num.⌊bers⌋ is given by the truth⌊ ⌋t⌊able,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. T ∨ F = T (i⌊.⌋e. the sum
of the two nu⌊mbers⌋ T and F is T) T ∨ T = T⌊,⌋ F ∨ T = T⌊,⌋ F ∨ F =
F⌊,⌋ ∼T = F⌊,⌋ ∼F = T⌊.⌋ In order to stress J40.K more the anal.⌊ogy⌋ to
alg.⌊ebra⌋ I shall \ also / write 1 inst⌊ead⌋ of T and 0 inst⌊ead⌋ of F. Then
in this not.⌊ation⌋ the rules for log.⌊ical⌋ mult.⌊iplication⌋ would look like
this⌊:⌋ 1.1 = 1⌊,⌋ 0.1 = 0⌊,⌋ 1.0 = 0⌊,⌋ 0.0 = 0⌊.⌋ If you look at this table you
see that log.⌊ical⌋ and arithm.⌊etical⌋ mult.⌊iplication⌋ exactly coincide in
this notation. Now what are the tautologies consider.⌊ed⌋ from this algebraic
standpoint? They are expr.⌊essions⌋ f(p⌊, ⌋q⌊, ⌋r⌊, ⌋ . . .) which have always
the value 1 whatever nu⌊mbers⌋ p, q, r may be⌊,⌋ J41.K i⌊.⌋e. in alg.⌊ebraic⌋
language expressions ident.⌊ically⌋ equ.⌊al⌋ to one f(p⌊, ⌋q⌊, ⌋ . . .) = 1 and
the contrad.\ ictions / expr.⌊essions⌋ id.⌊entically⌋ zero f(p⌊, ⌋q⌊, ⌋ . . .) =
0⌊.⌋ So an expr.⌊ession⌋ of usual alg⌊ebra⌋ which would corresp.⌊ond⌋ to a
contrad.⌊iction⌋ would be e.g. x2 − y2 − (x + y)(x − y)⌊;⌋ this is =⌊equal
to⌋0⌊.⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ But now from this algebr.⌊aic⌋ standp.⌊oint⌋ nothing
\ can / prevent us to consider also other sim.⌊ilar⌋ alg⌊ebras⌋ with say three
nu⌊mbers⌋ \ 0, 1, 2 / inst.⌊ead⌋ of two and with the op.⌊erations⌋ ∨⌊, ⌋ .⌊, ⌋ ∼
defined in some diff.⌊erent⌋ manner. For any such alg.⌊ebra⌋ we shall have
taut.⌊ologies,⌋ J42.K i⌊.⌋e. form⌊ulas⌋ =⌊equal to⌋ 1 and contr⌊adictions⌋
=⌊equal to⌋ 0⌊,⌋ but they will of course be diff⌊erent⌋ form⌊ulas⌋ for diff.⌊er-
ent⌋ alg⌊ebras.⌋ Now such alg.⌊ebra⌋ with 3⌊three⌋ and more nu⌊mbers⌋
were used by Bern.⌊ays⌋ for the proof of indep⌊endence,⌋ e.g. in order to
prove the ind.⌊ependence⌋ of the sec⌊ond⌋ ax.⌊iom⌋ Bern⌊ays⌋ considers the
foll.⌊owing⌋ alg⌊ebra⌋:
3 N⌊n⌋umbers 0, 1, 2
neg⌊ation⌋ ∼ 0 = 1 ∼ 1 = 0 ∼ 2 = 2
add⌊ition⌋ 1 ∨ x = x ∨ 1 = 1 2 ∨ 2 = 1
0 ∨ 0 = 0 2 ∨ 0 = 0 ∨ 2 = 2
⌊The equations on the right involving 2 are in a box in the manuscript.⌋
or 0 ∨ x = x ∨ 0 = x ⌊I⌋mpl.⌊ication⌋ and other op⌊erations⌋ ⌊“not nec
to” from the manuscript rendered by “need not be”⌋ def.⌊ined⌋ sep.⌊arately⌋
because p ⊃ q = ∼ p ∨ q⌊.⌋
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J43.K ⌊A t⌋aut.⌊ology⌋ =⌊is a⌋ formula =⌊equal to⌋ 1⌊,⌋ e.g. ∼ p ∨ p
bec.⌊ause⌋ for p = 0 or = 1 = 1⌊p equal to 0 or 1 it is equal to 1,⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋
the op.⌊erations⌋ for 0, 1 as arg⌊uments⌋ coincide with the op.⌊erations⌋ of
⌊the⌋ usual calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions;⌋ if p = 2 ⌊then⌋ ∼ p = 2 ⌊and⌋
2 ∨ 2 = 1 ⌊is⌋ also true. Also p ⊃ p ⌊is a⌋ taut.⌊ology⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ by
def⌊inition it is⌋ the same as ∼ p ∨ p.
Now for this alg.⌊ebra⌋ one can prove the foll⌊owing⌋ prop.⌊osition:⌋
1. Ax⌊ioms⌋ ⌊(⌋1⌊)⌋, ⌊(⌋3⌊)⌋, ⌊(⌋4⌊)⌋ are taut.⌊ologies⌋ in this alg⌊ebra⌋.
2. For each of the \ three / rules of inf⌊erence⌋ we have⌊:⌋ If the premises
are taut⌊ologies⌋ in this alg⌊ebra⌋ then ⌊al⌋so ⌊is⌋ the concl⌊usion⌋.
J44.K ⌊I.⌋e.
1. If P and P ⊃ Q ⌊are tautologies⌋ then Q ⌊is a tautology.⌋
2. If Q′ by subst⌊itution⌋ from Q and Q is a taut⌊ology⌋ then also
Q′ ⌊is a tautology.⌋
3. If Q′ ⌊is⌋ obt⌊ained⌋ from Q by replacing P ⊃ Q by ∼ P ∨ Q
etc⌊.⌋ and Q ⌊is a tautology⌋ then also Q′ ⌊is a tautology.⌋
3. The ax.⌊iom⌋ ⌊(⌋2⌊)⌋ is not a taut⌊ology⌋ in this alg⌊ebra⌋.
After having shown these 3⌊three⌋ lemmas we are finished bec⌊ause⌋ by
1, 2⌊:⌋ Any form⌊ula⌋ dem⌊onstrable⌋ from ax.⌊ioms⌋ 1, 2, 4 ⌊(1), (3), (4)⌋
by 3⌊the three⌋ rules of inf⌊erence⌋ is a taut⌊ology⌋ for our alg⌊ebra⌋ but
ax⌊iom⌋ ⌊(⌋3⌊)⌋⌊(2)⌋ is not a taut⌊ology⌋ for our J45.K alg⌊ebra.⌋ Hence it
cannot be dem⌊onstrable⌋ from ⌊(⌋1⌊)⌋, ⌊(⌋3⌊)⌋, ⌊(⌋4⌊)⌋.
Now to the proof of the lemmas 1, 2, 3. First some aux⌊iliary⌋ theor.⌊ems⌋
\ ⌊(⌋ for 1 I say T⌊t⌋rue and for 0 false bec.⌊ause⌋ for 1 and 0 the tables of
our alg⌊ebra⌋ coincide with those for T,⌊and⌋ F⌊):⌋ /
1. p ⊃ p ⌊(⌋ we had that before⌊,⌋ bec⌊ause⌋ ∼ p∨p = 1 also ∼ 2∨2 =
1⌊)⌋
2. 1 ∨ p = p ∨ 1 = 1 0 ∨ p = p ∨ 0 = p
3. p ∨ q = q ∨ p
4. Also in our three⌊-⌋val⌊ued⌋ algebra we have: An impl.⌊ication⌋ whose
first member is 0 is 1 and an impl⌊ication⌋ whose sec.⌊ond⌋ me⌊mber⌋
is 1 is also 1 whatever the other memb⌊er⌋ may be⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. 0 ⊃ p = 1
⌊and⌋ p ⊃ 1 = 1 bec⌊ause:⌋
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1.) 0 ⊃ p =∼ 0 ∨ p = 1 ∨ p = 1
J46.K
2.) p ⊃ 1 =∼ p ∨ 1 = 1⌊full stop deleted⌋
Now I⌊(1)⌋ p ⊃ p ∨ q = 1
1. p = 0 → p ⊃ p ∨ q = 1
2. p = 1 → 1 ⊃ 1 ∨ q = 1 ⊃ 1 = 1
III⌊(3)⌋ p ∨ q = q ∨ p → p ∨ q = q ∨ p = 1
IV⌊(4)⌋ (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q) E
1. r = 0 r ∨ p = p r ∨ q = q E = (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q) = 1
2. r = 1 r ∨ p = r ∨ q = 1 E = (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (1 ⊃ 1) = (p ⊃ q) ⊃ 1 = 1
J47.K
3. r = 2
α.) q = 2, 1⌊1, 2⌋ r ∨ q = 2 ∨ 1 = 1
= 2 ∨ 2 = 1
r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q = 1
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q) = 1
β.) q = 0
1. p = 0 r ∨ p = r ∨ q
(r ∨ p) ⊃ (r ∨ q) = 1
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ⊃ p) ⊃ (r ∨ q) = 1
2. p = 1 p ⊃ q = 0
E = 1
3. p = 2
(2 ⊃ 0) ⊃ (2 ∨ 2 ⊃ 2 ∨ 0) = 2 ⊃ (1 ⊃ 2) = 2 ⊃ 2 = 1
J48.K 2. Lemma⌊Lemma 2.⌋ A. p = 1 p ⊃ q = 1 → q = 1
1 =∼ p ∨ q = 0 ∨ q = q
Hence if f(p⌊, ⌋q⌊, ⌋ . . .) = 1 ⌊then⌋
f(p⌊, ⌋q⌊, ⌋ . . .) ⊃ g(p⌊, ⌋q⌊, ⌋ . . .) = 1
g(p⌊, ⌋q⌊, ⌋ . . .) = 1
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B. Rule of subst.⌊itution⌋ holds for any truth-value algebra⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. if
f(p⌊, ⌋q⌊, ⌋ . . .) = 1 then f(g(p⌊, ⌋q⌊, ⌋ . . .)⌊, ⌋q⌊, ⌋ . . .) = 1⌊.⌋
C. Rule of defined symb⌊ol⌋ likewise ⌊holds⌋ bec⌊ause⌋ p ⊃ q ⌊and⌋ ∼ p∨q
have the same truth⌊ ⌋table⌊.⌋
J49.K ⌊The following on the right of this page in the manuscript is deleted:
gen⌊eral⌋ remark about the mean⌊ing⌋ of derivability from axioms.⌋
Lemma 3. II.⌊(2)⌋ p ∨ p ⊃ p is not a taut.⌊ology⌋
i.e. 2 ∨ 2 ⊃ 2 = 1 ⊃ 2 =∼ 1 ∨ 2 = 0 ∨ 2 = 2 6= 1
So the lemmas are proved and therefore also the theorem about the indepen-
dence of Ax⌊iom⌋ II⌊(2).⌋
We have already developed a method for deciding of any given expr.⌊es-
sion⌋ whether or not it is a tautology⌊,⌋ namely the truth⌊-⌋table method. I
want to develop another method which uses the analogy of the rules of the
J50.K calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊osition⌋ with the rules of algebra. We have the two
distrib⌊utive⌋ laws:
p . (q ∨ r) ≡ (p . q) ∨ (p . r) p . q ≡ q
p ∨ (q . r) ≡ (p ∨ q) . (p ∨ r) p ∨ q ≡ q
In order to prove them by the shortened truth⌊-⌋table method I use the
following facts \ which I ment.⌊ioned⌋ already once at the occasion of one of
the exercises⌊:⌋ /
if p is true p . q ≡ q
if p is false p ∨ q ≡ q
In order to prove those equivalences I distinguish two cases⌊:⌋
1. p true ⌊and⌋ 2. p false
⌊The text on this page breaks here with the words: in both cases.⌋
J51.K Now the distrib.⌊utive⌋ laws in algebra make it possible to decide
of any given expr.⌊ession⌋ cont.⌊aining⌋ only letters and +⌊, ⌋−⌊, ⌋· whether
or not it is identically zero, namely by factori⌊z⌋ing out all prod.⌊ucts⌋ of
sums⌊,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ x2 − y2 − (x + y)(x − y) = 0⌊.⌋ A similar thing ⌊is⌋ to be
exp.⌊ected⌋ in ⌊the⌋ alg⌊ebra⌋ of logic. Only 2⌊two⌋ differences⌊:⌋ 1. In
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log⌊ic⌋ we have the neg.⌊ation⌋ which has no analogue in algebra. But for
neg⌊ation⌋ we have also a kind of distr⌊ibutive⌋ law given by the De Morgan
form.⌊ulas⌋ ∼ (p ∨ q) ≡ ∼ p . ∼ q J52.K ⌊and⌋ ∼ (p . q) ≡ ∼ p ∨ ∼ q⌊.⌋
(Proved very easily by ⌊the⌋ truth⌊-⌋table method.) These formula⌊s⌋ allow
us to get rid of the neg.⌊ations⌋ by shifting them \ inwards / to the letters
occurring in the expr⌊ession⌋. The sec.⌊ond⌋ difference is that we have two
distr.⌊ibutive⌋ laws and therefore two possible ways of factorizing. If we use
the first law we shall get \ as the final result / a sum of products \ of single
letters / as in algebra. By using the other law of distr.⌊ibution⌋ we get a
product of sums unlike in algebra. I think it is best to explain that on an
J53.K example⌊:⌋
⌊The formula (p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q, written in the manuscript at the top of the
page, above the page number 53., appears also in × 4. after the examples
done.⌋
× 1. (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃∼ p)
∼ (∼ p ∨ q) ∨ (q ∨ ∼ p)
(p . ∼ q) ∨ q ∨ ∼ p disj.⌊unctive⌋
(p ∨ q∨ ∼ p) . (∼ q ∨ q∨ ∼ p) conj.⌊unctive⌋
× 2. (p ⊃ q) . (p ⊃∼ q) . p
(∼ p ∨ q) . (∼ p ∨ ∼ q) . p conj.⌊unctive⌋
(∼ p . ∼ p ∨ q . ∼ p ∨ ∼ p . ∼ q ∨ q . ∼ q) . p
(∼ p . p) ∨ (q . ∼ p . p) ∨ (∼ p . ∼ q . p) ∨ (q . ∼ q . p)⌊full stop
deleted⌋ ⌊disjunctive⌋
3. ⌊(⌋p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)
∼ (∼ p ∨ q) ∨ [∼ (r ∨ p) ∨ r ∨ q]
(p . ∼ q) ∨ (∼ r . ∼ p) ∨ r ∨ q disj⌊unctive⌋
(p ∨ ∼ r ∨ r ∨ q) . (p ∨ ∼ p ∨ r ∨ q)⌊.⌋ conj.⌊unctive⌋
(∼ q ∨ ∼ r ∨ r ∨ q) . (∼ q ∨ ∼ p ∨ r ∨ q)
⌊The line “× 4. (p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q” inserted at the end, which seems to be the
beginning of an example not done, is deleted.⌋
J1.K ⌊Here the numbering of pages in this notebook starts anew.⌋ In the
last two lectures a proof for the completeness of our system of axioms for
the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋ \ was given⌊,⌋ / i.e. it was \ shown /
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that any tautology is demonstrable from these axioms. Now a tautology
is exactly what in trad.⌊itional⌋ logic would be called a law of logic or a
logically true prop⌊osition⌋. J2.K Therefore this completeness proof solves
\ for the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋ / the second of the two problems which
I announced in the beginning of my lectures⌊,⌋ namely it shows how all laws
of a certain part of logic \ namely / of the calc⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋ can
be deduced from a finite nu⌊mber⌋ of logical axioms and rules of inference.
⌊new paragraph⌋ And I wish to stress that the interest of this result does
not ly⌊ie⌋ in this so much in this that our particular four ax.⌊ioms⌋ and
three rules and four ax.⌊ioms⌋⌊repeated phrase “four axioms”⌋ are sufficient
to deduce everything⌊,⌋ J3.K but the real interest consists in this that here
for the first time in ⌊the⌋ history of logic it has really been proved that one
can reduce all laws of a cert.⌊ain⌋ part of logic to a few logical axioms⌊.⌋
You know it has often been claimed that this can be done and sometimes the
law⌊s⌋ of id⌊entity⌋, contr.⌊adiction⌋, excl.⌊uded⌋ middle have been consid-
ered as the log.⌊ical⌋ axioms. But not even the shadow of a proof was given
\ that every logical inference can be derived from them / . Moreover the as-
sertion to be proved was not even clearly formulated, because J4.K it means
nothing to say that something prop.⌊erty⌋ can be derived e⌊.⌋g⌊.⌋ from the
law of contradiction unless you formulate \ specify / in addition the rules of
inference which are to be used in the derivation.
As I said before it is not so very important that just our four ax.⌊ioms⌋
are sufficient. After the method has once been developed, it is possible to
give many other sets of axioms which are also sufficient to derive all (logically
true prop.⌊ositions⌋ \ tautologies / ) of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ J5.K of prop⌊ositions⌋,
\ e.g.
p ⊃ (∼ p ⊃ q)
(∼ p ⊃ p) ⊃ p
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p ⊃ r)] /
I have chosen the above four axioms because they are used in the stan-
dard textbooks of logistics⌊.⌋ But I do not \ at all / want to say that this
choice was particularly fortunate. On the contrary our system of axioms is
open to many \ some / objections from the aesthetic point of view⌊;⌋ e.g. one
of the aesthetic requirements for a good set of axioms \ is that / the axioms
should be as simple \ and evident / as possible⌊,⌋ in any case simpler than
the theor⌊ems⌋ to be proved, whereas in our system J6.K e.g. the last axiom
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is pretty complicated and on the \ other hand / the very simple law of iden-
tity p ⊃ p appears as a theorem⌊.⌋ \ So in our system it happens sometimes
that simpler propositions are based proved ⌊from⌋ on more complicated ones
\ axioms⌊,⌋ / which is to be avoided if possible. / Recently by the Gentzen
mathematician G. Gentzen a system was set up which avoids these disadvan-
tages. ⌊The sentence broken here starting with “I want to refer⌊ence⌋ briefly
about this system but wish to remark first that what I can” is continued on
p. 7. of Notebook IV.⌋
⌊At the end of the present notebook there are in the manuscript thirteen
not numbered pages with formulae and jottings. These pages are numbered
here with the prefix newpage. It seems new page i-iii have been filled up
backwards.⌋
Jnewpage iK
41 (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x⌊, ⌋y)ϕ(x) . ϕ(y)
?×! 42 ϕ(x) . ψ(xy) ⊃xy χ(xy) ≡ ϕ(x) ⊃x [ψ(xy) ⊃y χ(xy)]
43 (∃z)ϕ(z) . (∃v)χ(v) ⊃ [ϕ(z) ⊃z ψ(z) . χ(v) ⊃v ϑ(v) ≡
ϕ(z) . χ(v) ⊃zv ψ(z) . ϑ(v)]
a e
i o
❅ ❄ ❄
Jnewpage iiK
32′ ∼ (∃x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x)
32′′ (x)ψ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x)
× 32. ∼ [ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x)] ≡ (∃x)[ϕ(x) . ∼ ψ(x)]
33. ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) . χ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) . χ(x)
!34 ϕ(x) ⊃x ϕ(x) ∨ χ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x) ∨ (∃x)ϕ(x) . χ(x)
35 ϕ(x) ⊃x (p ⊃ ψ(x)) ≡ p ⊃ (ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x))
36. (x⌊, ⌋y)ϕ(xy) ≡ (yx)ϕ(xy)
(∃x⌊, ⌋y)ϕ(xy) ≡ (∃yx)ϕ(xy)
× 37 ∼ (x)(∃y)ϕ(xy) ≡ (∃x)(y) ∼ ϕ(xy)
38. (x⌊, ⌋y)ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(y) ≡ (x)ϕ(x) ∨ (y)ψ(y)
(x⌊, ⌋y)ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(y) ≡ (∃x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (y)ψ(y)
39 (∃x⌊, ⌋y)ϕ(x) . ψ(y) ≡ (∃x)ϕ(x) . (∃y)ψ(y)
40 (∃x⌊, ⌋y)ϕ(x) . ψ(xy) ≡ (∃x)[ϕ(x) . (∃y)ψ(xy)]
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Jnewpage iiiK
× 24. (x) ∼ ϕ(x) ⊃∼ (x)ϕ(x)
25. (z)[ϕ(z) ⊃ ψ(z)] . ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)
× 32. ∼ [ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x)] ≡ (∃x)[ϕ(x) . ∼ ψ(x)]
26. (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] ⊃ (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x) . χ(x)]
× 27. ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x) . ψ(x) ⊃x χ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x) ⊃ χ(x)
28 ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x) . χ(x) ⊃x ψ(x) . χ(x)
26 27′⌊,⌋ 28′ analog fu¨r⌊German: analogous for⌋ ≡
29 ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x) . χ(x) ⊃x ϑ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x) . χ(x) ⊃x ψ(x) . ϑ(x)
29′ for ⌊A⌋equiv⌊alence⌋
30 30′ 26 ∨ ⌊unreadable symbols⌋
31. ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x) . χ(x) ⊃x ψ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x) ∨ χ(x) ⊃x ψ(x)
Jnewpage ivK ⌊The beginning of this page is in shorthand in the manuscript
except for the following:
p . ∼ q p ◦ q p . ∼ q
F . ∼ q
× 1. ∼ ⌊“In” or |⌋ ∨ . ≡ ⊃
× 2. ∼ p . ∼ q
× 3. 0 ⊃ ⌊unreadable text⌋ p ⊃ p+ p ≡∼ p⌋
⌊The following column of formulae is crossed out in the manuscript:⌋
[p ⊃ (p ⊃ q)] . p ⊃ ⌊(⌋p ⊃ q)
⊃ p
Vor ⊃ (p ⊃ q) . p)
⌊(⌋p ⊃ q) . p
Vor ⊃ q
[p ⊃ (p ⊃ q)] ⊃ (p ⊃ q)
⌊unreadable formula⌋
⌊(⌋r ⊃ p) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃ p ⊃ (q ⊃ ⌊The formula breaks at this point.⌋
(q ⊃ p) . (∼ q ⊃ p) ⊃ p
200 SOURCE TEXT
⌊Here the crossed out column of formulae ends, and the following column of
formulae, which is not crossed out, is in the manuscript on the right of it on
the same page:⌋
(p ≡ q) ∨ (p ≡ r) ∨ (q ≡ r)
1.! (p . q ⊃ r) ⊃
≡
(p . ∼ r ⊃∼ q)
∼ p ⊃ (∼ q ⊃∼ (p ∨ q))
∼ (p ⊃ q) ≡ p . ∼ q
2. Red.⌊uctio ad⌋ abs.⌊urdum⌋ (∼ p ⊃ p) ⊃ p
3! (∼ p ⊃ p) ⊃ p
Jnewpage vK p ∨ ∼ p
1. ∨ ⌊unreadable text⌋
2. A ⊃ B B ⊃ A p ⊃ p ∨ q
3. A ≡ B B ≡ A
⌊unreadable symbol⌋ × 2′ Dualita¨t ⌊German: duality⌋
1′ ⌊unreadable symbols with ≡⌋
sec.⌊ond⌋ law of distr⌊ibution⌋
1.
{
⌊unreadable symbols with ∨ and ⊂⌋ ×! (p ⊃ q) ⊃ q ≡ p ∨ q ×
⌊unreadable text⌋ ⌊unreadable formula⌋ ×
⌊The following two columns of formulae are separated by a sinuous ver-
tical line in the manuscript:⌋
p ≡
! q ⊃ [(q ⊃ p) ⊃≡ p] × ! p ⊃ (p . q ≡ q) × viell.⌊per-
haps “vielleicht”, German: perhaps⌋
(p ⊃ q ∨ r) ≡ q ∨ (p ⊃ r) assoc.⌊iativity⌋ !×
∼ p ⊃ (p ∨ q ≡ q) ×
T, F, p, q,∼ p,∼ q, p ≡ q,∼ p ≡ q ∼ (p ⊃ q) ≡ p . ∼ q
|[p ≡ (p ≡ q)] ≡ q| p ≡ p ∨ p . q
|⌊unreadable formula⌋| p ≡ p . (p ∨ q)
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|[p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] ⊃ [(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ r)]| × [(p ⊃ q) ⊃ p] ≡ p ×
[(∼ p ⊃ q) ⊃ q] ⊃ (p ⊃ q) (∼ p ⊃ p) ≡ p
|(∼ q ⊃ r) ⊃ [(q ⊃ p) . (r ⊃ p) ⊃ p]| ∼ (∼ p ≡ p)
42! |p ⊃ (p ⊃ q) ≡ [p ⊃ q]| × |(q ⊃ p) ∨ (r ⊃ p) ≡ (q . r ⊃ p)|
|(q ⊃ p) . (r ⊃ p) ≡ (q ∨ r ⊃ p)| ×
⌊unreadable formula⌋
! p ⊃ q. ≡ . p⌊.⌋q ≡ p ×
. ≡ . q ≡ p ∨ q ×
⌊unreadable formula⌋
Jnewpage viK ⌊This page is in shorthand in the manuscript except for the
following: perspicuous, implicans, shorten the proof?, degenerated, formida-
ble, internal, manage, I claim, (p1 ∨ p2) . . . ∨ pn, prove with their help, des-
ignated role, Moore, ⌊unreadable word⌋, schlechthin⌊German: absolutely⌋⌋
Jnewpage viiK
× 0. (x)ϕ(x) ∨ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x) ∼ (∃x)[ϕ(x) . ∼ ϕ(x)]
× 1. ∼ (x) ≡ (∃x) ∼ ×1 · 1 ∼ (∃x) ≡ (x) ∼
× 2. Verschieb.⌊perhaps “verschieben”, German: move or postpone⌋
(x) (∃x) ⌊unreadable text with ∨ . ⌋
?×?× 3. (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ p] ≡ (∃x)ϕ(x) ⊃ p
⌊?⌋×?× 4. (∃x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ p] ≡ (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ p
× 5. (x)[p ⊃ ϕ(x)] ≡ p ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) ⌊unreadable text with ∃ perhaps⌋
6. (x)[ϕ(x) ≡ p] ≡ (p ≡ (x)ϕ(x)) ≡
[p ≡ (∃x)ϕ(x)] ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (∃x)ϕ(x)
× 7. (x)⌊[⌋ϕ(x) . ψ(x)⌊]⌋ ≡ (x)ϕ(x) . (x)ψ(x)
× 8. (∃x)[ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)] ≡ (∃x)ϕ(x) ∨ (∃x)ψ(x)
×× 9. (x)ϕ(x) ∨ (x)ψ(x) ⊃ (x)⌊[⌋ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)⌊]⌋
⌊perhaps “share” and “sicher”⌊German: sure⌋⌋ 9.
×× 10. (∃x)⌊[⌋ϕ(x) . ψ(x)⌊]⌋ ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) . (∃x)ψ(x)
× 11. (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ψ(x)
12. ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ψ(x)
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Jnewpage viiiK
13. (x)[ϕ(x) ≡ ψ(x)] ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)ψ(x)
14. ⌊unreadable word beginning perhaps with “eben”; “ebenfalls” is
German for “also”⌋ ∃
15 (∃x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ≡ (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ψ(x)
16. Vert.⌊perhaps “Vertauschung”, German: exchange⌋ in der Reihen
⌊perhaps “Reihenfolge”, German: in the order⌋
(∃x)⌊ϕ(x) ⊃⌋(x)⌊ψ(x)⌋
17 (x⌊, ⌋y)ϕ(xy) ⊃ (x)ϕ(xx)
18 (∃x)ϕ(xx) ⊃ (∃x⌊, ⌋y)ϕ(xy)
× 19 (x)ϕ(x) . (∃x)ψ(x) ⊃ (∃x)⌊[⌋ϕ(x) . ψ(x)⌊]⌋ ⌊An arrow points from
this formula to: Umkehrung⌊German: reversal⌋ v. 10.⌋
18′ (x)[ϕ(xx) ⊃ (∃u⌊, ⌋v)ϕ(uv)]
17′ (x)[(u⌊, ⌋v)ϕ(uv) ⊃ ϕ(xx)]
×!? 20.! (x)[ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)] . (x) ∼ ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ψ(x)
× 21 (x)⌊[⌋ϕ(x)∨ ∼ ϕ(x)⌊]⌋
22 (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x)
× 23 \ not inverse / (∃x)(y)ϕ(xy) ⊃ (y)(∃x)ϕ(xy)
Jnewpage ixK ⌊This page is in shorthand in the manuscript except for the
following:⌋
1. Tauto1.⌊ogy⌋ ?
2. Tauto1.⌊ogy⌋ Taut.⌊ology⌋
4. Theorie ⌊&⌋ Df.
5. demonstrable
6. impl.⌊ication⌋
primit⌊ive⌋ rules of inf⌊erence⌋
7. fundamental conj.⌊unction⌋
Syll⌊ogism⌋
p ⊃ p
∼ p ∨ p
p ⊃∼∼ p
1. Wajsb.⌊erg⌋
2. Post Sep.⌊aratabdruck, German: offprint⌋ Am⌊erican⌋ Jour⌊nal⌋ 43 ⌊Emil
Post’s paper “Introduction to a general theory of elementary propositions”,
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with his completeness proof for the propositional calculus is in the American
Journal of Mathematics vol. 43 (1921), pp. 163-185⌋
3. Zentralbl.⌊att fu¨r Mathematik und ihre Grenzgebiete⌋
5. ⌊unreadable symbol⌋ Father O⌊’⌋Hara ⌊President of the University of
Notre Dame from 1934 until 1939⌋
a e
i o
❅❘ ✠✒■?
?
?
?
⌊On the right of this picture one finds a question mark, the symbol ≤ rotated
counter-clockwise for approximately 45 degrees and an unreadable symbol.⌋
Jnewpage xK ⌊This and the following three pages in the manuscript, new
page x-xiii, are loose, not bound to the notebook with a spiral and without
holes for the spiral. In all of the notebooks the only other loose leafs are to
be found towards the end of Notebook V and at the end of Notebook VII. In
the upper half of the present page in the manuscript one finds the following,
turned counter-clockwise for 90 degrees and crossed out:
A→ B → A ⊃ B
B→ C
A→ C
∼ (A . ∼ B) A→ B
A . ∼ B → A
A . ∼ B →∼ B
A,B & C
A,B,C → A,B & C
A . ∼ A ∼ B,A, A→ B
∼ B,A→∼ A
A, A→ B
A⌊, ⌋ ∼ B →∼ A
A⌊, ⌋ ∼ B⌊, ⌋A→ B
A⌊, ⌋ ∼ B⌊, ⌋A→∼ B
⌊The lower half of this of the page is in shorthand in the manuscript except
for the following:⌋
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1. 1·2 P, G, lie, =
3. 3·1, 3·2 <, Z
4. ⌊two ditto marks referring to “<, Z” followed by =⌋
Jnewpage xiK
∼ R,A, p → R
→∼ R
∼ R,A→∼ p
Jnewpage xiiK ⌊The following list of formulae is crossed out in the manu-
script:⌋
(p ⊃ q) . (r ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ∨ r ⊃ q)
∼ [(∼ p ∨ q) . (∼ r ∨ q)] ∨ [∼ (p ∨ r) ∨ q]
∼ (∼ p ∨ q)∨ ∼ (∼ r ∨ q) ∨ (∼ p . ∼ r) ∨ q
(p . ∼ q) ∨ (r . ∼ q) ∨ (∼ p . ∼ r) ∨ q
(p ∨ r ∨ ∼ p ∨ q).
(p ∨ r ∨ ∼ r ∨ q).
(p ∨ ∼ q ∨ ∼ p ∨ q)
(p ∨ ∼ q ∨ ∼ r ∨ q)
(∼ q ∨ r ∨ ∼ p ∨ q)
(∼ q ∨ r ∨ ∼ r ∨ q)
(∼ q ∨ ∼ q ∨ ∼ p ∨ q)
(∼ q ∨ ∼ q ∨ ∼ r ∨ q)
⌊(⌋p ⊃∼ p) ⊃∼ p
∼ (∼ p⌊∨ ∼⌋p) ∨ ∼ p
[∼ (∼ p ∨ q) ∨ (p . ∼ q)]
[∼ (p . ∼ q) ∨ ∼ p ∨ q]
[(p . ∼ q) ∨ (p . ∼ q)]
[∼ p ∨ q ∨ ∼ p ∨ q]
∼ p . p . ∼ q ∨ q . p . ∼ q
⌊Here the list of formulae crossed out in the manuscript ends, and the fol-
lowing not crossed out list is given:⌋
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p ⊃ q. ⊃ . ∼ q ⊃∼ p
∼ (∼ p ∨ q) ∨ (q ∨ ∼ p)
(p . ∼ q) ∨ q ∨ ∼ p
(p ∨ q ∨ ∼ p) . (∼ q ∨ q ∨ ∼ p)
× (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)
∼ (∼ p ∨ q) ∨ (∼ (r ∨ p) ∨ r ∨ q)
(p . ∼ r) ∨ (∼ r . ∼ p) ∨ r ∨ q
(p ∨ ∼ r) . (p ∨ ∼ p) . (∼ q ∨ ∼ r) . (∼ q ∨ ∼ p) ∨ (r ∨ q)
Jnewpage xiiiK ⌊In the left margin turned counter-clockwise for 90 degrees
one finds first on this page of the manuscript:
⌊unreadable text with: Arist.⌊otelian⌋ Syll.⌊ogisms⌋⌋
∼ [a⌊·⌋b = 0 . c⌊·⌋b¯ = 0 . a · c 6= 0]
Next one finds in the left half of the page a column of propositional formulae,
partly effaced, partly crossed out and mostly unreadable, which is not given
here. In the rest of the page one finds
ℵℵ1ω1 · ℵℵ0ω1+ω ≥ ℵℵ1ω1+ω
followed by an unreadable inequality with ℵ2. One finds also the following,
turned counter-clockwise for 90 degrees:⌋
|ℵℵ02 > ℵℵ01 | ℵℵ0α+1 > ℵℵ01
ℵℵ01 ≥ ℵ2 ℵℵ0α = ℵℵ01
ℵℵ01 = ℵα
× ∼ [(∼ p ∨ q) . p] ∨ q
[∼ (∼ p ∨ q) ∨ ∼ p] ∨ q
(p . ∼ q) ∨ ∼ p ∨ q disj⌊unctive⌋
(p ∨ ∼ p ∨ q) ⌊.⌋(∼ q ∨ ∼ p ∨ q) ⌊conjunctive⌋
⌊and at the end the following, turned clockwise for 90 degrees:⌋
xRSy ≡ (z)⌊[⌋zSy ⊃ xRz⌊]⌋
(RS)T = R(S|T )
RS+T = RS⌊·⌋RT
(z)⌊[⌋zSy ∨ zTy ⊃ xRz⌊]⌋
(∃u) (z)⌊[⌋zSy ⊃ xRz⌊]⌋ . (z)⌊[⌋zTy ⊃ xRz⌊]⌋
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2.4 Notebook IV
⌊Folder 62, on the front cover of the notebook “Log.⌊ik⌋ Vorl.⌊esungen⌋
⌊German: Logic Lectures⌋ N.D. ⌊Notre Dame⌋ IV”⌋
⌊Before p. 7., the first numbered page in this notebook, there are in
the manuscript four not numbered pages with formulae. These pages are
numbered here with the prefix newpage. The formulae with R, S and T on
newpage i are in boxes on the right of this page.⌋
Jnewpage iK
⌊unreadable text⌋ (p ⊃ q) ⊃ [(r ⊃ p) ⊃ (r ⊃ q)] (1)⌊1.⌋
⌊unreadable text⌋ p ⊃ ∼∼ p (2)⌊2.⌋
R ..⌊:⌋ ∼ p
S ..⌊:⌋ ∼∼∼ p
T ..⌊:⌋ p
Su (2)⌊2.⌋ ∼ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ⌊one line below⌋ R ⊃ S
⌊unreadable text⌋ ∼ p ∨ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ∨ p ⌊one line below implication
with unreadable left-hand side and R ∨ T or R ∨ S on
the right; the implication in this line is R ∨ T ⊃ S ∨ T ⌋
Su⌊.⌋ III⌊(3)⌋ ∼ p ∨ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼ p (3)⌊3.⌋ R ∨ T ⊃ T ∨ R
Su IV⌊(4)⌋ ⌊(⌋ ∼ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p⌊)⌋ ⊃ [p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p] (4)⌊4.⌋
Imp 2⌊.⌋, 4⌊.⌋ p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p (5)⌊5.⌋ ⌊one line above⌋
T ∨R ⊃ T ∨ S
Su III⌊(3)⌋ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ∨ p (6)⌊6.⌋ ⌊one line above⌋
T ∨ S ⊃ S ∨ T
Su (1)⌊1.⌋ (p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p) ⊃
[(∼ p ∨ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼ p) ⊃ (∼ p ∨ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p)] (7)⌊7.⌋
Imp 2mal⌊zweimal, German: twice⌋ 5⌊.⌋, 7 ⌊. (unreadable word 3); 3.⌋
∼ p ∨ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p (8)⌊8.⌋
Su III⌊(3)⌋ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ∨ p (9)⌊9.⌋
⌊occurs already as (6)⌋
Su (1)⌊1.⌋ (p ∨ ∼∼∼ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ∨ p) ⊃
[(∼ p ∨ p ⊃ p ∨ ∼∼∼ p) ⊃ (∼ p ∨ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ∨ p)] (10)⌊10.⌋
Imp 2mal⌊zweimal, German: twice⌋ 9⌊6.⌋, 10⌊.⌋; 8⌊.⌋ ∼ p ∨ p ⊃ ∼∼∼ p ∨ p
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Jnewpage iiK p ⊃ q ∨ p
p ⊃ p ∨ q I⌊(1)⌋
p ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ p III⌊(3)⌋
\ Su (1)⌊1.⌋ / (p ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ p) ⊃ [(p ⊃ p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q ∨ p)] (2)⌋2.⌋
Su
p ∨ q
p
q ∨ p
q
p
r
Imp (2⌊.⌋, III⌊(3)⌋) (p ⊃ p ∨ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q ∨ p) (3)⌊3.⌋
Imp (3⌊.⌋, I⌊(1)⌋) p ⊃ q ∨ p (4)⌊4.⌋
Jnewpage iiiK
1. (∼ p ⊃ p) ⊃ p (∼∼ p ∨ p) ⊃ p
A. p ⊃ p
∼∼ p ⊃ p
∼∼ p ∨ p ⊃ p ⌊D⌋ilemma
2. (p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p . ∼ r ⊃ ∼ q)
1. (p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ [p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] Exp.⌊ortation⌋
(q ⊃ r) ⊃ (∼ r ⊃∼ q) Transpos.⌊ition⌋
2. [p ⊃ (q ⊃ r)] ⊃ [p ⊃ (∼ r ⊃∼ q)] Add.⌊ition⌋ from ⌊the⌋ left
3⌊.⌋ [p ⊃ (∼ r ⊃∼ q)] ⊃ [p . ∼ r ⊃∼ q] Imp⌊ortation⌋
(p . q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p . ∼ r ⊃ ∼ q) 1⌊.⌋, 2⌊.⌋, 3⌊.⌋ Syll.⌊ogism⌋
3.1 (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ (p ⊃ q))
r ⊃ (p ⊃ r) p ⊃ q
r
3.2 [p ⊃ (p ⊃ q)] ⊃ (p ⊃ q) ∼ p ∨ (∼ p ∨ q) ⊃ ∼ p ∨ q
Jnewpage ivK
1. ∼ p ∨ (∼ p ∨ q) ⊃ (∼ p ∨ ∼ p) ∨ q
∼ p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ ∼ p
2. (∼ p ∨ ∼ p) ∨ q ⊃ ∼ p ∨ q Add.⌊ition⌋ from ⌊the⌋ right
∼ p ∨ (∼ p ∨ q) ⊃ ∼ p ∨ q Syll.⌊ogism⌋ 1.⌊,⌋ 2.
[p ⊃ (p ⊃ q)] ⊃ (p ⊃ q) Rule of def.⌊ined⌋ symb.⌊ol⌋
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J7.K ⌊This page starts with the ending of the sentence started as follows
at the end of p. 6. towards the end of Notebook III: I want to refer⌊ence⌋
briefly about this system⌋ or to be more exact on a system which is based
on Gentzen’s idea, but simpler than his. The idea consists in \ / introducing
another kind of implication (denoted by an arrow →). ⌊The remainder of
p. 7. is crossed out in the manuscript.⌋ ⌈such that P → Q means Q is true
under the assumption P . The diff.⌊erence⌋ of this implication as opposed to
our former one is
1. There can be any number of premis⌊s⌋es⌊,⌋ e.g. P,Q → R means R
holds under the ass.⌊umptions⌋ P,Q (i.e⌊.⌋ the same thing which would be
⌊unreadable text, could be: den⌊oted⌋⌋ by P . Q ⊃ R. e.g In particular the
number of premis⌊s⌋es ⌊Here p. 7. ends and pp. 8. and 9. are missing, while
p. 10. begins with the second part of a broken sentence.⌋
J10.K system with altogether three prim⌊itive⌋ terms→, ∼, ⊃⌊.⌋We have
now to distinguish between expressions in the former sense⌊, i⌊.⌋e. containing
only ∼⌊,⌋ ⊃ and var⌊iables,⌋ e⌊.⌋g⌊.⌋ p ⊃ q, ∼ p ⊃ q, q ⊃ p ∨ r, etc⌊.,⌋ and
sec.⌊ondary⌋ formulas containing the arrow⌊,⌋ e⌊.⌋g. p, p ⊃ q → q⌊.⌋ I shall
use capital Latin letters P,Q only to denote expr⌊essions⌋ of the first kind⌊,⌋
i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ expressions in our former sense⌊,⌋ and I use cap.⌊ital⌋ Greek letters
\ ∆,Γ / to denote sequences of an arb.⌊itrary⌋ nu. number of ass.⌊umptions⌋
P,Q,R . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
p, p ⊃ q,∼ q︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
may be denoted by J11.K ∆. So the cap⌊ital⌋
Greek letters denote possible premis⌊s⌋es to the formulas of the
Hence a formula of G.⌊entzen’s⌋ system will \ always / have the form
∆→ S⌊,⌋ a cert.⌊ain⌋ sequence of expr.⌊essions⌋ of the first kind implies an
expr.⌊ession⌋ of the first kind. And Now to the axioms and rules of inference.
I Any form⌊ula⌋ P → P where P is an arb.⌊itrary⌋ expr⌊ession⌋ of the
first kind is an ax.⌊iom⌋ and only those form⌊ulas⌋ are ax⌊ioms⌋. (So that is
the law of identity)
J12.K P may be So that is the law of identity which appears here as an axiom
and as the only axiom.
As to the rules of inference we have 4⌊four,⌋ namely
⌊crossed out: 1. ∆→ A ∆, P → A
P,∆→ A ⌋
1. The rule of addition of premis⌊s⌋es⌊,⌋ i.e. from ∆→ A one can conclude
∆, P → A and P,∆→ A⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. if A is true under the assumptions ∆ then it
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is \ a fortiori / true under the assumptions ∆ and the further ass.⌊umption⌋
P ⌊.⌋
J13.K
2. The ⌊R⌋ule of exportation:
∆, P → Q : ∆→ (P ⊃ Q)
If the prop⌊ositions⌋ ∆ and P imply Q then the prop⌊ositions⌋ ∆ imply that
P implies Q.
3. The Rule of implication:
∆→ P
∆→ Q
∆→ (P ⊃ Q)
So that is so to speak the rule of implication under some assumptions: If A
and A ⊃ B both hold under the ass.⌊umptions⌋ ∆ then B also holds under
the ass.⌊umptions⌋ ∆⌊.⌋
4. Rule of Reductio ad abs⌊urdum⌋ or \ rule of / indirect proof⌊:⌋
∆,∼ P → Q
∆→ P
∆,∼ P → ∼ Q
Here the prem.⌊ises⌋ mean that from the ass⌊umptions⌋ ∆ and ∼ P a contra-
diction follows⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. ∼ P is incompatible J14.K with the ass.⌊umptions⌋
∆⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. from ∆ follows P .
Again it can be proved that every tautology follows from the ax.⌊ioms⌋
and rules of inf⌊erence⌋. Of course only the tautologies which can be ex-
pressed in terms of the symbols introd.⌊uced,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. ∼⌊,⌋ ⊃ ⌊and⌋ →⌊.⌋ If
we want to introduce also ∨⌊,⌋ . etc. we have to add the rule of the defined
symbol . or other rules concerning ∨⌊,⌋ . etc.
⌊new paragraph⌋ Now you see that in this system the aforementioned
disadvantages have been avoided⌊.⌋ All the axioms are really very simple and
J15.K evident. It is particularly interesting that also the pseudo-paradoxical
prop.⌊ositions⌋ about the impl.⌊ication⌋ follow from our system of axioms
although nobody will have any objections against the axioms themselves⌊,⌋
i⌊.⌋e. everybody would admit them if we interpret both the → and the ⊃ to
mean ⌊“⌋if. . . then⌊”⌋. Perhaps I shall derive these two prop. \ pseudo⌊-
⌋paradoxes / as an examples for a derivations from this system. The first
reads:
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q → p ⊃ q Proof:
J16.K
By I q → q
′′ 1 q, p→ q
′′ 2 q → (p ⊃ q)
Incidentally⌊,⌋ again app.⌊lying⌋ 2 we get → q ⊃ (p ⊃ q) which is another
form for the same theorem. The sec.⌊ond⌋ paradox reads like this:
∼ p→ p ⊃ q Proof⌊:⌋
I p→ p
1 ∼ p, p,∼ q → p
I ∼ p→∼ p
1 ∼ p, p,∼ q →∼ p
4 ∼ p, p→ q
2 ∼ p→ (p ⊃ q)
J17.K Incidentally this form⌊ula⌋ ∼ p, p → q which we derived as an
intermediate step of the proof is interesting also on its own account⌊;⌋ it says:
From a contrad.⌊ictory⌋ assumption everything follows since the formula is
true whatever the prop.⌊osition⌋ q may be. I am sorry I have no time left to
go into more details about this Gent.⌊zen⌋ system. I want to conclude now
this chapter about the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊osition⌋. ⌊Here p. 17. ends and
pp. 18.-23. are missing.⌋
J24.K I am concl.⌊uding⌋ now the chapt.⌊er⌋ about the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of
prop⌊ositions⌋ and begin with the next chapt.⌊er⌋ which is to deal with the
so called calc.⌊ulus⌋ of functions \ or predicates / . As I explained for-
merly the calc⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋ is c⌊h⌋aracteri⌊z⌋ed by this that only
prop.⌊ositions⌋as a whole occur in it⌊.⌋ You know The letters p, q, r etc⌊.⌋
denoted arbitrary propositions and all the formulas and rules \ which we
proved / are valid whatever the propos.⌊itions⌋ p, q, r may be⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. they
are independent of the structure of the prop.⌊ositions⌋ involved. Therefore
we could use a single letters \ p, q . . . / to denote a whole propositions.
J25.K But now we shall be concerned with inferences which depend on the
structure of the prop.⌊ositions⌋ involved and therefore we shall have to study
at first how prop.⌊ositions⌋ are built up of their constituents. To this end we
ask at first what do the simplest prop.⌊ositions⌋ which one can imagine look
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like. Now ⌊unreadable text⌋ evidently the simplest kind of prop.⌊ositions⌋
are those in which simply some predicate is asserted of some subject⌊,⌋ e.g.
Socrates is mortal⌊.⌋ Here the predicate mortal is asserted to belong to the
subject Socrates. Thus far we are in agree- J26.K ment with classical logic.
⌊new paragraph⌋ But there is another type of simple prop. osition⌋ which
was very \ much / neglected in classical logic, although this second type
is even more important for the applications of logic in mathem⌊atics⌋ and
other sciences⌊.⌋ This second type \ of simple prop.⌊osition⌋ / consists in
this that a predicate is asserted of several subjects⌊,⌋ e.g. New York is larger
than Washington. or Socrates is the teacher of Plato Here you have two
subj.⌊ects,⌋ New Y⌊ork⌋ and W.⌊ashington,⌋ and the pre⌊dicate⌋ greater
larger says that a certain relation subsists between those two subj⌊ects⌋.
Another ex.⌊ample is⌋⌊“⌋Socrates is the teacher of Plato⌊”⌋⌊“again” is su-
perfluous after the first occurrence of this sentence having been crossed out
above⌋. So you see there are two different kinds J27.K of predicates⌊,⌋ namely
pred.⌊icates⌋ with one subj⌊ect⌋ as e.g. mortal and predicates with several
subj.⌊ects⌋ as e.g. greater.
⌊new paragraph⌋ The pred.⌊icates⌋ of the first kind may be called prop-
erties or qualities, and those of the sec.⌊ond⌋ kind \ are called / relations.
So e.g. ,,⌊“⌋mortal” is a property⌊,⌋ ,,⌊“⌋greater” is a relation. ⌊M⌋ost of
the pred.⌊icates⌋ of everyday lang⌊uage⌋ are relations and not properties⌊.⌋
The relation ,,⌊“⌋greater” as you see requires two subjects and therefore is
called a dyadic relation. There are also relations which require three or
more subjects⌊,⌋ e.g. betweenness is a relation with three subj.⌊ects,⌋ i.e.
triadic relation. If I say e.g. New York J28.K lies between Wash⌊ington⌋ and
Boston.⌊,⌋ ⌊t⌋he relation of betweenness is asserted to subsist for the three
subjects N.⌊ew York,⌋ W⌊ashington⌋ and B.⌊oston,⌋ and always if I form a
meaningful prop. osition⌋ involving the word between I must mention three
objects of which one is to be in between the others. So \ Theref⌊ore⌋ /
,,⌊“⌋betweenness” is \ called / a triadic rel.⌊ation⌋ and similarly there are
tetradic, pentadic rel.⌊ations⌋ etc. Properties may also be called monadic rel
\ pred.⌊icates⌋ / in this order of ideas.
I don’t want to go into any discussions of what ⌊\ / to be deleted⌋ predi-
cates are (that could lead J29.K to a discussion of nominalism and realism⌊).⌋
⌊unreadable text, perhaps: But⌋ I want to say about the essence of a predi-
cate only this. In order that a predicate be well⌊-⌋defined it must be (uniquely
and) unambiguously determined of any objects (whatsoever) whether the
predicate belongs to them or not. So e.g. a property is given if it is uniquely
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determined of any object whether or not the pred.⌊icate⌋ bel.⌊ongs⌋ to it
and a dyadic rel⌊ation⌋ is given if it is . . . ⌊uniquely⌋ det.⌊ermined⌋ of any
two obj.⌊ects⌋ whether or not the rel.⌊ation⌋ subsists betw.⌊een⌋ them⌊.⌋ is
the only essential property to be required of a predicate I shall use capital
letters greek letters ϕ, ψ, χ M, P, to denote individual predicates—as e⌊.⌋g.
mortal⌊,⌋ greater etc. ⌊unreadable text⌋ p, q, r ⌊unreadable text⌋ to denote
arbitrary prop. and I shall use J30.K ⌊and⌋ small letters a, b, c to denote
arbitrary \ individual / objects \ as e⌊.⌋g. Socr⌊ates⌋, New Yor⌊k⌋ etc⌊.⌋
/ (of which the pred⌊icates⌋ ϕ, ψ M,P . . . are to be asserted). Those objects
are usually called individuals in math.⌊ematical⌋ logic⌊.⌋ ⌊The following sen-
tence is crossed out in the text: \ So the individuals are the domain of things
for which the pred.⌊icates⌋ are defined so that it is uniquely det.⌊ermined⌋
for any ind.⌊ividual⌋ whether or not a cert⌊ain⌋ pred.⌊icate⌋ bel.⌊ongs⌋ to
them. / ⌋
Now let M be a monadic pred⌊icate⌋ (i.e. a quality) \ ⌊,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ ,,⌊“⌋man
⌊mortal⌋”, / and a an indiv.⌊idual⌋ \ ⌊,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ Socr⌊ates⌋. / Then the
prop.⌊osition⌋ that M belongs to a is denoted by M(a)⌊.⌋ So M(a) means
,,⌊“⌋Socrates is mortal⌊”⌋ and similarly if G is a di⌊y⌋adic relation \ ⌊,⌋
e.g⌊.⌋ larger⌊,⌋ / and b, c two ind.⌊ividuals⌋ \ ⌊,⌋ e.g. New ⌊York and⌋
Wash⌊ington,⌋ / then G(b, c) means ,,⌊“⌋The rel.⌊ation⌋ G subsists between b
and c.”⌊c”,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. in our case ,,⌊“⌋New York ⌊is⌋ larger than Wash.⌊ington⌋”.
So in this notation there is no copula⌊,⌋ but e.g⌊.⌋ the prop.⌊osition⌋⌊“⌋Soc-
rates is mortal⌊”⌋ J31.K has to be expr.⌊essed⌋ like this Mortality(Socrates)⌊,⌋
and that New York is greater than W.⌊ashington⌋ by Larger(New York,
Wash.⌊ington⌋)⌊.⌋
That much I have to say about the simplest type of prop.⌊ositions⌋
which simply say that some \ def.⌊inite⌋ / pred.⌊icate⌋ belongs to some
\ def.⌊inite⌋ subject or subjects. These prop⌊ositions⌋ are sometimes called
atomic prop.⌊ositions⌋ in math⌊ematical⌋ logic bec.⌊ause⌋ they constitute
so to speak the atoms of which the more compl.⌊ex⌋ propositions are built
up. But now how are they built up? We know already one way of form-
ing J32.K compound propositions namely by means of the operations of
the propos.⌊itional⌋ calculus . ⌊, ⌋ ∨ ⌊, ⌋ ⊃ etc.⌊,⌋ e.g. from the two atomic
prop.⌊ositions “⌋Socr.⌊ates⌋ is a man⌊”⌋ and ⌊“⌋Socr.⌊ates⌋ is mortal⌊”⌋ we
can form the composit prop.⌊osition “⌋If Socr.⌊ates⌋ is a man Socr.⌊ates⌋ is
mortal⌊”;⌋ ⌊unreadable symbol⌋ i⌊written over I⌋n symb.⌊ols,⌋ if T denotes
⌊unreadable text⌋ \ the pred.⌊icate⌋ of / mortality ⌊unreadable text⌋ \ the
indiv.⌊idual⌋ / Socrates it would read M(a) ⊃ T (a)⌊,⌋ or e.g⌊.⌋ M(a) ∨ ∼
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M(a) would mean ,,⌊“⌋Either Socr.⌊ates⌋ is a man or Socr.⌊ates⌋ is not a
man”. M(a) . T (a) would mean ,,⌊“⌋Socr.⌊ates⌋ is a man and Socrates is
mortal”, and so on. The prop.⌊ositions⌋which we can obtain in this way⌊,⌋
i⌊.⌋e. by combining atomic prop.⌊ositions⌋ by means ⌊The next two pages are
again numbered 31. and 32. in the manuscript; they are numbered 31.a and
32.a here.⌋ J31.aK of the truth functions ∨⌊, ⌋. etc⌊.⌋ are sometimes called
molecular prop⌊ositions⌋.
⌊new paragraph⌋ But there is still another way of forming compound
prop.⌊ositions⌋ which we have not yet taken account of in our symbolism⌊,⌋
namely by means of the particles ,,⌊“⌋every” and ,,⌊“⌋some”. These are
expressed in logistics by the use of variables as follows: Take e.g. the prop⌊osi-
tion⌋ ,,⌊“⌋Every man is mortal”⌊.⌋ We can express \ that in other words
like this⌊:⌋ / ,,⌊“⌋Every object which is a man is mortal” or ,,⌊“⌋For every
individual \ object / x it is true that M(x) ⊃ T (x)”⌊.⌋ Now in order to
indicate ⌊comma from the manuscript deleted⌋ that this implication J32.aK
is asserted of any object x one puts x in brackets in front of the prop.⌊osition⌋
and includes the whole prop⌊osition⌋ in bracket⌊s⌋ to indicate that the whole
prop.⌊osition⌋ is asserted to be true for every x. And generally if we have
an arb.⌊itrary⌋ exp⌊ression,⌋ say Φ(x) which involves a variable x⌊,⌋ then
(x)[Φ(x)] means ,,⌊“⌋For every object x, Φ(x) is true”⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. if you take an
arbitrary individual a and substitute it for x then the resulting prop.⌊osition⌋
Φ(a) is true. As in our example (x)[M(x) ⊃ T (x)], where M means man
J33.K and Ψ means mortal if you subst.⌊itute⌋ Socrates for x you get the true
prop⌊osition⌋. And gen.⌊erally⌋ if you subst⌊itute⌋ for x something which is
a man you get a true prop.⌊osition⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ then the first and sec.⌊ond⌋
term of the impl.⌊ication⌋ are true. If however you subst⌊itute⌋ someth.⌊ing⌋
which is not a man you also get a true prop⌊osition⌋ \ bec.⌊ause⌋ . . . / So for
\ any / arb.⌊itrary⌋ obj.⌊ect⌋ which you subst⌊itute⌋ for x ⌊
⌈
⌋ you get a true
prop⌊osition⌋ and this is indicated by writing (x) in front of the prop⌊osition⌋.
(x) is called the universal quantifier⌊.⌋
⌊The following text in square brackets is crossed out in the manuscript.⌋
[I \ wish to / ⌊unreadable word⌋ that exactly as formerly I used ⌊unreadable
word⌋ to denote arb⌊itrary⌋ expressions I denote now by Φ etc expr.⌊essions⌋
which may involve variable x which I indicate by writing them after the Φ. An
expression which involves variables and which becomes a prop.⌊osition⌋ if you
replace the var⌊iable⌋ by J34.K individual objects is called a prop⌊ositional⌋
funct⌊ion⌋. So e.g. ϕ(x) is a prop⌊ositional⌋ funct⌊ion⌋ or ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)
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because. . . ]
As to the particle ,,⌊“⌋some” or ,,⌊“⌋there exists” (which is the same
thing) it is expr⌊essed⌋ by a reversed ∃ put in brackets together with a
var⌊iable⌋ (∃x). So that means: there is an object x⌊;⌋ e.g. if we want to
express that some men are not mortal we have to write (∃x)[M(x) . ∼ T (x)]
and generally if Φ(x) is a prop.⌊ositional⌋ funct⌊ion⌋ with the var.⌊iable⌋
x⌊,⌋ (∃x)[Φ(x)] means J35.K ,,⌊“⌋There exits some object a such that Φ(a)
is true”. Nothing is said about the nu.⌊mber⌋ of obj. ects⌋ \ for which Φ(a)
is true / that exist; there may be one or several⌊.⌋ (∃x)Φ(x) only means
there is at least one obj⌊ect⌋ x such that Φ(x). (∃x) is called the existential
quantifier⌊.⌋ From this def⌊inition⌋ you see at once that we have the following
equivalences:
(∃x)Φ(x) ≡ ∼ (x)[∼ Φ(x)]
(x)Φ(x) ≡ ∼ (∃x)[∼ Φ(x)]
⌊After these displayed formulae the page is divided in the manuscript by a
horizontal line.⌋
Generally (x)[∼ Φ(x)] means Φ(x) holds for no obj.⌊ect⌋ and∼ (∃x)[Φ(x)]
′′⌊means⌋⌊t⌋here is no \ object / x such that Φ(x)⌊.⌋ Again you see that these
two \ statements / are equivalent \ with each other / . It is now easy e.g. to
express the traditional \ four / J36.K types of prop.⌊ositions⌋ a, e, i, o in our
notation. In each case we have two predicates⌊,⌋ say P , S and
SaP means every S is a P i⌊.⌋e. (x)[S(x) ⊃ P (x)]
SiP means some S are P i⌊.⌋e. (∃x)[S(x) . P (x)]
SeP means no S is a P i⌊.⌋e. (x)[S(x) ⊃ ∼ P (x)]
SoP means some S are ∼ P i⌊.⌋e. (∃x)[S(x) . ∼ P (x)]
You see the universal prop.⌊ositions⌋ have the universal quantifier in front
of them and the part.⌊icular⌋ prop.⌊ositions⌋ the exist.⌊ential⌋ quantifier. I
want to mention that in classical logic two entirely different types of prop⌊osi-
tions⌋ are counted as univ.⌊ersal⌋ affirm.⌊ative,⌋ namely prop⌊ositions⌋ of
the type ⌊“⌋Socrates is mortal⌊”⌋ expressed by P (a) and ,,⌊“⌋Every man is
mortal⌊”⌋ (x)[S(x) ⊃ P (x)]⌊.⌋
J37.K Now the existential and univ⌊ersal⌋ quantifier can be combined with
each other and with the truth⌊ ⌋f⌊unctions⌋ \ ∼, . . . / in many ways so as to
express more complicated prop⌊ositions⌋. ⌊Here one finds in the manuscript
a page numbered 37.1 inserted within p. 37.⌋
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J37.1K Thereby one uses some abbrev.⌊iations,⌋ namely: Let Φ(xy) be an
expr.⌊ession⌋ cont⌊aining⌋ 2⌊two⌋ var.⌊iables;⌋ then we may form: (x)[(y)
[Φ(xy)]] ⌊.⌋ That means ,,⌊“⌋For any obj⌊ect⌋ x it is true that for any
obj.⌊ect⌋ y Φ(xy)” that evidently means ,,⌊“⌋Φ(xy) is true whatever objects
you take for x, y” and this is den⌊oted⌋ by (x, y)Φ(xy). Evidently the order
of the var⌊iables⌋ is arb.⌊itrary⌋ here⌊,⌋ i.e. (x⌊, ⌋y)Φ(xy) ≡ (y⌊, ⌋x)Φ(xy).
Similarly (∃x)[(∃y)[Φ(xy)]] means ,,⌊“⌋ There are some obj⌊ects⌋ x, y such
that Φ(xy)” and this is abbr.⌊eviated⌋ by (∃x, y)Φ(xy) \ and means: ⌊text
missing⌋ / \ But / it has to be noted ⌊comma from the manuscript deleted⌋
here that this does not mean that there are really two diff.⌊erent⌋ obj.⌊ects⌋
x, y satisfying Φ(xy)⌊.⌋ This formula is also ⌊be⌋ true if there is one obj⌊ect⌋
a such that Φ(a, a)⌊Φ(aa)⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ then there exists an x⌊,⌋ namely a,
such that there exists a y⌊,⌋ namely again a⌊,⌋ such that etc. ⌊At this place
\ Expl. / is inserted, and the following text from the end of p. 37.1 seems to
refer, by having at its end “p 37” and a sign for insertion, to this spot:
Ex
{
Throug⌊h⌋ any two points there exists a straight line⌊.⌋
In any plane there exist to⌊two⌋ || ⌊parallel⌋ lines⌊.⌋
These may be examples of universal and existential quantification that, unlike
(∃x, y)Φ(xy), involve variables standing for different objects, but the first is
related to an example for notation on p. 39. below.⌋ Again (∃x, y)Φ(xy) ≡
(∃y, x)Φ(xy)⌊.⌋
But it is to be noted that this interchangeability holds JnewpageK only
for two univ.⌊ersal⌋ or two exist.⌊ential⌋ quant⌊ifiers⌋. It does not hold for
an univ.⌊ersal⌋ and an exist⌊ential⌋ quant.⌊ifier,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. (x)[(∃y)[Φ(yx)]] 6≡
(∃y)[(x)[Φ(yx)]]⌊.⌋ Take e.g. for Φ(yx) the prop⌊osition⌋⌊“⌋y greater than
x⌊”;⌋ then the first means ,,⌊“⌋For any obj.⌊ect⌋ x it is true that there exists
exists an obj⌊ect⌋ y greater than x”⌊;⌋ in other words ⌊“F⌋or any object there
exists something greater”. The right⌊-⌋hand side however means ,,t⌊“T⌋here
exists an obj⌊ect⌋ y such that for any x y is greater than x”⌊,⌋ there exists
a greatest obj⌊ect⌋. So that means in our case \ the right side / ⌊says⌋
just the oppos.⌊ite⌋ of what the left hand side says. As to the brackets
⌊T⌋he above abbrev.⌊iation is⌋ also used for more than two var.⌊iables,⌋
i⌊.⌋e. (x⌊, ⌋y⌊, ⌋z)[Φ(xyz)]⌊,⌋ (∃x⌊, ⌋y⌊, ⌋z)[Φ(xyz)]⌊.⌋
⌊Here one returns to p. 37.⌋I want now to give some examples for the
notation introduced. Take e.g⌊.⌋ the prop.⌊osition⌋ ,,⌊“⌋For any integer there
exists a greater one”⌊.⌋ The pred⌊icates⌋ occurring in this prop⌊osition⌋ are:
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1. integer and 2. greater⌊.⌋ Let us denote them by I and > \ so I(x) is to
be read. . . ⌊“x is an integer” and⌋ > (x, y) ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′⌊> (xy) is to be read⌋⌊“⌋x
greater y⌊”⌋ or ⌊“⌋y smaller x⌊”.⌋ Then the prop⌊osition⌋ \ ⌊unreadable
text⌋ / is expressed in log.⌊istic⌋ symb⌊olism⌋ as follows:
(x)[I(x) ⊃ (∃y)[I(y) . >(y, x)⌊>(yx)⌋]]⌊.⌋
We can express the same fact by saying J38.K there is no greatest integer:⌊.⌋
What would that \ look like in logist.⌊ic⌋ symb.⌊olism:⌋ /
∼(∃x)[I(x) . \ such that no int⌊eger⌋ is greater i⌊.⌋e. /
(y)[I(y) ⊃ ∼ >(yx)]⌊].⌋
As another ex.⌊ample⌋ take the prop⌊osition⌋ ,,⌊“⌋There is a smallest int.⌊e-
ger⌋” that would read⌊:⌋
(∃x)[I(x) . \ such that no int.⌊eger⌋ is smaller i⌊.⌋e. /
(y)[I(y) ⊃ ∼ >(x, y)⌊>(xy)⌋]].
I wish to call your attention to a near at hand mistake. It would be wrong
to express this \ last / prop.⌊osition⌋ like this:
(∃x)[I(x) . (y)[I(y) ⊃ >(yx)]]
bec.⌊ause⌋ that would \ mean / there is an int.⌊eger⌋ smaller than every
int⌊eger⌋. But such an int.⌊eger⌋ does not exist J39.K since it would have to
be smaller than itself. An integer smaller than every int.⌊eger⌋ would have to
be smaller than \ itself⌊—⌋that is clear⌊.⌋ / So the sec.⌊ond⌋ prop.⌊osition⌋ is
false whereas the first is true, bec.⌊ause⌋ it says only there exists an int.⌊eger⌋
x ⌊full stop deleted⌋ which is not greater than any int⌊eger⌋. and that is
true, because ⌊unreadable text⌋ has this prop. that it is greater \ than
/ ⌊unreadable text⌋ itself (not greater than itself either).
Another ex.⌊ample⌋ for our not.⌊ation⌋ may be taken from Geom⌊etry⌋.
Consider the prop.⌊osition⌋ ,,⌊“⌋Through any two different points there is ex-
actly one straight line”. The pred.⌊icates⌋ which occur in this prop.⌊osition⌋
are 1. ⌊p⌋oint P (x)⌊,⌋ J40.K 2. straight line L(x)⌊,⌋ 3. different that is
the neg⌊ation⌋ of identity⌊.⌋ Identity is den.⌊oted⌋ by = and diff⌊erence⌋
sometimes by 6=⌊.⌋ =(xy) means x and y are the same thing⌊,⌋ e.g. = (Shake-
speare, author of Hamlet)⌊,⌋ and 6= (xy) ⌊means⌋ x and y are different from
each other⌊.⌋ There is \ still / another relation ⌊comma from the manuscript
deleted⌋ that occurs in \ our geom.⌊etric⌋ prop.⌊osition,⌋ namely the one
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/ expressed by \ the word / ,,⌊“⌋through” w⌊.⌋ That is the rel.⌊ation⌋ which
holds betw⌊een⌋ a point \ x / and a line \ y / if ,,⌊“⌋y passes through
x” or in other words ⌊,, deleted⌋ if ⌊“⌋x lies on y”. Let us den⌊ote⌋ that
\ relation / by J(x, y) ⌊J(xy)⌋. Then the \ geom.⌊etric⌋ / prop.⌊osition⌋
ment.⌊ioned⌋, in order to be expressed in our \ log⌊istic⌋ / symb⌊olism⌋,
has to be splitted into to⌊two⌋ parts⌊,⌋ namely there is at least one line and
there is at most one line. The first reads: (x, y)[P (x) . P (y) . 6= (xy) ⊃ J41.K
(∃u)[L(u) . J(xu) . J(yu)]]⌊.⌋ So that means that through any two diff⌊erent⌋
points there is. . . But it is not excl.⌊uded⌋ \ by that statement / that there
are two or three diff.⌊erent⌋ lines passing through two points. To express
That there are no \ two / diff⌊erent⌋ lines could be expr.⌊essed⌋ like this
(x, y)[P (x) . P (y) . 6= (xy) ⊃ ∼ (∃u, v)[L(u) . L(v) . 6= (u, v)⌊6= (uv) . ⌋
J(xu) . J(yu) . J(xv) . J(yv)]]
I hope these ex.⌊amples⌋ will suffice to make \ clear how the quantifiers
are to be used. / For any quantifier occurring in an expr⌊ession⌋ there is a
definite portion of the expr⌊ession⌋ to which it relates (called the scope of the
expression)⌊,⌋ e.g. scope of x whole expr.⌊ession,⌋ of y only this portion. . .
So the scope it⌊is⌋ the prop.⌊osition⌋ of which it is asserted that it holds
for all or every obj⌊ect⌋. ⌊I⌋t is indicated by the brackets which begin⌊s⌋
immediately behind the quantifier. There are some conv⌊entions⌋ about
leaving out this⌊these⌋ brack.⌊ets,⌋ namely they may be left out 1. ⌊i⌋f \ the /
scope is atomic⌊,⌋ e.g. (x)ϕ(x)∨⌊⊃⌋p⌊:⌋ (x)[ϕ(x)] ⊃ p⌊,⌋ not (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ p]⌊,⌋
2. if the scope begins with ∼ or a quant⌊ifier,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋
(x) ∼ [ϕ(x) . ψ(x)] ∨ p : (x)[∼ [ϕ(x) . ψ(x)]] ∨ p
(⌊perhaps proof correction mark for delete,
indicating that ϕ, ψ are to be replaced by⌋ Q,R)
(x)(∃y)ϕ(x) ∨ p : (x)[(∃y)[ψ⌊ϕ⌋(x)]] ∨ p
But these rules are only facultative⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. we may also write all the brackets
if \ it is / expedient for the sake of clarity⌊.⌋
A variable to which a quantifier (x)⌊,⌋ (y)⌊,⌋ (∃x)⌊,⌋ (∃y) refers is called
a ,,⌊“⌋bound variable”. In the examples which I gave, all variables J42.K are
bound (e.g. to this x relates this quant.⌊ifier⌋ etc⌊.⌋) and similarly to any
var.⌊iable⌋ occurring in those expr.⌊essions⌋ you can associate a quantifier
which refers to it. If however you take e.g. the exp⌊ression⌋: I(y).(∃x)[I(x). >
(yx)].⌊,⌋ which means: there is an int.⌊eger⌋ x smaller than y.⌊, t⌋hen
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here x is a bound var.⌊iable⌋ bec⌊ause⌋ the quantifier (∃x) refers to it.
But y is not bound bec⌊ause⌋ the expr⌊ession⌋ contains no quantifier re-
ferring to it⌊.⌋ Therefore y is called a free variable of this expression. An
expr.⌊ession⌋ containing free variables is not a propos.⌊ition⌋, but it only be-
comes a prop.⌊osition⌋ if the free variables are replaced by individual objects,
e.g. this expression here means J43.K ,,⌊“⌋There is an int.⌊eger⌋ smaller than
\ the int.⌊eger⌋ / y”. That evidently is not a \ definite / assertion which
is either true or wrong. But if you subst.⌊itute⌋ for the free var.⌊iable⌋
y a definite obj.⌊ect,⌋ e.g. 7⌊,⌋ then you obtain a definite prop.⌊osition,⌋
namely:⌊“⌋There is an int.⌊eger⌋ \ smaller ⌊than⌋ 7⌊”.⌋ /
⌊The paragraph that starts here and the next, which are entirely crossed
out, are on p. 43.1, inserted within p. 43 of the manuscript.⌋ Expressions
containing free var.⌊iables⌋ \ and such that they become prop.⌊ositions⌋ if. . .
/ are called prop.⌊ositional⌋ funct⌊ions⌋. Here we have a prop.⌊ositional⌋
funct⌊ion⌋ with one free var⌊iable⌋. There are also such ⌊functions⌋ with
two or more free variables. Any prop.⌊ositional⌋ f⌊u⌋unct⌊ion⌋ with one
var.⌊iable⌋ def.⌊ines⌋ a cert.⌊ain⌋ prop⌊erty⌋ and one with two variables a
cert.⌊ain⌋ dyadic rel⌊ation⌋.
⌊The scope of quantifiers mentioned in the crossed out paragraph that
starts here is considered in a text inserted on p. 41.⌋ To any quantif.⌊ier⌋
occurring in an expr⌊ession⌋ there is a definite portion of the expr⌊ession⌋
to which it relates, which is called the scope of the quantif.⌊ier⌋,⌊;⌋ it is
indicated by the brackets⌊,⌋ which opens immediately after the quantifier⌊,⌋
e.g. the scope of (x) in. . . is the whole expr.⌊ession:⌋it says for any x the
whole \ subsequ.⌊ent⌋ / prop.⌊osition⌋ is true⌊;⌋ the scope of y \ here / is
the rest of this exp.⌊ression⌋ bec⌊ause⌋ it says there is a y for which. . . You
see also that this bracket closes up here and this bracket here⌊.⌋
The bound variables have the property that it is entirely irrelevant by
which letters they are denoted⌊;⌋ e.g. (x)(∃y)[Φ(xy)] means exactly the same
thing as (u)(∃v)[Φ(uv)]⌊. T⌋he only requirement is that you must use differ-
ent letters for different bound variables⌊.⌋ But even that is only necessary for
variables J44.K one of whom is one contained in \ the scope of the / each other
as e⌊.⌋g⌊. in⌋ (x)[(∃y)Φ(xy)]⌊, w⌋here y is in the scope of x which is the whole
expr⌊ession, and⌋ therefor it has to be den⌊oted⌋ by a letter diff.⌊erent⌋ from
x⌊;⌋ (x)[(∃x)Φ(xx)] would be ambiguous. Bound variables whose scopes lie
outside of each other \ however can \ be denoted by the same letter without
any ambiguity⌊,⌋ e.g. (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ψ(x). For the sake of clarity we also
require that the free variables in a prop.⌊ositional⌋ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ should al-
NOTEBOOK IV 219
ways be denoted by letters different from the bound var⌊iables;⌋ so e⌊.⌋g⌊.⌋
ϕ(x) . (x)ψ(x) is no⌊t a⌋ correctly formed prop⌊ositional⌋ \ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion,⌋ /
but ϕ(x) . (y)ψ(y) is one⌊.⌋
The examples \ of formulas / which I gave \ last time and also the
problems to be \ solved ⌊unreadable word, perhaps “for”⌋ / / so far were
propositions concerning cert.⌊ain⌋ definite \ ⌊unreadable text⌋ / predicates
I, <, =, etc. They are true only for those part⌊icular⌋ pred.⌊icates⌋ occurring
in them. But now exactly as we had in the calc⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋ \ there
are / cert.⌊ain⌋ formulas which are true whatever prop.⌊ositions⌋ the letters
p, q, r may be so also in the enlarged calculus of pred.⌊icates⌋ J45.K there
will be certain formulas which are true for any \ arbitrary / predicates. I
denote arb⌊itrary⌋ pred.⌊icates⌋ by small Greek letters ϕ, ψ⌊.⌋ So these are
supposed to be variables for predicates exactly as p, q . . . are variables for
prop.⌊ositions⌋ and x, y, z are variables for obj.⌊ects.⌋ ⌊\ individual pred⌊i-
cates⌋. / ⌋
Now take e.g. \ the prop⌊osition⌋ (x)ϕ(x)∨ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x)⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. ,,⌊“⌋Ei-
ther every ind.⌊ividual⌋ has the prop.⌊erty ϕ or ther is an indiv⌊idual⌋
which has not the prop⌊erty⌋ ϕ”⌊.⌋ That will be true for any arbitrary
\ monadic / pred.⌊icate⌋ ϕ⌊.⌋ We ⌊had⌋ other examples before⌊,⌋ e⌊.⌋g⌊.⌋
(x)ϕ(x) ≡∼ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x) that again is true for ⌊text omitted in the manu-
script, should be: any arbitrary monadic predicate ϕ.⌋ Now exactly as in
the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋ such expr.⌊essions⌋ which are true for all
pred.⌊icates⌋are called tautologies or logically true or universally true. Among
them are e.g. all the form.⌊ulas⌋ which express the Arist.⌊otelian⌋ J46.K
moods of inf.⌊erence,⌋ e.g. \ the / mood b⌊B⌋arb.⌊ara⌋ is expr.⌊essed⌋ like
this:
(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)[ψ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] ⊃ (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ χ(x)]
The mood d⌊D⌋arii ⌊I⌋ like this
ϕ MaP ψ
χ SiM ϕ
SiP
(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (∃x)[χ(x) . ϕ(x)] ⊃ (∃x)[χ(x) . ψ(x)]
It is of course the chief aim of logic to investigate the⌊written over some-
thing else⌋ ⌊unreadable symbol⌋ tautologies and exactly as in the calc.⌊ulus⌋
of prop.⌊ositions⌋ there are \ again / two chief problems which arise. Namely
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⌊:⌋ 1. To develop methods for finding out about a given expr.⌊ession⌋ whether
or not it is a tautology⌊,⌋ 2. To reduce all taut.⌊ologies⌋ to a finite nu.⌊mber⌋
of logical axioms and rules of inf.⌊erence⌋ from which they can be derived. I
wish to mention right now that only J47.K the second problem can be solved
satisfactorily for the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of pred⌊icates⌋. One has actually succeeded
in setting up a system of ax.⌊ioms⌋ for it and in proving its completeness
(i⌊.⌋e. that every taut.⌊ology⌋ can be derived from it)⌊.⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ As to the first problem⌊,⌋ \ the so called decision
probl.⌊em,⌋ / it has also been solved \ in a sense / but \ in the / negative⌊,⌋
i⌊.⌋e. one has succeeded in \ proving / that there does not \ exist any /
mechanical proced.⌊ure⌋ to decide of any given expression whether or not it
is a tautology \ of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of pred⌊icates⌋. / That does not mean
mean that there are \ any individual / formulas of which one could not
decide whether or not they are J48.K taut⌊ologies⌋. It only means that it
is not poss.⌊ible⌋ to decide that by a \ purely / mech.⌊anical⌋ procedure.
For the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋ this was possible⌊,⌋ e.g. the truth⌊-
⌋table method is a purely mec.⌊hanical⌋ proc.⌊edure⌋ which allows to decide
of any given expr.⌊ession⌋ whether or not it is a taut⌊ology⌋. So what has
been proved is only that a similar thing cannot exist for the calc⌊ulus⌋ of
pred⌊icates⌋. However for certain particular \ special / kinds of formulas
such methods of decision have been developed⌊,⌋ e.g. for all form.⌊ulas⌋ with
only monadic pred.⌊icates⌋ (i⌊.⌋e. formulas without relations in it)⌊;⌋ J49.K
e.g. all form.⌊ulas⌋ expressing the Arist.⌊otelian⌋ moods are of this type ⌊full
stop deleted⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ no relations occur in the Arist.⌊otelian⌋ moods.
Before going into more detail about that I must say a few more words
about the notion of a taut.⌊ology⌋ of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of pred⌊icates⌋.
There are also taut⌊ologies⌋ which involve variables both for propositions
and for pred.⌊icates,⌋ e.g.
p . (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[p . ϕ(x)]
i⌊.⌋e. if p is an arb.⌊itrary⌋ prop⌊osition⌋ and ϕ an arb.⌊itrary⌋ pred.⌊icate⌋
then the assertion on the left⌊,⌋ i.e⌊.⌋ ,,⌊“⌋p is true and for every x⌊,⌋ ϕ(x)
is true” is equivalent with the assertion on the right⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. ,,⌊“⌋for every
obj.⌊ect⌋ J50.K x the conjunction p .ϕ(x) is true”. Let us prove that⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e.
let us prove that the left side implies the right side and vice versa the right
side implies the left side I. If the left side is true that means: p is true and for
every x⌊,⌋ ϕ(x) is true⌊,⌋ but then the right side is also true bec.⌊ause⌋ then
for every x⌊,⌋ p .ϕ(x) is evidently true [So the left side implies the right side].
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But also vice versa⌊:⌋ If for every x⌊,⌋ (x)[ p . ϕ(x) is true then 1. p must be
true bec.⌊ause⌋ otherwise p . ϕ(x) would be true for no x and 2. ϕ(x) must
be true for every x since by ass.⌊umption⌋ even p . ϕ(x) is true for every x.
So you see this equiv.⌊alence⌋ holds for any pred.⌊icate⌋ ϕ⌊,⌋ J51.K i⌊.⌋e. it
is a tautology.
⌊new paragraph⌋ There are four analogous taut.⌊ologies⌋ obtained by
repl.⌊acing⌋ . by ∨ and the un.⌊iversal⌋ qu.⌊antifier⌋ by the exist.⌊ential⌋
qu⌊antifier,⌋ namely
2. p ∨ (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)]
3. p . (∃x)ϕ(x) ≡ (∃x)[p . ϕ(x)]
4. p ∨ (∃x)ϕ(x) ≡ (∃x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)]
I shall give the proof for them later on⌊.⌋ These 4⌊four⌋ \ formulas / are of
a great importance because they allow to shift a quantifier over a symb⌊ol⌋
of conj⌊unction⌋ or disj⌊unction⌋. If you write ∼ p inst⌊ead⌋ of p in the first
you get [p ⊃ (x)ϕ(x)] ≡ (x)[p ⊃ ϕ(x)]. This law of logic is used particularly
frequently in proofs as you will see later⌊.⌋ Other ex.⌊amples⌋ of tautologies
are e.g⌊.⌋
(x)ϕ(x) . (x)ψ(x) ≡ (x)[ϕ(x) . ψ(x)]
(∃x)ϕ(x) ∨ (∃x)ψ(x) ≡ (∃x)[ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)]
or e.g.
∼ (x)(∃y)ϕ(xy) ≡ (∃x)(y) ∼ ϕ(xy)
J52.K That means:
Proof⌊.⌋ ∼ (x)(∃y)ϕ(xy) ≡
means
(∃x) ∼ (∃y)ϕ(xy), but ∼ (∃y)ϕ(xy) ≡
(y) ∼ ϕ(xy) as we saw before. Hence the whole expr.⌊ession⌋ is equiv.⌊alent⌋
with ≡ (∃x)(y) ∼ ϕ(xy) which was to be proved.
Another ex⌊ample⌋: (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x)⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. If ϕ bel. to every
ind.⌊ividual⌋ / has the prop⌊erty⌋ ϕ / then a fort.⌊iori⌋ there are ind.⌊ividuals⌋
which have the prop.⌊erty⌋ ϕ. The inverse of this prop.⌊osition⌋ no is no
taut.⌊ology,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋
(∃x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) is not a taut.⌊ology⌋
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bec.⌊ause⌋ if there is an obj.⌊ect⌋ x which has the prop⌊erty⌋ ϕ that does
not imply that every ind.⌊ividual⌋ has the prop.⌊erty⌋ ϕ.
⌊new paragraph⌋ But here there is an ⌊unreadable text, perhaps: ast.⌋
\ important / remark J53.K to be made. Namely: In order to prove that this
form⌊ula⌋ here is not a taut⌊ology⌋ we must know that there exists more
than one obj.⌊ect⌋ in the world. For if we assume that there exists only one
obj.⌊ect⌋ in the world then this form⌊ula⌋ would be true for every pred⌊icate⌋
ϕ⌊,⌋ hence would be a taut. \ universally true / bec⌊ause⌋ if there is only
one obj⌊ect,⌋ \ say a⌊,⌋ / in the world then if there is an obj⌊ect⌋ x for which
ϕ(x) is true this obj⌊ect⌋ must be a (since by ass⌊umption⌋ there is no other
obj.⌊ect⌋)⌊,⌋ hence ϕ(a) is true⌊;⌋ but then ϕ is true for every obj.⌊ect⌋
bec.⌊ause⌋ by ass.⌊umption⌋ there exists only this obj.⌊ect⌋ a. ⌊I.⌋e. in a
world with only one J54.K obj.⌊ect⌋ (∃x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) is a taut⌊ology⌋. It
is easy to ⌊find⌋ some expressions which are tautol. \ universally true / if
there are only two ind⌊ividuals⌋ in the world etc⌊.,⌋ e.g.
(∃x, y)[ψ(x) . ψ(y) . ϕ(x) . ∼ ϕ(y)] ⊃ (x)[ψ(x)]
At present \ I only wanted to point out that / the notion of a taut.⌊ology⌋
of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of pred⌊icates⌋ needs a further specific⌊ation⌋ in order to be
precise⌊.⌋ This specif⌊ication⌋ consists in this that an expr.⌊ession⌋ is called
a taut.⌊ology⌋ only if it \ ⌊is⌋ universally / true for \ every pred. / no
matter how many ind.⌊ividuals⌋ are in the world assuming only that there
is at least one (otherwise the meaning \ of the quantifiers is not ⌊unreadable
text, perhaps “definite”⌋ / ⌊).⌋ So e⌊.⌋g. \ (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)ϕ(y)⌊;⌋ / this is ⌊a⌋
taut.⌊ology⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ it is true. . . ⌊but this \ inverse / is not bec.⌊ause⌋ . . .
It can be proved that this means the same thing as if I said: An expr⌊ession
is⌋ a taut⌊ology⌋ if ⌊it⌋ is true in a world with infinitely many ind.⌊ividuals,⌋
i.e. one can prove that \ whenever an expr⌊ession⌋ is univ.⌊ersally⌋ / true in
a world
⌊This text is continued on p. 55., the first page of Notebook V. On a
new page after p. 54., the last page of the present notebook, one finds the
following jottings:⌋
interest lies in this, choice fortunate Ideenrealismus, lie betw, greater essence,
(predicate is asserted of), individuals property (quality) copula, (built up
of), (every), ⌊unreadable text, presumably in shorthand⌋, (reversed ∃) ⌊sign
pointing to (every) above⌋ property ⌊unreadable symbol⌋ Hamlet. property
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belongs to ⌊underlined unreadable text, presumably in shorthand, pointing
to Hamlet above⌋ author
(x, y)[P (x) . P (y) . 6= (xy) ⊃ (∃u)(v)[L(v) J(xu) . J(yv) ≡ . v = u]]
strict. implic.
2.5 Notebook V
⌊Folder 63, on the front cover of the notebook “Log.⌊ik⌋ Vorl.⌊esungen⌋
⌊German: Logic Lectures⌋ N.D. ⌊Notre Dame⌋ V”⌋
⌊The first page of this notebook, p. 55., begins with the second part of a
sentence interrupted at the end of p. 54. of Notebook IV.⌋
J55.K with infinitely many obj⌊ects⌋ it is true in any world no matter how
many ind.⌊ividuals⌋ there may be and of course also vice versa. I shall not
prove this equiv.⌊alence⌋ but shall stick to the first definition.
The formulas by which we expressed the taut.⌊ologies⌋ contain free var.⌊i-
ables⌋ (not for individuals) but for predicates and for prop.⌊ositions,⌋ e.g. ϕ
here is a free var⌊iable⌋ in this expr.⌊ession⌋ (no quant⌊ifier⌋ related to it⌊,⌋
i⌊.⌋e. no (ϕ) (∃ϕ) occurs)⌊;⌋ similarly here⌊,⌋ \ ⌊s⌋o these form⌊ulas⌋ are
really prop⌊ositional⌋ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ since they contain free var⌊iables.⌋ ⌊and
bec⌊ause⌋ prop.⌊ositions⌋ if etc.⌋ / [And the def⌊inition⌋ of a taut⌊ology⌋ was
that whatever part.⌊icular⌋ prop.⌊osition⌋ or pred.⌊icate⌋ you subst.⌊itute⌋
for those free var⌊iables⌋ of pred⌊icates⌋ or prop⌊ositions⌋ you get a true
prop⌊osition.⌋ The var⌊iables⌋ for ind⌊ividuals⌋ were all bound⌊.⌋] We can
extend the notion of a J56.K taut.⌊ology⌋ also to such expr.⌊essions⌋ as con-
tain free variables for indiv⌊iduals,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋
ϕ(x) ∨ ∼ ϕ(x)
This is a prop.⌊ositional⌋ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ containing one free funct⌊ional⌋ var⌊i-
able⌋ and one free indiv⌊idual⌋ variable x and whatever obj⌊ect⌋ and pred.⌊i-
cate⌋ you subst⌊itute⌋ for ϕ, x you get a true prop⌊osition.⌋ For⌊mula⌋
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y)
contains ϕ, y and \ is / univ.⌊ersally⌋ true bec.⌊ause⌋ ifM is an \ arb.⌊itrary⌋
/ pred.⌊icate and⌋ a ⌊an⌋ \ arb.⌊itrary⌋ / ind.⌊ividual⌋ then
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(x)M(x) ⊃M(a)
So in gen.⌊eral⌋ a tauto⌊logical⌋ \ logical formula / of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of
funct.⌊ions⌋ is a expr.⌊ession⌋ \ prop.⌊ositional⌋ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ / composed
of the above mentioned symbols and which is true whatever part.⌊icular⌋
J57.K objects and predic.⌊ates⌋ and prop.⌊ositions⌋ you subst⌊itute⌋ for free
var.⌊iables⌋ \ no matter how many ind⌊ividuals⌋ there exist⌊.⌋ / We can
of course express this \ fact⌊,⌋ namely / that a cert.⌊ain⌋ formula is a
universally⌊,⌋ true by writing quantifiers in front⌊,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋
(ϕ, x)[ϕ(x) ∨ ∼ ϕ(x)]
or
(ϕ, y)[(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y)]
⌊unreadable text⌋ ⌊F⌋or the taut⌊ology⌋ of the calc⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋
(p, q)[p ⊃ p ∨ q]
But it is more convenient to make the convention that univ.⌊ersal⌋ quanti-
fiers whose scope is the whole expr.⌊ession⌋ may be left out⌊.⌋ So if a formula
cont.⌊aining⌋ free var.⌊iables⌋ is written down as an assertion⌊,⌋ \ e.g. as an
axiom or theorem⌊,⌋ / it means that it holds for everything subst.⌊ituted⌋
for the \ free / var.⌊iables,⌋ i.e. it means the same thing as if all var.⌊iables⌋
were bound by quantifiers whose scope is the whole expr⌊ession.⌋ \ This
\ convention / is in agreement with the way in which the theorems are ex-
pressed in math.⌊ematics,⌋ e.g. the law of raising a sum to the square is
written (x + y)2 = x2 + 2xy + y2⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. with free var.⌊iables⌋ x, y which
express that this holds for any num⌊bers.⌋ / J57.1K ⌊This page begins with
a crossed out part of a sentence.⌋ It is also in agreement with our use of
the variables for propositions in the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋. The ax-
ioms and theorems of the prop.⌊ositional⌋ calc.⌊ulus⌋ were written with free
var.⌊iables,⌋ for prop.⌊ositions⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ p ⊃ p ∨ q⌊,⌋ and such a formula like
this was understood to mean that it holds for any prop.⌊ositions⌋ p, q⌊.⌋ ⌊The
remainder of this page, until the line near the top of p. 58. beginning with
“I hope that”, is crossed out in the manuscript: (So it means what we would
have to express by the use of quantifiers by (p, q)[q ⊃ p∨ q]. And in a similar
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sense we shall also use free variables for pred.⌊icates⌋ to express that some-
thing holds for any arb.⌊itrary⌋ pred.⌊icate.⌋ So it is quite⌋ J58.K natural
that we make the same convention.
I hope that these examples will be sufficient and that I can \ now /
begin with setting up the axiomatic system for the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of pred⌊icates⌋
\ which allows to derive all taut.⌊ologies⌋ of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of pred⌊icates⌋.
/ The primit.⌊ive⌋ notions will be 1. the former ∼,∨ 2. the univ⌊ersal⌋
quant.⌊ifier⌋ (x), (y)⌊.⌋ The exist⌊ential⌋ quant⌊ifier⌋ need not be taken as
a primit.⌊ive⌋ notion because it can be def⌊ined⌋ in terms of ∼ and (x) by
(∃x)ϕ(x) ≡∼ (x) ∼ ϕ(x)⌊.⌋ The form⌊ulas⌋ of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of pred.⌊icates⌋
will be composed of three kinds of letters⌊:⌋ p, q, . . . prop⌊ositional⌋ var.⌊ia-
bles,⌋ ϕ, ψ, . . . \ functional / var⌊iables⌋ for pred.⌊icates,⌋ x, y, . . . var.⌊iables⌋
for individuals. Furthermore they will contain J59.K (x)⌊, ⌋(y)⌊, ⌋ ∼ ⌊, ⌋∨ and
the notions defined by those 3⌊three,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. (∃x), (∃y),⊃, .,≡, | etc. ⌊The fol-
lowing text written on the right of p. 59. in the manuscript is numbered 59.1,
but since the whole of that text is marked in the manuscript for insertion on p.
59., the number of the page 59.1. is deleted.⌋ \ So the quantifiers apply only
to ind.⌊ividual⌋ var.⌊iables,⌋ prop⌊ositional⌋ and funct.⌊ional⌋ var.⌊iables⌋
are free⌊,⌋ \ i.e. that something holds for all p, ϕ is to be expressed by free
var⌊iables⌋ according to the conv.⌊ention⌋ mentioned before⌊.⌋ /
So all formulas given as ex.⌊amples⌋ \ before / are examples for expr.⌊es-
sions⌋ of the calc⌊ulus⌋ of funct⌊ions⌋ but also e⌊.⌋g⌊.⌋ (∃x)ψ(xy) ⌊and⌋
[p . (∃x)ψ(xy)] ∨ ϕ(y) \ would be ex⌊amples⌋ / etc. I am using the let-
ters Φ,Ψ,Π⌊comma from the manuscript deleted⌋ to denote arbitrary ex-
pressions of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of pred⌊icates⌋ and if I wish to ind.⌊icate⌋ that
some var⌊iable⌋ say x occurs in a form⌊ula⌋ as a free var⌊iable⌋ denote the
form.⌊ula⌋ by Φ(x)or
∨
Ψ(xy) \ if x, y occur both free⌊,⌋ / which does not ex-
clude that there may be other free var.⌊iables⌋ bes.⌊ides⌋ x, or x and y⌊,⌋ in
the form⌊ula⌋. /
The axioms are like this:
I. The four ax.⌊ioms⌋ of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋
p ⊃ p ∨ q p ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ p
p ∨ p ⊃ p (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)
II⌊.⌋One specific ax.⌊iom⌋ for the univ.⌊ersal⌋ quantifier
⌊Ax. 5⌋ (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y)
This is the formula mentioned before which says: ,,⌊“⌋For any y⌊,⌋ \ ϕ / it
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is true that if ϕ holds for every x then it holds for y”⌊.⌋
These are all ax.⌊ioms⌋ which we need. [They are expressed by using free
var.⌊iables⌋ p, ϕ, y in the sense just discussed.] The rules of inf⌊erence⌋ are
the following 4⌊four:⌋
J60.K
1.⌊1⌋ The rule of impl⌊ication which reads exactly as for the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of
prop⌊ositions:⌋ If Φ,Ψ are any expr.⌊essions⌋ then from Φ,Φ ⊃ Ψ you
can conclude ⌊Ψ⌋⌊.⌋
The only diff⌊erence⌋ is that now Φ,Ψ are expr.⌊essions⌋ which may in-
volve quantifiers and funct⌊ional⌋ var.⌊iables⌋ and individual var.⌊iables⌋ in
add.⌊ition⌋ to the symb⌊ols⌋ occuring in the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋.
\ So e⌊.⌋g⌊.⌋ from [p ∨ (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x)]] ⊃ ϕ(y) ∨ ∼ ϕ(y)
and [p ∨ (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x)]]
concl.⌊ude⌋ ϕ(y) ∨ ∼ ϕ(y) /
2.⌊2⌋ The rule of Subst.⌊itution⌋ which has now 3⌊three⌋ parts (accord.⌊ing⌋
to the 3⌊three⌋ kinds of var.⌊iables⌋)⌊:⌋
1. For prop.⌊ositional⌋ var.⌊iables⌋ p, q any expr.⌊ession may be
subst.⌊ituted⌋
1.⌊a)⌋ For ind.⌊ividual⌋ var⌊iables⌋ x, y \ bound or free / any other
ind.⌊ividual⌋ var⌊iable⌋ may be subst⌊ituted⌋ as long as our con-
ventions \ about the not.⌊ion⌋ of free var.⌊iables⌋ / are observed⌊,⌋
i.e. bound variable are whose scopes do not ly⌊ie⌋ outside of each
other must be denoted by diff.⌊erent⌋ letters and that all free
variables must be denoted by letters different from all bound
var.⌊iables⌋ – [Rule \ of / renaming the ind⌊ividual⌋ variables.]⌊].⌋
J61.K
2.⌊b)⌋ For a prop.⌊ositional⌋ var⌊iable⌋ any expre⌊ession⌋ may be subst-
⌊ituted⌋ \ with a cert⌊ain⌋ restriction form⌊ulated⌋ later⌊.⌋
3.⌊c)⌋ If you have the an expr⌊ession⌋ Π ⌊(e.g. . . )⌋ and ϕ a prop.⌊osition-
al⌋ ⌊functional⌋ variable occurring ⌊in⌋ Π perhaps on sev.⌊eral⌋
places and with diff.⌊erent⌋ arg⌊uments⌋ ϕ(x)⌊,⌋ ϕ(y)⌊,⌋ . . . and
if Φ(x) is an expr.⌊ession⌋ containing x free then you may subs.⌊ti-
tute⌋ Φ(x) for ϕ(x)⌊,⌋ Φ(y) for ϕ(y) etc⌊.⌋ simultaneously in all
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places wher⌊e⌋ ϕ occurs. Similarly for ϕ(xy) ⌊and⌋ Φ(xy)⌊\ it
concerns the letters by which the. . . / ⌋
⌊The following text on the rest of this page is crossed out in the manuscript:
Take e.g. (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y) and consider the expr.⌊ession⌋ (∃z)ψ(zx) which
is a prop.⌊ositional⌋ f⌊u⌋nct⌊tion⌋ with one free ind.⌊ividual⌋ var⌊iable⌋. If
we subst⌊itute⌋ this expr⌊ession⌋ for ϕ of the first expr.⌊ession⌋
In all those three rules of subst⌊itution⌋ we have only to be careful about
one thing which may be expr.⌊essed⌋ roughly speaking by saying⌊:⌋ The
bound variables must not get mixed up. But⌋
J61.1K It is clear that this is a correct inf⌊erence,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ gives a taut⌊olo-
gy⌋ if the formula in which we subst⌊itute⌋ is a taut⌊ology,⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ if a
form.⌊ula⌋ \ is / ⌊a⌋ taut⌊ology⌋ that means that it holds for any propert⌊y⌋
or rel.⌊ation⌋ ϕ, ψ⌊,⌋ but \ any / prop⌊ositional⌋ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ with one or
several free var.⌊iables⌋ defines a cert⌊ain⌋ prop⌊erty⌋ or rel.⌊ation;⌋ there-
fore the form⌊ula⌋ must hold for them. \ Take e.g. the taut.⌊ology⌋ /
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y) and subst⌊itute⌋ for ϕ the expr⌊ession⌋ (∃z)ψ(zx) \ which
has one free ind.⌊ividual⌋ variable / . Now the last form.⌊ula⌋ says that
for every prop.⌊erty⌋ ϕ and any ind⌊ividual⌋ y we have: ,,⌊“⌋If for any x
ϕ(x) then ϕ(y)”⌊.⌋ Since this holds for any prop.⌊erty⌋ \ ϕ / . But if ψ
is an arb.⌊itrary⌋ rel.⌊ation⌋ then (∃z)ψ(zx) defines a cert⌊ain⌋ prop.⌊erty⌋
bec.⌊ause⌋ it is a prop⌊ositional⌋ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ with one free var⌊iable⌋ x.
Hence the ab.⌊ove⌋ form.⌊ula⌋ must hold also for this prop⌊erty,⌋ i.e. we
have: If for every object (x)[(∃z)ψ(zx)] then also for y ⌊⊃⌋(∃z)ψ(zy) and
that will be true whatever the rel.⌊ation⌋ ψ \ and the object y / may be⌊,⌋
i⌊.⌋e. it is again a taut⌊ology⌋.
J62.K
⌈
You see in this process of subst.⌊itution⌋ we have sometimes to
change the free variables⌊,⌋ like⌊as⌋ here we have to change x into y bec.⌊ause⌋
the ϕ occurs with the var⌊iable⌋ y here⌊;⌋ if the ϕ occurred with the var.⌊iable⌋
u ϕ(u) we would have to subst.⌊itute⌋ (∃z)ψ(zu) in this place.
⌋
In this
ex.⌊ample⌋ we subst.⌊ituted⌋ an expr.⌊ession⌋ cont.⌊aining⌋ x as \ ⌊the⌋ only
free var.⌊iable,⌋ but / we can subst⌊itute⌋ for ϕ(x) here also an expr⌊ession⌋
which contains other free \ ind.⌊ividual⌋ variables besides x⌊,⌋ and i⌊.⌋e.
\ also in this case we shall obtain a taut⌊ology⌋. Take e.g. the expr.⌊ession⌋
(∃z)χ(zxu). This is a prop.⌊ositional⌋ funct⌊ion⌋ with the free ind.⌊ividual⌋
var.⌊iable⌋ x but it has the free ind.⌊ividual⌋ var⌊iable⌋ u in addition. Now
if we replace χ by a spec.⌊ial⌋ triadic rel.⌊ation⌋ R and u by a spec.⌊ial⌋
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obj⌊ect⌋ a then (∃z)R(zxa) is a prop.⌊ositional⌋ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ with one free
var.⌊iable⌋ x⌊;⌋ hence
⌊As indicated by “63.1” at the bottom on the right of this page, the
sentence interrupted here is continued on p. 63.1, after the last sentence on
this page which is crossed out, and the entirely crossed out p. 63, which
together make the following text: Therefore ⌊unreadable text⌋ rel⌊ation⌋
between x, u but if we replace u by J63.K an individ.⌊ual⌋ obj.⌊ect⌋ say a then
(∃z)χ(zxa) is now a prop.⌊ositional⌋ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ with one free var.⌊iable⌋
x⌊,⌋ i.e. defines a cert.⌊ain⌋ property of x. Therefore we can substitute it for
ϕ in the above taut⌊ology⌋ and obtain
(x)[(∃z)χ(zxa)] ⊃ (∃z)χ(zya)
But now this will be correct whatever the obj⌊ect⌋ a may be⌊,⌋ i.e. we can
replace a by a variable u and obt.⌊ain⌋
(x)[(∃z)χ(zxu)] ⊃ (∃z)χ(zyu)
and this will be a taut.⌊ology,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. true whatever u, y, χmay be. So the rule
of subst.⌊itution⌋ is to be understood to mean for ϕ(x) one can subst.⌊itute⌋
an expr⌊ession⌋ containing at least the free var⌊iable⌋ x but⌋
J63.1K ⌊it⌋ defines a cert.⌊ain⌋ prop.⌊erty,⌋ hence the above form⌊ula⌋
holds⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋
(x)(∃z)R(zxa) ⊃ (∃z)R(zya)
whatever y may be⌊,⌋ but this will be true whatever R, a may be⌊;⌋ therefore
if we replace them by var⌊iables⌋ \ χ, u / the form⌊ula⌋ obtained:
(x)(∃z)χ(zxu) ⊃ (∃z)χ(zyu)
and this will be true for any χ, u, y⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. it is a taut⌊ology⌋. So the rule of
subst.⌊itution⌋ is also correct for expr.⌊essions⌋ containing add.⌊itional⌋ free
var.⌊iables⌋ u, and therefore this Φ(x) is to mean an expr.⌊ession⌋ containing
\ the free var⌊iable⌋ / x but perhaps some other free var.⌊iables⌋ in addition.
J64.K Examples for the other two rules of subst.⌊itution:⌋
⌊1.⌋ ⌊F⌋or prop.⌊ositional⌋ var.⌊iable⌋
p . (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[p . ϕ(x)]
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subst⌊itute⌋ (∃z)ψ(z). Since this holds for every prop⌊osition⌋ it holds also
for (∃z)ψ(z) which is a prop⌊osition⌋ if ψ is any arb.⌊itrary⌋ pred.⌊icate.⌋
⌊unreadable word⌋ Hence we have for any pred.⌊icates⌋ ψ, ϕ
(∃z)ψ(z) . (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[(∃z)ψ(z) . ϕ(x)]
But we are also allowed to subst⌊itute⌋ expr.⌊essions⌋ containing free var.⌊ia-
bles⌋ and prop.⌊ositional⌋ var.⌊iables⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ p ⊃ (z)χ(zu) (free var⌊iable⌋ u)
bec.⌊ause⌋ if \ you / take \ for / u be any ind.⌊ividual⌋ obj.⌊ect⌋ \ a / [and
p any indiv.⌊idual⌋ prop⌊osition⌋ \ pi / ] and χ any rel.⌊ation⌋ \ R / then
J65.K this will be a prop⌊osition⌋. hence And p.(x)ϕ(x)⌊≡⌋(x)[p.ϕ(x)] holds
for any prop⌊osition⌋. So it will also hold for this⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e.
[p ⊃(z)χ(zu)] . (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[p ⊃(z)χ(zu) . ϕ(x)]
will be true whatever p, χ, ϕ, u may be⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ a tautology.
Finally an example for subst.⌊itution⌋ of ind.⌊ividual⌋ var⌊iables:⌋
⌊1.⌋ For a bound (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y) ⌊:⌋ (z)ϕ(z) ⊃ ϕ(y). So this inf.⌊erence⌋
merely brings out the fact that the notation of bound variables is
arb⌊itrary⌋.
⌊2.⌋ The rule of subst.⌊itution⌋ applied for free var.⌊iables⌋ is more essen-
tial⌊;⌋ e.g. ⌊f⌋rom (x⌊, ⌋y)ϕ(xy) ⊃ ϕ(uv) we can conclude (x⌊, ⌋y)ϕ(xy)
⊃ ϕ(uu) \ by subst.⌊ituting⌋ u for v. This is an all.⌊owable⌋ subst.⌊itu-
tion⌋ because the variable which you subst.⌊itute,⌋ u⌊,⌋ does⌊ ⌋not oc-
cur as a bound var⌊iable⌋. It occurs as a free var⌊iable⌋ but that
does⌊ ⌋not matter⌊.⌋
Of course if a var.⌊iable⌋ occurs in sev.⌊eral⌋ places it has to be replaced
by the same other var⌊iable⌋ J66.K in all places where it occurs. In the rule
of subst⌊itution⌋ for prop.⌊ositional⌋ and functional \ variable there is one
restriction to be made as I mentioned before, namely one has / to be careful
about the letters which we \ one / uses for the bound variables⌊,⌋ e.g.
(∃x)[p . ϕ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)[p . ϕ(x)]
\ is a tautol⌊ogy⌋. / Here we cannot subst⌊itute⌋ ψ(x) for p bec⌊ause⌋ ⌊ie.⌋
(∃x)[ψ(x) . ϕ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)[ψ(x) . ϕ(x)]
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is not a tautology⌊,⌋ e.g. we cannot subst.⌊itute⌋ here for p the expr.⌊ession⌋
ψ(x) i⌊.⌋e. ψ(x) . ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[ψ(x) . ϕ(x)] ⌊is not a tautology⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ here
the expr.⌊ession⌋ which we subst.⌊ituted⌋ contains a var⌊iable⌋ x which
is bound in the expr⌊ession⌋ in which we substitute⌊.⌋ \ Reason⌊:⌋ This
form⌊ula⌋ holds for any prop.⌊osition⌋ p but not for any prop.⌊ositional⌋
f⌊u⌋nct.⌊ion⌋ with the free var.⌊iable⌋ x⌊.⌋ ⌊Before the next sentence a hor-
izontal line is drawn in the manuscript.⌋ Now if we subst⌊itute⌋ for p an
expr.⌊ession⌋ Φ containing perhaps free var⌊iables⌋ y, z, . . . (but not the free
var⌊iable⌋ x) then y, z will be free in the whole expr⌊ession⌋. Therefore if
y, z, . . . are replaced by definite things then Φ will bec.⌊ome⌋ a prop.⌊osition⌋
bec⌊ause⌋ then all free var⌊iables⌋ con⌊tained⌋ in it are repl.⌊aced⌋ by def.⌊i-
nite⌋ obj⌊ects⌋. ⌊After the preceding sentence a horizontal line is drawn in
the manuscript.⌋
Therefore the expr⌊ession⌋ to be subst⌊ituted⌋ must not contain x as a
free var.⌊iable⌋ because it would play the role of a prop.⌊ositional⌋ f⌊u⌋nc-
t⌊ion⌋ and not of a prop⌊osition⌋. In order to avoid such / \ occurrences / we
have to make in the rule of subst⌊itution⌋ the further stipulation that the
expr.⌊ession⌋ to be subst⌊ituted⌋ should contain no variable J67.K (bound or
free) which occurs in the expr.⌊ession⌋ in which we substitute bound or free⌊,⌋
exc.⌊luding⌋ ⌊[⌋of course the variable x here⌊]⌋⌊.⌋ If you add this restriction
you obtain the formulation of the rule of subst⌊itution⌋ which you have in
your notes that were distributed.
⌊The following text is crossed out in the manuscript: which are iden-
tified with x ⌊unreadable word⌋ ϕ(x). But besides these the expr.⌊ession⌋
should contain no var.⌊iable⌋ which occurs in the expr.⌊ession⌋ in which we
subst.⌊itute⌋ \ So this restriction has to be added to the rule of subst⌊itution⌋.
/ So the final form of the rule of subst⌊itution⌋ is as follows:⌋
So far I formulated two rules of inf⌊erence⌋ (impl⌊ication,⌋ subst.⌊itution⌋).
The third is ⌊displayed with number 3⌋ the rule of defined symb⌊ol⌋ which
reads:
1. For any expre⌊essions⌋ Φ,Ψ⌊,⌋ Φ ⊃ Ψ may be repl.⌊aced⌋ by ∼ Φ ∨Ψ
and similarly for . ⌊and⌋ ≡.
J68.K
2. (∃x)Φ(x) may be repl.⌊aced⌋ by ∼ (x) ∼ Φ(x) \ and vice versa / where
Φ(x) is any expr.⌊ession⌋ containing the free var.⌊iable⌋ x⌊.⌋ (So that
means that the exist.⌊ential⌋ quantifier is def.⌊ined⌋ by means of the
univ.⌊ersal⌋ quant.⌊ifier⌋ in our syst⌊em⌋.)
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⌊unreadable word⌋ ⌊T⌋he three rules of inf⌊erence⌋ ment.⌊ioned⌋ so far
(impl.⌊ication⌋, subst⌊itution,⌋ def.⌊ined⌋ symb⌊ol⌋) corresp⌊ond⌋ exactly to
the three rules of inf.⌊erence⌋ which we had in the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋.
Now we set up a fourth one which is specific for the univ⌊ersal⌋ quantifier⌊,⌋
namely:
4.⌊4⌋ \ Rule of the universal quantifier⌊:⌋ / From Π ⊃ Φ(x)⌊,⌋ if Π does not
contain x as a free var.⌊iable⌋ we can conclude J69.K Π ⊃ (x)Φ(x).
That this inf.⌊erence⌋ is correct can be seen like this: Assume pi is a defi-
nite propos⌊ition⌋ andM(x) a ⌊unreadable word⌋ \ definite / prop.⌊ositional⌋
f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ with \ exactly one free var.⌊iable⌋ x and let us assume we know:
pi ⊃M(x) ⌊colon deleted⌋ holds for every x⌊.⌋ Then I say we can conclude:
pi ⊃ (x)M(x)⌊.⌋ For 1. ⌊i⌋f pi is false the concl⌊usion⌋ holds⌊,⌋ 2. if pi is
true then by ass⌊umption⌋ M(x) is true for every x⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ (x)M(x) is
true⌊;⌋ hence the conclusion again holds bec.⌊ause⌋ it is an impl.⌊ication⌋
both terms of which are true⌊.⌋
⌊The following text is crossed out in the manuscript: pi ⊃ M(x) reason:
For every obj⌊ect⌋ x it is true that: If pi then x has the prop.⌊erty⌋ \ def⌊ined⌋
by M / ⌊unreadable symbol⌋ But then it follows: If pi is true then every
obj.⌊ect⌋ has the prop.⌊erty⌋ M i⌊.⌋e. pi ⊃ (x)M(x) bec⌊ause⌋ assume pi is
true then owing to this M(x) is true whatever x may ⌊be⌋ bec⌊ause⌋ \ this
impl.⌊ication⌋ holds / i⌊.⌋e. (x)M(x) is true⌋
So we have proved that in any case pi ⊃ (x)M(x) \ is true if pi ⊃ M(x)
is true for every x / . But from this consid.⌊eration⌋ about a part.⌊icular⌋
prop.⌊osition⌋ pi and a part.⌊icular⌋ prop.⌊ositional⌋ J70.K \ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋
with one free var⌊iable⌋ / M(x) it follows that the above rule of inf.⌊erence⌋
yields tautologies if applied to tautologies. Bec.⌊ause⌋⌊a⌋ssume Π ⊃ Φ(x) is
a taut⌊ology.⌋ Now then Π will cont.⌊ain⌋ some free var.⌊iables⌋ for prop⌊osi-
tions⌋ p, q, . . . for fu⌊nctions⌋ ϕ, ψ, . . . and for ind.⌊ividuals⌋ y, z, . . . (x does
not occur among them) and Φ(x) will also contain \ free / var.⌊iables⌋
p, q, . . .⌊,⌋ ϕ, ψ, . . . and \ free / var.⌊iables⌋ for ind⌊ividuals⌋ x, y, z (x
among them). Now if you subst⌊itute⌋ def.⌊inite⌋ prop⌊ositions⌋ for p, q⌊,⌋
def.⌊inite⌋ pred⌊icates⌋ for ϕ, ψ and def.⌊inite⌋ obj.⌊ects⌋ for y, z, . . . but
leave x w.⌊here⌋ it stands then J71.K by this subst.⌊itution⌋ all free var.⌊iables⌋
of Π are replaced by indiv.⌊idual⌋ objects, hence Π becomes a definite assertion
prop.⌊osition⌋ pi and all free var.⌊iables⌋ of Φ exc.⌊luding⌋ x are repl.⌊aced⌋
by obj.⌊ects;⌋ hence Φ(x) becomes a prop.⌊ositional⌋ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ with one
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free var.⌊iable⌋M(x) which defines a cert.⌊ain⌋ monadic predicateM and we
know pi ⊃ M(x) is true for any obj.⌊ect⌋ x bec.⌊ause⌋ the it is obt.⌊ained⌋
by subst⌊itution⌋ of indiv.⌊idual⌋pred⌊icates⌋, prop⌊ositions and⌋ obj⌊ects⌋
in a taut⌊ology⌋. But then \ as we have just seen under this ass⌊umption⌋
pi ⊃ (x)M(x) is true. But this argum⌊ent⌋ applies whatever part.⌊icular⌋
pred.⌊icate,⌋ J72.K prop.⌊osition⌋ etc⌊.⌋ we subst.⌊itute;⌋ always the result
pi ⊃ (x)M(x) is true⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. Π ⊃ (x)Φ(x) is a taut⌊ology⌋. \ ⌊T⌋his rule of
course is meant \ to apply / to any other ind.⌊ividual⌋ var.⌊iable⌋ y, z instead
of x ⌊.⌋ / So these are the axioms and rules of inf.⌊erence⌋ of which one can
prove that they are complete: i.e⌊.⌋ every taut.⌊ology⌋ of the cal⌊culus⌋ of
f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ can be derived⌊.⌋ ⌊Here one finds in the manuscript an inser-
tion sign to which no text to be inserted corresponds, and the page is divided
by a sinuous horizontal line.⌋
Now I want to give some examples \ for derivations from these ax⌊ioms⌋.
Again an expression will be called demonstrable or derivable if it can be
obtained from Ax⌊ioms⌋ 1 . . . 5 ⌊(1). . . (4) and Ax. 5⌋ by rules 1 – 4. / First
of all I wish to remark that, since among our ax.⌊ioms⌋ and rules all ax⌊ioms⌋
and rules of the calc⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋ occur, we can derive from our
ax.⌊ioms⌋ and rules all formulas and rules which we formerly derived in the
calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋. \ But \ the rules ⌊are⌋ now / formulated ⌊now⌋
for the all expr.⌊essions⌋ of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of pred.⌊icates,⌋ e.g. \ if Φ,Ψ /
⌊are such expressions⌋
Φ ⊃ Ψ
Ψ ⊃ Π
Φ ⊃ Π /
So we are justified to use them in the subsequ.⌊ent⌋ J73.K derivations.
At first I mention some further rules of ⌊the⌋ calc.⌊ulus⌋ \ of prop.⌊ositions⌋
/ which I shall need:
1. P ≡ Q : P ⊃ Q, Q ⊃ P and vice versa
2. P ≡ Q ⌊:⌋ ∼ P ≡∼ Q
1′. p ≡∼∼ p (2′. p ≡ p)
3′. (p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q (p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q) Import.⌊ation⌋
1. ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x)
(x)[∼ ϕ(x)] ⊃∼ ϕ(y) Subst.⌊itution,⌋ Ax⌊. ⌋5
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ϕ(y) ⊃∼ (x)[∼ ϕ(x)] Transp.⌊osition⌋ ∼ ϕ(x)
ϕ(x)
ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) def.⌊ined⌋ symb.⌊ol⌋
2. (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x)
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y) Ax. 5
ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) 1⌊.⌋
⌊The next page of the manuscript is not numbered and contains only the
following heading:
Log.⌊ik⌋ Vorl.⌊esungen⌋ ⌊German: Logic Lectures⌋ Notre Dame
1939
This page and the pages following it up to p. 73.7, which makes nine pages,
are on loose, torn out, leafs, with holes for a spiral, but not bound with the
spiral to the rest of the notebook, as the other pages in this Notebook V are.
In all of the notebooks the only other loose leafs are to be found at the end
of Notebooks III and VII.⌋
J73.1K Last time I set up a system of axioms and rules of inf.⌊erence⌋ from
which it is possible to derive all tautologies of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of predicates.
Incidentally I wish to mention that ⌊the⌋ technical term tautology is some-
what out of use \ fashion / at present⌊,⌋ the word analytical (which goes back
to Kant) is used in it’s ⌊its⌋ place, and that has certain advantages because
analytical is an indifferent term whereas the term tautological suggests a cer-
tain philosophy of logic⌊,⌋ namely \ the theory / that the propositions \ of
logic / are in some sense void of content⌊,⌋ that they say nothing⌊.⌋ Of course
it is by no means necessary for a J73.2K mathematical logician to adopt this
theory, bec.⌊ause⌋ math.⌊ematical⌋ logic is a purely math.⌊ematical⌋ theory
which is wholly indiff.⌊erent⌋ towards ⌊any⌋ phil.⌊osophical⌋ question. So if
I use this term tautological I don’t want to imply \ by that / any definite
standpoint as to the essence of logic⌊,⌋ but \ the term taut.⌊ological⌋ / is
only to be understood as a shorter expr.⌊ession⌋ for universally true. Now
as to our axiomatic syst.⌊em⌋ the Axioms were as follows 1. 2. Rules of
inf⌊erence⌋
1.⌊1⌋ Implic⌊ation⌋ Φ,Φ ⊃ Ψ : Ψ
2.⌊2⌋ Subst.⌊itution⌋ ⌊a⌋) indiv.⌊idual⌋ var⌊iables⌋
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b) prop.⌊ositional⌋ var.⌊iables⌋
d.⌊c⌋) funct.⌊ional⌋ ⌊variables⌋
3.⌊3⌋ Rule of def.⌊ined⌋ symb.⌊ol⌋
1. For .⌊,⌋ ⊃⌊,⌋ ≡ as formerly
2. (∃x)Φ(x) may be repl.⌊aced⌋ by ∼ (x) ∼ Φ(x) and vice versa
4.⌊4⌋ Rule of the univ⌊ersal⌋ quantifier
Φ ⊃ Ψ(x) . . ⌊:⌋ Φ ⊃ (x)Ψ(x)
J73.3K It may seem superfluous to formulate \ so carefully / the stipula-
tions about the letters which we have to use for the bound var.⌊iables⌋ here
in rule 3.⌊2⌋ because if you take account of the meaning of the expr.⌊essions⌋
involved you will observe these rules automatically⌊,⌋ because otherwise they
would either be ambiguous or not have the intended \ meaning⌊.⌋ / To this it
is to be answered that it is exactly one of the \ chief / purpose of the axiom-
atization of logic \ to avoid this reference to the meaning of the formulas⌊,⌋
i⌊.⌋e. we want to / ⌊to⌋ set up a calculus which can be handled purely me-
chanically (i⌊.⌋e. \ a calculus / which makes thinking superfluous J73.4K and
which can replace thinking for cert⌊ain⌋ quest⌊ions⌋)⌊.⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ In other words we want to put into effect as far as pos-
sible Leibnitz⌊’s; or perhaps “Leibnitzian”⌋ program of a ,,⌊“⌋calculus rati-
ocinator” which he c⌊h⌋aracter⌊izes⌋ by saying:⌊colon from the manuscript
deleted⌋ ⌊that⌋ ⌊h⌋e expects there will be a time in the future when there
will be no discussion \ or reasoning / necessary for deciding logical ques-
tions but when one will be able to simply to say ,,⌊“⌋calculemus”⌊,⌋ \ let
us reckon / exactly as in questions of elementary arith⌊metic⌋. This pro-
gram has been partly carried out by this axiomatic syst⌊em⌋ \ for logic /
. For you will see that the rules of inference can be applied J73.5K purely
mechanical⌊ly,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ in order to apply the rule of syll.⌊ogism⌋ ⌊comma from
the manuscript deleted⌋ Φ,Φ⊃ Ψ you don’t have to know what Φ or Ψ or
the sign of impl.⌊ication⌋ means⌊,⌋ but you have only to look at the outward
structure of the two prem⌊ises⌋. ⌊The following insertion is found in the
scanned manuscript on a not numbered page after p. 73.6.⌋ \ All you have
to know in order to apply this rule to two premises is that the sec.⌊ond⌋
premise contains the ⊃ and that the part preceding the ⊃ is conform with
the first premise. And similar remarks apply to the other axioms⌊.⌋ /
⌊new paragraph⌋ Therefore \ as I men⌊tioned⌋ already / it would \ actual-
ly / be possible to construct a machine which would do the following thing:
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The \ supposed / machine is to have a crank and whenever you turn the crank
once around the machine would write \ down / a tautology of the calc⌊ulus⌋
of predicates and it would write down every \ existing / taut.⌊ology⌋ of the
calc.⌊ulus⌋ of pred⌊icates⌋ J73.6K if you turn the crank sufficiently often. So
this machine would really replace thinking completely as far as deriving of
form⌊ulas⌋ of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of pred⌊icates⌋ \ is concerned. / It would be a
thinking machine in the literal sense of the word.
⌊new paragraph⌋ For the calculus of prop.⌊ositions⌋ you can do even
more⌊.⌋ You could construct a machine in ⌊the⌋ form of a typewriter such
that if you type down a formula of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop.⌊ositions⌋ then
the machine would ring a bell ⌊if it is a tautology⌋ and if it is not it would
not. You could do the same thing for the calculus ⌊The next page of the
scanned manuscript, which is not numbered, contains just an insertion for
the text on p. 73.5, to be found at the appropriate place there.⌋ J73.7K of
monadic pred⌊icates⌋. But one can prove that it is impossible to construct
a machine which would do the same thing for the \ whole / calculus of
pred⌊icates⌋. So here already one can prove that Leibnitz⌊’s; or perhaps
“Leibnitzian”⌋ program of the ,,⌊“⌋calculemus” cannot be carried through⌊,⌋
i⌊.⌋e. one knows that the human mind will never be able to be replaced by a
machine already for this comparatively simple quest.⌊ion⌋ to decide whether
a form⌊ula⌋ is a taut.⌊ology⌋ or not.
⌊The next page of the manuscript, which is not numbered, but is not
on a loose leaf as the preceding nine pages in the scanned manuscript are,
contains only the following two lines:⌋
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) Syll.⌊ogism⌋
?4′ (p ∨ q) ⊃ (∼ p ⊃ q) | (∼ p ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ∨ q)
J74K (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) Syll.⌊ogism⌋
3. ∼ (∃x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x) ∼ ϕ(x)
∼∼ (x) ∼ ϕ(x) ≡ (x) ∼ ϕ(x) p ≡∼∼ p p
(x) ∼ ϕ(x) ⌊
(x) ∼ ϕ(x)
p
fraction bar omitted in the manuscript
and arrow pointing to line under 3.⌋
∼ (∃x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x) ∼ ϕ(x) def.⌊ined⌋ symb⌊ol⌋
4. p . (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[p . ϕ(x)]
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(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x)
p . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ p . ϕ(y) Mult⌊iplication⌋ from left
p . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (y)[p . ϕ(y)] Rule 4 Φ : p . (x)ϕ(x) Ψ(y) : p . ϕ(y)
(x)[p . ϕ(x)] ⊃ p . ϕ(y) Ax. 5 Subst.⌊itution⌋ p . ϕ(x)
ϕ(x)
p . ϕ(y) ⊃ ϕ(y) p . q ⊃ q q
ϕ(y)
⌊ϕ(y)
q
fraction bar omitted in the
manuscript⌋
p . ϕ(y) ⊃ p p . q ⊃ p
(x)[p . ϕ(x)] ⊃ ϕ(y) Syll⌊ogism⌋
(x)[p . ϕ(x)] ⊃ p Syll⌊ogism⌋
J75K (x)[p . ϕ(x)] ⊃ (y)ϕ(y) Rule 4
(x)[p . ϕ(x)] ⊃ p . (y)ϕ(y) Compos.⌊ition⌋
5.? p ∨ (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)]
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y) Ax⌊.⌋ 5
p ∨ (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ p ∨ ϕ(y) Add⌊ition⌋ from left
p∨(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (y)[p ∨ ϕ(y)] Rule 4
(x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)] ⊃ p ∨ ϕ(y) Ax⌊. ⌋5
p ∨ ϕ(y) ⊃ (∼ p ⊃ ϕ(y)) p ∨ q ⊃ (∼ p ⊃ q)
(x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)] ⊃ (∼ p ⊃ ϕ(y)) Syll⌊ogism⌋
(x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)] . ∼ p ⊃ ϕ(y) Imp⌊ortation⌋
(x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)] . ∼ p ⊃ (y)ϕ(y) Rule 4
(x)[p ∨ ϕ(x)]⊃ [∼ p ⊃ (y)ϕ(y)] Exp.⌊ortation⌋
⊃ [p ∨ (y)ϕ(y)]
⌊\ 6. / ⌋
J76K
6. (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ψ(x)]
(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y)]
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y)
}
Ax⌊. ⌋5 ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)
ϕ(x)
(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ [ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y)] . ϕ(y) Mult.⌊iplication⌋
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[ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y)] . ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y) (p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q p
ϕ(y)
q
ψ(y)
⌊ϕ(y)
p
ψ(y)
q
fraction bars omitted in the manuscript⌋
(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x)⊃ ψ(y) Syll.⌊ogism⌋
⊃ (y)ψ(y) Rule 4
(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (y)ψ(y)] Exp.⌊ortation⌋
7. Derived Rule I
Φ(x) . . ⌊:⌋ (x)Φ(x)
P ⊃ Q ⌊:⌋ P . R ⊃ Q
p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ Φ(x) by add.⌊ition⌋ of premises Q ⌊:⌋ P ⊃ Q
J77K p ∨ ∼ p ⊃ (x)Φ(x) Rule 4
p ∨ ∼ p
(x)Φ(x) Rule of impl.⌊ication⌋
8⌊.⌋ Derived rule II
Φ(x) ⊃ Ψ(x) : (x)Φ(x) ⊃ (x)Ψ(x)
1. (x)[Φ(x) ⊃ Ψ(x)]
2. Subst⌊itution⌋: (x)[Φ(x) ⊃ Ψ(x)] ⊃ (x)Φ(x) ⊃ (x)Ψ(x)
3⌊.⌋ Impl⌊ication⌋
?9. Derived rule III
Φ(x) ≡ Ψ(x) : (x)Φ(x) ≡ (x)Ψ(x)
Φ(x) ⊃ Ψ(x) (x)Φ(x) ⊃ (x)Ψ(x)
Ψ(x) ⊃ Φ(x) (x)Ψ(x) ⊃ (x)Φ(x)
8 8 8
J78K
?10. ∼ (x)ϕ(x) ≡ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x)
ϕ(x) ≡∼∼ ϕ(x) double neg⌊ation⌋
(x)ϕ(x) ≡ (x) ∼∼ ϕ(x) Rule II
∼ (x)ϕ(x)≡∼ (x) ∼∼ ϕ(x) Transp.⌊osition⌋
≡ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x) def.⌊ined⌋ symb.⌊ol⌋
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\ ?10′. (x)ϕ(x) ∨ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x)
(x)ϕ(x) ∨ ∼ (x)ϕ(x) Excl.⌊uded⌋ middle
∼ (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x) ⌊?⌋10.
|(x)ϕ(x) ∨ ∼ (x)ϕ(x)| ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) ∨ (∃x) ∼ ϕ(x) Implic.⌊ation⌋ /
?11. (x)[ϕ(x) . ψ(x)] ≡ (x)ϕ(x) . (x)ψ(x)
ϕ(x) . ψ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x)
(x)[ϕ(x) . ψ(x)] ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) Rule II
(x)[ϕ(x) . ψ(x)] ⊃ (x)ψ(x) ′′
(x)[ϕ(x) . ψ(x)] ⊃ (x)ϕ(x) . (x)ψ(x) Comp.⌊osition⌋
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y)
(x)ψ(x) ⊃ ψ(y)
}
Ax⌊. ⌋5
(x)ϕ(x) . (x)ψ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x) . ψ(x) Comp⌊osition⌋
J79K (x)ϕ(x) . (x)ψ(x) ⊃ (x)[ϕ(x) . ψ(x)] Rule 4.⌊4⌋
?12. (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)[ψ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] ⊃ (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] ⌊\ g”s / ⌋
* (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)[ψ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] ⊃ (x){[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] .
[ψ(x) ⊃ χ(x)]} Subst⌊itution ?⌋11.
[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . [ψ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] ⊃ [ϕ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] Subst.⌊itution⌋
Syll.⌊ogism⌋
** (x){[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . [ψ(x) ⊃ χ(x)]} ⊃ (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ χ(x)] Rule 4.⌊II⌋
* and ** ⌊with⌋ Syll⌊ogism⌋ give the result.
J80.K
13⌊.⌋ Rule Ψ(x) ⊃ Φ ⌊:⌋ (∃x)Ψ(x) ⊃ Ψ
∼ Φ ⊃∼ Ψ(x)
∼ Φ ⊃ (x) ∼ Ψ(x)
∼ (x) ∼ Ψ(x) ⊃ Φ
(∃x)Ψ(x) ⊃ Φ
\ 13′⌊.⌋ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x)
(x) ∼ ϕ(x) ⊃∼ ϕ(y)
ϕ(y) ⊃∼ (x) ∼ ϕ(x) def.⌊ined⌋ symb.⌊ol⌋ /
14. (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [(∃x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)ψ(x)]
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(x) [ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [∼ ψ(x) ⊃∼ ϕ(x)]
× (x) ..⌊′′⌋ (x) ⌊′′⌋
× (x)[∼ ψ(x) ⊃∼ ϕ(x)] ⊃ (x) ∼ ψ(x) ⊃ (x) ∼ ϕ(x)
× [(x) ∼ ψ(x) ⊃ (x) ∼ ϕ(x)] ⊃∼ (x) ∼ ϕ(x) ⊃∼ (x) ∼ ψ(x)
(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (∼ q ⊃∼ p) p
(x) ∼ ψ(x)
q
(x) ∼ ϕ(x)
⌊(x) ∼ ψ(x)
p
(x) ∼ ϕ(x)
q
fraction bars omitted in the manuscript⌋
(x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [∼ (x) ∼ ϕ(x) ⊃∼ (x) ∼ ψ(x)] Rule of def⌊ined⌋
symb.⌊ol⌋
J81.K
15⌊.⌋ Rule corresp.⌊onding⌋ to 14.
16. (∃x)[ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)] ≡ (∃x)ϕ(x) ∨ (∃x)ψ(x)
ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)
(∃x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃x)[ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)]
. . .
Dilemma
ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x)
ψ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ψ(x)
ϕ(y) ∨ ψ(y)⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) ∨ (∃x)ψ(x)
(∃y)[ ′′ ] ⊃ ′′ ′′
An example where we have to subst.⌊itute⌋ for ϕ(x) something containing
other free var.⌊iables⌋ besides x⌊:⌋
(y)(x)ψ(xy) ≡ (x)(y)ψ(xy)
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y) (z)ψ(xz)
(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(u) ψ(xy)
ϕ(x)
* (x)ψ(xy) ⊃ ψ(uy)
(z)ϕ(z) ⊃ ψ(y)⌊ϕ(y)⌋ (x)ψ(xz)
ϕ(z)
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* (z)(x)ψ(xz) ⊃ (x)ψ(xy) * * Syllog.⌊ism⌋
(z)(x)ψ(xz) ⊃ ψ(uy) Rule 4 y
(z)(x)ψ(xz) ⊃ (y)ψ(uy) ′′ u
(z)(x)ψ(xz) ⊃ (u)(y)ψ(uy)
y x
(y)(x)ψ(xz) ⊃ (x)(y)ψ(uy)
J82.KI have mentioned already that among the taut.⌊ological⌋ form.⌊ulas⌋
of the calc⌊ulus⌋ of pred.⌊icates⌋ are in part.⌊icular⌋ those which express
the Aristotelian moods of inf⌊erence⌋, ⌊b⌋ut \ ⌊unreadable symbol⌋ that /
not all of the 19 Arist⌊otelian⌋ moods are really valid in the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of
prop⌊ositions.⌋ ⌊but⌋ only 15 of them ⌊unreadable word⌋ the remaining 4
\ ⌊S⌋ome of them / require an add.⌊itional⌋ third premise in order to be
valid⌊,⌋ \ namely that the predicates involved be not vacuous⌊;⌋ / e.g. the
mood Darapti is one of those not valid⌊,⌋ it says
MaS, MaP : SiP , in symbols:
(x)[M(x) ⊃ S(x)] . (x)[M(x) ⊃ P (x)] ⊃ (∃x)[S(x) . P (x)]
But this is not a tautological formula because that would mean it holds for
any monadic pred.⌊icates⌋M,S, P whatsoever. But J83.K we can easily name
pred.⌊icates⌋ for which it is wrong namely⌊;⌋ if you take forM a \ vacuous /
pred.⌊icate⌋ which belongs to no object⌊,⌋ say e.g. the pred⌊icate⌋ president
of A.⌊merica⌋ born in South Bend ⌊The following text is crossed out in the
manuscript: that is a perfectly meaningful \ correctly formed / pred⌊icate,⌋
only by a historical accident there exists no object to which it belongs [or wa-
ter snake is another ex.⌊ample⌋ when a water snake is defined to be a snake
living in the water.] Now I say if you take forM such a vacuous pred.⌊icate⌋⌋
and take for S and P any two mutually exclusive pred.⌊icates,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ such
that no S is P ⌊,⌋ then the above formula will be wrong because ⌊1.⌋ the two
premises are both true⌊.⌋ ⌊S⌋ince J84.K M(x) is false for every x we have
M(x) ⊃ S(x) is true for every x (bec.⌊ause it is an⌋ impl.⌊ication⌋ with false
first term)⌊;⌋ likewise M(x) ⊃ P (x) is true for every x⌊.⌋ i⌊I.⌋e. the premises
are both true but the conclusion is false bec.⌊ause⌋ S, P are supposed to
be two predicates such that there is no S which is a P ⌊.⌋ Hence for the
part.⌊icular⌋ pred.⌊icate⌋ we chose the first term of this whole impl.⌊ication⌋
is true ⌊and⌋ the sec⌊ond⌋ is false⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ the whole form.⌊ula⌋ is false.
So there are pred⌊icates⌋ which substituted in this form⌊ula⌋ yield a false
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prop⌊osition,⌋ hence this form⌊ula⌋ is not a taut⌊ology⌋. If we want to trans-
form \ that expr.⌊ession⌋ into / ⌊a⌋ real taut.⌊ology⌋ we have to add the
further premise that M is not J85.K vacuous⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e.
(∃x)M(x) . (x)[M(x) ⊃ S(x)] . (x)[M(x) ⊃ P (x)] ⊃ (∃x)[S(x) . P (x)]
would really be a tautology. Altogether there are 4⌊four⌋ some of the \ 19 /
Arist.⌊otelian⌋ moods which require this additional premise. \ Furthermore
SaP ⊃ SiP ⌊,⌋ \ P iS (conversion) / as I mentioned last time also re-
quires that S ⌊is⌋ n⌊written over t⌋on⌊-⌋vac⌊uous⌋. Also SaP ⊃∼ (SeP )⌊,⌋
i⌊.⌋e. SaP and SeP cannot both be true⌊,⌋ does not hold in the log.⌊ical⌋
calc.⌊ulus⌋ bec.⌊ause⌋ if S ⌊is⌋ vacuous both SaP and SeP are true (x)[S(x) ⊃
P (x)] .(x)[S(x) ⊃∼ P (x)]⌊;⌋ S(x) = x \ is a / pres.⌊ident⌋ of the States born
in Southb.⌊South Bend,⌋ P (x)⌊=⌋ x is bald, then both
Every presid.⌊ent⌋ . . . is bald
No ′′⌊president . . . ⌋ is bald /
So \ we see / Arist.⌊otle⌋ makes the implicit assumption that all pred.⌊i-
cates⌋ which he speaks of are non-vacuous; in the logistic calc.⌊ulus⌋ of
pred.⌊icates⌋ however we do⌊ ⌋not make this assumption⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. all tautolo-
gies and all formulas derivable from our axioms hold for any pred.⌊icates⌋
whatsoever they may be⌊,⌋ vacuous or not. J86.K Now one may ask: which is
the more expedient procedure is preferable, to form⌊ulate⌋ the laws of logic in
such a way that they hold for all pred.⌊icates⌋ \ vacuous and non⌊-⌋vacuous
/ or in such a way that they hold only for non⌊-⌋vacuous. I think there can
be no doubt that the logistic way is preferable for many reasons:
1. As we saw it may depend on purely empirical facts whether or not
a pred.⌊icate⌋ is vacuous (as we saw in the ex.\ ample / of a presid.⌊ent⌋
of America born in South⌊B⌋end). Therefore if we don’t admit vacuous
predic⌊ates⌋ at all it will depend on empirical facts which pred.⌊icates⌋ \ are
/ have to be admitted in logical reasonings \ or which inferences are valid,
/ but that J87.K is very undesirable. Whether a pred.⌊icate⌋ can be used in
reasoning (drawing inf.⌊erences⌋) should depend only on mere logical consid-
erations and not on empir.⌊ical⌋ facts.
But a second and still more important argument is this⌊:⌋ that to exclude
vacuous predicates would be a very serious hampering⌊,⌋ e.g. in mathematical
reasoning, because it happens frequently that we have to form pred⌊icates⌋
of which we don’t know in the beginning of the \ an / argument whether
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or not they are vacuous⌊,⌋ e.g. in indirect proofs⌊.⌋ If we want to prove
that there does not exist an alg.⌊ebraic⌋ equ.⌊ation⌋ whose root is pi we
operate J88.K with the pred⌊icate⌋ ,,⌊“⌋algeb⌊raic⌋ equ.⌊ation⌋ with root pi”
and use it in conclusions⌊,⌋ and later on it turns out that this pred.⌊icate⌋
is vacuous. \ But also in everyday life it happens frequently that we want
\ have / to make general assertions about predicates of which we don’t know
whether they are vacuous [e⌊. E⌋.g. if \ A⌊a⌋ssume that / in a ⌊u⌋niversity
⌊deleted from the manuscript: \ in Muham⌊medan⌋countries we have the
true prop.⌊osition⌋ / ⌋there is the rule that examinations may be repeated
arbitrarily often⌊;⌋ \ then / we can make the statement⌊:⌋ A student which
has. . . ten times is allowed to. . . for an eleventh time⌊]⌋. But if we want
to exclude vacuous pred⌊icates⌋ we cannot express this true prop⌊osition⌋
⌊deleted from the manuscript: about \ Turkey / (the univ.⌊ersity⌋ under
cons⌊isderation⌋)⌋ if we don’t know whether there exists such a student who
has. . . But of course this (rule) \ prop⌊osition⌋ / has nothing to do with the
exist⌊ence⌋ of a student. . . \ ⌊O⌋r e.g. excluding vac.⌊uous⌋ pred.⌊icates⌋
has the consequ⌊ence⌋ that we cannot always form the conj.⌊unction⌋ of two
pred.⌊icates,⌋ e.g. presid.⌊ent⌋ of U.S.A. is ⌊an⌋ adm⌊issible⌋ \ pred.⌊icate,⌋
/ born in South Bend is adm.⌊issible,⌋ but presid⌊ent⌋ of Am⌊erica⌋ born
in South Bend is not admissible. / / So if we want to avoid absolutely
unnecessary complications we \ must not exclude the vacuous pred⌊icates⌋
and / have to form.⌊ulate⌋ the laws of logic in such a way that they apply
both to vacuous and non-vacuous pred⌊icates⌋. I don’t say that it is false to
exclude them⌊,⌋ but it leads to abs.⌊olutely⌋ unnec.⌊essary⌋ complic⌊ations⌋.
⌊After this paragraph the page is divided in the manuscript by a horizontal
line.⌋
As to the 15 valid moods of Arist.⌊otle⌋ they can all be expressed by one
logistic formula⌊.⌋ \ However / ⌊i⌋n order to do that I have first to embody
the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of monadic pred⌊icates⌋ in a different form⌊,⌋ namely in the
form of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of classes. This \ transformation however applies
only to the / however applies only to the formulas containing only monadic
pred⌊icates⌋ J89.K i.e. such that no var.⌊iables⌋ for rel⌊ations⌋ ϕ(xy) occur).
The calc.⌊ulus⌋ of classes also yields also the decision solution of the decision
problem for formulas with only monadic predicates.
If we have an arb.⌊itrary⌋ \ monadic / predicate⌊,⌋ say P ⌊,⌋ then we
can consider the extension of this pred.⌊icate,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ the totality of all
obj.⌊ects⌋ satisfying P ⌊;⌋ it is denoted by xˆ[P (x)]. These ext.⌊ensions⌋ of
monad.⌊ic⌋ predicates ⌊are⌋ all called classes. So this \ symb⌊ol⌋ xˆ / means:
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the class of obj.⌊ects⌋ x such that the subsequ.⌊ent⌋ is true. It is applied also
to prop.⌊ositional⌋ f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions,⌋ e.g. xˆ[I(x) . x > 7] means ,,⌊“⌋the class of
integers greater ⌊than⌋ seven”⌊.⌋ J90.K xˆ[T (x)] the class of most beings. So
to any monadic predicate belongs a uniquely det.⌊ermined⌋ class of obj⌊ects⌋
as its ,,⌊“⌋extension”⌊,⌋ but of course there may be different predicates with
the same extension⌊,⌋ as e⌊.⌋g. the two pred⌊icates⌋: good heat conducting,
elasticity conducting⌊. T⌋hese are two entirely diff.⌊erent⌋ pred.⌊icates,⌋ but
every obj.⌊ect⌋ which has the first prop⌊erty⌋ also has the sec.⌊ond⌋ one and
vice versa⌊;⌋ therefore their ext⌊ension⌋ is the same⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. if H,E denotes
them, xˆ[H(x)] = xˆ[E(x)] although H 6= E \ I am writing the symbol of
identity \ and distinctness / in between the two ident.⌊ical⌋ obj.⌊ects⌋ as is
usual in math⌊ematics⌋. I shall speak \ about / this way \ of writing / in
more detail later⌊.⌋ /
In gen.⌊eral⌋ we have if ϕ, ψ are two mon.⌊adic⌋ pred.⌊icates⌋ then
xˆ[ϕ(x)] = xˆ[ψ(x)] ≡ (x)[ϕ(x) ≡ ψ(x)]
\ This equivalence expresses the essential property of extensions of pred⌊i-
cates⌋. It is to be noted \ that / we have not defined what classes are
bec⌊ause⌋ we \ explained it by the term extension⌊,⌋ and extensions we
explained by the term totality⌊,⌋ and a totality is the same thing as a class.
So this def.⌊inition⌋ would be circular. The real state of affairs is this⌊:⌋ that
we consider x̂ as a primitive term ⌊a⌋ new primit.⌊ive⌋ (undefined) term,
which satisfies this axiom here. Russell \ however / has shown that one can
dispense with this \ xˆ as a / primit.⌊ive⌋ term by introducing it by a kind of
implicit def.⌊inition,⌋ but that would take too much time \ to explain it⌊;⌋
/ so we simply can consider it as a primit⌊ive.⌋ / /
The letters α, β, γ, . . . are used as variables for classes and the statement
that ⌊The text interrupted here is continued on p. 91., the first page of
Notebook VI.⌋ an obj⌊ect⌋ a bel⌊ongs⌋ to α is den⌊oted⌋ by aεα.
⌊On the remaining not numbered, last page, of Notebook V, one finds
many lines in shorthand or crossed out, and one finds also: individual vari-
ables, facultative \ optional / , convention, The interest lies in this that pro-
priety, choice is fortunate, specific(individual, definite), Def 1. Expression
(P,Φ(x)→, 2. Conv., 4. Taut., embody.⌋
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2.6 Notebook VI
⌊Folder 64, on the front cover of the notebook “Log.⌊ik⌋ Vorl.⌊esungen⌋
⌊German: Logic Lectures⌋ N.D. ⌊Notre Dame⌋ VI”⌋
⌊The first page of this notebook, p. 91., begins with the second part of a
sentence interrupted at the end of p. 90. of Notebook V.⌋
J91.K an obj⌊ect⌋ a bel.⌊ongs⌋ to α (or is an el⌊ement⌋ of α) by a ε α.
Hence
y ε xˆ[ϕ(x)] ≡ ϕ(y) Furthermore
{
α = xˆ[x ε α]
(x)[x ε α ≡ x ε β] ⊃ α = β
So far we spoke only of extensions of monadic predicates⌊;⌋ we can also
introduce extensions of dyadic (and polyadic⌊)⌋ pred⌊icates.⌋ If e⌊.⌋g⌊.⌋ Q
is a dyadic pred⌊icate⌋ then xˆyˆ[Q(xy)] (called the ext.⌊ension⌋ of Q) will be
something that satisfies the condition:
xˆyˆ[ψ(xy)] = xˆyˆ[χ(xy)⌊]⌋⌊.⌋ ≡ ⌊.⌋(x⌊, ⌋y)[ψ(xy) ≡ χ(xy)]
e.g. the class of pairs \ (x, y) / such that Q(xy) would J92.K be something
which satisfies this cond.⌊ition,⌋ but the ext.⌊ension⌋ of ⌊a⌋ rel.⌊ation⌋ is
not defined as the class of ord⌊ered⌋ pairs⌊,⌋ but is consid.⌊ered⌋ as an
und.⌊efined⌋ term bec.⌊ause⌋ ordered pair is defined in terms of ext.⌊ension⌋
of relations. An example for this \ formula⌊,⌋ / i⌊.⌋e. an \ example / of two
different dyadic \ pred⌊icates⌋ / which have the same extension would be
x < y, x > y ∨ x = y⌊,⌋ x exerts an electrostatic a⌊t⌋traction on y⌊,⌋ x and
y are loaded by electricities of different sign⌊.⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ Ext.⌊ensions⌋ of monadic pred.⌊icates⌋ are called classes,
⌊unreadable symbol⌋ extensions of polyadic pred.⌊icates⌋ are called relations
in logistic. So in log.⌊istic⌋ the term rel⌊ation⌋ is reserved \ used / not for the
polyadic pred⌊icates⌋ themselves but for their extensions, that ⌊unreadable
text⌋ conflicts with the meaning of the term rel.⌊ation⌋ in everyday ⌊life⌋
\ and also with the meaning in which I introduced this term a few lectures
ago, / but since it is usual to use this term rel⌊ation⌋ in \ this ext⌊ensional⌋
sense / I shall stick to this use \ and the trouble is that ⌊there is⌋ no better
term / . If R is a rel⌊ation⌋, the statement that x bears R J93.K to y is
den⌊oted⌋ by xRy. This way of writing⌊,⌋ \ namely to write the symb⌊ol⌋
denoting the rel.⌊ation⌋ between the symbols denoting the obj.⌊ects⌋ for
which the rel⌊ation⌋ is asserted to hold⌊,⌋ / is adapted to the notation of
math⌊ematics,⌋ e.g. <⌊,⌋ x < y, =, x = y⌊. O⌋f course we have:
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(x⌊, ⌋y)[xRy ≡ xSy] ⊃ R = S
for any two rel⌊ations⌋ R, S⌊,⌋ ⌊The text that follows, until the end of the
paragraph, is inserted in the manuscript.⌋ exactly as before ⌊(x)[ ⌋x ε α ≡
x ε β⌊ ] ⊃ α = β⌋. So a relation is uniquely det.⌊ermined⌋ if you know all
the pairs which have this relation bec.⌊ause⌋ \ by this form⌊ula⌋ / there
cannot exist two different rel.⌊ations⌋ which subsist between the same pairs
(although there can exist many different dyadic pred.⌊icates⌋)⌊.⌋
⌊The text that follows, until the end of the paragraph, is in big square
brackets in the manuscript.⌋ Therefore a relation can be represented e.g⌊.⌋
by a figure of arrows
❜❜
❜ ❜
❜❅
❅
 
 
a
b
c
d
e✛
❘ ✒
✲
or by a quadratic scheme e⌊.⌋g⌊.⌋
a b c d e
a •
b •
c • •
d
e
Such a figure determines a unique rel.⌊ation;⌋ in general it will be infinite⌊.⌋
⌊The l⌋etters R, S, T are mostly used as var.⌊iables⌋ for rel⌊ations⌋. But
now let us return to the ext.⌊ensions⌋ of mon.⌊adic⌋ pred.⌊icates,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. the
classes for which we want to set up a calculus.
First we have two part.⌊icular⌋ classes ∧ ⌊written over 0⌋ (vacuous class)
⌊,⌋ ∨ (the universal class) which are defined as the ext.⌊ension⌋ J94.K of a
vacuous pred⌊icate⌋ and of a pred⌊icate⌋ that bel.⌊ongs⌋ to everything. So∧
= xˆ[ϕ(x) . ∼ ϕ(x)]∨
= xˆ[ϕ(x) ∨ ∼ ϕ(x)]
It is clear that It makes no difference which vacuous pred⌊icate⌋ I take
for defining
∧
. If A⌊,⌋ B are two diff⌊erent⌋ vacuous pred.⌊icates⌋ then
xˆ(A(x)) = xˆ(B(x)) ⌊xˆ[A(x)] = xˆ[B(x)]⌋ bec⌊ause⌋ (x)[A(x) ≡ B(x)]. And
similarly if C,D are two diff.⌊erent⌋ pred.⌊icates⌋ belonging to everything
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xˆ[C(x)] = xˆ[D(x)] bec.⌊ause⌋ (x)[C(x) ≡ D(x)]⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. there exists exactly
one 0-class and exactly one J95.K universal class⌊,⌋ \ although of course
there exist many different vacuous pred⌊icates⌋. But they all have the same
extension⌊,⌋ namely nothing which is denoted by ∧⌊.⌋ So the zero class is
the class with no el.⌊ements⌋ (x)[∼ x ε ∧]⌊∧ written over 0⌋⌊,⌋ the universal
class is the class of which every obj.⌊ect⌋ is an el.⌊ement⌋⌊unreadable text⌋
(x)⌊(⌋x ε ∨)⌊;⌋ ∧ and ∨ are sometimes denoted by 0 and 1 because of ⌊[⌋
cert.⌊ain⌋ analogies with arithm⌊etic⌋. /
⌊new paragraph⌋ Next we can introduce cert.⌊ain⌋ operations for classes
which are analogous to the arithm⌊etical⌋ operations: namely
Add.⌊ition⌋ or sum α + β = xˆ[x ε α ∨ x ε β]
y ε α+ β ≡ y ε xˆ[x ε α ∨ x ε β] ≡ y ε α ∨ y ε β
mathem.⌊atician⌋ or dem.⌊ocrat⌋
Mult.⌊iplication⌋ or inters.⌊ection⌋ α · β = xˆ[x ε α . x ε β]
mathem⌊atician⌋ democr.⌊at⌋
Op.⌊posite⌋ or compl.⌊ement⌋ −α = xˆ[∼ x ε α] or α
non mathem.⌊atician⌋
Difference α− β = α · (−β) = xˆ[x ε α . ∼ x ε β]
mathem⌊atician⌋ not democr⌊at⌋
(New Yorke⌊r⌋ not sick)
⌊On the right of the table above, two intersecting circles, as in Euler or Venn
diagrams, are drawn in the manuscript.⌋
Furthermore we have a rel.⌊ation⌋ classes which corresponds to the arith-
m⌊etic⌋ rel⌊ation⌋ of <⌊,⌋ namely the relation of subclass
α ⊆ β ≡ (x)[x ε α ⊃ x ε β] \ Man ⊆ Mortal /
All these op.⌊erations⌋ obey laws very similar J96.K to the corresponding
arithmetical laws: e.g.
α+ β = β + α α · β = β · α
(α+ β) + γ = α + (β + γ) (α · β) · γ = α · (β · γ)
(α+ β) · γ = α · γ + α · γ⌊β · γ⌋
(α · β) + γ = (α + γ) · (α+ γ)⌊β + γ⌋
\ ⌊T⌋hey follow from the corresponding laws of the calculus of prop.⌊ositions:⌋
e.g.
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x ε(α+ β) ≡ x ε α ∨ x ε β ≡ x ε β ∨ x ε α ≡ x ε(β + α)
x ε(α+ β) · γ ≡ x ε(α+ β) . x ε γ ≡ (x ε α ∨ x ε β) . x ε γ
≡ (x ε α . x ε γ) ∨ (x ε α⌊x ε β⌋. x ε γ)
≡ x ε α · β ∨ x ε αγ⌊x ε α · γ ∨ x ε β · γ⌋
≡ x ε(α · β + α · γ)⌊x ε(α · γ + β · γ)⌋ ⌊(α + β) · γ deleted⌋ /
α + 0 = α α · 0 = 0
α · 1 = α α+ 1= 1
\ (x) ∼ (x ε 0) x ε(α+ 0) ≡ x ε α ∨ x ε 0 ≡ x ε α
(x)⌊(⌋x ε 1) /
⌊On the right of the table above, three intersecting circles, as in Euler or
Venn diagrams, with α, β and perhaps γ marked in them, and some areas
shaded, are drawn in the manuscript.⌋
α ⊆ β α ⊆ β⌊.⌋β ⊆ γ ⊃ α ⊆ γ
γ ⊆ δ Law of transitivity
α + γ ⊆ β + δ
α · γ ⊆ β · δ α ⊆ β . β ⊆ α ⊃ α = β.
Laws different from arithm⌊etical:⌋
α + α = α · α = α x ε α · ⌊+⌋α ≡ x ε α ∨ x ε α ≡ x ε α
α ⊆ β ⊃ [α + β = β . α · β = α] β ⊆ α + β α ⊆ β
β ⊆ β
α+ β ⊆ β + β = β
J97.K
−(α + β) = (−α) · (−β) De Morgan
x ε − (α+ β) ≡ ∼ x ε (α+ β) ≡ ∼ (x ε α ∨ x ε β) ≡ ∼ (x ε α) . ∼ (x ε β) ≡
x ε − α . x ε − β ≡ x ε (−α) · (−β)
−(α · β) = (−α) + (−β)
α · (−α) = 0 α + (−α) = 1
−(−α) = α
\ The compl.⌊ement⌋ of α is sometimes also denoted by α (so that α =
−α)⌊.⌋ /
⌊The exercise that follows, with three displayed formulae, is in big square
brackets in the manuscript.⌋ Exercise ⌊unreadable text⌋ Law for diff.⌊erence:⌋
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α⌊·⌋(β − γ) = α · β − α · γ
α · β = α− (α− β)
α ⊆ β ⊃ β ⊆ α
If α ·β = 0⌊,⌋ that means the classes α and β have no common element⌊,⌋
then α ⌊and⌋ β are called mutually exclusive. We can now formulate the
four Aristotelian types of judgement a, e, i, o also in the symbolism of the
calc.⌊ulus⌋ of classes as follows⌊:⌋
α a β ≡ α ⊆ β ≡ |α · β = 0|
J98.K
α e β ≡ α · β = 0 ≡ α ⊆ β ≡ α⌊·⌋β = 0
α i β ≡ α · β 6= 0 ≡ ∼ (α ⊆ β) ≡ α · β 6= 0
α o β ≡ α · β 6= 0 ≡ ∼ (α ⊆ β) .⌊≡⌋ α · β 6= 0
⌊In the last three lines, the underlined formulae and the≡ symbol that follows
them are to be deleted, since they are repeated at the end of the lines.⌋ So
all of these 4⌊four⌋ types of judgements can be expressed by the vanishing⌊,⌋
resp.⌊ectively⌋ not vanishing⌊,⌋ of cert.⌊ain⌋ intersections.
Now the formula which compresses all of the 15 valid Aristotelian infer-
ences reads like this
∼ (α · β = 0 . α · γ = 0 . β · γ 6= 0)
So this is a universally true formula bec⌊ause⌋ α · β⌊= 0⌋ means β outside
of α⌊,⌋ α · γ = 0 means γ inside of α⌊.⌋ If β outside γ inside they can
have no element in J99.K common⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. the two first prop⌊ositions⌋ imply
β · γ = 0⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. it cannot be that all three of them are true⌊.⌋ Now since
this says that all ⌊written over “All”⌋ three of them cannot be true you can
always conclude the negation of the third from the two others⌊;⌋ e.g⌊.⌋
α · β = 0 . α · γ = 0 ⌊α · γ = 0⌋ ⊃ β · γ = 0
α · β = 0 . β · γ 6= 0 ⊃ α · γ 6= 0 etc⌊.⌋
and in this way you obtain all valid 15 moods if you substitute for α, β, γ
the in an appropriate way the minor term⌊,⌋ the major term and the middle
term or their neg⌊ation,⌋ e⌊.⌋g⌊.⌋
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J100.K
I ⌊B⌋arbara MaP SaP
SaM
⌊M · P = 0 . S ·M = 0⌋ ⊃ S · P = 0
∼ (M · P = 0 . S ·M = 0 . S · P 6= 0)
α =M β = P γ = S
III ⌊F⌋eriso MeP SoP
M iS
M · P⌊P ⌋ = 0 . M · S 6= 0 ⊃ S · P 6= 0
∼ (⌊M · P = 0 . M · S 6= 0⌋ . S · P⌊P ⌋ = 0)
α = P β =M γ = P ⌊γ = S⌋.
The \ 4⌊four⌋ / moods which require an additional premise can also be
expressed by one formula⌊,⌋ namely:
∼ (α 6= 0 . α · β = 0 . α · γ = 0 . β · γ = 0)
J101.K Darapti
MaP
MaS
SiP
e.g. is obtained by taking
M = α⌊α =M⌋ β = P γ = S
MaP . MaS ⊃ SiP
M⌊·⌋P = 0⌊.⌋M⌊·⌋S = 0⌊⊃⌋S · P ⌊6=⌋0
⌊β = P and γ = S, which are written already above, are deleted⌋
However⌊,⌋ this sec.⌊ond⌋ formula is an easy consequence of the first⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e.
we can derive it by two applications of the first. To this end we have only to
note that α 6= 0 can be expressed by α iα bec.⌊ause⌋ ⌊unreadable symbol⌋
ϕ iψ ≡ (∃x)[ϕ(x)⌊.⌋ψ(x)]
ϕ iϕ ≡ (∃x)[ϕ(x) . ϕ(x)] ≡ (∃x)ϕ(x)
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∼ (α⌊·⌋β = 0 . α⌊·⌋γ = 0 . β⌊·⌋γ 6= 0)
α⌊·⌋α 6= 0 αβ = 0 ⌊α · β = 0⌋ αβ = 0 ⌊α · β = 0⌋
α : β β : γα ⌊perhaps β, γ : α, which should mean: β : α, γ : α⌋
α⌊·⌋β 6= 0 α⌊·⌋γ = 0 βγ 6= 0 ⌊β · γ = 0⌋
α : γ β : α γ : β
III ⌊F⌋eriso α⌊·⌋α 6= 0 . α⌊·⌋β = 0 . α⌊·⌋γ = 0 ⊃ β⌊·⌋γ 6= 0
⌊α · α 6= 0 α · β = 0⌋
α⌊·⌋β 6= 0 α⌊·⌋γ = 0
β⌊·⌋γ 6= 0
J102.K In general it can be shown that every correct formula express.⌊ed⌋
by the Arist⌊otelian⌋ terms a, e, i, o and op⌊erations⌋ of ⌊the⌋calc.⌊ulus⌋
of prop.⌊ositions⌋ can be derived from this principle⌊;⌋ to be more exact⌊,⌋
fund⌊amental⌋ notions a, i
def α e β ≡ ∼ (α i β)
α o β ≡ ∼ (α a β)
1. α aα Identity
2. α a β . β a γ ⊃ α a γ I Barbar⌊a⌋
3. α i β⌊β⌋ . β⌊β⌋ a γ ⊃ γ iα⌊α⌋ Darii IV ⌊D⌋imatis
and all axioms of the prop.⌊ositional⌋ calculus⌊;⌋ then if we have a form⌊ula⌋
composed only of such expr.⌊essions⌋ α a β⌊,⌋ α i γ and ∼,∨ . . . and which
is universally true⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. holds for all classes α⌊, ⌋β, γ involved⌊,⌋ then it
is derivable from these ax.⌊ioms by rule of subst⌊itution⌋ and impl.⌊ication⌋
and def.⌊ined⌋ symb⌊ol⌋. J103.K I am sorry I have no time to give the proof.
⌊new paragraph⌋ So we can say that the Aristotelian theory of syllogisms
for expressions of this part.⌊icular⌋ type a, e, i, o is complete⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. every
true formula follows from the Aristotelian moods. ⌊The following inserted
jottings from the manuscript are deleted: µ⌊or u⌋·β = 0, νγ = 0, µ⌊or
u⌋ν = 0.⌋ ⌊B⌋ut those Arist⌊otelian⌋ moods are even abundant because those
two moods alone are already sufficient to obtain everything else. But The
incompleteness of the Aristot⌊elian⌋ theory lies in this that there are many
J104.K propositions which cannot be expressed in terms of the Arist.⌊otelian⌋
primit.⌊ive⌋ terms. E.g. all form.⌊ulas⌋ which I wrote down for +⌊, ⌋ · ⌊, ⌋−
(distrib⌊utive⌋ law, De Morgan law etc.) bec⌊ause⌋ those symb.⌊ols⌋ +⌊, ⌋ ·
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⌊, ⌋− do⌊ ⌋not occur in Arist⌊otle⌋. But there are even simpler things not
expr.⌊essible⌋ in Arist⌊otelian terms;⌋⌊left square bracket deleted⌋ e⌊.⌋g. a ·
c = 0 ⌊full stop deleted⌋ (some not a are not c)⌊,⌋ e.g. α eβ
β o γ
according to
Arist⌊otle⌋ there is no concl.⌊usion⌋ from that (there is a ⌊principle⌋ that
from two neg.⌊ative⌋ premises no conclusion can be drawn)
⌊On the right of p. 104. one finds in the manuscript the following jottings:⌋
α⌊written over β⌋ = Comm.⌊unist?⌋
β = Dem⌊ocrat⌋ β aα
γ = Math⌊ematician⌋ β o γ
⌊the conclusion is presumably in shorthand⌋ α o γ
J105.K and that is true if we take account only of propositions expressible
by the a, e, i, o⌊.⌋ But there is a concl.⌊usion⌋ to be drawn from that⌊,⌋
namely ⌊“⌋Some not α are not γ⌊”⌋ α · γ 6= 0⌊.⌋ Since some β are not γ
and every β is not α we have some not α (namely the β) are not γ⌊.⌋⌊right
parenthesis deleted⌋⌊The relation⌋ which ⌊holds⌋ between two classes α, γ if
α · γ 6= 0 cannot be expressed by a, e, i, o⌊,⌋ but it is arb.⌊itrary⌋ to exclude
that rel⌊ation⌋. ⌊
⌋
deleted⌋ Another ex.⌊ample⌋
α i β
α o β
β⌊α⌋ contains at least t⌊w⌋o elements
⌊On the right of p. 105. one finds in the manuscript:
MeP MaP
SaM SaM
SeP SaP
which show that the mood Celarent of the first figure is really Barbara.⌋
J106.K Such prop.⌊ositions: “⌋There are two diff.⌊erent⌋ objects a, b to which
the pred⌊icate⌋ α belongs⌊”⌋ can of course not be expr.⌊essed⌋ by a, e, i, o⌊,⌋
but they can in the logistic calc.⌊ulus⌋ by
(∃x⌊, ⌋y)[x 6= y . x ε α . y ε β⌊y ε α⌋]⌊.⌋
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⌊Here, after “Another ex:” the text is interrupted in the manuscript.⌋
J107.K ⌊The following paragraph is crossed out in the manuscript:
We have seen already in the theory of the monadic pred⌊icates⌋ for classes
that many that many concepts ⌊unreadable text⌋ laws of ⌊unreadable text⌋
are missing in the Arist⌊otelian⌋ treatment⌊.⌋ But the proper domain of
logic where the incompleteness of Arist⌊otelian⌋⌊unreadable text⌋ in terms
of diff⌊erent⌋⌊unreadable text⌋is the theory of relations. ⌊unreadable text⌋
we are going to deal with in more detail ⌊unreadable text⌋ relations⌋
\ Last time I developed in outline the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of classes in which we
introduced certain operations +⌊,⌋ ·⌊,⌋ − which obey laws similar laws \ to
those / of arithmetic⌊.⌋ / One can develop a \ similar / calc.⌊ulus⌋ \ for
relations⌊.⌋ / First of all we can introduce for relations operations +⌊,⌋ ·⌊,⌋
− in a manner perfectly analogous to the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of classes.
J108.K If R ⌊and⌋ S are any two dyad.⌊ic⌋ rel.⌊ations⌋ I put
R + S = xˆyˆ[xRy ∨ xSy]
R⌊·⌋S = xˆyˆ[xRy . xSy]
−R = xˆyˆ[∼ xRy] ⌊unreadable word⌋ p⌊.⌋ 110
\ R− S = xˆyˆ[xRy . ∼ xSy] /⌈
So e.g. if R is the rel⌊ation⌋ of father, S the rel⌊ation⌋ of mother
⌊unreadable text; should be: one has for the relation⌋ of parent⌊:⌋
parent = father + mother
x ⌊is a⌋ parent of y ≡ x is a father of y ∨ x is ⌊a⌋ mother of y
≤ = (< + =)
child = son + daughter
⌋
⌊The following unfinished paragraph at the end of p. 108. is crossed out:
subrel⌊ation⌋. R is called a subrelation of S
R ⊆ S if (x⌊, ⌋y)[xRy ⊃ xSy]
e.g. father ⊆ ancestor⌊,⌋ but not⌋
J109.K Or consider similarity for polygons and ⌊the⌋rel⌊ation⌋ of ⌊unread-
able text, perhaps in shorthand, maybe: same size⌋ and the rel⌊ation⌋ of
congr.⌊uence⌋, then Congr⌊uence⌋ = Simil⌊arity⌋ · ⌊unreadable text, perhaps
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in shorthand, same as the preceding one, maybe: Same size⌋, or consider⌊the
text until “then we have” is partly crossed out⌋ the 4⌊four, written over
3⌋ rel⌊ations⌋ ‖ ⌊parallelism⌋, without com⌊mon⌋ points, co⌊m⌋planar, and
⌊unreadable text, perhaps in shorthand, maybe: skew,⌋ then we have
⌊or ,,⌋ Parallelism = without com⌊mon⌋ point ⌊·⌋ co⌊m⌋planar,
or Parallelism ⌊=⌋ without com⌊mon⌋ point ,⌊·⌋ − ⌊unreadable text,
perhaps in shorthand, same as the preceding one, maybe: skew⌋
or −brother will subsist⌊unreadable letter⌋ between two obj⌊ects⌋ x, y if 1.
x, y are two human beings and x is not a brother of y or 2⌊.⌋ if x or y is
not a human being bec.⌊ause⌋ x brother y is true only if x and y are human
beings and in addition x is a brother of y. So if x or y are not human beings
the relation eo ipso will not J110.K ⌊will not⌋ hold⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. \ the rel⌊ation
/ −brother will hold. \ \ Exactly / as for classes there will exist also a
vacuous and a universal relation denoted by Λ˙ and V˙. Λ˙ is the rel⌊ation⌋
which subsists between no obj⌊ects⌋ (x⌊, ⌋y) ∼ xΛ˙y⌊, and⌋ (x⌊, ⌋y)xV˙y⌊,⌋
e⌊.⌋g⌊.⌋
greater · smaller = Λ˙
greater + (not greater) = V˙
Also there exists an analogon to the notion of subcl.⌊ass,⌋ namely R ⊆ S if
xRy ⊃ xSy⌊,⌋ e.g.
father ⊆ ancestor
brother⊆ relative
smaller ⊆ not greater /⌈
These \ operations / for rel.⌊ations⌋ considered so far (i⌊.⌋e. +⌊,⌋ ·⌊,⌋
−) are exactly analogous to the corresp.⌊onding⌋ for classes and therefore
will obey the same laws, e.g⌊.⌋ (R+ S)⌊·⌋T = R · T + S · T . But in addition
to them there are cert⌊ain⌋ operations specific for relations and therefore
more interesting⌊,⌋ e.g. for any \ rel.⌊ation⌋ / R we can form what is called
the inverse of R (denoted by R˘ \ or R−1 / ) where R˘ = xˆyˆ[yRx]⌊,⌋ hence
xR˘y ≡ yRx⌊,⌋ i.e. if y⌊written over x⌋ has the rel⌊ation⌋ R to x then x has
the rel⌊ation⌋ R˘ J111.K to y.⌊,⌋ e.g.
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child = (parent)−1
x child y ≡ y parent x
< = (>)−1
smaller = (greater)−1
(nephew + niece) = (uncle + aunt)−1
There are also relations which are identical with their inverse ⌊the following
text until I = I−1 is crossed out: e.g. identity ⌊unreadable word, perhaps:
to⌋ (=) = (=)−1⌊,⌋ bec⌊ause⌋ (x = y) ≡ (y = x) (in order to make the
form more conspicuous one writes \ also / I for identity such that I =
I−1⌋⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. xRy ≡ yRx⌊.⌋ Such relations are called symmetric. ⌊O⌋ther
ex.⌊ample⌋ (brother + sister) is sym.⌊metric⌋ because - ⌊. . . ;⌋ brother is not
sym.⌊metric,⌋ sister is \ n’t / either. J112.K ⌊The following text until
⌋
is
crossed out: The op.⌊eration⌋ of inverse obeys the law (R−1)−1 = R \ and is
connected by laws of distr⌊ibution⌋ with the former oper⌊ation⌋ + .⌊,⌋ e.g.
(R + S)−1 = R−1 + S−1 / (R + S)−1 = R−1 + S−1 .
⌋
⌋
Another oper.⌊ation⌋ specific for rel.⌊ations⌋ \ and particularly important
/ is the so called relative prod.⌊uct⌋ of two rel.⌊ations⌋ ren.⌊dered⌋ by R|S
and defined by
R|S = xˆyˆ[(∃z)(xRz . zSy)]
i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ R|S subsists between x and y if there is some obj.⌊ect⌋ z to which x
has the ⌊r⌋ el.⌊ation⌋ R and which has the rel.⌊ation⌋ S to y⌊,⌋ e.g.
nephew = son|(brother or sister)
J113.K x is a nephew to y if there is a person z such that x \ is / son of \ some
person / z and th which is brother or sister of y. In everyday langu⌊age⌋
the prop⌊osition⌋ xRy is usually expressed by x is an R of y \ or x is the
R of y / ⌊(e.g⌊.⌋ ⌊missing text⌋)⌋. Using this ⌊unreadable text, perhaps in
shorthand⌋ we can say xR|Sy means x is an R of an S of y⌊,⌋ e.g. x is a
nephew of y means x is a son of a brother or sister of y⌊. O⌋ther example:
paternal uncle = brother|father
\ Forts.⌊German: continued⌋⌊unreadable word, should be: p.⌋ 119. /
The relative prod⌊uct⌋ can also be applied to a relation and the same rel⌊ation⌋
again ⌊, i.e.⌋ we can form R|R (by def= R2) square of a rel⌊ation,⌋ J114.K
e⌊.⌋g.
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⌊p⌋aternal grandfather = (father)2
grandchild = (child)2
⌊S⌋imilarly we can form (R|R)|R = R3⌊,⌋ e⌊.⌋g.
great grandchild = (child)3
\ Forts.⌊German: continued⌋ p⌊.⌋ 117. /⌈
The relative product again follows laws very similar to the arithmetic
one⌊’⌋s⌊,⌋ e.g.
Associat⌊ivity⌋: (R|S)|T = R|(S|T )
Distrib⌊utivity:⌋ R|(S + T ) = R|S +R|T
also R|(S⌊·⌋T ) ⊆ R|S ·R|T
⌊on the right of the formulae just displayed, there is a pale, unreadable and
crossed out text with formulae, probably a derivation of some of the displayed
formulae⌋ but not commutativity
R|S = S|R is false
brother|father 6= father|brother
since paternal uncle ⌊unreadable text⌋ but 6=⌊is not⌋ father⌊.⌋
⌋
⌊The whole of pages 115. and 116. are crossed out.⌋
J115.K Identity I is a unity for this prod.⌊uct,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. R|I = I|R = R
bec.⌊ause
xR|Iy ≡ xIz . zRy for some z
≡ xRy
Monotonicity: R ⊆ S, P ⊆ R ⊃ R|P ⊆ S|Q⌈
Furthermore the class of all ⌊unreadable text⌋ obj⌊ects⌋ which have
the rel⌊ation⌋ R to some \ obj⌊ect⌋ / y is called domain ⌊unreadable text⌋
D‘R = xˆ[(∃y)xRy] and the class of all obj.⌊ects⌋ to which some obj⌊ect⌋
has the rel.⌊ation⌋ is called converse domain C‘R = xˆ[(∃y)yRx] so that
C‘R = D‘R−1⌊,⌋ e.g. D‘(father) = men that have children⌊.⌋
J116.K
⌈
In ord.⌊inary⌋ language this class is also denoted by ,,⌊“⌋father”.
So you see in everyday lang⌊uage⌋ the same word is used for two diff⌊erent⌋
things⌊,⌋ a rel.⌊ation⌋ and its domain⌊:⌋
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C‘father = class of \ all / men (except Adam and Eve)
D‘(brother or sister) = C‘(brother or sister)
= class of men which have a brother or sister⌊,⌋
⌊unreadable symbol⌋ hence
Man−D‘(brother or sister) = unique children
D‘R +C‘R = C‘R⌊,⌋
C‘father = class of all men
An important property which belongs to many relations is ,,⌊“⌋Transitivi-
ty”⌊.⌋
⌋
J117.K A rel.⌊ation⌋ R is called transitive if
(x⌊, ⌋y⌊, ⌋z)[xRy . yRz ⊃ xRz] :⌊≡⌋ R is transitive
In other words if an R of an R of z is an R of z⌊;⌋ e.g. brother is transitive⌊,⌋
a brother of a brother of a person is a brother of this person⌊,⌋ in other words
x brother y . y brother z ⊃ x brother z
Smaller is also transitive⌊,⌋ i.e.
x < y . y < z ⊃ x < z
\ Very many rel⌊ations⌋ in math.⌊ematics⌋ are transit⌊ive:⌋⌊unreadable word⌋
⌊,⌋ congr.⌊uence,⌋ || ⌊parallelism,⌋ isom⌊orphism,⌋ ancestor⌊.⌋ / Son is not
transitive, a son of a son of a person is not a son of a person⌊.⌋ ⌊The following
sentence, under a line drawn in the text, is crossed out: The relation of son
even has the opposite prop⌊erty⌋
x son y . y son z ⊃ ∼ (x son y) ⌊∼ (x son z)⌋
⌋
⌋
J118.K
⌈
t⌊T⌋herefore called intransitive⌊;⌋ friend is an ex⌊ample⌋ of a relation
which is neither transitive nor intransitive. A friend of a friend of x is not
always a friend of x⌊,⌋ but is sometimes a friend of x. By means of the
previously introduced op.⌊eration⌋ transitiv⌊ity⌋ \ can be / expressed by
R2 ⊆ R bec.⌊ause⌋
xR2y .⊃ (∃z)⌊(⌋xRz . zRy) ⊃ xRy
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if R is transitive⌊,⌋ but also vice versa if R satisfies the cond.⌊ition⌋ R2 ⊆ R
then R is trans.⌊itive⌋
xRy . yRz ⊃ xR2z ⊃ xRz
⌋
⌊The following inserted sentence is crossed out: Ex.⌊amples⌋ of trans⌊itive⌋
rel.⌊ations:⌋ sim⌊symmetry⌋, congr⌊uence⌋, ⌊unreadable word, presumably in
shorthand⌋, =⌊equality⌋, || ⌊parallelism⌋, ancestor, ⌊unreadable word, pre-
sumably in shorthand⌋,⌋
J119.K A very important prop.⌊erty⌋of relations is the following one: A
binary rel.⌊ation⌋ R is called one-many if for any obj.⌊ect⌋ y there exists at
most one obj.⌊ect⌋ x such that xRy⌊:⌋
(x⌊, ⌋y⌊, ⌋z)[xRy . zRy ⊃ x = z] ≡ R is one⌊-⌋many
and many⌊-⌋one if R−1 is one⌊-⌋many⌊;⌋ e.g. father is one⌊-⌋many⌊,⌋ every
obj.⌊ect⌋ x can have at most one father⌊,⌋ it can have no father if it is no
man⌊,⌋ but it never has two ⌊unreadable text in parentheses⌋ \ or more /
fathers. The rel⌊ation⌋ < is not one⌊-⌋many⌊:⌋ for any nu.⌊mber⌋ there are
many diff.⌊erent⌋ nu.⌊mbers⌋ <⌊smaller than it⌋.
⌊The following text at the end of p. 119. is crossed out, though its con-
tinuation on p. 120. is not:
⌈
⌊deleted: or e.g.⌋ t⌊T⌋he rel⌊ation⌋ x is the
reciproc.⌊al⌋ of n.⌊umber⌋y is one⌊-⌋many. Every nu.⌊mber⌋ has at most
⌋
⌋
J120.K
⌈
one reciprocal. Some numbers have no reciprocal⌊,⌋ namely 0 (but
that makes no difference). The rel.⌊ation⌋ of reciprocal is at the same time
many⌊-⌋one⌊;⌋ such relations are called one⌊-⌋one⌊.⌋
⌋
⌊The following inserted text is crossed out: The inverse rel⌊ation⌋ ,,⌊“⌋son”
is not one⌊-⌋many⌊;⌋ there ⌊unreadable word⌋ can be several persons having
this relation of son to one person. A rel.⌊ation⌋ which is one⌊-⌋many and
many⌊-⌋one is called one-one⌊.⌋⌋
The relation of husband \ in Christian ⌊coun⌋tries / e.g. is an other
ex.⌊ample⌋ of a one-one relation. The rel.⌊ation⌋ smaller is neither one-many
nor many⌊-⌋one⌊; for⌋ any nu.⌊mber⌋ there exist many different nu.⌊mbers⌋
smaller than it and many diff⌊erent⌋ numbers greater than it. \ One-many
doesnot mean that /
One-many-ness can also be defined for polyadic relations J121.K ⌊namely⌋.
\ A triadic rel.⌊ation⌋ / M is called one⌊-⌋many if
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(x⌊, ⌋y⌊, ⌋z⌊, ⌋u)[xM(zu) . yM(zu) ⊃ x = y]
e.g. xˆyˆzˆ(x = y + z)⌊,⌋ xˆyˆzˆ[x − ⌊=⌋y
z
] have this prop⌊erty⌋. For any two
nu.⌊mbers y and z⌋there exists at most one x which is the sum or difference⌊.⌋
xˆyˆ(x⌊= deleted⌋ √y) is a square root of y) is not one⌊-⌋many because there
are in gen.⌊eral⌋ two different nu.⌊mbers⌋ which are square roots of y. but
xˆyˆ[x = y2] is onemany You see the one⌊-⌋many dyadic relations are exactly
the same thing which is called ,,⌊“⌋functions” in math⌊ematics⌋. The dyadic
one⌊-⌋many relations are the f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions⌋ with one argument \ as e⌊.⌋g.
x2⌊,⌋ / the J122.K triadic one⌊-⌋many relations are the funct⌊ions⌋ with two
arg.⌊uments⌋ as e.g. x + y⌊.⌋ ⌊The inserted text that follows from
⌈
to
⌋
is
crossed out.⌋ \
⌈
Relations which are not one⌊-⌋many may also be thought of
as f⌊u⌋nct.⌊ions,⌋ but as many⌊-⌋valued f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ the log⌊arithm⌋
for complex⌊full stop deleted⌋ nu.⌊mbers⌋ log x has inf.⌊initely⌋ many val-
ues for a given x⌊.⌋ There this symb⌊ol⌋ log ⌊full stop deleted⌋ from the
log.⌊ical⌋ standpoint denotes a ⌊not⌋ one many dyadic relation \ which is
not one⌊-⌋many⌊.⌋ / This rel⌊ation⌋ subsists between two nu.⌊mbers⌋ y⌊,⌋ x
if y is one of the values of the log.⌊arithm⌋ for the argument x. But if the
word f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ is used without further specification then always single⌊-
⌋valued f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋ are \ is / meant in math.⌊ematics⌋; and a \ the term
/ ,,⌊“⌋single-valued f⌊u⌋nct⌊ion⌋” is \ denotes exactly / the same \ thing
/ as \ the term / a ,,⌊“⌋one⌊-⌋many relation”.
⌋
/
In \ order to / make statements about f⌊u⌋nct⌊ions,⌋ \ i⌊.⌋e. one⌊-⌋many
rel.⌊ations⌋ / it is very convenient to introduce a notation usual in math-
ematics and also in everyday lang.⌊uage;⌋ namely R‘x means \ denotes /
the y which has the rel.⌊ation⌋ R to x⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. the y such that yRx pro-
vided that this y exists and is unique. Similarly for a triadic rel.⌊ation⌋
M ‘(yz) means⌊denotes⌋ the x such that⌊. . . ⌋ Inst⌊ead⌋ of this also yMz
is written⌊,⌋ e.g. + denotes a triadic rel.⌊ation⌋ between J123.K numbers
\ (sum) / and y+ z denotes the number which has this triadic rel.⌊ation⌋ to
y and z ⌊\ provided that it exists / . ⌊The following inserted sentence from⌈
to
⌋
is crossed out:
⌈
the statement that it exists is ⌊unreadable text, per-
haps: seen⌋ by E!R‘x (e.g⌊.⌋ E!1
2
⌊,⌋ ∼ E!1
0
⌋
⌋ (This notation is not ambiguous
\ ⌊unreadable text⌋ / ) In everyday language the ‘ is expressed by the words
The. . . of⌊,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ t⌊T⌋he sum of x and y⌊,⌋ The father of y.
⌊The text that follows until the end of p. 125. is crossed out in the
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manuscript.⌋
⌈
There is only one tricky point ⌊in this⌋ notation. Namely
⌊w⌋hat meaning are we to ⌊attribute⌋ \ assign / to propositions contain-
ing this symbol R‘x if there does⌊ ⌋not exist ⌊a⌋ unique y such that yRx
(i⌊.⌋e. none or several)⌊,⌋ e.g. The present king of
⌋
J124.K
⌈
France is bald.
We may convene that such propositions are meaningless ⌊full stop deleted⌋
(neither true nor false). But that has certain undesirable consequences,
namely whether or not the present king of France exists or not is an em-
pirical question⌊.⌋ Therefore it would depend on an empirical fact whether
or not this sequence of words is a meaningful statement or nonsense whereas
one should expect that it can depend only on the grammar of the language
concerned whether something makes sense⌊.⌋
⌋
J125.K
⌈
Therefore eg. Russell
makes the convention⌊s⌋ that such statements are false and not meaningless.
The conv.⌊ention⌋ is: That every atomic prop.⌊osition⌋ in which such an R‘x
(describing something nonexistent) occurs is false⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e.
ϕ(R‘x) ≡ (∃y)[(z)[zRx ≡ z = y] . ϕ(y)]
⌊e.g.⌋
⌋
J126.K All afore\ mentioned / notions defined of the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of classes
and relations are themselves relations; e.g. α ⊆ β is a binary rel.⌊ation⌋ be-
tween classes⌊,⌋ α+β is a dyadic f⌊u⌋nct.⌊ion,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. a triadic rel⌊ation⌋ be-
tween classes (which subsists between α, β, γ if γ = α+β)⌊.⌋ The op.⌊eration⌋
of inverse is a rel.⌊ation⌋ between relations subsisting between R and S if
R = S−1 ⌊or⌋ the rel.⌊ative⌋ prod.⌊uct⌋ is a triadic rel.⌊ation⌋ between rela-
tions subsisting between R, S, T if R = S|T . Symmetry defines a cert⌊ain⌋
class of rel.⌊ations⌋ (the \ class of / sym.⌊metric⌋ relations)⌊.⌋ So we see that
we have obtained a J127.K new kind of objects concepts (called concepts of
second type or sec.⌊ond⌋ order) which refer to the concepts of first order⌊,⌋
\ i⌊.⌋e. which expresses properties of conc.⌊epts⌋ of first order or rel.⌊ations⌋
between conc.⌊epts⌋ of first order ⌊full stop deleted⌋ or to be more exact
prop⌊erties⌋ and rel⌊ations⌋ of extensions of concepts of first order⌊.⌋ But
this is not very essential since we can define corresponding conc.⌊epts⌋ which
express prop.⌊erties⌋ and rel⌊ations⌋ of the pred.⌊icates⌋ themselves⌊,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋
χ⌊written over ψ⌋ sum of ϕ, ψ ⌊if⌋ χ(x) ≡ ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x) etc⌊.⌋ /
And it is possible to (go on) continue in this way⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. we can define
concepts of third order or \ type or / order, which refer to the concepts of
sec.⌊ond⌋ order. as eg \ An example would be: / ,,⌊“⌋mutually exclusive”⌊;⌋
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a class of classes U⌊,⌋ \ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ a class whose el⌊ements⌋ are themselves
classes⌊,⌋ / is called a mut.⌊ually⌋ excl.⌊usive⌋class of classes if α, β ε U ⊃
α · β = Λ. This concept of ,,⌊“⌋mut.⌊ually⌋ excl.⌊usive⌋ class of classes”
expresses a prop.⌊erty⌋ of classes \ of classes⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ of an obj⌊ect⌋ of
3⌊third⌋ order⌊,⌋ therefore is / of third order. ⌊On the right of p. 127. one
finds the following text to be inserted it is not clear where: e⌊.⌋g. the word
community of Am.⌊erica⌋ or army the present states of on the earth⌋ So
\ you see⌋ in this way we get a whole hierarchy of concepts J128.K which is
called the hierarchy of types⌊.⌋ In fact there are two diff⌊erent⌋ hierarchies
of types ⌊unreadable symbol⌋⌊,⌋ namely the hierarchy of ext.⌊ensions⌋ and
the hierarchy of predicates. ⌊The following sentence is crossed out: So far I
have spoken only of the former⌊;⌋ the latter would begin with predicates⌊,⌋
then \ we have / predicates of predicates (i⌊.⌋e. prop.⌊erties⌋ of pred⌊icates⌋
or relations between pred.⌊icates⌋) ⌊. . . ⌋⌋
⌊Following an unreadable symbol, perhaps in shorthand, there is a vertical
line on the left margin for the remaining text on p. 128. and the whole text
on p. 129.⌋ An interesting ex.⌊ample⌋ of predicates of highe⌊r⌋ \ type are
/ the nat natural numbers. According to Russell and Frege the nat⌊ural⌋
nu.⌊mbers⌋ are properties of pred⌊icates⌋. ⌊unreadable text⌋ If I say e.g⌊.⌋:
There are eight planet⌊e⌋s ⌊full stop deleted⌋⌊,⌋ this expresses a property of
the predicate J129.K ,,⌊“⌋planet”. So the nu.⌊mber⌋ 8 can be defined to be
a property \ of predicates / which belongs to a pred.⌊icate⌋ ϕ if there are
exactly 8 obj⌊ects⌋ falling under this pred⌊icate⌋. If this definition is followed
up it turns out that all notions of arithm⌊etic⌋ can be defined in terms of
logical notions and that the laws of arithm.⌊etic⌋ can be derived from the
laws of logic except for one thing⌊,⌋ namely \ for building up arithmetic⌋
one needs the prop⌊osition⌋ that there are infinitely many obj.⌊ects,⌋ which
cannot be proved from the ax.⌊ioms⌋ of logic.
J130.K The lowest layer in the hierarchy of types described are the in-
dividuals or obj.⌊ects⌋ of the world⌊;⌋ what these ind.⌊ividuals⌋ are is an
extralog.⌊ical⌋ question which depends on the theory of the world which we
assume⌊;⌋ in a material.⌊ist⌋ theory it would be the atoms or the points of
space and time⌊,⌋ i⌊written over I⌋n a spiritualist theory it would be the
spirits and so on. As to the higher types (classes⌊,⌋ classes of classes⌊,⌋
\ predicates of pred.⌊icates⌋ / etc⌊.⌋) each \ type / must be distinguished
very carefully \ from any other / as can be shown e.g⌊.⌋ by the foll⌊owing⌋
J131.K example. If a is an obj⌊ect⌋ one can form the class whose only element
is a (denoted by ι‘a)⌊.⌋ So this ι‘a would be the extension of a predicate,
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which belongs to a and only to a. Now It should be \ is / near at hand to
identify this a and ι‘a⌊,⌋ i.e. to assume that the obj⌊ect⌋ a and the class
whose only element is a are the same. However it can be shown that this is
not admissible⌊,⌋ i.e. it would lead to contradictions to J132.K assume this
identity ι‘a = a ⌊comma from the manuscript deleted⌋ to be generally true
because ⌊comma from the manuscript deleted⌋ if we take for x a class (which
has several elements) then certainly ι‘α and α are distinct from each other;
since ι‘α is a class which has only one element⌊,⌋ / namely α⌊,⌋ / whereas
α is a class which has several elements⌊,⌋ so they are certainly distinct from
each other. But ⌊on the other hand⌋ although we have to distinguish very
carefully between the different type⌊s⌋ there is \ on the other hand / a very
close analogy between the diff.⌊erent⌋ type⌊s⌋. Sup E.g. classes of individuals
J133.K and classes of classes \ of individuals / will obey exactly the same
laws. For both of them we can define an ⌊unreadable letter⌋ and a multi-
plication and the same laws of calculus \ will hold / for them. Therefore it
is desirable not to formulate these laws separately for classes of classes and
classes of individuals, but to introduce a general notion of a class compris-
ing \ in it / all those particular cases⌊:⌋ classes of ind⌊ividuals⌋, classes of
rel⌊ations⌋, classes of classes etc. And it was actually in J134.K this way
that the logistic calculus was first set up (with such a general notion of a
class \ and / of a predicate \ and / of a relation and so on comprising all
embracing under it all types) and this way also corresponds certainly more
to the natural thinking. In ordinary \ language e.g. / we have such a general
notion of a class without a distinction of the different types⌊.⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ The more detailed working out of logic on this \ typeless
/ base (in natural thinking) has led to \ the discovery ⌊of⌋ / of the most in-
teresting J135.K facts in modern logic. Namely to the fact that the evidences
of natural thinking are not consistent with themselves⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. lead to contra-
dictions which are called ,,⌊“⌋logical paradoxes”⌊.⌋ The first of these contra-
dictions was found discovered by the mathematician Burali-Forti ⌊in⌋ 1897.
A few years later Russell produced a similar contradiction which however
was cleaned \ avoided / ⌊the⌋ the \ un / essential mathematical by⌊-⌋work
\ of Burali-Forti⌊’⌋s contrad.⌊iction⌋ / and showed the real logical structure
of the contradiction \ much clearer / . This Ru so⌊hyphen deleted⌋ J136.K
called Russell ⌊hyphen deleted⌋ paradox has remained \ up to now / the
classical example of a logical paradox and I want to explain it now in all
detail⌊.⌋ I shall first \ enumerate / some apparently evident propositions
from which the paradox follows in a few steps⌊.⌋
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The paradox under consideration involves \ only / the following notions⌊:⌋
1. object in the most general sense⌊,⌋ which embraces everything that
can be made an object of thinking⌊;⌋ in part.⌊icular⌋ it embraces the
indiv.⌊iduals⌋, classes, pred⌊icates⌋ of all types
⌊at the bottom of this page: Forts. Heft⌊German: continued in Notebook⌋
VII⌋
J137.K ⌊at the top of this page: Heft⌊German: Notebook⌋ VII.⌋
2. monadic predicate (briefly pred⌊icate⌋)⌊,⌋ also in the most general sense
comprising \ predicates of ind⌊ividuals⌋ as well as / predicates of pred-
icates etc. And this term ⌊dash deleted⌋ predicate is to be so un-
derstood that it is an essential requirement of a predic⌊ate⌋⌊comma
from the manuscript deleted⌋ that it is well⌊-⌋defined for any object
\ whatsoever / whether the given predicate belongs to it or ⌊not⌋
Now of these two notions ,,⌊“⌋object” and ,,⌊“⌋predicate” we have the
following apparently evident propositions⌊:⌋
1. If ϕ is a pred⌊icate⌋ and x an obj⌊ect⌋ then it is uniquely det⌊ermined⌋
whether ϕ belongs to x or not.
Let us denote the prop.⌊osition⌋ ϕ bel.⌊ongs⌋ to x by ϕ(x)⌊.⌋ So we have
⌊)⌋ if ϕ is a well⌊-⌋def.⌊ined⌋ pred.⌊icate⌋ and x ⌊)⌋ an obj⌊ect⌋ then ϕ(x) is
always a meaningful⌊l⌋ prop.⌊osition⌋ J138.K which is either true or false⌊.⌋
2. Vice versa⌊:⌋ If we have a combination of words or symbols \ A(x) /
which contains the letter x and is such that it becomes a \ meaningful
/ prop⌊osition⌋ for any arbitrary object which you substit.⌊ute⌋ for x
then A(x) defines a cert⌊ain⌋ predicate ϕ which belongs to an obj.⌊ect⌋
x if and only if A(x) is true⌊.⌋
\ So the assumption means that ⌊ie.⌋ if you subst.⌊itute⌋ for x the name
of an arb.⌊itrary⌋ object then it is always uniquely determined whether the
resulting propos⌊ition⌋ is true or false⌊.⌋ /
⌊The first item numbered 3 and the text which follows it until the page
ends with “whatever x” has a big square bracket on its left margin.⌋
3. It is uniquely determined of any obj⌊ect⌋ whether or not it is a pred⌊i-
cate⌋.
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Let us denote by P and unreadable symbol P (x) the prop⌊osition⌋ ,,⌊“⌋x
is a predicate” so that P (red)⌊,⌋ ∼ P (smaller)⌊,⌋ ∼ P (New York)⌊;⌋ then
by 3 for P (x) is always a meaningful prop.⌊osition⌋ whatever x J139.K may
be⌊]⌋⌊.⌋
3.⌊4.⌋ Any predicate is an obj⌊ect⌋.
I think these 3⌊written over 4; in the next paragraph four assumptions
are mentioned (see also the corresponding four assumptions on pp. 138.-140.
of Notebook VII), so it should be: four⌋ prop.⌊ositions⌋ are all evident to
natural thinking⌊.⌋ ⌊[⌋ 1 and 2 can be considered as a def⌊inition⌋ of the
term predicate and 3 says that the notion of pred.⌊icate⌋ thus defined is
well⌊-⌋defined.⌊]⌋
And now let us consider the following statement P (x) . ∼ x(x) that means
x is a predicate and it belongs to x (i⌊.⌋e. to itself). According to our
\ four ass⌊umptions⌋ that is a meaningf⌊ul⌋ pro⌊position⌋ which is either
true or false whatever you subst⌊itute⌋ for x. ⌊N⌋amely⌊,⌋ \ at first by 3 it is
uniquely det⌊ermined:⌋ / if you J140.K subst.⌊itute⌋ for x something which is
not a pred.⌊icate⌋ it becomes false⌊,⌋ if you subst.⌊itute⌋ for x a pred.⌊icate⌋
then \ P (x) is true but / x(y) is either true or false for any obj.⌊ect⌋ y
⌊written over x⌋ by 1. ⌊B⌋ut x is a pred.⌊icate,⌋ hence an obj.⌊ect⌋ by
ass⌊umption⌋ 3⌊4,⌋ hence x(x) is either true or false⌊,⌋ hence the whole state-
ment is always meaningful⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. either true or false⌊.⌋ Therefore by 2 it
defines a cert⌊ain⌋ pred.⌊icate⌋ Φ which such that Φ(x) ≡
means
P (x). ∼ x(x)⌊.⌋
\ ≡ x is pro impredicable /
⌊Next comes a page again numbered 140. with a crossed out text.⌋
Φ(Φ) ≡ P (Φ) . ∼ Φ(Φ)
But this leads immediately to a contradiction since this equ.⌊ation⌋ means
two implications
Φ(Φ) ⊃ P (Φ) . ∼ Φ(Φ)
P (Φ) ⌊.⌋ ∼ Φ(Φ) ⊃ Φ(Φ)
⌊The last two pages of Notebook VI are not numbered. These two pages
will not be entirely reproduced here, since they contain only rather uncon-
nected notes and jottings, presumably for exercises, written without much
order and care. These notes will however be described here up to a point.
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On the first of these pages is first an exercise involving reduction to normal
form, in which one finds the following (the unsystematically written . is here
deleted, as well as the unreadable crossed out beginning of the third line):
c(b+ ya¯) + d(b¯(y¯ + a)) 6= 0
db¯a + cb+ yca¯+ db¯y¯ 6= 0
cb+ ca¯+ db¯ 6= 0 ab 6= 0
b+ ba¯ + ab¯ 6= 0
d = 0 c = a
In the first line, and above it, one finds in the margin:
a b b 6= 0
(c d)
b a
In the remainder of this page one finds “x is a parent of y” and “child = son
or daughter”. The rest is either in shorthand, or it is unreadable, or it is
crossed out.
On the remaining, last page, of Notebook VI, one finds first a few lines,
mostly in shorthand (once crossed out), in which one finds also: (x)ϕ(x),
equally shaped, tautological entailment, out of fashion, unfeasible, fail, per-
mitted to take, unpracticable. Next, at the end of the notebook, one finds
notes, rather difficult to read, written without much order and care, and
partly erased, which involve some equations, Boolean expressions, perhaps a
syllogism, a Venn-Euler diagram, “24−1(= 15)”, “215 = 32000” (215 is 32768)
and “215 − 2”. At the top of this last page, one finds the caption “illegible
text”, presumably put by the archive where the manuscript is preserved.⌋
2.7 Notebook VII
⌊Folder 65, on the front cover of the notebook “Logik Vorl.⌊esungen⌋ ⌊German:
Logic Lectures⌋ N.D. ⌊Notre Dame⌋ VII”⌋
⌊Notebook VII starts with nine, not numbered, pages of numbered re-
marks and questions, more than eighty of them, partly unreadable, partly in
shorthand, and all seemingly not closely related to the remaining notes for
the course. They will be reproduced here up to a point only.⌋
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JnewpageK −1. Every ⌊unreadable abbreviated word⌋ prop⌊osition⌋ is
true⌊.⌋
−2. Everyone ⌊not⌋ (Christ⌊ian⌋, cathol⌊ic⌋) bel.⌊ieving⌋ \ the neg⌊ation⌋
of / in dogm⌊a⌋ commits a mortal sin⌊.⌋
−3. Everyone not bel⌊ieving⌋ a dogma although he knows that it is
⌊dogma⌋ commits a mortal sin⌊.⌋
−4. Everyone teaching \ publicly / the neg⌊ation⌋ doctr.⌊inal⌋ prop.⌊osi-
tion⌋ as the truth (although) commits a. . .
−5⌊.⌋ Everyone asserting privately. . .
◦ 6. The world was existed appr.⌊oximately⌋ 6000 years ⌊9⌋vid⌊.⌋ 25⌊).⌋
◦ 7. The sky is \ made / of solid material⌊.⌋
◦ 8. There exist angels and evil spirits⌊.⌋
◦ 9. Some of the ⌊unreadable text⌋ are caused by evil spirits⌊.⌋
◦ 10⌊.⌋Hypnot The phen⌊omena⌋ of hypnotism \ (telepathy \ telekinesis⌊,⌋
prophecy / ) / are caused by evil spirits (spirits?)
−1′. If A is a dogma at some time it is a dogma at any later time.
−2′. If A is a ⌊unreadable abbreviated word, same as in 1.⌋ prop⌊osition⌋
at some time it is. . .
JnewpageK  11. Will logic and mathematics be the same in the after
the end of this world⌊?⌋
 12. Woul ⌊or “Word”⌋ The death of Christ was It was in the power
of Christ (inqu. R homo) not to dy for manhood⌊.⌋ ⌊Sentence 12 is in big
square brackets.⌋
◦ 13. It would have been no sin of Christ if he had not died for sacrificed
himself for manhood⌊.⌋
◦ 14. Can an infidel \ cath⌊olic⌋ / priest deal out administer sacraments
if he keeps the outward form⌊?⌋
◦ 15. Can an infidel make a valid baptism if he keeps the form⌊?⌋
 16. Does Is everyone not baptis⌊z⌋ed and living after Christ’s death
go to hell damned⌊?⌋
 17. Does everybody baptis⌊z⌋ed which has committed a mort⌊al⌋ sin
without being ◦ absolved by a cath⌊olic⌋ priest go to hell damned⌊?⌋
JnewpageK  17⌊.⌋ ⌊D⌋oes it make sense to speak of a mortal sin of ⌊two
unreadable symbols, should be: a⌋ Christian (⌊perhaps: not⌋ cathol⌊ic⌋⌊In
the remainder, one recognizes “ipso facto” and “etc”, which seem to be mixed
with shorthand.⌋
 17.1⌊.⌋ Is any action of which one does⌊ ⌋not know that it is a mortal
sin ⌊text interupted⌋
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⌊Here an arrow originating in a  put before 23 ◦ and 24 ◦ points to the
space between 17.1. and 18.⌋
sp. 18⌊.⌋ Is ⌊unreadable word, perhaps: avarice⌋ a mortal sin in any
case⌊?⌋
sp. 19. Is every lie intended for deceiving (maybe ⌊unreadable text⌋) a
mortal sin] ⌊?⌋ sp. 20⌊.⌋ Is every action whose final aim is to damage anybody
a mort⌊al⌋ sin⌊?⌋
sp. 21⌊.⌋ Is it a mort⌊al⌋ sin to kill the enemy ⌊in⌋ a war waged by the
⌊unreadable word⌋ secular power⌊?⌋
sp. 22. Is it a mortal sin ⌊unreadable text⌋
⌊see the remark after 17.1⌋
Th 23 ◦ Are the mort⌊al⌋ sins for a noncath.⌊olic⌋ Christian the same
(even without ⌊unreadable word⌋ teaching)
Th 24 ◦ Are they the same to someone Christian who has ⌊unreadable
text⌋ relig.⌊ious⌋ teaching⌊?⌋
 25⌊.⌋ vide 74 Are all ⌊unreadable word⌋ made by God or also by other
spirits⌊?⌋
⌊The following item, sp. 20, is set under a line at the bottom of the page,
like a footnote.⌋
sp. 20⌊unreadable symbol⌋ to procure someth⌊ing⌋ good for oneself by
dam⌊aging⌋ another.
JnewpageK  26. Is every \ act⌊ual⌋ / suff⌊ering⌋ a punishment for a
preceding (succeeding) ⌊unreadable text⌋ sin (of the parents)⌊?⌋ Animals?
sp. 27. Is it a mortal sin to ask a ⌊unreadable word, perhaps shorthand⌋
⌊unreadable text⌋ or to ask them
 21⌊.⌋ Is it in the power of anybody to make the world better by his
acts or is it all the same⌊?⌋
sp. 22. Is the use of ⌊unreadable word⌋ means to make mon⌊e⌋y a
mort⌊al⌋ sin⌊?⌋
×◦ ⌊preceded by symbols in shorthand, “c/c.” and “bib”⌋  23. Is
it possible that any⌊body⌋ who goes to heaven has a worse caract⌊er⌋ than
anyb⌊ody who⌋ goes to hell (bec.⌊ause⌋ / ⌊unreadable word⌋ / by ⌊unreadable
text⌋ he was ⌊unreadable word⌋ from sins)⌊?⌋
× 24. Are some of the physi⌊cal⌋ laws caused by evil regular action of
evil spirits⌊?⌋
JnewpageK ◦ 25⌊.⌋ Are the geo fossils a work of the devil⌊?⌋
× 26⌊.⌋ Do there exist exist any animals by natural reasons ⌊(⌋without
action of demons)⌊?⌋
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◦ 27. ⌊written over “vide 29”⌋Did the ⌊unreadable word⌋ really ⌊unread-
able text⌋ or was it a deception⌊?⌋
⌊The questions numbered ◦ 28., ◦ 29⌊.⌋, −30, ◦ ⌊31.⌋ and ◦ 32⌊.⌋and
Z. 33., which is on a new page, are mostly unreadable.⌋ In ◦ 29⌊.⌋medicine
seems to be mentioned together with spirits, in −30. the propositions of the
Bible as dogmas, while in Z. 33. one finds “Satisfact. for div. mortal sins.”
and “Protest.”, in −34. one finds “Def”, “Dogma” and “Doctrine” besides
shorthand, and −35. is entirely in shorthand.⌋
? 36⌊.⌋ Is praying only caused by sin⌊?⌋
 37⌊.⌋ Are the saints in heaven at present have conscience and are
praying⌊?⌋
 ⌊preceding the next two numbers⌋ 38. Is heaven where they are a spa
place in space⌊?⌋
39. Similarly (hell)
 40. Has the body of J.⌊esus⌋ Chr.⌊ist⌋ moved to heaven⌊?⌋
⌊The text in the remaining remarks, numbered until 80, is mostly in
shorthand, or too fragmentary to be understandable. We single out some
readable words and fragments that seem important: in Lit 46. “Martyrology”,
in Th 57. “Confessio Excom.” and “Status” and a word that seems to begin
with “amor”, in  60⌊.⌋ “renasci de spiritu”, in Lit 64. “Synchron.”, in
 69. “omnes qui filii diaboli vocantur”, in ?  70⌊.⌋ “filii diaboli” and
“diabolus”, in  72. “Christus”, in 74. “Lex iis qui sub lege sunt loquitur”,
in  77. “corpus Christi”, in −78. “theor⌊.⌋ Physik”, and here are some
complete numbered remarks:
 75. Trinit. dogma⌊:⌋ una natura⌊,⌋ tres persones
 76. Homousi⌊os, homoousios:⌋ una persona⌊,⌋ duae naturae
80. Ja[mes]cob 1,5, ⌊1⌋,8 ?
New pages start within 44. and after 58. and 72.⌋
⌊At the bottom of p. 136. of Notebook VI, for subsequent pages, 137.
and later, the reader was directed to Notebook VII, and at the top of p. 137.
of Notebook VI it is written: “Notebook VII”. It seems one should assume
that pp. 137.-140. of Notebook VI are to be superseded by pages which
follow here, starting with p. 137.⌋
J137.K
2. The notion of a ,,⌊“⌋well⌊-⌋defined \ monadic / predicate”.
That is ⌊unreadable word⌋ a monadic predicate ϕ such that for any obj⌊ect⌋
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x whatsoever it is uniquely det.⌊ermined⌋ by the def.⌊inition⌋ of ϕ whether or
not ϕ belongs to x, so that \ for any arb.⌊itrary⌋ obj⌊ect⌋ x / ϕ(x) is always
a meaningful prop.⌊osition⌋ which is either true or false⌊.⌋ Since I need no
other kind of pred⌊icate⌋ in the subsequ.⌊ent⌋ considerations but only well⌊-
⌋defined monadic pred⌊icates⌋, I shall use the term ,,⌊“⌋pred.⌊icate⌋” in the
sense of monadic well⌊-⌋def.⌊ined⌋ pred⌊icate⌋.
\ 3. The concept which is expressed by \ the word / ,,⌊“⌋is” or ,,⌊“⌋belongs”
in ord⌊inary⌋ langu⌊age⌋ and which we expressed by ϕ(x)⌊,⌋ which
means the pred⌊icate⌋ ϕ belongs to x⌊.⌋ /
Now for these notions (of obj.⌊ect⌋ and pred.⌊icate⌋) we have the foll.⌊ow-
ing⌋ apparently evident prop.⌊ositions:⌋
J138.K
1. For any obj.⌊ect⌋ x it is well uniquely det⌊ermined⌋ whether or not
it is a welldef. pred.⌊icate;⌋ \ in other word⌊s⌋ \ well⌊-⌋def⌊ined⌋ /
predicate is itself a well⌊-⌋defined predicate⌊.⌋ /
2. If y is a pred.⌊icate⌋ and x an obj⌊ect⌋ then it is well⌊-⌋defined whether
the pred.⌊icate⌋ y belongs to x. \ This is an immed.⌊iate⌋ consequence
of the def.⌊inition⌋ of a well⌊-⌋defined pred⌊icate⌋. /
Let us denote \ for any two obj⌊ects⌋ y⌊, x⌋ / by y(x) the prop.⌊osition
y is a pred.⌊icate⌋ and belongs to x⌊.⌋ So for any two obj⌊ects⌋ \ y, x / y(x)
will be a meaningful prop.⌊osition⌋ \ of / which it is uniquely determ⌊ined⌋
whether it is true or false⌊,⌋ namely if y is no pred⌊icate⌋ it is false \ whatever
x may be⌊,⌋ / if it is a pred⌊icate⌋ then it is true or false according as the
pred.⌊icate⌋ y bel.⌊ongs⌋ to x or does not belong to x⌊,⌋ which is uniquely
det⌊ermined⌋.
J139.K
3. If we have a combination of symbols or words A(x) contain⌊ing⌋ the
letter x (denote it by A(x)) and if this comb.⌊ination⌋ is such that
it becomes a mean.⌊ingful⌋ prop.⌊osition⌋ whatever you obj⌊ect⌋ you
subst.⌊itute⌋ for x then A(x) defines a cert⌊ain⌋ \ well⌊-⌋def⌊ined⌋ /
predicate ϕ which belongs to an obj⌊ect⌋ x if and only if ϕ(x) ⌊A(x)⌋
is true.
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(I repeat the hypothesis of this statement: It means is as follows⌊,⌋ that if you
subst⌊itute⌋ for x \ the name of / an arb.⌊itrary⌋ obj.⌊ect⌋ then the resulting
expr.⌊ession⌋ is always a meaningf.⌊ul⌋ prop.⌊osition⌋ of which it is uniquely
det.⌊ermined⌋ whether it is true or false.) \ Now this statement too could
be consid.⌊ered⌋ as a consequence of the def.⌊inition⌋ of a well⌊-⌋def.⌊ined⌋
pred⌊icate⌋. /
4. Any pred⌊icate⌋ is an obj⌊ect⌋. That J140.K follows bec.⌊ause⌋ we
took the term obj⌊ect⌋ in the most general sense according to which
anything one can think of is an object.
I think these 4⌊four, written over 3⌋ prop.⌊ositions⌋ are all evident to nat-
ural thinking. But nevertheless they lead to contradictions⌊,⌋ namely in the
following way⌊.⌋ Consider the expr⌊ession⌋ ∼ x(x) that is an expr.⌊ession⌋
involving⌋ the var⌊iable⌋ x and such that for any obj⌊ect⌋ ⌊unreadable symbol⌋
substituted for this var.⌊iable⌋ \ x / you do \ obtain / a \ mean.⌊ing⌋ful⌊l⌋
propos.⌊ition⌋ of which it is uniquely det⌊ermined⌋ whether it is true or
⌊missing from the manuscript: false.⌋ J141.K ⌊N⌋amely if x is not a pred.⌊i-
cate⌋ this bec.⌊omes⌋ false by the above definition of y(x)⌊;⌋ if x is a pred⌊i-
cate⌋ then \ by 1 / for any obj⌊ect⌋ y it is uniquely det.⌊ermined⌋ whether
x bel⌊ongs to⌋ y⌊,⌋ hence also for x it is uniquely det⌊ermined⌋ bec⌊ause⌋ x
is a pred⌊icate,⌋ hence an object (by 4)⌊.⌋ ⌊unreadable word⌋ ∼ x(x) means
x is a pred.⌊icate⌋ not belonging to itself. It is easy to name pred⌊icates⌋
which do belong to themselves⌊,⌋ e.g. the pred⌊icate⌋ ,,⌊“⌋predicate”⌊;⌋ we
have \ the concept / ,,⌊“⌋predicate” is a predicate. Most of the pred.⌊icates⌋
of course do⌊ ⌋not belong to thems⌊elves.⌋ ⌊S⌋ay e⌊.⌋g. ⌊t⌋he predicate man
is not a man⌊,⌋ J142.K so it does⌊ ⌋not belong to itself⌊.⌋ But e⌊.⌋g. the
pred⌊icate⌋ not man ⌊hyphen between these two words deleted, since it is
omitted in the text later⌋ does belong to itself since the pred⌊icate⌋ not man
is certainly not a man⌊,⌋ so it is a not man⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. belongs to itself⌊.⌋
Now since ∼ x(x) is either true or false for any obj⌊ect⌋ x it defines a
cert⌊ain⌋ pred⌊icate⌋ by 3. Call this \ well⌊-⌋def⌊ined⌋ / pred.⌊icate⌋ Φ⌊,⌋
so that Φ(x) ≡ ∼ x(x)⌊.⌋ For Φ even a term in ord.⌊inary⌋ lang.⌊uage⌋
was introduced⌊,⌋ namely the word ,,⌊“⌋impredicable”⌊,⌋ and \ for / the
neg⌊ation⌋ of it \ the word / ,,⌊“⌋predicable”⌊;⌋ so \ an obj⌊ect⌋ is called /
predicable if it J143.K is a pred.⌊icate⌋ belonging to itself and impredicable in
the opposite case⌊,⌋ \ i⌊.⌋e. if it is either not a pred⌊icate⌋ or is a pred⌊icate⌋
and does⌊ ⌋not belong to itself. / ⌊S⌋o predicate is predicable⌊,⌋ not man is
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pred⌊icable,⌋ man is impred⌊icable,⌋ Socr⌊ates⌋ is impred⌊icable⌋. ⌊A line
at the end of this paragraph separates it from the text below it.⌋
And now we ask is predicable the pred⌊icate⌋ ,,⌊“⌋impred⌊icable⌋” \ predi-
cable or / impredicable⌊.⌋ Now we know this equiv.⌊alence⌋ holds for any
obj⌊ect⌋ x (it is the def⌊inition⌋ of impred⌊icable⌋).⌊;⌋ Φ is a pred⌊icate,⌋
hence an obj.⌊ect,⌋ hence this equiv.⌊alence⌋ holds \ for Φ⌊,⌋ / i⌊.⌋e.⌋ Φ(Φ) ≡
∼ Φ(Φ). And \ What does / Φ(Φ) say⌊?⌋ Since Φ means impred.⌊icable⌋
it says \ the pre / impred⌊icable⌋ is impredicable. and So we see that this
prop.⌊osition⌋ is equivalent ⌊unreadable symbol⌋ with its \ own / negation⌊.⌋
J144.K But from that it follows that it must be both true and false⌊,⌋
bec⌊ause⌋ we can conclude from this equiv⌊alence⌋:
Φ(Φ) ⊃ ∼ Φ(Φ)
∼ Φ(Φ) ⊃ Φ(Φ)
By the first impl.⌊ication,⌋ Φ(Φ) cannot be true⌊,⌋ bec⌊ause⌋ the ass⌊ump-
tion⌋ that it is true leads to the concl.⌊usion⌋ that it is false⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. \ it
leads / to a contradiction⌊;⌋ but ⌊unreadable symbol⌋ Φ(Φ) cannot be false
either because the ass by the sec.⌊ond⌋ impl.⌊ication⌋ the ass.⌊umption⌋ that
it is false leads to the concl.⌊usion⌋ that it is true.⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. \ again / to a
contrad⌊iction⌋. So this Φ(Φ) would be a prop.⌊osition⌋ which is neither true
nor false⌊,⌋ hence it would be both true and false J145.K bec⌊ause⌋ that it
is not true implies that it is false and that it is not false implies that it is
true. So we apparently have discovered a prop⌊osition⌋ which is both true
and false⌊,⌋ which is impossible by the law of contradiction⌊.⌋
⌊The text in the following paragraph is inserted in the manuscript on
the right of p. 145., which is numbered 145.1., and at the top of the
not numbered page on the right of p. 146.⌋ \ The same argument can be
given without log.⌊ical⌋ symb⌊ols⌋ in the following form⌊.⌋ The quest⌊ion⌋
is: \ Is the pred.⌊icate / ,,⌊“⌋impredicable” pred.⌊icable⌋ or impred⌊icable⌋.
1. If it \ impred⌊icable⌋ / were pred.⌊icable⌋ that would mean that it be-
longs to itself⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. then impred⌊icable⌋ is impred⌊icable⌋. So from the
ass⌊umption⌋ that \ impred.⌊icable⌋ / is pred.⌊icable⌋ we derived that it
is impred⌊icable;⌋ so it is not im predic⌊able⌋. 2.⌊)⌋ On the other hand
assume impred⌊icable⌋ is impred⌊icable;⌋ then it belongs to itself⌊,⌋ hence
\ ⌊unreadable word⌋ / is predicable. So from the ass.⌊umption⌋ that it
is impred⌊icable⌋ we derived that it is pred⌊icable⌋. So it is cert⌊ainly⌋
not impred⌊icable⌋. So it is neither pred⌊icable⌋ nor impred⌊icable⌋. But
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then it must be both pred.⌊icable⌋ and impred.⌊icable⌋ because since it is
not pred.⌊icable⌋ it is impr.⌊edicable⌋ and since it is not impred⌊icable⌋ it
is pred⌊icable⌋. So again we have a prop.⌊osition⌋ which is both true and
false⌊.⌋ /
Now what are we to ⌊unreadable word, should be: do⌋ about this situa-
tion? One may first try to say⌊:⌋ Well⌊,⌋ the law of contradiction is an error.
There do exist such strange things as prop.⌊ositions⌋ which are both true and
false. But this \ way out of the diff⌊iculty⌋ / is \ evidently / not possible
J146.K because that would imply that every prop.⌊osition⌋ \ whatsoever / is
both true and false⌊.⌋We had the form. of in the calc.⌊ulus⌋ of prop⌊ositions⌋
the form⌊ula⌋ p . ∼ p ⊃ q \ for any p, q⌊,⌋ / hence also p . ∼ p ⊃ ∼ q where p
and q are arb⌊itrary⌋ prop⌊ositions⌋. So if we have one prop⌊osition⌋ p which
is both true and false then any prop⌊osition⌋ q has the undesirable prop⌊erty⌋
of being both true and false⌊,⌋ which would make any thinking completely
meaningless. So we have to conclude that we arrived at this contradictory
concl.⌊usion⌋
Φ(Φ) and ∼ Φ(Φ)
J147.K by some error or fallacy⌊,⌋ and the question is what does this error
consist in [i⌊.⌋e. which one of our evident prop⌊ositions⌋ is wrong]⌊.⌋
⌊new paragraph⌋ The nearest at hand conjecture about this error is that
there is some circular fallacy hidden in this argument.⌊,⌋ because we are
speaking of pred.⌊icates⌋ belonging to themselves or not belonging to them-
selves. One may say that it is meaningless from the beginning to apply a
predicate to itself⌊.⌋ ⌊’ deleted⌋ I don’t think that this is the correct solution.
For the following reasons⌊:⌋
1. It is \ not possible to / except for any pred.⌊icate⌋ P J148.K just this
pred⌊icate⌋ P itself from the things to which it can be applied
i⌊.⌋e⌊.⌋ ⌊unreadable word⌋ we \ cannot / modify the assumption 1. by
\ saying / the ⌊written over another unreadable word⌋ prop.⌊property, or
perhaps: proposition⌋ ϕ(x) is well⌊-⌋def.⌊ined⌋ for any x except ϕ itself be-
cause if you define \ e.g. / a pred⌊icate⌋ µ say by two pred⌊icates⌋ ϕ, ψ by
µ(x) ≡ ϕ(x) . ψ(x) then we would have already three ⌊written over another
unreadable word⌋ pred.⌊icates⌋ µ, ϕ and ψ to which µ cannot be applied⌊:⌋
µ(ϕ) ≡
Df
ϕ(ϕ) . ψ(ϕ) where this makes no sense⌊.⌋
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J149.K So it is certainly not sufficient to exclude just self⌊-⌋reflexivity \ of a
pred.⌊icate⌋ / \ because that entails automatically that we have to exclude
also other thing⌊s⌋ and it is very difficult and leads to \ very / undesirable re-
sults if one tries to formulate what is to be excluded \ ⌊unreadable text⌋ / on
the basis of this idea to avoid self⌊-⌋reflexivities. That was done by Russel⌊l⌋
in his so called ramified theory of types which since has been abandoned by
practically all logicians. / On the other hand \ it is not even justified to
exclude self⌊-⌋reflexivities of every formula / \ bec.⌊ause⌋ / self⌊-⌋reflexivity
does⌊ ⌋not always lead to contradiction but is perfectly legitimate in many
cases⌊.⌋ If \ e.g⌊.⌋ / I say ⌊e.g.:⌋ ,,⌊“⌋Any sent⌊ence⌋ of the English language
contains a verb⌊”⌋ then it is perfectly alright to apply this proposition to it-
self and to conclude from it that also this prop.⌊osition⌋ under consideration
contains a verb.
⌊new paragraph⌋ The \ Therefore the / real fallacy seems to ly⌊lie⌋
J150.K in something else \ tha⌊t⌋n the self⌊-⌋reflexivity⌊,⌋ / namely in these
⌊unreadable symbol⌋ notions of object and predicate in the most general
sense \ embracing obj⌊ects⌋ of all logical types / . The Russell paradox seems
to show that there does not exist such ⌊a⌋ concept of everything because⌊.⌋
A⌊written over a⌋s we saw the logical objects form a certain hierarchy of types
and however far you may proceed in the⌊“e” written over “is”⌋ construction
of these types you will always be able to continue the process ⌊unreadable
symbol⌋ still farther and therefore it is illegitimate and makes no sense to
speak of the totality of all obj⌊ects⌋.
J151.K One might think that one could obtain the totality of all obj.⌊ects⌋
in the following way: take first the indiv.⌊iduals⌋ and call them obj.⌊ects⌋ of
type 0⌊,⌋ then take the concepts of type 1⌊,⌋ then the conce⌊pts⌋ of type 2⌊,⌋
3 etc⌊.⌋ for any natural nu⌊mber⌋. But it is by no means true that we obtain
in this manner the totality of all concepts.⌊,⌋ But that isnt true because
\ e.g⌊.⌋ / the concept of the⌊“e” written over “is”⌋ totality of concepts thus
obtained \ for all int⌊egers⌋ n as types is itself a / concept not occurring
in this totality⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. it is a concept of a ty⌊“y” written over another
letter⌋pe higher than J152.K any finite nu.⌊mber,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. of an infinite type.
It is denoted as \ a concept of / type ω. But even with this type \ ω / we
are by \ no means / at an end, either because we can \ e.g. / define concepts
which are e.g⌊.⌋ relations between conc⌊epts⌋ of type ω and they would be of
\ a still higher / type ω + 1⌊.⌋ So we see there are \ in a sense / much more
than infinitely many log⌊ical⌋ type⌊s⌋; and there are so many that it is not
possible to form a concept of the totality of all of them⌊,⌋ because whichever
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concept we form we can define a concept of a higher type⌊,⌋ hence not falling
under J153.K the given concept.
⌊new paragraph⌋ So if we want to take account of this fundamental fact
of logic \ that there does⌊ ⌋not exist a concept of the totality of all ob-
jects whatsoever⌊,⌋ / we must drop the words ,,⌊“⌋object”⌊, “⌋predicate”⌊,
,,⌊“⌋everything” from our language and replace them by the words: ob-
ject of a given type⌊,⌋ predicate of a given type⌊,⌋ everything which be-
longs to a given type. \ In part.⌊icular,⌋ prop⌊osition⌋ 4 has now ⌊to⌋
be formul⌊ated⌋ like this. ⌊If⌋ A(x) is an expr.⌊ession⌋ which becomes
a meaningf.⌊ul⌋ prop.⌊osition⌋ for any obj⌊ect⌋ x of a given type α then
it defines a concept of type α + 1⌊.⌋ Now We cannot even formulate the
prop.⌊osition⌋ in its previous form.⌊,⌋ because we don’t have such words as
obj⌊ect⌋, pred⌊icate⌋ etc⌊.⌋ in our lang⌊uage⌋. / Then the Russell para-
dox disappears immediately because we can form the concept Φ defined by
Φ(x) ≡ ∼ x(x) only for x’s of a given type α⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. J154.K we can define a
concept Φ such that this equivalence holds for every x of type α⌊.⌋ (We can-
not even formulate that it holds for every obj.⌊ect⌋ because we have dropped
these words from our langu⌊age⌋).⌊.)⌋ But then Φ will be ⌊a⌋ concept of next
higher type because it is a property of objects of type α. Therefore we cannot
substitute Φ here for x because this equiv⌊alence⌋ holds only for obj.⌊ects⌋
of type α.
⌊new paragraph⌋ So this seems to me to be the (satisfactory) true solution
of the J155.K Russell paradox⌊e⌋s. I only wish to mention that the hierarchy
of types as I sketched it here is considerably more general than it was when it
was first presented by it’s⌊its⌋ inventor B. Russell. Russell’s theory of types
was given ⌊in⌋ two different forms⌊,⌋ the so called simplified and the ramified
theory of types⌊,⌋ both of which are much more restrictive then the one I
explained here⌊; e.⌋g⌊.⌋ in both of them it would be imp.⌊ossible⌋ to form
concepts of type ω, \ also the statement x(x) would always be meaningless⌊.⌋
/ Russell⌊’⌋s theory⌊“he” written over an unreadable word⌋ of J156.K types
is more based on the first idea of s⌊writen over: ex⌋olving the paradoxes
(namely to exclude self⌊-⌋reflexivities) and the tot.⌊ality⌋ of all obj⌊ects⌋ is
only excl.⌊uded⌋ because it would be self⌊-⌋reflexive (since it would itself
be an object⌊)⌋. However the develop⌊ment⌋ of ax⌊ioms⌋ of set theory has
shown that Russell⌊’⌋s syst⌊em⌋ is too restrictive⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. it excludes many
arguments \ which (as far as one can see) do⌊ ⌋not lead to contradictions and
which are necessary for building up abstract set⌊ t⌋heory⌊.⌋ /
There are other logical paradoxes which are solved by the theory of
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types⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. by excluding the terms obj⌊ect⌋, every etc⌊.⌋ But there are
others in which the fallacy is of an \ entirely / different nature. They are
the so called epistemological paradoxes. J157.K The oldest of them is the
Epimenides⌊.⌋ In the form it is ⌊unreadable symbols⌋ usually presented, it
is no paradox. But if a man says ,,⌊“⌋I am lying now” \ and says nothing
else⌊,⌋ \ or if he says: The prop.⌊osition⌋ which I am jus pronouncing right
now is false⌊,⌋ / then th⌊written over something unreadable⌋is statement can
be proved to be both true and false, because this prop⌊osition⌋ p says that
p is false⌊;⌋ so we have p ≡ (p is false)⌊,⌋ p ≡ ∼ p⌊,⌋ from which it follows
that p is both true and false as we saw before. The same para⌊dox⌋ can be
brought to a much more conclusive form as follows:
⌊Here, at the end of p. 157., the text in the manuscript is interrupted,
and subsequent pages are not numbered until p. 1. below. In between are
four pages of jottings given here, presumably for exercises.⌋
Jnewpage iK Ableitung d.⌊der⌋ paradoxen⌊,,ox” in this word written over
something else⌋ Aussagen u¨ber Impl. ⌊Implikation⌋ aus den unten angeg.⌊an-
gegeben⌋ 5 Axiomen ⌊German: Derivation of paradoxical propositions about
implication from the five axioms given below:⌋
⌊The next three lines, before 1., are crossed out:⌋
p ⊃ p r ⊃ (p ⊃ p⌊.⌋r)
p . r ⊃ r
p ⊃ r
1.) p ⊃ q 2.) p ⊃ q
q ⊃ r r
p ⊃ r p ⊃ q . r
3.) q . r ⊃ r 4.) p ⊃ p
Ableitung ⌊derivation⌋

r
p ⊃ p . r
p . r ⊃ r
p ⊃ r ⌊unreadable sign⌋ 5.) tollendo tollens
∼ r ⊃ ∼ p p ⊃ r . ∼ r :⊃ ∼ p
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Jnewpage iiK
µ(x) ⌊= or ≡⌋ ϕ(x) . ψ(x)
ϕ(µ)
strike out, drop
something else but (than)
falling under a concept
⌊The following pages new page iii-iv and pp. 1.-7. following them until the
end of the scanned manuscript, which makes nine pages, are on loose, torn
out, leafs, with holes for a spiral, but not bound with the spiral to the rest
of the notebook, as the other pages in this Notebook VII are. In all of the
notebooks the only other loose leafs are to be found at the end of Notebooks
III and towards the end of Notebook V.⌋
Jnewpage iiiK
1.© p→ p 1©. q → (∆→ q)
2.© p, q → p 2©. ∼ q → (⌊crossed out symbol⌋q,∆→ p)
3© ∼∼ q → q
4.© ∆, q → ∼ (∆→ q)
5.© ∆→ p
∆→ q p, q → r
∆→ r
6.© ∆, p→ q ⌊unreadable formula⌋
∆,∼ p→ q ⌊unreadable formula⌋
∆→ q
5© A→ p1
A→ pn A→ (p→ r)
p1 . . . pn → q A→ p
A→ q A→ r
4.© Ind.⌊uktive⌋ Bew.⌊eis⌋⌊German: Inductive proof⌋
3© Export. ⌊gen⌋ a Import. (p, p→ r)→ r
⌊(⌋p→ r)→ p→ r
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Jnewpage ivK
⌊1.⌋ R + S⌊,⌋ R · S⌊,⌋ R ⊂ S⌊,⌋ −R⌊,⌋ R− S
V˙⌊,⌋ Λ˙⌊,⌋ R‘x⌊,⌋ E!R‘x
[
−→
R ⌊,⌋ ←−R ⌊,⌋ R“β⌊,⌋ Rε‘β]
R˘⌊,⌋ D‘R⌊, C‘R, C‘R,⌋ R|S
⌊inside two incomplete boxes and crossed out: sym⌊metry⌋, as, 1, [, I⌋
trans⌊itivity,⌋ one many⌊,⌋ father, ⊥
x
,
xM(y, z)⌊,⌋ M ‘(y⌊, ⌋z)⌊,⌋ yMz
i‘x⌊,⌋ {x}⌊,⌋ 0, 1, 2, . . .⌊,⌋ 1→ 1
Abstractions ⌊ ⌋ prinz.⌊ip, perhaps German: principle,⌋ aeq.⌊perhaps: equal,
or something of the same root,⌋ Ind⌊uction⌋.
J1.K ⌊Here the numbering of pages in this notebook starts anew.⌋ All
four rules are purely formal⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e. for applying them it is ⌊apostrophe
deleted⌋ not necessary to know the meaning of the expressions. Examples
of derivations from the axioms. Since all axioms and rules of the calculus
of propositions are also axioms and rules of the calculus of functions we are
justified to in as⌊sum⌋ing all formulas and rules formerly derived ⌊the order
of the last two words corrected in the manuscript⌋ for in the calculus of
propositions.
1. Example ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x)
Derivation:
(1) (x)[∼ ϕ(x)] ⊃ ∼ ϕ(y) obtained by substituting ∼ ϕ(x) for ϕ(x)
in Ax5.⌊Ax. 5⌋
(2) ϕ(y) ⊃ ∼ (x)[∼ ϕ(x)] by rule of transposition applied to (1)
(3) ϕ(y) ⊃ (∃x)ϕ(x) by rule of defined symbol from (2)
J2.K 2. Example (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ψ(x)]
(1) (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y)] by substituting ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)
for ϕ(x) in Ax. 5
(2) (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(y) Ax⌊. ⌋5
(3) (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ [ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y)] . ϕ(y) by rule of
multiplication of implications applied to (1) and (2)
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(4) [ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y)] . ϕ(y) ⊃ ψ(y) by substituting ϕ(y) for p and ψ(y)
for q in the demonstrable formula (p ⊃ q) . p ⊃ q
J3.K(5) (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(y) by rule of syllogism applied to
(3) ⌊and⌋ (4)
(6) (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] . (x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (y)ψ(y) by rule of quantifier from (5)
(7) (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (y)ψ(y)] by rule of exportation
from ⌊(⌋6⌊)⌋
(8) (x)[ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(x)] ⊃ [(x)ϕ(x) ⊃ (x)ψ(x)] by rule of substitution for
individual variables
Predicates which belong to no object are called vacuous (e.g. president
of U.S.A. born in South Bend). SaP and SeP are both true if S is vacuous
whatever P may be. J4.K All tautologies are true also for vacuous predicates
but some of the Aristotelian inferences are not⌊,⌋ e.g.
SaP ⊃ SiP (false if S is vacuous)
SaP ⊃ ∼ (SeP ) (false ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ),
the mood Darapti MaP .MaS ⊃ SiP is false if M is vacuous and if S, P are
any two predicates such that ∼ (SiP ).
The totality of all objects to which a monadic predicate P belongs is
called the extension of P and denoted by xˆ[P (x)], so that the characteristic
J5.K property of the symbol xˆ is:
xˆϕ(x) = xˆψ(x) ≡ (x)[ϕ(x) ≡ ψ(x)]
Extensions of monadic predicates are called classes (denoted by α, β, γ . . .)
⌊.⌋ That y belongs to the class α is expressed by yεα so that yεxˆϕ(x) ≡
ϕ(y)⌊.⌋ xˆ is also applied to arbitrary propositional functions Φ(x)⌊,⌋ i⌊.⌋e.
xˆΦ(x) means the class of objects satisfying Φ(x)⌊,⌋ e.g⌊.⌋ xˆ[I(x) . x > 7] =
class of integers greater ⌊than⌋ seven⌊.⌋
Also for dyadic pred⌊icates⌋ \ Q(xy) / extensions \ denoted by xˆyˆ[Q(xy)]
/ are introduced⌊,⌋ which satisfy the equivalence
xˆyˆ[ψ(xy)] = xˆyˆ[χ(xy)] ≡ (x⌊, ⌋y)[ψ(xy) ≡ χ(xy)]
J6.K It is usual to call these extensions (not the dyadic predicates them-
selves) relations. If Φ(xy) is a propositional function with two variables
278 SOURCE TEXT
xˆyˆΦ(xy) denotes the relation which is defined by Φ(xy)⌊.⌋ If R is a relation
xRy means that x bears the relation R to y so that
u{xˆyˆ[ϕ(xy)]}v ≡ ϕ(uv)
The extension of a vacuous predicate is called 0⌊zero⌋ class and denoted
by 0\ (or Λ) / ⌊;⌋ the extension of a pred.⌊icate⌋ belonging to every object
is called universal class and denoted by 1 (or V)⌊.⌋
J7.K For classes operation of +, · , − which obey laws similar to the
arithmetic laws are introduced by the following definitions:
α+ β = xˆ[x ε α ∨ x ε β] (sum)
α · β = xˆ[x ε α . x ε β] (intersection)
−α = xˆ[∼ x ε α] (complement)
α− β = α · (−β) (difference)
